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1 
The ‘Rise’ of East Asia – The East Asian Miracle 
 
In the 1990s East Asia experienced a ‘rise and fall’ in the international financial 
community: the rise was the so-called ‘East-Asian Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993) while the 
fall of the region came in 1997/1998 due to the experience the East Asian Crisis. 
From a closer study of these two periods one can see that the ‘miracle’ was in fact not a 
miracle, as economic growth was long-term  - characterized by the decision of sticking to 
specific economic policies only if they seemed to be beneficial to their economies.  The 
crisis on the other side was a sudden shock in the financial market – a sudden reversal of 
short-term capital flows.  A sharp reversal of this kind of capital flows put all currencies in 
the region under pressure.  In July 1997 Thailand let the currency float and within a few 
months the crisis spread to other countries within this region.  Nobody expected this a few 
months prior to the onset of this crisis, as traditional signs of vulnerability failed.  An 
example of perception of the IMF just a few weeks before the crisis broke out can be 
found on Indonesia (IMF 1997) 
 
Nevertheless the crisis economies recovered very soon (following a V-shaped recovery) 
with one exception, i.e. Indonesia where the recovery took much longer. 
 
 
This chapter will give a short overview of the ‘East-Asian Miracle’ and study in more detail 
the growth since political independence of the presently studied economies, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
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1.1 Growth and Development in East Asia: Overview of the East Asian Miracle 
 
‘The emergence of Asia […] on the world economic scene has been a remarkable story […] Asia is in the midst of 
an economic and social transformation unrivalled in history.  In virtually every dimension, life in Asia is changing at 
a pace never seen before in any part of the world during a comparable period of time‘(ADB, 1997, xi, 1). 
 
This quote summarizes what happened over the period since the 1960’s in the following 
countries: Hong Kong, (South) Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan which were followed only a 
few years later by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and to some extent by the Philippines; all 
economies are grouped together as high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs). 
Growth and Development in the East Asian region was the highest in the world for the 
period of 1965 to the mid of the 1990s.  Looking at Tables 1.1 to 1.4 below it can be seen 
that countries in East Asia experienced high economic growth and transformation during 
this period. 
As Table 1.1 shows real GDP growth rates were in all periods higher (with the exception of 
the Philippines) than comparable economies, i.e. middle-income countries, South-Asian 
economies and Latin America.  The picture is even clearer by looking at GDP per capita 
relative to USA where the impressive growth of the East Asian economies can be seen with 
at least doubling numbers, again with the exception of the Philippines.  A very impressive 
example of this Singapore where GDP per capita relative to GDP increased by almost 470 
% from the years 1965 to 1995. 
Furthermore Table 1.2 shows the structural change in the economies.  From, a table it can 
be seen that the share of agriculture and industry decreased while the weight of the 
services sector increased significantly; this pattern emphasizes the economic development 
over the period and the shift towards more developed economies. 
Table 1.3, which illustrates the share of manufacturing value added in percentage GDP. 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan increased from 1965 to 1980 their share of 
manufacturing value added in percentage GDP, this value decreased from 1980 to 1995.  
Which emphasize the pattern and results derived from Table 1.2 that the service sector 
increased its importance in these countries in the 1990s e.g. in Hong Kong and Singapore 
their change to a financial centre played an important role.  The other East Asian 
economies were still experiencing a high contribution of manufacturing to GDP in the 
1990s.  Furthermore this indicator shows the reliance on manufacturing in the East-Asian 
economies as a growth engine. 
Finally,  Table 1.4 shows the advances of social development here can be seen that the 
HPAEs experienced an improvement in some main indicators and compared again to the 
three reference groups, middle-income countries, South-Asia and Latin America, they were 
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outperforming them (with the exception of Thailand).  This is remarkable and shows that 
the gains from economic growth have been distributed among population. 
 
Most East and Southeast Asian countries gained their independence after World War II: 
Indonesia in 1949, Malaysia in 1957, Singapore in 1963, and Korea in 1948.  The political 
systems implemented in the first period after independence included all different kinds, 
from authoritarian regimes to Western liberal democracies, where the latter did not last 
very long.  In South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia in the 1950s the military became the 
most important force.  Indonesia experienced a one-party military regime until 1998.  
Authoritarian regimes could be found elsewhere until the late 1980s/early 1990s in 
Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan, while Malaysia and Singapore, both technically had a 
West minster style democracy, ruled by one dominant party. 
From Table 1.4 there can be seen, as previously mentioned, that not only the economy 
grew at positive rates (almost) every year in the countries but these countries also 
experienced an improvement in social development.  Again the development was higher 
compared to South Asia and Latin America.  During 1966 to 1996, for almost 30 years, the 
region experienced an annual positive GDP growth rates.  In this period the Per capita 
GDP  was as follows: 4.7 % in Indonesia, 7.4 % in Korea, 4.4 % in Malaysia, and 5.2 % in 
Thailand - all per annum growth averages.  Meanwhile poverty drastically decreased, real 
GDP growth was positive every year during this period for Indonesia and Thailand, with 
one falling rate for Korea (1980) and Malaysia (1985).  Poverty rates decreased drastically 
in the region from 60 % in 1975 to 20 % in 1995 and in Indonesia even more drastically 
from 64 % in 1975 to 7 % in 1997 (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998).  Export products consisted 
at the beginning of low-technology manufactured products and upgraded in the 1990’s to 
high-technology products (some of the countries, like Malaysia, promote special areas for 
attracting the high-technology industry, the so-called ‘high-technology parks’). 
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TABLE 1.1 – Convergence and Growth Rates of Real GDP 
Country Real GDP Growth Rates (%) GDP Per Capita Relative to USA 
 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1995 1965 1995 
Hong Kong 9.3 7.2 5.6 0.30 0.98 
Indonesia 7.7 5.5 7.6 0.05 0.13 
Korea 9.0 8.8 7.2 0.09 0.49 
Malaysia 7.8 5.2 8.7 0.14 0.37 
Philippines 6.0 1.0 2.3 0.11 0.09 
Singapore 7.9 6.3 8.7 0.15 0.85 
Taiwan 9.3 8.5 6.5 0.14 0.56 
Thailand 7.9 7.9 8.4 0.10 0.26 
Middle-income 
countries 
6.2 2.9 0.1 NA NA 
South Asia 3.7 5.1 4.6 0.08 0.09 
Latin America 6.1 1.6 3.2 NA NA 
Sources: Growth Rates: World Development Report (various issues), Key indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 
(various issues). Convergence: ADB, 1997, Table 2.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.2 – Structural Change (percentage Share of Sectors in GDP) 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Country 
1970 1980 1997 1970 1980 1997 1970 1980 1997 
Hong Kong NA 0.9 0.2 NA 32.0 15.5 NA 67.2 84.4 
Indonesia 35.0 24.4 14.3 28.0 41.3 43.2 37.0 43.3 42.0 
Korea 29.8 14.2 6.1 23.8 37.8 43.7 46.4 48.1 50.2 
Malaysia NA 22.9 11.7 NA 35.8 47.6 NA 41.3 40.8 
Philippines 28.2 23.5 20.5 33.7 40.5 35.9 38.1 36.0 43.6 
Singapore 2.2 1.1 0.1 36.4 38.8 34.3 61.4 60.0 65.5 
Taiwan NA 7.9 2.9 NA 46.0 35.3 NA 46.1 61.8 
Thailand 30.2 20.2 10.8 25.7 30.1 42.2 44.1 49.7 47.0 
Middle-income 
countries 
NA NA 11.0 NA NA 35.0 NA NA 52.0 
South Asia 38.4 36.2 24.8 23.5 23.4 27.5 44.1 40.5 47.8 
Latin America NA 10.0 10.0 NA 37.0 33.0 NA 38.0 55.0 
Sources: World Development Report (various issues), Key indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries (various 
issues). 
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TABLE 1.3 – Share of Manufacturing Value Added in GDP (percentage) 
Country 1965 1980 1995 
Hong Kong 24 24 9 
Indonesia 8 13 24 
Korea 18 29 27 
Malaysia 9 21 33 
Philippines 20 26 29 
Singapore 15 29 27 
Taiwan 17 36 32 
Thailand 14 22 29 
Middle-income countries 20 NA 18 
South Asia 15 15 17 
Latin America 23 25 21 
Sources: World Development Report (various issues), Key indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries (various 
issues). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.4 – Social Development Indicators 
Country 
Infant Moratlitya Adult illiteracyb 
Life expectancy 
in % 
Inequality 
(Gini 
coefficient) 
Povertyc 
Human 
development - 
1994 
 1965 1995 1960 1995 1960 1995  1995 Index Rank 
Hong Kong 38 5 29 8 63 79 0.41 (1991) NA 0.668 22 
Indonesia 132 51 53 16 40 64 0.34 (1994) 14.5 0.914 99 
Korea 65 10 29 4 63 72 0.40 (1988) NA 0.890 32 
Malaysia 69 12 77 17 52 71 0.48 (19899 17.0 0.832 60 
Philippines 85 39 28 5 49 66 0.43 (1994) 27.5 0.672 98 
Singapore 
35 4 
25 
(1974) 
9 63 76 0.49 (1989) NA 0.900 26 
Taiwan 31 4 36 10 64 72 0.31 (1990) NA NA NA 
Thailand 92 35 32 6 49 69 0.46 (1992) 0.1 0.833 59 
Middle-
income 
countries 
97 39 61 18 49 68 NA NA 0.576d  
South Asia 153 75 72 51 44 61 NA NA 0.911e  
Latin 
America 
165 92 34 13 51 69 NA NA 0.764f  
Sources: World Development Report (various issues), Key indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries (various 
issues). 
Notes: a per 1000 live births; b at birth; c % of people living on less than US$1 a day (PPP); d all developing countries; e 
industrial countries; f world 
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1.2 The ‘East-Asian Miracle’  
There are different views about the reasons for the long economic growth in East Asia, 
which was unprecedented in history. This section will show some of the reasons scholars 
attribute to the excellent performance before the crisis. We will start with some 
neoclassical views (e.g. World Bank and ADB) moving than to different other views of 
scholars. 
 
1.2.1 The View of the World Bank, ADB and Hali Hill 
1.2.1.1 The World Bank Study 
In 1993, the World Bank published ‘The East-Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public 
Policy’. The study argues that the experience of East Asia is an example to follow for other 
developing countries in order to reach economic growth and development. 
According to Yusuf (2001, pp. 5-7) the main elements of the miracle in the beginnings of 
the 1990s identified by the World Bank (1993) or Ohno (1998) could be reduced to four 
main strands:  
1) The adherence to the fundamentals of macroeconomic management, which called 
for  
a. a stable business environment with relatively low inflation that encouraged 
investment in long-gestation, fixed assets; 
b. prudent and sustainable fiscal policies to actively complement other 
measures aimed at equitably sharing the rewards from higher growth; 
c. exchange rate policies to underpin export competitiveness; 
d. financial development and the progressive liberalization of the sector so as 
to maximize domestic savings and promote efficient allocation and 
integration with the global financial system; 
e. efforts to minimize price distortions; 
f. actions to support the spread of primary and secondary schooling as well as 
the creation of a hierarchy of skills to buttress an outward-looking 
development push. 
2) Need for a bureaucracy that is able to conceive and implement the designs of a 
‘strong-state’ (meaning an authoritarian, centralized developmental state) and to 
make a credible commitment to long-run development. Therefore, administration 
needed to be well paid, insulated to a significant degree from politics and 
empowered. Insulation means here not that government is distant from businesses 
but that the bureaucrats do not look at short-run goals; instead, they are focused 
more on the long-run goals. Although meetings of businesspersons and 
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bureaucrats were common, it did not mean that competition was undermined. 
Domestic competition remained an important goal for the Asian economies. 
3) Activist policies of the government in order to pace industrialization and to boost 
the export share of the industrial output. The outward-orientation paired with 
exchange rate policy was important in order to reach viable external balances and 
generating the demand needed to accelerate GDP growth, force producers to 
absorb technology and strive after competitiveness. Some of the policies used by 
the East-Asian economies like the selective use of tariff protection and export 
incentives (ranging from moral suasion to subsidies and mild repression) were 
applied sparingly and the World Bank report recommends its use by other 
countries very cautiously. 
4) The policy approach during the phase of growth was pragmatic, and the measures 
were applied flexibly and abandoned if their purpose was not fulfilled. 
 
Figure 1.1 summarizes the policies that according to the World Bank study were 
responsible for the long-term economic growth in East Asia. From this figure an intelligible 
style on how the policy choices identified by the World Bank study led to the growth 
experience of the East Asian economies, can be seen. The system identified by the World 
Bank is characterized by interactions and feedbacks within the system. 
FIGURE 1.1 – A Functional Approach to Growth 
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repression 
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investment 
Productivity 
change 
 
- Productivity-
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up 
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technological 
change 
Rapid and 
sustained 
growth 
 
- Rapid growth of 
exports 
- Rapid 
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transition 
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agricultural 
transformation 
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Industrialization 
 
Equal income 
distribution 
 
- Reduced 
poverty 
- Improving social 
indicators 
Policy Choices Competitive 
discipline 
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Source:  World Bank 1993, p. 88 
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The expressions used by the World Bank in this study had a positive meaning in 1993 like 
‘financial repression’ or ‘selective promotion’. During and after the crisis these same 
expressions were afflicted with a negative meaning. 
Table 1.5 shows how the perception by the same experts changed. One example is the 
interpretation of the relations in business-government coordination before and after the 
crisis: before the crisis it was considered as positive and ‘improved performance through 
superior handling of information’ while after the crisis this changed into negative and 
means nowadays ‘collusion and political cronyism’ also known as ‘crony capitalism’.  
 
TABLE 1.5 – Contrasting Interpretation of Southeast-Asian’s Success Issues 
Positive (Before) Negative (After) 
Business-government coordination: improved 
performance through superior handling of information. 
Business-government relations: collusion and political 
cronyism (“crony capitalism”) 
Open to international markets. 
Economies closed in important ways that must be 
addressed. 
Macroeconomic stability, including low inflation and fiscal 
prudence. 
Poor macroeconomic policy; institutional changes 
needed. 
Government-promoted competition, especially in 
exports. 
Lack of competition and presence of large 
conglomerates. 
Strong financial markets: large quantities of savings 
mobilized and allocated efficiently to investment. 
Weak financial markets. 
Source: Furman and Stiglitz (1998) 
 
1.2.1.2 The View of ADB 
A similar approach to economic growth in East Asia is provided by the study of the ADB 
conducted in 1997 (ADB, 1997, chapters 1 and 2). This study notes that ‘The lesson of 
history and international comparisons are that countries growth rates depend […] primarily 
on […] the performance of their institutions and policies’ (ADB, 1997, p. 8). Their study 
includes as well an econometric analysis of cross-country growth where East Asia is the 
critical comparator. The second chapter of the study shows how different growth theories 
can explain the growth in East Asia. This is summarized in the following Table 1.6. Here it 
can be seen how different growth theories try to explain the experience of East Asia and 
the period of high growth. Furthermore, ADB tries to gain some insights into the future, 
which could be declared from pessimistic (i.e. neoclassical growth theory) to optimistic 
(endogenous growth theory). 
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TABLE 1.6 – Growth Theories and East Asia 
Type of growth theory Key sources of growth and implications for future evolution 
of East Asia 
Classical theory (e.g. Adam Smith) Outward orientation maintained through trade policy, 
relatively strong protection of property rights and effective 
enforcement of contracts. East Asia’s geography, with its 
fine natural ports and easy access to major markets, is a 
bonus. Growth in East Asia can be sustained as long as 
these preconditions are sustained. 
Neo-classical growth theory (e.g. Robert Solow) Rapid capital accumulation reflected in high saving and high 
investment. While the gap between East Asia and poor 
nations will diminish (the “catch-up” factor), the rate of East 
Asian economic growth will slow because of diminishing 
returns to new investment as the ratio of capital to labour 
rises. 
Endogenous growth theory, also known as “new” 
growth theory (e.g. Paul Romer) 
New ideas and new products represent the engine of long-
term growth. The superior institutions and human capital of 
East Asia have led to productivity-driven growth. Given that 
investments in knowledge are subject to constant, or even 
increasing, returns to scale the prediction is that East Asia 
may eventually overtake richer countries. 
Source: Adapted from ADB, 1997, pp. 63-65 
 
Furthermore the ADB-study uses an econometric model in order to show economic growth 
in the different countries, using the following variables: trade policy, government saving, 
quality of government institutions, structural factors entailing demographic, geographic, 
and natural resource endowments, and initial conditions pertaining to initial level of per 
capita income (as measured in 1965) and initial human capital endowments (as measured 
by schooling in 1965). The study concludes after analysing the period of 1960-1995 that: 
 
‘The evidence best supports a synthesis of the classical and neoclassical approaches, augmented by demographic 
considerations. East Asia has benefited from rapid capital accumulation […] and (outward-orientation) […] 
supported by good policies and institutions and a rapid demographic transition […] The predictions of endogenous 
growth theory do not apply.’ (ADB, 1997, p. 67) 
 
The results found by this study are not entirely consistent with the World Bank Study 
(1993). The World Bank study bases growth in East Asia on all three growth theories (i.e. 
classical, neo-classical and endogenous growth theory) while the ADB study neglects any 
empirical relevance of the endogenous growth theory in this context (Islam and 
Chowdhury, 2000, p. 26). 
 
1.2.1.3 The View of Hali Hill 
A different explanation of the high growth in East Asia can be found in the analysis done 
by Hill (1997). Hill considers macroeconomic orthodoxy, openness and equity as the core 
factors for growth in Southeast Asia (including Singapore) (Hill, 1997, p. 103-104). He 
argues that important growth factors were a political leadership, which was committed on 
economic growth and supported by good technocrats, which were to some extent 
insulated from political pressure groups (Hill, 1997, p. 108). On the other side, he does not 
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believe that the activist industrial policy was important for growth in Southeast Asia (Hill, 
1997, p. 138-139). This view of economic growth in Southeast Asia is close to the 
neoclassical view of the World Bank and the ADB study. 
 
1.2.2 Different Views: Jomo, Krugman and Other Scholars 
1.2.2.1 The View of Jomo 
Jomo (2003, p. 3) highlights that the World Bank (1993) identifies at least six types of 
state interventions which were important in East Asia. The first four, functional 
interventions (which should compensate for market failures and are therefore necessary 
and less distortive of markets), were approved by the World Bank while it was more 
sceptical of the last two, strategic interventions (considered to be more market-distortive). 
The two strategic interventions are in the area of finance: 
- directed (i.e. subsidised) credit, and 
- international trade. 
The four functional interventions are: 
- ensuring macroeconomic discipline and macroeconomic balances, 
- providing physical and social infrastructure, 
- providing good governance more generally, and 
- raising savings and investment rates. 
Not all of these factors highlighted by the World Bank actually happened, as for example 
one finding claimed that inflation was below 10 % (i.e. single digit) in the high-performing 
Asian economies (HPAEs) over the period but as Jomo (2003, p. 3) claims was generally 
kept below 20 %. 
The growth patterns in East Asia and similarly in Southeast Asia were much more 
complicated than the single model claimed by the World Bank. For example it can be 
shown that there was a period of deregulation in the mid-1980s (as the World Bank Study 
suggested) but there were as well some new private sector-oriented regulations which 
were introduced in order to cope with new industrial policy priorities of the governments 
of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (Jomo, 2003, p.8).  
Other examples are the role of FDI. Singapore and Malaysia are in some sense exceptions 
as there were not exclusively economic reasons behind encouragement for FDI but 
additionally some political motivations.  One such example of this is the ethnic diversity 
and limiting Chinese ownership could be achieved by foreign investment in Malaysia or FDI 
as an important factor for getting access to the technology frontier as it was the case for 
Singapore). There are some other differences in the region such as the different 
orientations, emphases and instruments in industrial policy i.e., the role of trade policy has 
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been very important in almost all economies in the region except Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  However, financial policy has been important in all the countries including 
Singapore but with exception of Hong Kong (Jomo, 2003, pp. 3-4). Furthermore Jomo 
(2003, p. 12-13) argues that the export-led growth strategy was not the main driver 
behind growth in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, but could be an important factor for 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. The same is true for FDI. 
 
1.2.2.2 The View of Paul Krugman 
Another explanation to the so-called ‘miracle’ can be found in the article ‘The Myth of 
Asia’s Miracle’ in Foreign Affairs (Nov.1994) written by Paul Krugman. He argues that the 
East Asian growth is not sustainable because it is based primarily on factor accumulation. 
He is sceptical about defining the East Asian experience as a miracle and argues that by 
having high savings and investment rates and people transferring from low-productivity 
agricultural work to manufacturing and service work, growth is inevitable and will end 
when the transfer is completed. As economic transformation can be explained by the 
growth of capacity not all other explanations of success such as efficient resource 
allocation and good strategies are relevant. 
 
1.2.2.3 The View of Other Scholars 
A different view of the causes of the miracle is shown by Raffer and Singer (2001, pp. 
142-148). The authors identify six different factors by focusing on Taiwan and South 
Korea: 
- Generous Aid Flows: Taiwan and South Korea were large recipient countries of the 
USA due to the threat of communists. Aid flows to Asia were large compared to 
other regions during the early period after WWII. 
- Land Reform: The two countries experienced land reforms in the second half of the 
20th century. 
- Production Structures Inherited from Colonial Times: The two former Japanese 
colonies inherited good infrastructure and Japan paid compensation for the colonial 
past. 
- Economic policy: Export promotion played an important role in the ascendance of 
the tiger countries. 
- Transnational Firms: Both Taiwan and Korea were not very open to FDI and 
especially Korea encouraged the creation of Korean transnational corporations. 
- Role of the State: The countries experienced interventionist governments, which 
intervened in the economy efficiently and effectively. 
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The view of Hill (1997) on economic growth in East Asia is close to the neoclassical view of 
the World Bank and the ADB study but contrasting to the view of Jomo described above 
(Jomo, 1997) and other scholars such as Mackie (1988), MacIntyre (1994) and Chowdhury 
and Islam (1996) (Islam and Chowdhury, 2000, p. 29). These scholars argue that in the 
economies of East Asia, there was a lack of bureaucratic competence and technocratic 
insulation of the core East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies, but there were additional 
factors. These factors include the perception of higher corruption in East Asia, higher 
ethnic diversity (which could create some problems in the build up of a reputable civil 
service) and more natural resources compared to the other ‘miracle’ economies (Islam and 
Chowdhury, 2000, pp. 29-30). 
 
Table 1.7 shows some basic economic and monetary data from 1975 to the outbreak of 
the crisis for Japan, the ‘Four Tigers’ – Hong Kong SAR, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, China – and Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
 
TABLE 1.7 – Basic Economic and Monetary Data  
 1975-82 1983-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Hong Kong SAR 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
 
 
9.3 
8.6 
29.7 
27.8 
 
1.5 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
 
 
1.9 
… 
 
 
 
7.2 
6.7 
33.6 
23.6 
 
1.6 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
 
 
8.3 
… 
 
 
 
3.4 
9.7 
35.8 
26.4 
 
0.7 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
 
 
8.9 
… 
 
 
 
5.1 
11.6 
33.8 
26.6 
 
3.2 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
 
73.5 
80.1 
 
… 
 
 
7.1 
… 
 
 
 
6.3 
9.3 
33.8 
27.4 
 
2.5 
… 
 
 
8.5 
9.6 
10.2 
 
6.9 
4.3 
 
 
4.1 
-2.8 
 
 
71.6 
78.3 
 
… 
 
 
5.7 
… 
 
 
 
6.1 
8.5 
34.6 
27.3 
 
2.3 
… 
 
 
14.5 
21.0 
20.1 
 
15.4 
5.6 
 
 
4.6 
-6.5 
 
 
69.2 
75.2 
 
… 
 
 
7.4 
… 
 
 
 
5.4 
8.1 
33.1 
29.8 
 
1.3 
… 
 
 
11.7 
25.0 
19.9 
 
19.4 
-4.1 
 
 
3.2 
-3.6 
 
 
70.6 
74.5 
 
… 
 
 
1.6 
… 
 
 
 
3.9 
8.7 
30.4 
30.5 
 
-0.3 
… 
 
 
10.6 
8.6 
11.0 
 
7.5 
6.0 
 
 
2.8 
-2.8 
 
 
70.4 
74.4 
 
… 
 
 
-3.9 
… 
 
 
 
4.9 
6.0 
30.6 
31.3 
 
2.2 
… 
 
 
12.5 
18.0 
15.8 
 
15.3 
2.0 
 
 
3.5 
-4.9 
 
 
66.4 
69.7 
 
… 
 
 
-1.3 
… 
Indonesia 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
 
 
 
6.2 
15.0 
19.3 
19.8 
 
… 
… 
 
 
29.3 
28.6 
29.7 
 
26.3 
 
 
 
5.5 
8.1 
23.2 
24.3 
 
-1.3 
… 
 
 
27.0 
33.2 
32.3 
 
26.1 
 
 
 
9.0 
7.8 
27.9 
28.3 
 
1.3 
… 
 
 
44.6 
58.3 
65.6 
 
60.4 
 
 
 
8.9 
9.4 
28.7 
27.0 
 
- 
… 
 
 
17.5 
18.9 
16.7 
 
21.4 
 
 
 
7.2 
7.5 
27.3 
25.8 
 
-1.2 
… 
 
 
19.8 
14.1 
11.4 
 
16.1 
 
 
 
7.3 
9.7 
31.4 
26.3 
 
-0.7 
… 
 
 
20.2 
21.0 
25.5 
 
23.0 
 
 
 
7.5 
8.5 
29.2 
27.6 
 
- 
… 
 
 
20.0 
22.9 
23.0 
 
25.2 
 
 
 
8.2 
9.4 
29.0 
28.4 
 
0.8 
… 
 
 
27.2 
21.7 
22.6 
 
24.4 
 
 
 
8.0 
7.9 
28.8 
28.1 
 
1.4 
… 
 
 
27.2 
22.7 
21.4 
 
24.5 
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Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
14.1 
 
 
3.5 
-11.1 
 
 
8.4 
19.9 
 
2.2 
 
 
-1.2 
3.5 
 
8.6 
 
 
1.8 
-7.7 
 
 
3.0 
20.9 
 
3.1 
 
 
-3.5 
6.8 
-3.3 
 
 
6.1 
-12.5 
 
 
11.0 
10.2 
 
4.1 
 
 
-2.8 
8.3 
7.8 
 
 
3.9 
-11.8 
 
 
8.6 
7.9 
 
5.7 
 
 
-3.4 
8.4 
12.3 
 
 
2.3 
-8.7 
 
 
10.3 
8.3 
 
6.6 
 
 
-2.2 
8.7 
-0.9 
 
 
1.4 
-1.9 
 
 
10.9 
6.0 
 
7.5 
 
 
-1.5 
8.4 
-2.9 
 
 
1.3 
-2.3 
 
 
10.9 
5.7 
 
6.2 
 
 
-1.7 
8.6 
3.4 
 
 
2.0 
-0.6 
 
 
9.6 
6.1 
 
5.0 
 
 
-3.3 
8.5 
9.5 
 
 
4.7 
-6.7 
 
 
8.5 
6.0 
 
5.5 
 
 
-3.3 
9.0 
Japan 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
 
 
3.9 
6.6 
31.9 
30.9 
 
-4.0 
… 
 
 
10.7 
11.2 
9.6 
 
13.3 
-0.3 
 
 
0.3 
-2.3 
 
 
5.7 
3.3 
 
2.5 
 
 
0.4 
… 
 
 
 
4.1 
1.4 
31.9 
28.4 
 
-0.4 
… 
 
 
9.2 
9.4 
10.3 
 
11.5 
-1.0 
 
 
0.5 
-1.3 
 
 
13.0 
8.3 
 
3.4 
 
 
3.0 
… 
 
 
 
 
5.1 
3.1 
33.5 
31.7 
 
2.9 
… 
 
 
8.2 
9.2 
9.2 
 
11.2 
-1.0 
 
 
-0.2 
-2.0 
 
 
19.4 
13.9 
 
3.2 
 
 
1.5 
… 
 
 
 
3.8 
3.3 
34.2 
31.4 
 
2.9 
… 
 
 
2.5 
2.9 
5.3 
 
3.5 
2.6 
 
 
-0.2 
-3.6 
 
 
15.3 
12.2 
 
2.9 
 
 
2.0 
… 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
1.7 
33.8 
30.5 
 
1.5 
… 
 
 
-0.1 
2.9 
2.3 
 
3.6 
2.0 
 
 
- 
-5.8 
 
 
12.4 
10.9 
 
2.9 
 
 
3.0 
… 
 
 
 
0.3 
1.2 
32.8 
29.5 
 
-1.6 
… 
 
 
2.2 
0.8 
-1.1 
 
1.0 
1.3 
 
 
0.7 
- 
 
 
11.0 
10.1 
 
3.8 
 
 
3.1 
… 
 
 
 
0.6 
0.7 
31.4 
28.6 
 
-2.3 
… 
 
 
3.1 
-0.4 
0.2 
 
-0.5 
6.9 
 
 
0.6 
-3.3 
 
 
9.7 
13.4 
 
4.3 
 
 
2.8 
… 
 
 
 
1.5 
-0.1 
30.7 
28.5 
 
-3.7 
… 
 
 
2.8 
1.8 
1.7 
 
2.1 
2.1 
 
 
1.1 
-1.5 
 
 
10.0 
14.5 
 
5.2 
 
 
2.2 
… 
 
 
 
3.9 
0.1 
31.3 
29.7 
 
-4.1 
… 
 
 
2.3 
1.4 
1.2 
 
1.7 
-0.7 
 
 
0.6 
1.4 
 
 
10.6 
13.8 
 
5.8 
 
 
1.4 
… 
Korea 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
 
 
7.0 
17.6 
25.7 
29.4 
 
-2.7 
… 
 
 
30.0 
32.1 
31.6 
 
40.6 
-0.8 
 
 
4.6 
-9.9 
 
 
18.4 
13.2 
 
1.8 
 
 
-4.6 
… 
 
 
 
9.6 
3.8 
32.7 
29.4 
 
-0.3 
… 
 
 
16.8 
16.0 
18.1 
 
23.7 
4.1 
 
 
3.5 
-11.0 
 
 
19.5 
9.2 
 
1.5 
 
 
2.5 
… 
 
 
 
9.5 
8.6 
36.1 
37.1 
 
-0.6 
… 
 
 
17.2 
24.8 
26.2 
 
34.6 
2.1 
 
 
-0.5 
-19.5 
 
 
6.5 
6.0 
 
2.3 
 
 
-0.9 
… 
 
 
 
9.1 
9.3 
35.9 
38.4 
 
-1.6 
… 
 
 
21.9 
22.4 
20.1 
 
33.3 
-2.9 
 
 
-1.1 
-8.5 
 
 
7.7 
6.0 
 
1.8 
 
 
-3.0 
… 
 
 
 
5.1 
6.2 
35.1 
36.6 
 
-2.6 
… 
 
 
14.9 
11.7 
11.5 
 
17.4 
4.7 
 
 
3.0 
-7.2 
 
 
7.6 
6.7 
 
2.2 
 
 
-1.5 
… 
 
 
 
5.8 
4.8 
35.2 
36.0 
 
-1.0 
… 
 
 
16.6 
12.7 
13.3 
 
18.5 
5.7 
 
 
2.5 
-7.6 
 
 
6.9 
7.5 
 
2.5 
 
 
0.1 
… 
 
 
 
8.6 
6.3 
34.6 
35.7 
 
1.0 
… 
 
 
18.7 
18.4 
19.5 
 
25.7 
2.6 
 
 
3.9 
-9.6 
 
 
8.0 
8.0 
 
2.6 
 
 
-1.2 
… 
 
 
 
8.9 
4.5 
35.1 
36.6 
 
- 
… 
 
 
15.6 
14.7 
15.6 
 
20.6 
1.4 
 
 
4.2 
-6.4 
 
 
10.1 
8.9 
 
2.5 
 
 
-2.0 
… 
 
 
 
7.1 
4.9 
33.3 
36.8 
 
- 
… 
 
 
15.8 
19.4 
19.8 
 
26.9 
-1.5 
 
 
0.7 
-9.5 
 
 
12.8 
10.1 
 
2.3 
 
 
-4.9 
… 
Malaysia 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
 
 
 
7.1 
5.3 
21.6 
29.4 
 
… 
… 
 
 
20.2 
25.6 
24.0 
 
 
 
 
5.4 
2.0 
29.4 
28.5 
 
-4.0 
… 
 
 
9.2 
11.2 
13.2 
 
 
 
 
9.6 
2.8 
29.1 
32.4 
 
-2.2 
… 
 
 
10.6 
18.0 
21.2 
 
 
 
 
8.6 
2.6 
28.4 
36.4 
 
0.1 
… 
 
 
16.9 
18.5 
20.6 
 
 
 
 
7.8 
4.7 
31.3 
36.0 
 
-3.5 
-3.5 
 
 
29.2 
16.6 
11.2 
 
 
 
 
8.3 
3.5 
33.0 
38.3 
 
-2.6 
-2.6 
 
 
26.6 
12.3 
11.6 
 
 
 
 
9.2 
3.7 
32.7 
40.1 
 
2.5 
2.5 
 
 
12.7 
14.8 
15.3 
 
 
 
 
9.5 
3.4 
33.5 
43.0 
 
3.8 
3.2 
 
 
20.0 
29.5 
30.5 
 
 
 
 
8.6 
3.5 
36.7 
42.2 
 
4.2 
1.6 
 
 
… 
… 
… 
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Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
18.7 
4.9 
 
 
5.5 
-3.4 
 
 
9.6 
6.9 
 
4.5 
 
 
-2.0 
3.8 
11.7 
3.9 
 
 
2.8 
-6.4 
 
 
8.8 
6.7 
 
3.9 
 
 
-0.7 
9.0 
19.8 
4.9 
 
 
7.7 
-14.1 
 
 
7.3 
6.0 
 
3.7 
 
 
-2.1 
6.9 
21.7 
-1.8 
 
 
4.0 
-3.1 
 
 
9.0 
4.2 
 
3.3 
 
 
-8.8 
5.9 
19.8 
10.7 
 
 
19.5 
-1.3 
 
 
13.0 
3.6 
 
4.7 
 
 
-3.8 
5.6 
 
13.3 
18.7 
 
 
22.1 
-5.3 
 
 
19.5 
6.5 
 
6.2 
 
 
-4.8 
6.1 
14.2 
4.3 
 
 
-3.2 
-5.7 
 
 
8.8 
5.4 
 
4.5 
 
 
-7.8 
5.2 
28.7 
-2.1 
 
 
-2.6 
-6.6 
 
 
6.5 
4.2 
 
3.3 
 
 
-10.0 
6.6 
… 
… 
 
 
4.1 
… 
 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
 
 
-4.9 
5.4 
Singapore 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
 
 
8.0 
4.2 
33.4 
38.2 
 
0.6 
… 
 
 
16.2 
31.6 
19.1 
 
16.9 
10.0 
 
 
14.1 
-10.7 
 
 
32.8 
25.8 
 
3.8 
 
 
-8.8 
… 
 
 
 
6.9 
1.0 
42.0 
38.1 
 
4.8 
… 
 
 
12.5 
9.9 
9.0 
 
9.0 
11.9 
 
 
11.3 
-8.4 
 
 
41.5 
36.0 
 
4.7 
 
 
1.8 
… 
 
 
 
9.0 
3.5 
44.1 
31.8 
 
11.4 
11.4 
 
 
20.0 
12.3 
14.4 
 
8.8 
13.3 
 
 
28.0 
-2.1 
 
 
39.0 
39.3 
 
5.1 
 
 
8.3 
… 
 
 
 
7.3 
3.4 
45.4 
33.3 
 
10.3 
10.3 
 
 
12.4 
13.9 
12.4 
 
9.3 
14.5 
 
 
18.7 
-11.3 
 
 
33.6 
35.3 
 
5.8 
 
 
11.2 
… 
 
 
 
6.2 
2.3 
47.3 
35.6 
 
11.3 
11.3 
 
 
8.9 
5.5 
9.8 
 
3.7 
15.4 
 
 
14.3 
-10.2 
 
 
35.3 
37.6 
 
6.1 
 
 
11.3 
… 
 
 
 
10.4 
2.3 
44.9 
35.0 
 
14.3 
14.3 
 
 
8.5 
12.0 
15.2 
 
7.9 
10.3 
 
 
18.2 
-9.7 
 
 
34.8 
34.0 
 
6.3 
 
 
7.4 
… 
 
 
 
10.5 
3.1 
49.8 
33.6 
 
13.7 
13.7 
 
 
14.4 
12.8 
15.3 
 
8.7 
6.9 
 
 
19.3 
-1.1 
 
 
35.6 
33.9 
 
6.3 
 
 
17.1 
… 
 
 
 
8.8 
1.7 
50.0 
33.3 
 
12.0 
12.0 
 
 
8.5 
17.4 
20.3 
 
11.6 
4.6 
 
 
17.1 
-7.7 
 
 
35.2 
29.4 
 
6.1 
 
 
16.9 
… 
 
 
 
7.0 
1.4 
50.1 
36.5 
 
8.4 
8.4 
 
 
9.8 
17.3 
15.8 
 
12.5 
4.0 
 
 
11.3 
-6.7 
 
 
36.4 
28.3 
 
6.5 
 
 
15.0 
… 
Taiwan Province of China 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
8.6 
30.2 
27.8 
 
- 
… 
 
 
22.3 
23.8 
21.1 
 
22.2 
5.8 
 
 
3.8 
-5.7 
 
 
12.0 
16.0 
 
… 
 
 
1.6 
… 
 
 
 
9.2 
1.2 
35.0 
20.4 
 
1.3 
… 
 
 
24.4 
16.5 
20.1 
 
11.1 
10.7 
 
 
14.1 
2.7 
 
 
8.3 
8.5 
 
… 
 
 
12.9 
… 
 
 
 
5.4 
4.1 
29.3 
22.4 
 
0.8 
… 
 
 
10.5 
17.0 
16.1 
 
11.2 
2.5 
 
 
-0.4 
-3.3 
 
 
4.8 
5.4 
 
… 
 
 
6.7 
… 
 
 
 
7.6 
3.6 
29.5 
22.2 
 
0.5 
… 
 
 
19.7 
26.3 
21.2 
 
18.4 
1.6 
 
 
4.2 
-0.3 
 
 
5.2 
4.8 
 
… 
 
 
6.7 
… 
 
 
 
6.8 
4.5 
27.8 
23.2 
 
0.3 
… 
 
 
19.6 
28.5 
28.7 
 
21.0 
-0.9 
 
 
- 
-0.4 
 
 
4.2 
3.6 
 
… 
 
 
3.8 
… 
 
 
 
6.3 
2.9 
27.7 
23.7 
 
0.6 
… 
 
 
15.5 
19.8 
19.0 
 
15.7 
1.3 
 
 
0.3 
-1.5 
 
 
3.9 
3.2 
 
… 
 
 
3.0 
… 
 
 
 
6.5 
4.1 
27.1 
22.9 
 
0.2 
… 
 
 
15.2 
16.5 
16.5 
 
13.6 
1.8 
 
 
2.2 
-0.1 
 
 
4.1 
3.4 
 
… 
 
 
2.6 
… 
 
 
 
6.0 
3.7 
28.0 
22.9 
 
0.4 
… 
 
 
9.6 
10.6 
9.5 
 
8.8 
0.7 
 
 
-0.5 
0.1 
 
 
4.1 
3.8 
 
… 
 
 
1.9 
… 
 
 
 
5.7 
3.1 
28.0 
21.0 
 
0.2 
… 
 
 
4.7 
10.1 
6.6 
 
8.4 
0.2 
 
 
-0.5 
-3.9 
 
 
3.3 
3.5 
 
… 
 
 
5.2 
… 
Thailand 
 
Real Sector 
Real GDP growth2 
Inflation 2,3 
Domestic saving 
Fixed capital formation 
Public sector 
General government balance 
Public sector balance 
Monetary sector 
Growth rates 
M2 
Domestic credit 
Credit to private sector 
 
 
 
7.0 
9.0 
19.6 
23.6 
 
-5.8 
… 
 
 
19.3 
22.6 
20.6 
 
 
 
8.1 
3.1 
25.4 
27.7 
 
-3.0 
… 
 
 
18.8 
16.0 
21.0 
 
 
 
11.6 
6.0 
32.6 
40.2 
 
4.4 
… 
 
 
26.7 
26.8 
34.7 
 
 
 
8.1 
5.7 
35.2 
41.6 
 
4.2 
4.0 
 
 
19.8 
15.5 
20.4 
 
 
 
8.2 
4.1 
34.3 
39.2 
 
2.6 
1.6 
 
 
15.6 
18.0 
20.5 
 
 
 
8.5 
3.4 
34.9 
39.4 
 
2.1 
0.9 
 
 
18.4 
22.7 
24.0 
 
 
 
8.9 
5.1 
34.9 
39.9 
 
2.0 
1.8 
 
 
12.9 
28.9 
30.3 
 
 
 
8.7 
5.8 
34.3 
41.8 
 
2.6 
2.5 
 
 
17.0 
23.1 
23.8 
 
 
 
6.4 
5.9 
33.1 
40.8 
 
1.6 
2.2 
 
 
12.6 
14.0 
14.6 
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Contribution to growth in M21 
Domestic credit 
Nonfinancial assets of banking 
system 
Memorandum 
Change in official reserves 
Other items (net) 
Foreign assets and liabilities of 
banking system 
Commercial bank foreign liabilities4 
Commercial bank foreign assets5 
Official reserves 
Official reserves/imports (in 
months) 
External sector 
Current account balance5 
External debt service 
 
 
25.0 
-0.1 
 
 
-0.2 
-5.6 
 
 
10.6 
6.3 
 
3.5 
 
 
-5.6 
3.8 
 
18.2 
3.4 
 
 
3.8 
-2.8 
 
 
6.4 
5.0 
 
2.9 
 
 
-3.2 
5.8 
 
26.8 
4.9 
 
 
8.1 
-5.1 
 
 
6.4 
3.3 
 
4.5 
 
 
-8.3 
3.8 
 
15.5 
7.0 
 
 
7.0 
-2.6 
 
 
6.0 
3.5 
 
5.0 
 
 
-7.7 
4.0 
 
17.4 
1.9 
 
 
4.0 
-3.7 
 
 
6.9 
3.2 
 
5.2 
 
 
-5.6 
4.3 
 
22.4 
0.2 
 
 
4.9 
-4.2 
 
 
11.7 
5.2 
 
5.5 
 
 
-5.0 
4.4 
 
 
29.5 
-12.2 
 
 
4.9 
-4.5 
 
 
20.3 
4.4 
 
5.5 
 
 
-5.6 
4.8 
 
27.0 
-5.2 
 
 
5.9 
-4.8 
 
 
24.3 
4.9 
 
5.3 
 
 
-8.0 
5.0 
 
17.2 
-2.5 
 
 
1.3 
-2.2 
 
 
23.3 
3.4 
 
5.4 
 
 
-7.9 
5.4 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and the World Economic Outlook database (various issues) 
 
1 Changes in percent of M2 at end of preceding period. 
2 Annual percent change. 
3  Consumer price index. 
4 In percent of total liabilities of commercial banks. 
5 In percent of total assets of commercial banks. 
 
 
Table 1.7 demonstrates that all economies experienced before the outbreak of the crisis 
positive real GDP growth rates (Singapore for some years even two-digit growth rates), 
stable inflation, a relative and stable high domestic saving rate, and double-digit capital 
formation. This emphasizes again the strong growth before the outbreak of the crisis. 
Additionally, it can be seen that the public sector was balanced and the monetary sector 
showed that the economies had increased their official reserves over time (with the 
exception of Malaysia, which intervened in 1994, and 1995 on financial markets due to 
some problems in the banking sector). More important are the figures of foreign assets 
and liabilities of the banking system, which shows two different patterns. Firstly, the share 
of foreign assets of commercial banks (in % of total assets of commercial banks) 
compared to the share of commercial bank foreign liabilities (in % of total liabilities of 
commercial banks) is higher in the case of Hong Kong and Japan  from 1994 to 1996.  In 
addition, secondly, the opposite (higher foreign liabilities compared to foreign assets) is 
true for the other economies. The latter pattern can be considered as being more 
dangerous as it highlights a vulnerability to withdrawals of foreign investments. The 
biggest divergence of figures for the second pattern can be found for Thailand. For 
instance, pre-crisis levels on foreign assets remained stable and below 5 %  , however,  
the share of foreign liabilities almost doubled from 1992 to 1993 and from 1993 to 1994 
reaching a level of almost 24 % in 1996 which was almost eight times higher than the 
share of foreign assets in that year. 
Lastly, there can be seen that current account balance and external debt service was at 
‘normal’ levels indicating no problems in official debt servicing or similar. 
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During late 1980s until mid 1990s the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990 
and 1994) influenced policy choices in East Asian countries as well. The ‘Washington 
Consensus’ describes the shared ideas of US Treasury and the Washington-based, Bretton 
Woods institutions of the IMF and World Bank on appropriate universal economic policies. 
They emphasized free markets, free trade, free capital mobility and a limited government. 
The fears of the institutions for macroeconomic management were external shocks as the 
oil price shock (in 1973, 1979), the commodity price shock (1986), two deep recessions in 
OECD countries (1975, 1982) and the debt crises in developing countries (1982-1983). 
The World Bank began to implement this neo-classical orthodoxy by their ‘structural 
adjustment lending’ programs which could be seen as a variation of the IMF ‘conditionality’ 
(lending respectively financial assistance is conditional on fulfilling certain policy 
measures).  
As proposed by the ‘Washington Consensus’ the countries opened not only their current 
accounts (i.e. they were relatively open compared to other developing countries) but also 
their capital account gradually starting in the late 1980s. From this time they experienced 
a sharp increase of capital flows where structure and time of capital flows changed over 
the period of late 1980s until 1997 from long-term to huge amounts of short-term capital 
flows (bank loans and portfolio flows). The issue of capital flows as well as the policies 
available for the resolution of the crisis will be discussed later as it is crucial in 
understanding the emergence and resolution of the crisis. 
 
The following sections of this chapter will give an overview of the two economies of 
interest, Indonesia and Malaysia, and their development from independence to the onset 
of the East Asian Crisis. It would go beyond the scope of this dissertation dealing in detail 
with all East Asian Crisis economies and their development. 
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TABLE 1.8 - Indonesia and Malaysia – Basic Information 
Geography INDONESIA MALAYSIA 
Geographical Co-ordinates 5 00 S, 115 00 E 5 00 N, 110 00 E 
Capital Jakarta Kuala Lumpur 
Adjacent countries Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Papua 
New Guinea, East Timor. Also shares 
maritime boundaries with India and 
Australia 
Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Philippines 
Area (km2) 1,919,440 (land: 1,826,440) 329,750 
Coastline 54,416 km 4,675 km 
Climate Tropical, hot, humid Tropical; south-west monsoon 
from April to October and north-
east monsoon from October to 
February 
Economic statistics   
Currency Indonesian Rupiah (Rp) Ringgit (RM) 
Exchange Rate (home currency vs. 
US$) 
9,056 (2007 estimation) 3.46 (2007) 
Gross Domestic Product (US$, billions) US$ 432.9 (2007 estimation) US$ 186.5 (2007 estimation) 
GDP per Capita (US$ in PPP) US$ 3,700 (2007 estimation) US$ 13,300 (2007 estimation) 
Real GDP growth (% change, year-
over-year) 
6.3% (2007 estimation) 6.3% (2007 estimation) 
Inflation rate (% change, year-over-
year)  
6.4% (2007 estimation) 2.1% (2007 estimation) 
Current account balance (US$, billions) US$ 11.01 (2007 estimation) US$ 26.05 (2007 estimation) 
Natural Resources Petroleum, tin, natural gas, nickel, 
timber, bauxite, copper, coal, gold, 
silver 
Tin, petroleum, timber, copper, 
iron ore, natural gas, bauxite 
Industries Petroleum and natural gas, textiles, 
mining, cement, chemical fertilizers, 
plywood, food, rubber, tourism 
Electronics and electrical goods, 
petroleum, liquefied natural gas, 
chemicals, palm oil, rubber, 
textiles, wood and wood products 
Major trading partners (exports) Japan, United States, Singapore, South 
Korea, China 
United States, Singapore, Japan, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand 
Major trading partners (imports) Japan, Singapore, United States, China, 
South Korea 
Japan, United States, Singapore, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, 
China 
Government and political 
statistics 
  
Nature of government Republic Constitutional monarchy, 
parliamentary democracy, 
federalist system (de facto 
executive-centred limited 
democracy and unitary system) 
Constitution August 1945, abrogated by Federal 
Constitution of 1949 and Provisional 
Constitution of 1950, restored 5 July 
1959 
Adopted 1957 
Head of state President Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO 
(since 20 October 2004) 
Paramount Ruler Sultan MIZAN 
Zainal Abidin (since 13 December 
2006) 
Executive branch President Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO 
(since 20 October 2004) 
Prime Minister ABDULLAH bin 
Ahmad Badawi (since 31 October 
2003) 
Social statistics   
Population size (millions) 237,512,355 (July 2008 estimation) 25,274,133 (July 2008 estimation) 
Life expectancy Men: 63.7; Woman: 67.5 Average: 71; Men: 68.22; Woman: 
73.63 
Ethnic composition Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, 
Madurese 7.5%, coastal Malays 7.5%, 
others 26% 
Malay 58%, Chinese 26%, Indian 
7%, Other 9% 
Religions Islam 87%, Protestant 6%, Catholic 3%, 
Hindu 2%, Buddhist and other 1% 
Islam 53%, Buddhism and other 
Chinese folk religions 30%, Hindu 
7%, Christianity 6% 
National languages spoken Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified 
form of Malay), English, Dutch, local 
dialects, the most widely spoken of 
which is Javanese 
Bhasa Melayu (official), Chinese 
(Mandarin and dialects), Tamil, 
English, East Malaysian languages 
and dialects 
Source: Jarvis (2003); Lim (2004); CIA – The World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html). 
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1. 3 A Deeper Look at Indonesia 
1.3.1 A Brief Overview 
The economic growth of Indonesia during the period of 1965 up until the East Asian Crisis 
in 1997/1998 was remarkably high, although the economy had trouble during this period 
(hyperinflation in 1965 and 1966, default of PERTAMINA in 1975, ‘Dutch disease’ during 
1973-1978, fall of oil-prices after 1982). 
Looking at real GDP per capita growth the country experienced an annual average growth 
rate of 4.3 %. During the 1970-1980 period the development in Indonesia was mainly 
driven by the evolvement of the oil-market and prices and earnings from exports of 
petroleum products and liquefied natural gas increased from 5 % in 1970 (US$0.4 billion) 
to 14 % in 1975 (US$5.3 billion) and 21 % in 1980 (US$ 12.9 billion). The earnings went 
mainly into investments as can be seen by the Gross Domestic Investment rate (13.2 % of 
GDP in 1970, 20.00 % in 1975, 24.3 % in 1980). Although the oil-sector was important 
until the early 1980s the nonoil-sector gained in importance during the 1980s as the share 
of nonoil and non-liquefied natural gas manufacturing sector increased from 8.5 % of GDP 
in 1980 to 15.9 % in 1989 (Woo Ed., 1994, pp. 2-3). 
One problem of Indonesia is the peculiarity of being an archipelago and being split up into 
islands and different regions of economic strength. While the west of the archipelago is 
very much involved with the economies of the region, for example, Singapore is 
geographically close and the importance of the Malacca Strait for western Indonesia 
should not be neglected. Therefore, western Indonesia comprising of Sumatra, Kalimantan 
and Java/Bali are well integrated in the regional context and people and goods move with 
high intensity between Java and Singapore and from Sumatra and Kalimantan to Java and 
Singapore. On the other side, the eastern part of the archipelago is in a far worse 
situation. The neighbouring countries and regions like Papua New Guinea, the Southern 
Philippines, Australia's northwestern and northern territories are shaken by political 
separation or have no economic weight. Therefore, there is no economic growth stimulus 
and no regional coherence. Therefore, the islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara 
and Irian Jaya represent half of the nation’s area of land and sea but only 8% of the 
economy. This is also reflected by the distribution of the income per capita, which 
substantially differs across the country with a relatively high income per capita in the west, 
which decreases as one moves east. These economic differences across the archipelago 
fuel ethnic problems and are putting more pressure on regional autonomy or separation 
efforts from Indonesia (Dick, 2002a, pp. 11-13).  
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Prior to a studying the political and economic eras of Indonesia some important features 
of the Indonesian economy will be given. 
 
- Economic Planning and the Annual State Budget 
Economic plans are published every five years (since 1969). These plans are 
essentially indicative as they give only detailed statements of aggregate and 
sectoral objectives. More important than economic plans are annual budget 
documents, especially the Nota Keuangan (Financial Note). Since 1968 all budgets 
were balanced budgets (balanced budgets were needed in the beginning of the 
Soeharto era in order to become rid of the hyperinflation) although off-balance 
items increased in the years before the crisis (Woo et al., 1994, p. 11). 
- Foreign Debt Situation 
The Indonesian government avoided borrowing in the domestic capital market 
(only a few Central Bank certificates were sold domestically). Outstanding 
disbursed external debt grew from 1976 to 1987 at an annual rate of 13 %. 
Indonesia did not experience a debt service crisis but external debt was a burden 
to the government (Woo et al., 1994, p. 11-15). 
- The Banking System, the Jakarta Stock Market and Credit/Loans 
After reaching independence all banks in Indonesia were nationalized and merged 
into one institution, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), in order to facilitate the 
financing of the deficits. Through the enactment of Banking Act No. 14 of 1967 and 
the Central Bank Act No. 13 of 1968 BNI was split into four parts: a Central Bank 
(Bank Indonesia), with no commercial banking functions; five state-owned 
commercial banks, where each bank was assigned to a sector for lending activities; 
a state-owned savings bank; and a state development bank. During the oil boom of 
1974-1980 Bank Indonesia and the state-owned banks supplied 86 % to 90 % of 
all bank credits as not only the state-owned banks gave credits to companies but 
additionally they granted ‘liquidity credits’ to the banking system in order to 
promote targeted activities and direct credits to certain enterprises(Woo et al., 
1994, p. 15).  In 1977, the government reduced the required reserve ratio from 30 
% to 15 % due to continuing inflows of foreign exchange. This in addition to credit 
ceilings resulted into foreign assets hold abroad by banks i.e. an increase in the 
foreign exchange reserves of the economy (Nasution, 1994, p. 134).  
Since 1983, the banking system has been greatly deregulated and credit ceilings 
and regulations on deposit rates have been abolished. Since the late 1980s, private 
banks were allowed to open and compete with the state-owned banks. Since the 
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financial intermediation, market grew rapidly after the deregulation the Indonesian 
government neglected to introduce regulatory and supervisory bodies in order to 
promote basic prudential banking standards. Therefore, most banks were 
undercapitalized or allowed to violate other prudential regulations without penalty. 
Some major business groups owned their own banks. Hence, they were mainly 
used to promote group business internal projects and had significant exposure to 
affiliated companies. In early 1990s, the number of non-performing loans grew and 
rapidly reached high levels (Radelet and Woo, 2000, p. 171). 
Although the Jakarta Stock Exchange was established in 1952, it was closed in 
1958 (due to political and economic instability) and only reopened in August 1977. 
In the 1980s only a small proportion of corporations were listed on the Stock 
Exchange this changed dramatically during the 1990s as deregulation of the 
financial sector became effective (Woo et al., 1994, pp. 17-18). 
Until early 1980s, bank lending was mainly driven by political interests of the 
government as can be seen by selective credit allocation practice during 1974-
1983. As already mentioned each state-owned bank was assigned a specific sector 
and a specific credit quota. In the early 1990s, Indonesian corporations started to 
borrow heavily from foreign creditors (short maturity and foreign currency 
denominated). This short-term debt was not or only to a small degree hedged 
against exchange rate risk, since hedging would have added about 6 percentage 
points to the cost of borrowing (according to the World Bank). Most of short-term 
debt was borrowed by companies as the amount that banks could borrow was 
limited by the introduction of borrowing policies in 1991. 
The reason for these huge short-term debts was manifold. Corporations were 
attracted by relatively lower interest rates and their implied assumption to roll over 
these credits in the future as the economy was expanding further. On the other 
hand foreign creditors were careless in lending as a part of the loans went to 
companies, which were closely associated with Soeharto, and therefore they 
believed that these companies could not fail (Radelet and Woo, 2000, pp. 171-
172). 
From Table 1.9, the structure of short-term outstanding debt can be seen and  
should be read in the following way: The first column ‘Total’ indicates total debt 
outstanding to foreign commercial banks; the second to the fourth column show 
how total debt outstanding was distributed among different sectors while the fifth 
column shows the fraction of short term debt on total outstanding debt. The last 
column shows foreign reserves excluding gold. 
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From Table 1.9 it can be seen that the fraction of the non-bank private sector to 
total debt outstanding reached it’s highest of almost 70 % in June 1998 while the 
share of banks to total debt outstanding was decreasing over the one-year period. 
Furthermore, more than half of total debt outstanding was short-term debt and 
that foreign reserves were decreasing by approximately 10 % over the same 
period. 
To summarize, Table 1.9 clearly demonstrates how heavily the economy was 
exposed to the so-called ‘hot money’ i.e. short-term debt (maturity of one year or 
less) and that most of the outstanding debt ran to the non-bank private sector. 
This is an important finding and crucial for the understanding of the crisis and 
corresponding remedies. Later we will see how the interaction of the non-bank 
private sector during the crisis will be explained by different theoretical models. 
 
TABLE 1.9 – Indonesia: Debt Outstanding to Foreign Commercial Banks (Billions of 
US$) 
  Debt by sector   
 Total Banks Public Non-bank 
private 
Short-term 
debt 
Foreign 
reserves 
(excl. gold) 
June 1997 58.7 12.4 6.5 39.7 34.7 20.3 
December 
1997 
58.4 11.7 6.9 39.7 35.4 16.6 
June 1998 50.3 7.1 7.6 35.5 27.7 17.9 
Adapted from Radelet and Woo (2000) p. 172. Sources: Debt data – BIS; Reserves data – IMF. 
  
The financial system - before beginning with capital account liberalisation in 
Indonesia - was characterized by effectively having control of capital inflows as it 
was using an administered credit ceiling programme in order to deal with its 
foreign exchange flows (especially from petroleum exports). These ceilings were 
therefore limiting the liquidity injections into the economy from the foreign 
exchange inflows and helped to keep the rupiah weak (vs. other currencies) by 
encouraging the outward investment of these same flows (as mentioned above, 
from 1977 onwards Indonesian banks were effectively encouraged to keep foreign 
exchange abroad and not inside the country). Although these policies were 
effectively controls on capital inflow, there did not exist at the same time any 
controls on capital outflow. Indonesia had opened its capital account by 
conventional wisdom by 1970, as Indonesians were free to purchase financial 
assets denominated in foreign currencies, to open bank accounts abroad and hold 
US dollar accounts in Indonesian banks. From 1982 onwards, the credit ceiling 
programme was abolished as the oil-boom finished and more liquidity in the 
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economy was needed. From this action capital flows to and from Indonesia were 
completely free.  Having no form of control on capital flows, the financial system 
remained weak and showed potential downside risk, as there were only a limited 
number of financial instruments in the market and there existed only a limited 
secondary market for financial assets (Montes and Abdusalamov, 1998, pp. 163-
164). Indonesia experienced in the period before the crisis relatively high interest 
rates as the authorities tried to maintain modest increases in money supply in the 
face of persistent capital inflow. This in turn attracted even more capital inflows 
but shifting more to short-term instruments. Having only few instruments in the 
markets and a shallow secondary market, corporations had to use bank loans for 
financing and the exchange rate that was effectively pegged to the US dollar. 
Thus, giving corporations an incentive to borrow abroad as the US dollar offered 
lower interest rates with relatively low exchange rate risk being presumed by 
corporations and therefore not hedging against an exchange rate risk. Investors 
from outside and borrowers in Indonesia perceived that foreign currency 
denominated loans (i.e. not rupiah denominated) a relatively secure (i.e. the rupiah 
was effectively pegged to the US dollar) and therefore hardly hedging against 
foreign exchange risk.  The consequence of this resulted in big problems as soon 
as Indonesia’s currency was attacked and slipped causing severe problems for 
corporations as loans were not rolled-over and the need to repay their loans at 
tripled or even higher rupiah amounts than underwritten. A summary of the 
deregulation in banking, deposit and loan markets, as discussed previously, can be 
seen in Table 1.10. 
 
TABLE 1.10 - Indonesia: Summary of Deregulation in Banking, Deposit and Loan 
Markets 
Date Banking sector Deposit market Loan market 
April 1974  Stabilisation package 
including continued 
regulation of state bank 
deposit interest rates 
Stabilisation package including 
introduction of credit ceilings for 
all banks; continued regulation of 
state bank lending interest rates; 
extension of provision of liquidity 
credits to state banks and of 
direct credits to priority sectors 
June 1983  Removal of interest rate 
ceilings on time deposits 
by state banks (but banks 
entered into an agreement 
of understanding to avoid 
undue competition) 
Removal of interest rate ceilings 
on loans by state banks (and 
introduction of money market 
instruments); abolition of credit 
ceilings; reduction in liquidity 
credits to state banks and direct 
credits to priority shifts to non-oil 
exports 
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October 1988 Prudential system 
overhauled; foreign banks 
allowed access to Tabanas 
and Taska rupiah savings 
schemes; entry and 
branch establishment 
requirements eased for 
domestic and foreign 
banks; restrictions on 
ATMs and mobile cash 
units eased 
Tax-free status of interest 
earned on time deposits 
removed 
 
January 1990   Substantial reduction in scale and 
scope of liquidity credits 
February 1991 Bank supervision policy 
overhauled; domestic e 
banks permitted to 
establish branches 
overseas; restrictions on 
bank mergers eased 
  
1992 Foreigners allowed to buy 
up to 49% of publicly 
listed shares in banks 
  
Source: de Brower (1999, Appendix 5.1) 
 
The next section will look at the economic development of Indonesia since independence 
in 1949 until the outbreak of the crisis in 1997. This part is split according to the political 
‘eras’ in Indonesia. 
 
1.3.2 Early Independence and the Sukarno Era: 1949-1965 
On 27 December 1949, the Indonesian Government assumed effective control over main 
parts of the former Netherlands Indies. The newly established country faced some difficult 
problems, an impoverished population as a result of the Japanese occupation including a 
scarcity of food, clothing and medicines and an arbitrary requisition of forced labour which 
showed that the Japanese occupation was not a ‘liberalization’ from colonialism but rather 
the exchange of one colonial power with another one (Dick, 2002b, pp. 163-167). In 
addition, the ensuing armed struggle against the Dutch, and rebellions in some regions 
(Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi, and Moluccas) which the government successfully 
suppressed created difficulties. The inheritances of the Dutch were weak economic and 
institutional structures. 
The primary goals of this new government were to raise the standard of living of the 
population, lay the foundation for a sound national economy, increase production and 
stimulate commerce and industry (Sumitro 1952, p.5) but with limited government 
financial sources. 
In the following years, with the exception of the ‘Korea boom’ (the US demanded strategic 
raw materials during the Korean war and therefore Indonesia experienced a short high 
increase in export revenues), the government ran budget deficits during the 1950s and 
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from mid-1952 to mid-1954 the Indonesian Government lost foreign exchange reserves at 
a faster rate than any other country in the world. Further problems arose, as the 
Government decided to protect their reserves by severe import restrictions, which led to a 
huge gap by the mid-1960s between the official exchange rate and the black market rate 
(Thee, 2003, p.5). 
In the political sphere, there were some difficulties in taking over the political power from 
the former Dutch colonial ruler. The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia was the result of a negotiated settlement by the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia (UNCI). The results were two political and two economic compromises (Thee, 
2003, pp. 5-6): 
1. The Netherlands transferred sovereignty not to the Indonesian Republic which had 
waged the war of independence, but to the United States of Indonesia (Republik 
Indonesia Serikat, RIS) which the Dutch had set up in order to weaken the 
Indonesian Republic; 
2. The Dutch refused to hand over West New Guinea (called by Indonesian 
nationalists ‘West Irian’) as they argued that the Papua population was racially, 
culturally and linguistically different and therefore not a part of the Indonesian 
nation; 
3. The newly installed Indonesian government had to take over the foreign debt of 
the Dutch administration in Indonesia; 
4. Dutch enterprises were allowed to continue their business in Indonesia without 
interference (declared by the Financial-Economic Agreement – Finec); most of 
Indonesia’s modern sectors were therefore owned and controlled by the Dutch 
until the early 1950s. 
The result of this agreement was therefore political independence but not economic 
independence. The Governor and the Board of Directors of the Java Bank, which acted as 
the Central Bank during the colonial period, remained Dutch as well as the Director of the 
Foreign Exchange Control Board and most officials at the Ministry of Finance (Higgings, 
1990, p. 40; Sumitro, 1986; Dick, 2002b, pp. 170-172). 
 
The Indonesian Government pursued in these first years of political independence policies 
that were based on leftist ideas, as capitalism was associated with ‘Colonialism’ (Dutch and 
ethnic Chinese) while ‘socialism’ was seen as ‘Indonesianization’ or ‘indigenism’. Whether 
this goal should be achieved by nationalisation or by promoting Indonesian business class 
was not clear (Mackie, 1971, p.44). As in Malaysia in the late 1960s, the dilemma was 
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growth and equity and how to combine these two in order to stabilize the economy (Dick, 
2002b, p.172). 
The bureaucratic and legal system was a heritage of the former colonial power and was 
slightly changed and adopted by the new government. As the slightly changed institutions 
did not work very well, the power vacuum in Indonesia grew creating opportunities for the 
military (Dick, 2002b, pp. 172-173). By the introduction of ‘Guided Economy’ and 
‘socialism á la Indonesia’ of President Sukarno in the late 1950s the government directed 
the economy more to state owned enterprises and private enterprises were only allowed in 
sectors that did not include the supply of people’s basic needs (Rice, 1983, p. 61). 
Some economic institutions and enterprises were allowed to be nationalized by the 
Indonesian Government, which was quickly doing this for key institutions and enterprises 
like the Java Bank in 1951, renamed in Bank Indonesia, the Royal Netherlands Indies 
Airlines (KNLIM), renamed in Garuda Indonesian Airways, or the railroads on Java and 
main public utilities. 
In April 1950 the Indonesian Government launched a first programme to develop a strong 
indigenous Indonesian business class – the Benteng (Fortress) Programme (Anspach, 
1969, p. 168) one of its purpose was to try and set up a counterforce to Dutch economic 
interests (Sumitro, 1986). 
One major goal of the Benteng Programme was to secure national control of the import 
trade: import licences for easy-to-sell goods were restricted to indigenous Indonesian 
citizens (Mackie, 1971, pp. 47-48). As the requirements were stringent for prospective 
indigenous Indonesian importers this programme led to some abuses by Chinese 
importers, which should have been countered by this programme. Chinese importers 
switched to the method of doing business through puppet indigenous Indonesian licence 
holders, who was referred to as ‘briefcase importers’ (Mackie, 1971, p. 48). The Benteng 
programme did not reach the goal of building up a strong indigenous Indonesian business 
class but instead a group of socially unproductive rent-seekers. 
Until  1957 the prospects for growth of the economy were rather optimistic as inflation 
and money growth were relatively low both at around 10 % in 1955 and 1956 (Mackie, 
1967, p.96; Paauw, 1963, p. 205) while the problems with the balance of payments were 
not resolved and foreign exchange reserves were at precarious levels (Paauw, 1960, pp. 
119-120). 
In November 1957, the political conflicts between Indonesia and the Netherlands 
culminated as the Indonesian Government failed to persuade the United Nations General 
Assembly to adopt a resolution calling on the Dutch Government to cede West Irian to 
Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesian militant workers took over the management of the Dutch 
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inter-island shipping company KPM and which was followed by similar take-overs of other 
Dutch enterprises (Thee, 2003, p.13). The Indonesian Government did not attempt to 
resist the ‘take-over’ movement (Glassburner, 1971, p.92) and in November 1959 the 
formal take-over of all Dutch companies were legalized and turned into state-owned 
enterprises (Dick, 2002b, p.184). 
The Dutch business community was therefore eliminated in one foul swoop but the ethnic 
Chinese business community remained. This ethnic Chinese business community included 
Indonesian and foreign citizens. The Indonesian Government tried to impair the foreign 
Chinese citizens by introducing special measures. These measures however were soon 
stopped as they caused serious economic dislocation (Thee, 2003, p.14). 
 
After the Japanese occupation and the armed struggle against the Dutch, the Indonesian 
Government had difficulties in reordering the production of export goods as many estates, 
mines and factories were in a bad condition and the cultivation of tobacco, rubber, coffee, 
tea, sugar and palm oil was changed into food crop cultivation during this period. Up to 
the early 1970s, rubber and oil generated the bulk of export revenues of Indonesia 
(Glassburner, 1971, p. 14). During this period the oil industry in Indonesia was performing 
well as in 1959 the Indonesian Government signed new oil exploration agreements with 
the three large foreign oil companies, Caltex, Stanvac and Shell, and some smaller foreign 
oil companies. This was important in order to keep the oil production at steady levels, as 
the oil fields are smaller and shallower than the large oil fields in Middle Eastern countries 
(Thee, 2003, pp. 14-15). 
 
During the first period of independence only sugar factories and oil, refineries had been 
set up. Indonesia remained an agrarian economy in these first years although the 
movement towards import-substituting industrialization began. Estimates show that during 
the period of 1951-1959 manufacturing accounted for 8-10 % of net domestic product 
while agriculture accounted for 56 % during 1953-1958 (Paauw, 1963, pp. 176-177). The 
efforts to move in the direction of an industrializing country can be seen by the 
introduction of the Economic Urgency Plan in 1951 (sometimes referred to as Industrial 
Urgency Plan of which the Bentang Programme was part of) (Siahaan, 1996, p.190). The 
results were disappointing. Only a few industrial plants were built during the five-year 
period of the Plan. In 1956 a new development plan was introduced, Indonesia’s First 
Five-Year Development Plan, as the former plan only led to disappointing results and the 
fear of the government about inflationary pressures grew (Anspach, 1969, p. 163). 
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However, this plan, which ran from 1956 to 1960, was no better than its predecessor was 
and became largely irrelevant (Mackie, 1971, p. 50).  
In July 1959, President Sukarno restored the 1945 Constitution, under which he became 
the head of government as well as head of state and which ushered in the period of 
‘Guided Democracy’ and ‘Guided Economy’. This period of ‘socialism á la Indonesia’ was 
the end of pragmatic economic policies (Thee, 2003, p. 17). 
President Sukarno appointed a new National Planning Council, which was given the task to 
draw a new ‘Eight-Year Overall Development Plan’, which was impossible to implement as 
there, were huge expenditures for military and perpetual political turmoil in this period 
(Thee, 2003, p. 17). 
President Sukarno’s policy was largely anti-Western and anti-capitalist but he did not 
clearly address to the economic problems of Indonesia. In early 1960s, therefore the rate 
of inflation began to accelerate in an alarming way and steadily rose from 19 % in 1960 to 
a peak of 636 % in 1966 (Greenville, 1981, p. 108). The main problem of this 
hyperinflation was that Indonesia’s Government was printing money in order to deal with 
their growing budget deficit (Thee, 2003, p. 18). The last year of political power of 
President Sukarno was characterized by a deterioration of the economy. In 1963, the 
Indonesian economy experienced a 3 % contraction (World Bank, 1998, p. 21), 
hyperinflation, and a sharp decline in productive capacity due to problems with foreign 
exchange, which was needed to import spare parts and capital goods (Thee, 2003, p. 19). 
The Indonesian economy recovered soon after independence, but stagnated in the late 
1950s and experienced a negative growth in the early to mid-1960s (van der Eng, 2001, p. 
182). 
 
1.3.3 The New Order and President Soeharto: 1966-1998 
1.3.3.1 A Short Overview 
In this era, the economy-developed form one of the worst performing economies in the 
region to an economy with good rates of sustained economic growth compared with other 
developing countries (MacIntyre, 2000, p. 252). The period until early 1990s has been 
analyzed by many scholars and there exists a large amount of literature regarding the 
development of Indonesia (e.g. Booth, 1992; Battacharya and Pangestu, 1993; Little et 
al., 1993; World Bank, 1993; Woo et al., 1994; Hill, 1996). 
The experience of Indonesia during the Sukarno era and its huge fiscal spending, i.e. 
deficit, led the new government in power run the ‘Balanced Budget rule’ spending not 
more than it earned from taxes and foreign aid (including foreign loans). The government 
subordinated itself to fiscal discipline. As the revenue consisted of taxes, aid and foreign 
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loans Indonesia actually had moderate deficits. Indonesia’s stick to fiscal prudence was 
especially important in the periods of oil-shock (i.e. during the 1970s) with the oil-driven 
inflation and the years thereafter with the collapse of oil prices (MacIntyre, 2000, p. 252). 
The period of the Soeharto era can be split into three phases of economic policies, 
challenges and performance (Thee, 2002a, p.203): 
• 1966-1973: stabilisation, rehabilitation, partial liberalisation and economic 
recovery; 
• 1974-1982: oil booms, rapid economic growth and increasing government 
intervention; 
• 1983-1996: post-oil boom, deregulation, renewed liberalisation and rapid 
export-led growth. 
 
1.3.3.2 A Deeper Look 
In 1966, General Soeharto took over the political power from President Sukarno. The 
economy was nearly bankrupt and on the verge of a breakdown (Thee, 2003, p. 21). The 
country was on default on US$2.4 billion foreign debt, hyperinflation was around 600 %, 
industrial output below 20 % of capacity, shipping, rail and road transport equipment were 
run down, and the system of government control of the economy experienced a high level 
of corruption (Panglaykim and Arndt, 1966, p.8). 
In order to get rid of these problems General Soeharto turned to a group of five young 
economists from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FEUI), for economic 
advice (they included: Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Sdli, Subroto, and Emil Salim) in September 
1966 and based them at Bappenas, the National Planning Board. This economic group is 
sometimes referred to as ‘Berkeley Mafia’, as many of them had studied at the University 
of California, Berkeley, or as ‘Technocrats’ (Thee, 2003, pp. 19-20). ‘Technocrats’ were 
according to Sadli (Sadli, 1997, p. 243) top government officials who by preparing 
economic policy were guided by rational considerations, having the national interest at 
heart, observing the major economic principles and preferring pragmatism. This economic 
team played an important role in stabilizing and rehabilitating the economy and which was 
achieved through the design of a stabilization and rehabilitation programme. In order to 
stop the high inflation rate this team proposed to keep a balanced budget (no more 
money printing to finance budget deficits) and they relied, in contrast to the former 
government, on foreign aid as a source of financial support. The ‘inward-looking’ policies 
of the old regime were changed to ‘outward-looking’ policies, which were characterized by 
a more liberal trade and foreign investment regime. The new government tried to rebuild 
good relations to the Western countries and Japan. In 1965, Indonesia rejoined the United 
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Nations and after the termination of the armed confrontation with Malaysia in May 1966, 
they rejoined as well the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank from which 
Sukarno had withdrawn in 1965 in order to cut links with the capitalist world. This new 
effort was positively recognized by the international aid community that helped to handle 
the debt repayments by rescheduling them and granting new foreign aid (Thee, 2002a, p. 
195; Thee, 2003, p. 23). However, as will be shown below the balanced budget was 
reached through accounting tricks as they included foreign aid and loans as revenues and 
run as well an off-balance budget, which was increasing over time. 
Another important way to give new impulses to the economy was to stop ‘statism’, where 
the state was the dominant player in the economy, and instead private capital, domestic 
and foreign, was encouraged to invest in different economic sectors (Thee, 1994, p. 6). 
The most important sectors for foreign investment were the oil sector, other mining 
projects and the manufacturing sector (Hill, 1988, p. 81). In the context of domestic 
investment promotion, the government adopted a ‘whitewash policy’ in order to encourage 
Chinese businesspersons (mostly Indonesian citizens) to repatriate capital. While this 
policy was rather risky due to political turmoil during the Sukarno era, it helped to 
stimulate the domestic economy and investment (Sadli, 1997, pp. 244-245). These policies 
were important for the stabilization programme, while the rehabilitation programme 
focused on the repair of infrastructure in agriculture (Sadli, 1997, p. 245). 
 
This stabilization and rehabilitation programme resulted in an impressive recovery of the 
economy, where hyperinflation soon came under control of the government (from 636 % 
in 1966 to 9 % in 1970) (Greenville, 1981, p. 108). The economy grew over the next three 
decades with an average annual growth rate of 4.5 % (over the period 1967-1997) and 
grew stronger than the population growth rate (van der Eng, 2001, p. 182). Like the other 
countries of ‘The East-Asian Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993) Indonesia experienced high rates 
of domestic capital investment (World Bank, 1993, p. 8), and had by the mid-1990s one of 
the highest rates of gross domestic capital investment among developing countries which 
was financed by a high rate of domestic savings of approximately 33 % of GDP in 1996 
(World Bank, 1997). 
Absolute poverty declined from 40 % of population in 1976 to 11 % in 1996 (respectively 
from 54 million people in 1976 to 23 million in 1996) (BPS, 1999, p. 576). This occurred in 
rural and urban areas. During the 1970s, the Indonesian government tried to promote the 
development of rural areas, which was highly effective in reducing poverty (McCawley, 
2002, p. 263). Other social indicators for this development are for example net primary 
enrolment ratios (for males and females close to 100), infant mortality rates (sharply 
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declining compared to 1970) and a rising percentage of population having access to safe 
water (World Bank, 1999, pp. 16-19). As such, Indonesia experienced not only increased 
economic development but also social development, this also applies to other countries in 
the region (Hill, 1996, p. 195). Another important transformation occurred during this 
period:  Indonesia, which was a largely agrarian economy in the late 1960s, became a 
newly industrializing economy (NIE) by the early 1990s, where the manufacturing sector 
contributed more to export revenues than primary exports (including oil and gas exports) 
(Thee, 2003, p. 26). The following steps led to this outcome in the 1990s: 
- From the 1970s to the early 1980s Indonesia had a highly inward-looking industry, 
with many non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the highest rate of nominal and effective 
protection among the ASEAN countries (Ariff & Hill, 1985, p. 17; Naya, 1988, p. 
87). 
- During the late 1970s basic industries were heavily promoted and initiated by 
government with the help of oil revenues (Soehoed, 1988). 
- After the oil-boom and its ending in 1982 the Government had to change its 
strategy again to an outward-looking, export-promoting industrial strategy, where 
deregulation efforts and a more open approach to foreign companies were 
introduced. The deregulation efforts included trade reforms to reduce the ‘anti-
export bias’ of the protectionist trade regime and a liberalization of the restrictive 
foreign investment regime in order to promote more export-oriented investments 
by foreign investors (Thee, 1992, pp. 234-237).  
- Industrial development from late 1980s onwards was driven by manufactured 
exports and the private sector (Hill, 1996, pp. 154-155). 
- After the oil boom the reliance of the government on revenues oil and gas exports 
respectively was reduced. By the mid-1980s non-oil domestic revenues increased 
(as a share of total government revenues and relative to GDP). The non-oil 
domestic revenues amounted to 11 % of GDP in 1989-1990 while in 1984-1985 
they were around 7 %. The main factor that drove non-oil domestic revenues up 
was due to tax reforms in the mid-1980s, and mostly the new value added tax and 
improvements in income tax collection played an important role (Booth, 1998, p. 
198). 
 
One shortcoming according to Thee is that like in most other East Asian countries the 
rapid economic growth in Indonesia was done in a ‘highly centralized, authoritarian and 
increasingly repressive setting’ (Thee, 2003, p. 28). The economic development in the 
early stage was mainly designed by the technocrats but their influence began to erode in 
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the 1990s. This was reflected by a rising in off-budget transactions, which included 
financial expenditures to the lower levels of government, quasi-government institutions, 
and state-owned enterprises (Nasution, 1995, p. 18). Most of the companies were 
managed by well-connected businesspersons and ‘strategic industries’ controlled by 
Habibie (Minister for Research and Technology) (Nasution, 1995, p. 19). The study of 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999) shows how the concentration of wealth in different 
Asian countries was measured by influence of families in corporations in mid 1990s , i.e. 
corporate share) . Top ten families as of end December or end of accounting year 1996 
(% of total market capitalization that families hold) in Indonesia and the Philippines were 
at the top of the list in Asia with 57.7 % and 52.5 % respectively while in other Asian 
countries the share was smaller (in Japan 2.4 %, in Malaysia 24.8 %, in South Korea 26.8 
% and in Taiwan 18.4 %) (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999). Not only was the 
Soeharto family was among these top ten families, but also the Salim group, an 
Indonesian conglomerate, under businessman Liem Sioe Long, which controlled about 
16.6 % of market capitalization by the onset of the financial crisis in 1997/1998 (Smith, 
2001, p. 3). 
 
During this period of the New Order public discontent increased as the population 
experienced political oppression, gross violation of human rights, embezzlement of public 
funds, mutually profitable collusive relationships between political power holders and their 
business cronies, and the proliferation of policy-generated barriers to domestic competition 
(Thee, 2001, p. 178). 
During the New Order political repression was common. Military officers and non-
commissioned officers were placed in strategic positions in public administration in order 
to have a direct access to all levels of administration for the implementation of 
development plans, policies and political ideology from top to bottom (Dick, 2001, p. 212). 
Another important factor was the perception of the population that the economic gap 
between rich and poor was widening although the Gini ratios were relatively constant over 
time. The widely held view was of a ‘widening economic gap’ between rich and poor and 
between indigenous (pribumi) and non-indigenous (non-pribumi) Indonesians of which the 
most were Sino-Indonesians (Thee, 2001, pp. 178-179). 
 
The success of Indonesia during this long period of economic growth and during the 32 
years of the New Order was mainly based on the influence of the technocrats’ team, the 
economic team that enjoyed the confidence of President Soeharto (Woo et al. 1994, pp. 
148-149).  A key factor in relations between the international financial community (IMF, 
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World Bank, Asian Development Bank) and Indonesia was the confidence in the ability in 
these technocrats (Bresnan, 1993, p. 282). They were important in many occasions, as for 
example by designing the Stabilization and Rehabilitation Programme in the late 1960s in 
order to deal with hyperinflation and economic problems inherited from the Sukarno era, 
or during the PERTAMINA crisis in February 1975, when the company was unable to roll 
over a short-term loan of US$40 million from a small American bank (Woo et al., 1994, p. 
57). The management of PERTAMINA was only responsible to President Soeharto and 
sometimes referred to a ‘state within a state’ (Prawiro, 1998, p. 105) and the economic 
team successfully, although with some costs for the state treasury, resolved this crisis 
(Thee, 2003, p. 32-33). Over time the influence of the technocrats was lowered and 
prudent macroeconomic government spending became less important as more off-budget 
expenditures arose by funding expensive prestige projects. This slowing down of the 
influence can partly be attributed to the retirement of the ‘first generation of economic 
technocrats’ as Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Mohamad Sadli, Subroto and Emil Salim. While the 
newer generation experienced confidence of the international aid community, it did not 
enjoy the same degree of trust and rapport as the former technocrats had developed with 
President Soeharto (Thee, 2003, p. 35). 
At the same time as the influence of the technocrats slowed down another group gained 
influence, the so-called ‘technologs’, like B.J. Habibie, which questioned the wisdom of 
pursuing the economic strategy of the economists. Under his leadership at the Ministry for 
Research and Technology new investments into large-scale, capital-intensive and high 
technology projects were done, like the investments in the state-owned aircraft 
assembling enterprise, PT Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) (McLeod, 1993, p. 
5). Not only was Soeharto supporting this idea of Habibie to build advanced industrial 
plants utilizing advanced technologies but as well a wider part of the public (engineers, 
intellectuals, students and youth) combined with an emerging ‘industrial nationalism’ 
(Thee, 1994, p. 18).  
Another problem the younger generation of technocrats had to deal with was the influence 
of the children of Soeharto in economic policymaking, which the older economists in the 
1970s and early 1980s did not have this issue (Thee, 2003, p. 36). 
Although during the New Order many macroeconomic steps and policies were applied and 
had a positive effect on the development of the economy, the technocrats mostly 
neglected the important role of microeconomic policy (Thee, 2003, p. 38). 
One additional feature of the Indonesian balance of payments should be added: the off-
budget fiscal activity. As can be seen in Table 1.7 the official government budget was 
rather balanced but many activities were financed by a so-called off-budget fiscal activity 
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as the example of PERTAMINA demonstrates. As Nasution (1995) states, there existed a 
system of informal financing which was established in the 1940s during the armed 
struggle for independence and which helped the civilian and military arms of the fledgling 
republic to fund their activities. This activity of informal fiscal activity continued during the 
period after independence and senior military and civilian officials cultivated their 
relationships with business people, having therefore a hidden revenue and managed 
through so-called social or charitable foundations (yayasan) and commercial joint ventures 
(for details see Crouch (1978) and Robison (1986)). 
There existed different types of off-budget fiscal activity during the Soeharto era 
(MacIntyre, 2000, pp. 256-258): 
1. Command Lending: The government was able to direct the managers of one or 
more of the state enterprises and official economic entities to make resources 
under their control available to support a government initiative. Institutions like the 
central bank, the state commercial banks, the state pension funds and other 
entities such as Bulog (the grain stockpile authority) were used heavily for this. 
This is the best-known option and best understood by outsiders. Examples: 
issuance of financial guarantees to public and private firms, underwriting of their 
activities, writing-off or rolling-over of repayments on loans that firms were unable 
or unwilling to make. 
2. Private Contributions: The other possibility of the government was to informally 
induce the private sector to provide financing for a project, which the government 
wanted to pursue, but was unwilling or unable to finance through its budget. 
Examples: When Indonesia in 1983 cut its expenditure on planned investments, in 
one case one of the wealthiest businessperson in Indonesia, Liam Sioe Liong was 
persuaded by the government to invest in a massive new steel plant; he put into 
this project US$100 million and helped to arrange funding from international 
banks. 
3. Hidden Government Funds: The government could draw upon funds that were 
hidden in bank accounts and were not official treasury accounts, i.e. using off-
budget revenue to fund off-budget expenditure. This option is not very well known 
and was sometimes used as a kind of recycling of foreign aid funds. Example: 
When the government got specific aid for a project, e.g. expansion of electricity 
production, the fund was distributed through the Development Budget in form of 
loans to the state power company and was therefore counted in the fiscal budget. 
When the loan was repaid it was not repaid to the Development Budget but 
instead to an off-budget account known as the Investment Fund Account (Dana 
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Rekening Investasi) managed by the Ministry of Finance. The government repaid 
instead the foreign aid from budget activities. In this way foreign aid was 
redirected to off-budget accounts and in the early 1990s these had become very 
large. 
The experience of Indonesia in off-budget activities did not cause large problems for 
macroeconomics but on the microeconomic level there might have been some distortions 
due to efficiency implications of the rent-seeking surrounding (Macintyre, 2000, p.269). 
 
To summarise the New Order era under President Soeharto experienced a long period of 
growth (around 32 years) and economic development, but the end was rather harsh and 
steep as the East-Asian crisis broke out in 1997-1998 and Indonesia’s political leadership 
weakened. 
The event of the crisis and the performance of the economy after the crisis will be 
analysed in the following chapters. 
 
The following table will show some economic indicators for Indonesia before the outbreak 
of the crisis. Table 1.11 shows that most macroeconomic figures remained stable over the 
1990s and show no fragilities in the balance of payments. Nevertheless, it can be seen 
some other facts such as the real exchange rate depreciation from 1995 to 1996 and then 
the sharp appreciation from 1996 to 1997. Additionally, foreign direct investment remained 
relatively stable in the last years preceding the crisis. Looking at international reserves and 
short term foreign debt there can be seen that both numbers increased over the period 
and that the value of short-term debt was almost double the value of international 
reserves minus gold. This can indicate some fragility in the eventual sudden huge outflows 
of short-term debt. Lastly there it should note that the ratio of non-performing loans was 
rather high – almost at a two-digit level over the period. 
The summarize from the data seen in Table 1.11 it couldn’t be deduced as potential first- 
or second-generation crisis (definitions of crisis generation models, please refer to chapter 
two), while third-generation crisis were not already defined and known. 
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TABLE 1.11 – Pre-Crisis Situation of Indonesia 
 INDONESIA 
 1990-1994 1995 1996 1997 
Growth rate of real 
GDP % 
7.3 8.2 8.0 4.7 
CPI growth rate (%) 8.6 9.4 8.0 6.2 
Current account 
balance (% of GDP) 
-2.2 -3.5 -3.4 -3.6 
Foreign debt (as % 
of GDP) 
63.4 64.6 59.7 n.a. 
Debt service ratio for 
all external debt 
14.4 13.2 16.6 n.a. 
Exchange rate (vis-à-
vis US$) 
2,053 2,308 2,383 4,650 
Real exchange rate 
(1990=100, WPI 
based) 
95.7 91.3 80.4 126.3 
Current account 
balance (US$ million) 
-2,985 -6,431 -7,663 -4,890 
Capital account 
balance (US$ million) 
5,158 10,259 10,847 -603 
Foreign direct 
investment (US$ 
million) 
1,693 4,346 6,194 4,677 
Export value (US$ 
million) 
33,132 45,417 49,814 53,443 
Import value (US$ 
million) 
27,059 40,630 42,929 41,694 
Volume of exports 
(index) 
138.2 170.6 179.2 230.3 
Volume of imports 
(index) 
133.9 196.9 218.0 n.a. 
International 
reserves minus gold 
(US$ million) 
10,112 13,708 18,251 16,586 
Short-term foreign 
debt (US$ billion) 
16.2 26.0 32.2 32.9 
DS Stock Market 
Index ($) 
48.7 63.5 75.4 20.6 
Jakarta Composite 
Index (average) 
399.6 513.9 637.4 401.7 
Nominal lending rate 
(%) 
21.7 18.9 19.2 21.8 
Nominal deposit rate 
(%) 
17.5 16.7 17.3 20.0 
Non-performing 
loans 
8.3 10.4 8.8 9.0 
Direction of Trade 
(Exports, US$ 
Millions) 
Japan (10,910.4); 
USA (4,470.1); 
Singapore (3,029.4) 
Japan (12,288.3); 
USA (6,321.7); 
Singapore (3,766.7) 
Japan (12,885.2); 
USA (6,794.7); 
Singapore (4,564.6) 
Japan (12,485.0); 
USA (7,154.5); 
Singapore (5,467.9) 
Direction of Trade 
(Imports, US$ 
Millions) 
Japan (6,356.8); 
USA (3,316.2); 
Singapore (1,664.6) 
Japan (9,216.8); 
USA (4,755.9); 
Singapore (2,367.5) 
Japan (8,504.0); 
USA (5,059.8); 
Singapore (2,875.3) 
Japan (8,252.3); 
USA (5,444.3); 
Singapore (3,410.9) 
Source: Radelet and Woo (2000), p. 166-167. 
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1.4 A Deeper Look at Malaysia 
1.4.1 A Short Overview 
Like Indonesia economic growth in Malaysia was remarkable high during the period of its 
independence until the onset of the East-Asian crisis. 
One fact of importance is related to the population, which can be split into three main 
ethnic communities in Malaysia: the indigenous (bumiputra) community, consisting of 
ethnic Malays (around 58 %), the Chinese community (around 26 %) and Indian 
community (around 6 %).  During the British colonial period each community was 
assigned different status and occupational specialization. The Elite was arranged in the 
following way: the Malays were hereditary aristocrats, bureaucrats, and politicians on the 
top, and at the lower levels, schoolteachers and village headmen; the Chinese were 
traders, shopkeepers and businesspersons; the Indians were professionals and 
shopkeepers. At a working class level the Malays worked the fields, Chinese worked in the 
tin mines and the Indians tapped the rubber trees. This functional separation was often 
accompanied by a geographical separation of the three ethnic groups (Bowie and Unger, 
1997, p. 69).  
In 1957 at independence, Malaysia had the highest per capita income in the Asia-Pacific 
region, except Japan (Athukorala, 2001, p. 13). During the following two decades Malaysia 
experienced an economic expansion with an annual growth rate of real GDP (1965-1986) 
averaging at 5.5 %. After a short break, caused by a fall in commodity prices and increase 
in government expenditures, growth between 1987 and 1996 was again high with 
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted per capita income relative to the USA increasing 
from 22 % in 1987 to 37 % in 1996. During the early 1970s - 1980s growth in Malaysia 
was predominantly accounted for by the expansion of service industries, which were 
induced by public sector activities and growth in primary production. From the late 1980s 
onwards the biggest part of growth came from the expansion of the manufacturing 
industry through private sector initiatives (Athukorala, 2001, p. 14).  
Gross domestic investment as a ratio of GDP increased from about 28 % in the second 
half of 1980s to over 40 % by the mid-1990s. In most years a high investment rate could 
be maintained without accumulating foreign debt as the national saving rate increased as 
well as net FDI inflows. This is highlighted  by the external debt service ratio (debt 
repayments and interest payments as a percentage of total export earnings) which 
declined from over 12 % in mid-1980s to less than 7 % by the mid-1990s. The Malaysian 
government achieved a balanced budget in 1993 and subsequent years. The balance of 
payments was traditionally in surplus in the merchandise account but had persistent 
deficits in the services account. Unemployment rate in the 1960s was around 6 %, in early 
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1970s it increased to 8 %, dropped to around 5 % in the early 1980s, increased again 
until a peak in 1986 to 8.3 % and declined again by reaching in 1996 virtually full-
employment with an unemployment rate of 2.8 %, the lowest in 30 years (Athukorala, 
2001, pp. 17-20). 
The following paragraphs outline some major features of the Malaysian economy: 
- Malaysian Plans, New Economic Policy and National Development Policy 
Since the late 1960s every five years Malaysian Plans are adopted (the Ninth 
Malaysian Plan was adopted in 2006). The New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
introduced in 1971 in order to promote the redistribution of wealth among the 
ethnic groups. It was active from 1971 to 1990 when the National Development 
Policy (NDP) was launched which is the adoption of NEP with some modifications. 
Within this context it is possible to identify four stages of different strategies: 
o 1958-1970: First round of import-substitution industrialisation 
o 1970-1980: First round of export-oriented industrialisation 
o 1980-1985: Second round of import-substitution industrialisation 
o From 1986: Return to export-oriented industrialisation 
A potential IMF intervention was usually associated with the fear that these plans 
would be abolished as they are considered a strong intervention into the economy 
and creating rent-seeking structures (Jomo, 2000, p.275). 
- UMNO – United Malay National Organisation 
Since 1955 the Bumiputera party United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 
governs Malaysia. It has good connections to the entrepreneurs as during the 
privatization of early 1990s most stakes were sold to UMNO members (see below). 
- Financial sector developments 
In the 1980s Kuala Lumpur was heavily promoted as a global financial centre. On 
October 27th 1989 (with effect from January 2nd 1990) Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) was given independent status and with it a delisting of Malaysian 
registered companies from the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) implemented.  
Furthermore other measures including liberalization of impediments to portfolio 
capital inflow were reintroduced. The main objective of these was to promote the 
trading on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange with increased participation of 
institutional investors. Meanwhile, the Federal Territory of Labuan was declared as 
an international offshore financial centre (October 1st 1990). In this centre licensed 
offshore banks, offshore insurance entities and other offshore companies were 
declared as non-residents for exchange control purposes and therefore these 
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institutions could operate foreign currency accounts freely and moving funds 
without capital monitoring.  
In 1992 a new Securities Commission (SC) was introduced which took over the 
share market monitoring and supervision (introduced by the Securities Act) 
(Athukorala, 2001, pp. 25-26). 
Because of the increased liberalization of capital account, net flows to Malaysia 
increased until the early-mid 1990s. The most important factor of private capital 
flows was FDI, which was attracted by the favourable investment climate. From 
1993 onwards there was a shift from a small share of FDI on total flows towards 
short-term capital inflows, mainly portfolio capital (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 27-29). 
In contrast to other central banks in the region the Malaysian Central Bank 
continued to maintain prudential regulations on foreign borrowing by the corporate 
sector, which was attracted by the relative lower cost of borrowing abroad. 
Therefore Malaysia did not experience such large accumulations of foreign currency 
borrowings by the corporate sector as happened in Indonesia (see above) 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 29). 
The share market experienced from late 1980s onwards until the outbreak of the 
crisis a boom: market capitalization – total value of all stocks of all national 
companies listed on the stock exchange – of KLSE as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 8 % in 1985 to 324 % in 1996. The market capitalization to GDP 
ratio of Malaysia was in the mid-1990s the highest among countries in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, surpassing even Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Athukorala, 2001, p. 32); foreign investors accounted in this period for 
30-40 % of share trading in KLSE (BNM, 1999, p. 309); most of share trading was 
concentrated in secondary shares, reflecting that most of the share market boom 
was driven by speculative share trading rather than new capital mobilization 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 33).  
During this period the banking sector accumulated a large amount of outstanding 
domestic credits with a heavy exposure to the property sectors (broadly defined to 
include share trading and the real estate sector) (Soros, 1998). Additionally the 
banking sector experienced a growing concentration of new lending in non-
tradable sectors and the corporate sector became increasingly dependent on bank 
finance (Athukorala, 2001, p. 48 and p. 51). Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) tried to 
calm credit markets by using direct credit controls, interest rates and moral suasion 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 51). 
Table 1.12 gives an overview of deregulation in banking, deposit and loan markets. 
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TABLE 1.12 – Malaysia: Summary of Deregulation in Banking, Deposit and Loan 
Markets 
Date Banking sector Deposit market Loan market 
October 1978  Commercial banks allowed 
to set interest rates on 
deposits of one year or 
less 
Commercial banks allowed to set 
base lending rates (BLR) under 
guidance of Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
March 1983   Bank lending rates pegged to 
banks’ declared BLR 
October 1985  Pegged interest rate 
agreement whereby rates 
on deposits of one year or 
less are aligned to two 
lead banks’ rates 
 
February 1987  Pegged interest rate 
agreement disbanded 
Margin of lending rates over BLR 
restricted to four percentage 
points 
February 1991   BLR freed from Bank Negara 
Malaysia’s administrative control 
Source: de Brouwer (1999, Appendix 5.1, p. 204) 
 
As mentioned previously for Indonesia and as will be seen in Table 1.13 capital 
flows were important before the crisis in Malaysia. The pattern of total capital 
inflows in East-Asia and Indonesia from 1991 to 1996 was that it increased steadily 
(with exception of 1994 in East-Asia when it decreased slightly) while in Malaysia a 
sharp increase from 1991 to 1993 was followed by a drastic drop in 1994 and a 
return in 1995. Malaysia’s drop in 1994 can be explained by impositions on capital 
inflows of BNM due to strong buying pressure on the ringgit. 
More interesting is the composition of private capital inflows. It can be seen that 
the share of foreign direct investments in East Asia and Malaysia is a major source 
of private capital inflows while the importance of portfolio investment and bank 
and trade-related lending differs: Although in East Asia and Malaysia portfolio 
investment remains ahead of bank and trade-related lending the opposite is true in 
Indonesia. Nevertheless, outlining the facts mentioned previously there can be 
seen that private capital inflows were the major source of capital inflows in the 
region. Furthermore, the composition of private capital inflows shows that a large 
part were foreign direct investments (considered as being long term and stable 
capital flows). The other two types of private capital inflows are not considered as 
stable as FDI. More attention on the development of these inflows must be given. 
The pattern of the latter mentioned types of inflows has been unsteady, indicating 
their potential danger. The role of capital inflows during and after the crisis will be 
an important and constant topic throughout the following chapters. 
 
  40 
TABLE 1.13 – Net Capital Flows to East Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia (Millions of 
US$) 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1991-96 
1991-96 Share in 
% of total capital 
inflows, i.e. private 
capital inflows 
EAST-ASIA         
Total capital inflows 39530 21251 67157 65793 94179 94129 63673 100.0 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related 
lending 
33962 
14072 
 
4260 
15630 
15531 
16529 
 
12118 
-11030 
61205 
42009 
 
28190 
-8930 
62931 
42181 
 
10153 
10597 
90819 
46171 
 
19077 
25659 
93217 
52540 
 
4495 
36182 
59611 
35584 
 
13049 
11351 
93.6 
59.7 
 
21.9 
19.0 
         
INDONESIA         
Total capital inflows 6648 4609 6320 7076 12128 12734 8253 100.0 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related 
lending 
5365 
1399 
 
- 
3965 
3201 
1536 
 
- 
1664 
4898 
1896 
 
1738 
1264 
6899 
2476 
 
1061 
3361 
12532 
4649 
 
1415 
6468 
14326 
6367 
 
1819 
6140 
7870 
3054 
 
1006 
3810 
95.4 
38.8 
 
12.8 
48.4 
         
MALAYSIA         
Total capital inflows 5584 6607 10799 1235 7612 9416 6876 100.0 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related 
lending 
5391 
3995 
 
-708 
2104 
6665 
5158 
 
3027 
1520 
11185 
5014 
 
9497 
-3326 
1089 
4140 
 
5485 
-8536 
7699 
4200 
 
2110 
1389 
9516 
5055 
 
3468 
993 
6924 
4594 
 
3813 
-976 
100.7 
66.3 
 
55.1 
-14.1 
Adapted from: Athukorala, 2001, pp. 30-31. Net capital flows: comprise net direct foreign investment, net portfolio 
investment (equity and bond flows) and official and private bank borrowings. Changes in national foreign 
exchange reserves are not included. For each country, the difference between total and private flows represents 
net official flows. East Asia: consists of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, China (mainland), 
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong. The period of “1991-1996” is annual average. 
 
1.4.2 The Early Years of Independence 
The British colonial power left Malaysia with a well-developed infrastructure (considered to 
be more developed than in most other British colonies), an efficient administrative 
mechanism and a prospering export sector. During colonial times Malaya, as Malaysia and 
close territories were called, was the most profitable colony of Britain. However, during 
colonialism, the mass of ethnic Malays remained at the border of society while emerging 
business opportunities were mainly taken by the mostly urbanized and commercially 
better-connected Chinese (Jomo, 2000, pp. 278-279; Navaratnam, 2003, pp. 7-10). 
By 1957 the year of independence (Merdeka) economic conditions of Malaysia (Singapore 
was part of Malaysia at this stage) were good, in terms of per capita income, literacy and 
health care it was ahead of most of its neighbours (Athukorala, 2001, p. 8). The business-
environment after independence was favourable and the post-colonial government 
continued to promote private enterprise, economic interests of the ex-colonial power were 
protected and greater foreign investment inflows encouraged. The government pursued a 
minimal state intervention strategy except to diversify the economy and ensure suitable 
conditions for rapid capital accumulation (Jomo, 2000, p. 284). 
During the 1960s the Malaysian economy gained mostly from the Korean War commodities 
boom and from some internal changes, although there were some challenges to the 
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leadership in achieving higher development objectives and in the same time preserving 
communal harmony and political stability. During this early time of independence the 
government tried to develop rural regions and provide a better social and physical 
infrastructure in order to deal with the ethnic and regional economic imbalances 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 9). Although the policies adopted in the 1950s provided a sound 
basis for growth in the 1960s, Malaysia was in this period a raw material-dependent, 
foreign-dominated, lacking in diversity, and dualistic (native vs. non-native born) country. 
Industry promotion gained importance in the 1960s as well as the attempt to increase the 
participation of Malay ethnic groups by assisting Malay entrepreneurs in areas such as 
transportation, construction, and the timber industry. The government founded a state-
owned bank, Bank Bumiputera, to provide financing for Malay businesspersons. Policies in 
the 1960s were dominated by prevailing ideas of economists of the United States and 
multilateral institutions at that time, and to some extent the ethnical diversity of the 
country (Bowie and Unger, 1997, pp. 75-76). In 1965 Singapore, the wealthiest region in 
the domestic market was forced to withdraw from the federation. During the mid-1960s 
the import-substituting industrialization was slowing down as domestic market was limited 
with a low ability of creating employment possibilities as the industry was capital-intensive 
and not well linked to the rest of the national economy. The second half of the 1960s was 
characterized by a shift in government policies towards export-oriented industrialization 
accompanied by the establishment of the Federal Industrial Development Authority, now 
known as the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA). In 1968 the 
government passed the Industrial Incentives Act and provided a set of incentives oriented 
to attracting more labour-intensive, export-oriented industries (Jomo, 2000, p. 285). 
Although economic growth increased during this early stage of independence, some 
problems remained which were not addressed properly. Malays were given a special 
position while non-Malays began to question how well their interests were represented in 
Malaysia. In the period of 1957 to 1970 income inequality increased among the ethnic 
groups with the greatest increase being among ethnic Malays (Jomo and Ishak, 1986). 
The growing discontent of the ethnic groups and the problems within society culminated in 
the bloody communal riots of 13th May 1969. 
 
1.4.3 The Period After the Riots in 1969 
After this bloody communal riots Malaysian leadership shifted their development strategy 
away from purely economic considerations to more ethnic considerations in policymaking 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 9). After the restoration of the parliamentary government in 
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February 1971 the constitution was amended in order to prevent new riots due to 
discussion on ethnicity (e.g. language, citizenship, position of Malays and non-Malays). 
Economic policy changed and the leadership moved away from pure economic 
considerations towards affirmative action’s based on ethnicity. In 1971 an affirmative 
action policy package which was labelled ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) and was 
implemented for 20 years (Second to the Fifth Malaysia Plans, 1971-1990). The main 
objective of this NEP was to maintain national unity through the prosecution of two 
objectives (redistributive goals): 
1) Eliminating poverty among the whole population: this objective should have been 
reached by focusing on export-oriented industrialization; 
2) Eliminating the identification of race with economic functions within the society: 
this objective should have been reached by establishing long-term targets for the 
Malay ownership of share capital in limited companies as well as for the proportion 
of Malays employed in manufacturing and occupying managerial positions 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 9). 
 
Different policies introduced during the first years of NEP to reach these goals e.g., the 
Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) was introduced in 1975 and created a licensing system 
for most industries; licenses were granted if these companies complied with NEP 
guidelines (Bowie and Unger, 1997, p. 79). Although some efforts were made by the 
government to attract more direct foreign capital it was not reached as hoped as some 
laws in line with NEP were counterproductive for the attraction of foreign investors i.e., 
ICA or PDA – Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act which threatened foreign oil 
companies with nationalization of their oil exploration and production facilities. However, 
during this period Malay participation in the economy increased (Malay’s in manufacturing 
jobs increased from 25 % in 1970 to 32 % in 1975; share of Malays in managerial 
positions increased from 11 % in 1971 to 17 % in 1975; share of institutional credit held 
by Malays increased from 14 % in 1971 to 30 % in 1975). It should be noted that the 
implementation of NEP was connected with a certain degree of frustration as some 
activities were limited to ‘paper partnerships’ (Bowie and Unger, 1997, p. 81). In the early 
1970s domestic private investment and foreign direct investment targets projected by the 
Malaysian Government were not achieved. The response of the Government was to 
provide resources since during this period export revenues and official loans were easily 
accessible as there was a rise in oil price rise and  therefore cheap international credits 
(Bowie and Unger, 1997, pp. 81-82). 
  43 
The purpose of the introduction of public or state-owned enterprises was an ethnic 
affirmative action or positive discrimination starting in the early 1950s and growing 
modestly in the mid-1960s and with a higher rate in the 1970s until the mid-1980s when 
number almost ceased to grow. From the 1980s these state-owned enterprises were 
accused of having used an increasing amount of public debt and being inefficient; the 
accumulated losses did not only waste investment resources but also increased the 
financial burden and slowed down economic growth (Kamal and Zainal, 1989).  
It is important to mention that during the second half of the 1970s Malaysia became an 
important non-OPEC oil and gas producer. As such it was possible for Malaysia to generate 
huge revenues from oil exports during the second oil shock (PETRONAS, the state-owned 
petroleum and gas company, controlled not only their extraction but also licensing and 
extraction of foreign companies). In 1974 Malaysia introduced the controversial Petroleum 
Development Act that gave the federal authorities jurisdiction over petroleum resources 
(and this was in contrast to other natural resources such as land, water, forests and 
minerals where the state government had prerogatives); the federal government shared 
royalties with state governments but the former controlled PETRONAS as well as other 
petroleum revenues (Jomo, 2000, p. 280). 
 
1.4.4 The Dr Mahathir Mohamad Era Until the Early Crisis Period 
During the early 1980s Malaysia experienced some changes. In 1981 Datuk Seri Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad became Prime Minister. In 1980 the state-owned Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) was founded and the first step of the new emphasis was 
the promotion of heavy industries through direct government involvement. As Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad announced in November 1980, in this period acting as Minister of Trade and 
Industry the government would: 
 
‘[…] reduce the [country’s] dependence on foreign countries for the supply of machinery and intermediate 
inputs, exploit […] forward and backward linkages in industrial development, create spin-off effects for the growth of 
small and medium-scale industries, and develop […] the technological capability of the manufacturing sector.’ 
(Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1994) 
 
Dr Mahathir Mohamad wanted to follow the same path as South Korea and Japan had 
done in the previous year’s, which experienced high economic growth and development 
(Bowie and Unger, 1997, p. 84). 
HICOM entered into several partnerships with foreign companies in several industries such 
as iron and steel, petrochemicals, paper, machinery and equipment, automobiles, cement, 
general engineering, transport equipment and building materials. All these projects were 
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promoted by subsidized credits, government procurement provisions and heavy tariff 
protection (Athukorala, 2001, p. 10). One prominent example is Proton, the Malaysian 
automobile manufacturer.  
This new policy approach caused public expenditure to surge by widening budget and 
current account deficits between 1981 and 1986. Although during the 1970s Malaysia 
experienced better terms of trade, this trend was now reversed as many prices of 
commodities such as rubber, tin and palm oil, which Malaysia produced in large quantities, 
dropped. Government revenues declined as well as GDP growth. 
The new heavy industry experienced especially in mid 1980s a turbulent period as internal 
demand fell during this time (almost all HICOM units experienced operating losses) (Bowie 
and Unger, 1997, p. 86). Private investments dropped in the mid-1980s from RM13.3 
billion in 1984 to RM10.1billion in 1986 before increasing again up to RM10.5 billion in 
1987; private investment as a percentage of GDP had been declining since the beginning 
of the 1980s: from 19 % during 1979-1984 to 14.4 % in 1987 (BNM, 1988, p. 2). Foreign 
corporate investment declined as well by 19 % from 1984 to RM1.7billion in 1985 and to 
RM1.4 billion in 1986 and 1987 (BNM, 1988, p. 195).  
As economic circumstances worsened, the living together of the different ethnic groups 
was tense (e.g. unemployment increased). It was doubtful if the NEP targets, i.e. a 30 % 
share of Bumiputera in companies, could be achieved by 1990 (Drabble, 2000, p. 202). 
This private and political uncertainty reduced domestic and foreign private investment. In 
1986 the government amended the ICA to apply only to investments of roughly US$ 1 
million or more (previous US$ 400,000 or less) or to plants employing 75 or more full-time 
workers (Bowie and Unger, 1997, p. 88). In the same year the ‘Promotion of Investment 
Act’ was introduced which created new incentives for foreign investors. 
In 1987 the leadership of UMNO and its president Mahathir challenged internal problems 
during the 1987 party elections. Mahathir was able to maintain his positions within the 
party and the government, but faced some political vulnerability. 
In late 1980s Malaysia was again attractive for investment especially for electrical and 
electronics industries, as Malaysia provided a relatively well-developed infrastructure, 
relatively educated workforce, and already established electronics plants, additionally 
Malaysia was considered to be of relative low political risk in the region (Bowie and Unger, 
1997, p. 92).  
By the early 1990s the policy shifts done in mid-end 1980s resulted in a gradual process of 
privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. State-ownership was limited to 
car manufacturing, petrochemicals, iron and steel and cement industry, as these industries 
were considered politically sensitive (Athukorala, 2001, p. 10). Privatization in Malaysia 
  45 
was not only driven by considerations of efficiency, it was important to continue UMNO’s 
social redistribution policies. As most of the companies, which were sold, were already 
corporatized, share prices were already determined by market forces and therefore the 
selling price was not a major issue. Usually around 32 % or less of total shares was 
allocated as a higher block of shares would have required a general offer by law. These 
blocks of shares were mainly bumiputeras and members of UMNO. This increased the 
connection between the UMNO members i.e. entrepreneurs and the ministers (Perkins and 
Woo, 2000, p. 236). 
During this period the government no longer protected existing labour unions and the 
rights of workers but moved towards a policy of labour creation. In 1990 the NEP was 
extended but with some modifications (especially the prescriptive, ethnic-based targets of 
NEP were abandoned) under the new name of National Development Policy (NDP). 
Corporate tax was lowered in 1989 from previously 40 % to 35 % and the commitment to 
open trade was emphasized. In a context tariffs were further reduced although Malaysia 
was already relatively open compared to other developing countries (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 
11-12; Bowie and Unger, 1997, pp.93-94). 
During the Fifth (1986-1990) and the Sixth (1991-1995) Malaysia Plans, government 
expenditures were reduced further and there was a shift away from promoting and 
subsidizing public sector enterprises towards infrastructure projects in order to increase 
private sector development (e.g. Cyberjaya – the multimedia city in the surrounding of 
Kuala Lumpur). Due to increased government revenues and a more prudent approach to 
expenditures external borrowing was reduced further and it was possible to repay some 
expensive external loans before due dates (Athukorala, 2001, p. 12). 
From 1988 onwards BNM used tight monetary policy in order to accommodate fiscal 
prudence. During this time the exchange rate was a quasi-pegged exchange rate regime. 
Interest rate differentials widened and became more favourable for Malaysia but in the 
same time large capital inflows to the country put pressure on the exchange rate.  
Since 1991 the Malay business elite had experienced some limits in their former privileges 
as lucrative business opportunities were offered to some Chinese and Indian 
businesspeople in order to reduce the dissent amount the non-Malay communities (Jomo, 
2000, p. 294) 
In the period 1990 to 1995 Malaysia experienced an increase in capital inflows, Table 1.13. 
The central bank adopted different measures (e.g. raising the statutory reserve 
requirement) in order to sterilize the impact of capital inflows. In 1993/1994 the ringgit 
came under strong buying pressure. Therefore BNM introduced some restrictions on 
capital inflows, which included ceilings on external liabilities of commercial banks, a ban on 
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sales of short-term debt instruments to foreigners, restricting ringgit deposits of foreign 
institutions in non-interest-bearing accounts, prohibiting non-trade-related currency swaps 
and a new maintenance charge on non-interest-bearing foreign deposits (World Bank, 
1996, pp. 67-68; Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999, pp. 288-291). After a gradual removal of 
controls all restrictions were released by August 1994 (World Bank, 1996, pp. 67-68). 
Although the introduction of capital controls seemed drastic and led to widespread concern 
about a possible contraction in foreign investment flows (portfolio investment and FDI) to 
Malaysia this did not happen (Athukorala, 2001, p. 26). Capital inflows increased again 
during the years preceding the East-Asian crisis. 
 
As a consequence of the banking crisis experienced in the early 1990s the Malaysian 
Central Bank authorities become more cautious and prudent with respect to financial 
liberalization, domestically and internationally, and tried to discourage short-term debt as 
opposed to the other crisis-hit countries. Prior to the East Asian crisis the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and other banking regulations as well as other banking 
practices (e.g. Basel Standards) encouraged short-term debt in the exposure of the OECD 
countries-based banks, especially to emerging or developing countries due to 
measurement rules of risk exposure of balance sheet items of western financial 
corporations.  
In Malaysia portfolio capital inflows were more significant than the exposure of short-term 
debt, as in the other crisis countries, due to the discouraging measures taken by monetary 
authorities in Malaysia. Portfolio capital inflows were promoted as Malaysian authorities 
promoted their stock market in Kuala Lumpur abroad and by splitting from the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore (SES) they ensured that these flows entered the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) directly. Therefore the vulnerability of Malaysia resulted from the 
volatility of international portfolio capital flows into its stock market (Jomo, 2005). Table 
1.13 shows the role and weight of portfolio investment, along with its variability. 
Table 1.14 shows the economic crisis in 1997/1998. There can be seen, as in the case of 
Indonesia, major macroeconomic figures were stable during the early/mid 1990s showing 
no sign for a potential first- or second-generation crisis. Instead, some indicators showed 
that the picture in Malaysia was changing: the real exchange rate depreciation in 1996 and 
sharp appreciation in 1997, the change of international reserves (increase until 1996, 
sharp decrease in 1997), the build up of short-term foreign debt and lastly, the sharp 
increase of non-performing loans in 1997. 
Comparing these results to those of Indonesia above it can be seen that in both countries 
major macroeconomic figures showed no signs of a potential crisis but on the other hand 
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some signs related to the real exchange rate and the financial markets sector were 
changing indicating some fragilities (outflow of international reserves, increase of short 
term debt and non-performing loans). 
 
TABLE 1.14 – Pre-Crisis Situation of Malaysia 
 MALAYSIA 
 1990-1994 1995 1996 1997 
Growth rate of real GDP % 8.7 9.4 8.6 7.7 
CPI growth rate (%) 3.8 5.3 3.5 2.7 
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
-5.2 -8.6 -5.3 -5.9 
Foreign debt (as % of 
GDP) 
40.0 42.5 42.1 47.2 
Debt service ratio for all 
external debt 
21.0 17.5 19.2 n.a. 
Exchange rate (vis-à-vis 
US$) 
2.7 2.5 2.5 3.9 
Real exchange rate 
(1990=100, WPI based) 
93.6 86.1 77.6 106.1 
Current account balance 
(US$ million) 
-2,946 -8,469 -4,596 -4,791 
Capital account balance 
(US$ million) 
5,587 7,464 9,227 2,503 
Foreign direct investment 
(US$ million) 
4,172 4,178 5,078 5,105 
Export value (US$ million) 42,071 74,037 78,327 78,903 
Import value (US$ million) 42,214 77,751 78,417 79,045 
Volume of exports (index) 119.3 165.5 172.4 190.8 
Volume of imports (index) 118.0 186.0 195.3 218.9 
International reserves 
minus gold (US$ million) 
18,107 23,774 27,009 20,788 
Short-term foreign debt 
(US$ billion) 
4.2 7.3 11.1 14.9 
DS Stock Market Index ($) 377.1 510.3 635.5 197.4 
Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index (average) 
790.5 995.2 1,238.0 594.4 
Nominal lending rate (%) 8.3 7.6 8.9 9.5 
Nominal deposit rate (%) 6.6 5.9 7.1 7.8 
Non-performing loans 14.3 5.5 3.9 6.7 
Direction of Trade 
(Exports, US$ Millions) 
USA (8,083.2); 
Singapore 
(9,311.8); Japan 
(5,697.6) 
USA (15,313); 
Singapore (14,960); 
Japan (9,199) 
USA (14,251); 
Singapore (16,018); 
Japan (10,498) 
USA (14, 553); 
Singapore (15,869); 
Japan (9,983) 
Direction of Trade 
(Imports, US$ Millions) 
Japan (11,091.2); 
USA (6,905.2); 
Singapore 
(6,323.6) 
Japan (21,179); USA 
(12,657); Singapore 
(9,613) 
Japan (19,241); USA 
(12,133); Singapore 
(10,475) 
Japan (17,368); USA 
(13,246); Singapore 
(10,434) 
Source: Perkins and Woo (2000). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
The period before the outbreak of the crisis, which has been described by the World Bank 
as the ‘East Asian Miracle’, has been an unprecedented period of high economic growth 
and stability. This period has been characterized by changes in the economic policies (e.g. 
from import-substitution to export-driven policies) and economic growth which was 
distributed over all classes of population. 
This period has not only been characterized by similar economic policies and outcomes i.e. 
high growth rates, but additionally by some common political features: Indonesia and 
Malaysia were until 1950s/1960s colonies and were thereafter governed by a political elite 
which wanted to push the countries from less developed to highly developed economies. 
Furthermore, both countries experienced in the period before the outbreak of the crisis in 
1997/98 a relatively long period of political stability indicating that in power was a very 
small group of politicians for some decades. 
The East Asian Crisis, the outbreak and its causes will be discussed in the next chapters in 
detail. 
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2 
The East Asian Crisis 
 
The outbreak and severity of the East Asian Crisis was hardly predicted by economists and 
investors prior to the event as at the time macroeconomic data were not showing any 
signs of vulnerability although capital flows to the region increased as well as their 
composition changed. 
This chapter will give an overview of the chronology of the crises, their causes and 
theoretical models explaining the crisis. 
 
2.1 Chronology of the Crisis 
The East Asian financial Crisis was almost unexpected as ‘traditional’ economic indicators 
showed no vulnerability: high GDP growth rate, relative low inflation and indebtness of 
governments. 
Nevertheless, in early 1997 the East Asian financial crisis began to spread from Thailand 
through the whole region within a few weeks. On July 2nd 1997 the Thai baht was 
devalued by the Bank of Thailand and in August 1997 its neighbours, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines had substantially devalued their currencies (Sharma, 2003, p. 1). This 
can be seen from Table 2.1 below. 
 
TABLE 2.1 – Currency Movement and Depreciation (in Local Currency per US Dollar) 
 July 2nd , 1997 End September 1997 Rate of depreciation (%)  
July 1997 – Sept. 1998 
Philippine peso 26.38 43.80 66.10 
Indonesian rupiah 2,341.92 10,638.30 354.30 
Thai baht 24.40 38.99 59.80 
Malaysian ringgit 2.57 3.80 47.80 
Korean won 885.74 1369.86 54.70 
Source: OECD, 1999, p. 249. 
 
Next, the crisis spread to Taiwan and Singapore in September and October and as their 
currencies came under intensive pressure they let their currencies float. The Singapore 
dollar devalued by 15 % and its stock market fell by 13 %; the New Taiwan dollar 
depreciated 7 % on October 17th 1997. Both countries had sound and strong economic 
basis and after the depreciation of the New Taiwan dollar the speculation moved on to the 
Hong Kong SAR dollar. Hong Kong experienced as with the aforementioned countries 
strong economic basis and their currency was linked to the US dollar since 1983 by a 
currency board (around 7.80 Hong Kong SAR dollars were US$ 1.00). Although the Hong 
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Kong currency was backed fully by foreign reserves it was attacked by speculators and 
therefore the interest rate HIBOR (Hong Kong Inter-Bank Offered Rate) was raised, on 
October 23rd 1997 even to a high of 280 %, while the three-month inter-bank rate 
increased to 37 % (Yam, 1998; Sharma, 2003, pp. 2-3). As speculators were engaged in 
foreign exchange and stocks short selling, it was not only the currency that came under 
pressure, but also the stock market index Hang Seng Index also fell from 15,447 points in 
July 1997 to 7,225 points in August 1998 (Tan, 2000, p. 131). The exchange rate peg in 
Hong Kong could be maintained while share prices and property prices dropped (Sharma, 
2003, p. 3). 
The depreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar resulted in a speculative attack of the Korean 
won in November 1997. The exchange rate with respect to the US dollar had risen from 
870 (1st quarter 1997) to 1,100 (4th quarter 1997). As foreign banks demanded their 
claims on Korean banks and on their foreign branches back this resulted in an increase of 
the exchange rate in terms of US$ and as the central bank directly sold them dollars, 
Korea’s foreign reserves, net of deposits, slipped (from US$ 30 billion to less than US$ 15 
billion in third week of November). The sharp depreciation of the won caused a huge loss 
of foreign reserves, a credit crunch problem in the international capital markets which in 
turn caused a currency crash and a liquidity crisis (Korea had many unhedged and short-
term foreign liabilities). As the Korean won depreciated, this caused even more pressure 
on the other countries in East Asia. Although the Korean government tried to overcome 
this problem by widening the band on November 20th 1997, they called in the IMF and on 
December 4th 1997 an IMF-led support package of US$57 billion were announced and two 
days later, the won was allowed to float (Sharma, 2003, p. 4). 
The East Asian crisis had not only a fast and sharp outcome on the currencies but also on 
unemployment and inflation. Both rose in 1997 in the crisis countries and combined with 
increasing unemployment and inflation in the absence of a social safety-net system many 
displaced workers and their families were pushed into poverty (Sharma, 2003, p. 5).  
The East Asian crisis put pressure on the Russian economy in late 1997 and led to default 
in 1998 after huge depreciations of the Russian rubble and a collapse of the banking 
sector. In early-mid 1998, the speculative attacks went further this time to South America, 
especially Brazil. Brazil although implementing IMF programs faced difficulties and on 
January 15th 1999 after huge losses in foreign exchange reserves and in the stock market, 
the Brazilian real was allowed to float (Sharma, 2003, pp. 6-7). 
In Table 2.2 are listed all relevant facts regarding the East Asian crisis and the affecting 
countries. 
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TABLE 2.2 – Chronology of the Crisis 
End of 1980s - Early 
1990s 
East Asian economies liberalize their capital account (free convertibility). 
May to July 1997 Thailand: Thai Baht comes under attack (7th May 1997); In May introduction of selective 
capital controls and extensive forward foreign exchange intervention; Thai baht floated on 
July 2nd; Thailand calls on technical assistance by IMF in July. 
The Philippines: Philippine Peso target of speculative attack; central bank decides to go to 
float in July; IMF approves Us$1 bn loan to replenish reserves. 
Indonesia: Rupiah trading band widened, devaluation. 
Malaysia: Malaysian Ringgit also under attack; central bank abandons support July 13th. 
August 1997 Thailand: agreement reached on US$17.2bn IMF-led financial package; suspension of 48 
finance firms. 
Indonesia: rupiah floated on August 14th; introduction of credit restrictions for the trading of 
the rupiah. 
Malaysia: restriction on short selling of the ringgit; Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir 
blames US financier George Soros on attacking currencies in East Asia. 
September 1997 Malaysia: First downgrading by rating agencies. 
October 1997 Indonesia: call-in of the IMF; announcement of US$18bn IMF-led package on October 31st. 
Malaysia: announcement of austerity budget in order to prevent a recession of the 
economy. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Dollar comes under attack. 
Thailand: Financial restructuring package released; restrictions on foreign investment in 
financial sector relaxed. 
Taiwan: New Taiwan dollar devalued by 7%. 
Korea: Intervention to support the won. 
November 1997 Korea: Won trading band widened on November 19th; Korea calls in the IMF; operations of 
14 merchant banks suspended and two commercial banks nationalised by end-November.  
Indonesia: 16 banks closed (agreement of the Government and the IMF). 
December 1997 Korea: trading of won abolished on December 16th; Kim Dae-Jung elected President on 
December 18th; rescue package by the IMF for Korea are adopted. 
Indonesia: First rumours of the health of Indonesia’s Prime Minister Suharto sweep 
through the press; first worries of social unrest come up. 
IMF: revision of outlook for growth in 1998, announcement of a slowdown. 
January 1998 Indonesia: downgrades by Rating Agencies of major Indonesian banks; plans to open the 
banking sector for foreign banks; January 6th budget released; January 23rd revised budget 
released; January 27th announcement of bank deposit guarantees and restructuring agency. 
Malaysia: Plans of government to form a group of five or six “anchor” finance companies out 
of the existing 39 finance companies. IMF announces that Malaysia doesn’t need an 
emergency aid package.  
Thailand: two-tier exchange rate system introduced in May 1997 abolished, allowing baht 
loans to non-residents. 
Korea: by end-January agreement to reschedule US$24bn in short-term debt; 10 merchant 
banks closed (25% of assets) and flagged closure of a further 20 institutions. 
January to August 1998 IMF packages are revised; rating agencies downgrade further the East Asian economies; first 
steps in financial restructuring are introduced. 
February 1998 Korea: labour market reforms announced; two merchant banks closed (taking the number to 
12, which 15 of 30 institutions assessed to be financially viable). 
Thailand: two banks taken over by the Financial Institutions Development Fund; on 
February 25th IMF agreement revised. 
Malaysia: statutory reserve requirement reduced by 3.5 percentage points to 10%. 
March 1998 Thailand: IMF loan instalment paid. 
Indonesia: early month speculation about presidential and vice-presidential nominations; by 
March 5th announcement that IMF package to be delayed from mid-March to April; by March 
9th speculation that the government would renounce IMF-led package. 
May 1998 On May, 21st Indonesia’s President Suharto gives away his power; he was Prime Minister for 
32 years; at the same time, riots in Jakarta escalated. Vice-President B.J. Harbibie replaces 
him and announces elections for the following year. 
August 1998 In Indonesia annual inflation is around 50 percent; a new bankruptcy law has been 
introduced. 
Russian crisis  
September 1998 In Indonesia, rice prices (the primary source of food for people) have tripled since the year 
before (harvest reductions due to El Niño). 
Crisis of LTCM. 
Malaysia introduces capital controls on short-term capital outflows for one year and fixes the 
exchange rate at 3.8 RM/US$ on September, 1st; Anwar Ibrahim, former finance minister is 
arrested; he was a proponent of the “orthodox” economic policy. Many leading indexes 
remove and rating agencies downgrade Malaysia (for example the Dow Jones Global Indexes 
and Morgan Stanley) thereafter. 
October 1998 A program of economic stimulus (investments in infrastructure) is announced in Malaysia. 
September to November 
1998 
The Fed cuts interest rates by 75 basis points. 
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February 1999 The National Action Committee in Malaysia adopts a program that offers stepwise exit of the 
capital control system, favouring the exit tax long-term investors (the tax is up to 30 percent 
on principal and profits); Investors can repatriate their investment if they pay a levy. 
1999 Malaysia’s central bank, Bank Negara, announces merging the 21 banks into six banks in 
order to increase competitiveness of the banking sector. In the last quarter, indexes 
reinstated Malaysia.   
March 1999 Indonesia announces closure of 38 banks, taking seven and recapitalizing another nine. 
June 1999 Elections in Indonesia; the Rupiah appreciates. 
August 1999 Indonesia: East Timor votes for independence in a referendum. 
October 1999 Indonesia’s new President Abdurrahman Wahid and vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri 
sworn in. 
2000 IMF delays payments of tranches in Indonesia, further downgrades by rating agencies in the 
first half of the year, upgrading as government and IMF sign letter of intent with banking 
sector reform, corporate restructuring, governance, and law enforcement. Rumours in the 
province of Aceh propagating separatism.  
In Malaysia mergers among major industrial companies occur because of efforts of the 
government restructure and strengthen sectors through consolidation; strengthening the 
banking sector is of special interest to the government. 
2001 S&P lowers outlook of Indonesia and cuts rating; new president is Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
the Rupiah appreciates.  
In Malaysia, the economy experiences a slowdown as their major trading partners, the 
economies of the US, Japan and Korea slow down; the government therefore tries to boost 
the economy through higher government spending. On May, 2nd the exit levy system was 
formally abolished. 
2002 Malaysia’s economy recovers, led by strong consumption demand and a recovery in exports, 
but still performing under capacity. Expansionary fiscal policies are used by government, too.  
Banking sector is relatively strong and NPLs are not of great concern. 
Indonesia’s economy stabilizes; improvements were made in macroeconomic stability and 
fiscal sustainability, but investment is already declining and investor confidence is not fully 
restored.  Structural reforms began and efforts of a more transparent banking and capital 
markets supervision are done. Some policy uncertainties remain, especially the terrorist 
attacks in October 2002 in Bali are of great concern to the government. 
2003 Indonesia: In July, there are terrorist attacks in Jakarta; in August the first terrorist of the 
Bali attack was sentenced; announcement that it doesn’t need the help of the IMF and their 
programs anymore – exit from IMF programmes. GDP growth rate recovers further. 
Both countries Indonesia and Malaysia suffer from a lowering in tourism because of the 
global epidemic SARS and the conflict in Iraq. 
Malaysia: Office as prime minister overtaken by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, sworn in March 
2004. 
2004 Indonesia: Election held in September where Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is elected as new 
president. Tsunami in late December, about 100,000 people die in Aceh. GDP growth rate 
recovers further. 
Malaysia hit by the Tsunami as well but not as hard as other countries in the region. 
2005 Indonesia: President Yudhoyono reshuffles the cabinet in December and technocrats are 
appointed to become Economic Coordination Minister and Finance Minister. GDP growth rate 
recovers further 
Malaysia ends the fixing of the currency rate and sticks in July to an exchange rate basket 
of currencies. Fear of overheating of economy in 2006. 
Source:  Homepage of Roubini Global Economics (RGE) Monitor, http://www.rgemonitor.com and G. Bekaert and R. 
Campbell, http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_risk/couindex.htm; Asian Development Bank (2002); de 
Brouwer (1999, p. 9). 
 
 
2.1.1 A Chronology of the Crisis in Indonesia 
After the move to a floating exchange rate of the Thai baht on July 2nd 1997 Bank 
Indonesia soon widened the intervention bands on July 11th 1997 of the Indonesian 
Rupiah from 8 % to 12 % respectively from 192 RP/US$ to 304 RP/US$. During the weeks 
until mid-August, Bank Indonesia spent US$1.5 billion on market intervention. On August 
14th 1997, the Indonesian government decided after the hard speculative attacks to let the 
rupiah float which helped to prevent a further decline of foreign exchange reserves. By the 
end of October 1997, the Indonesian government called-in the IMF. 
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2.1.2 A Chronology of the Crisis in Malaysia 
After the collapse of the Thai baht, perception of foreign investors changed about the 
whole region and therefore Malaysia was involved in the crisis from the beginning from 
July 14th 1997. The currency fell rapidly from RM/US$ (Malaysian ringgit per US dollar) 
2.48 in March 1997 to 2.57 RM/US$ in July and 3.77 RM/US$ at year-end of 1997. In 
order to defend the ringgit in mid-1997 BNM increased short-term interest rates where the 
overnight and seven-day interbank rates peaked at 50 % and 35 % in July 1997. 
However, since this intervention did not help to stabilize the currency Bank Negara 
Malaysia abandoned the defence and therefore the flow off foreign reserves was halted. 
The rally against the currencies went on and in early January 1998 the ringgit fell to a all-
time low of 4.88 RM/US$, recovering thereafter in April 1998 to 3.73 RM/US$ and falling 
again to 4.20 RM/US$ in August 1998.  The stock market tumbled as well and investors 
began selling stocks on KLSE as concerns about the economy and the exchange rate grew. 
In January 1997, the Composite Index of KLSE compromised of 1,216.7 points and fell to 
594.4 points in December 1997, i.e. it halved in about one year. In August 1998, the 
Composite Index was even lower, at 302.9 points and market capitalisation was only 
RM200 billion compared to RM826 billion in January 1997.  On September 2nd 1998 the 
exchange rate was fixed at 3.8RM/US$ and capital controls on short-term capital outflows 
were introduced. 
A more detailed description of policies and interventions in the economy will be given for 
both countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, in Chapter 4. 
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2.2 Causes and Theoretical Models 
The debate on the causes of the East Asian crisis is both wide and varied and there are 
many opinions about the reasons. 
Section 2.2.1 will give an overview of the literature and the different views of the 
academic literature, while Section 2.2.2 will show theoretical models and ideas that try to 
explain the crisis. 
 
2.2.1 Causes 
Different views on the causes of the crisis can be found in academic literature. This section 
will give an overview regarding this literature.  
 
Tirole (2002, pp. 1-7) groups the views of economists about the causes of the crisis in the 
following way (the names in brackets are those economists that argue that this specific 
factor contributed to the outbreak of the crisis): 
1) Size and nature of capital inflows: Sharp increases in short term capital inflows 
(Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998); Radelet and 
Sachs (1998); Goldstein (1998)); 
2) Banking fragility: Supervision was inadequate according to its liberalization, 
problems with nonperforming loans in the banking sector (Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Goldstein 
(1998)); 
3) Currency and maturity mismatches: Debt was largely denominated in foreign 
currencies while lending was in national currency; maturity mismatch occurred as 
borrowing by banks was mainly short term (one year or less) (Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Goldstein 
(1998)); 
4) Macroeconomic evolution: Aggregate demand and asset prices grew and real 
estate prices increased substantially (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998); Radelet 
and Sachs (1998); Goldstein (1998)); 
5) Poor institutional infrastructure: Inadequate bankruptcy laws, lack of transparency 
etc. (Furman and Stiglitz (1998); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998);  Goldstein 
(1998)); 
6) Currency regime: Fixed or crawling pegs seem to increase the probability of a crisis 
(Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Goldstein 
(1998)); the East Asian currencies were pegged effectively to the US Dollar). 
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The six factors identified by Tirole above show how most economists judged the causes of 
the crisis. These causes will be explained now in more detail: 
1) Size and nature of capital inflows:  
During the early/mid-1990s, capital flows to East Asia changed. This can be seen 
from Table 2.3, which shows that during this period East Asia experienced an 
increase in capital inflows (from US$ 39,530 million in 1991 to US$94,129 millions 
in 1996 with an average annual inflow over the period of US$63,673). As can be 
seen from this table the largest part of total capital inflows consisted of private 
capital inflows. 
The structure of private capital inflows changed over time: from 1991 to 1996, the 
relative importance of foreign direct investment relative to total private capital 
inflows decreased, while portfolio investment and bank and trade-related lending 
increased.  Economic theory suggests that foreign direct investment is desirable as 
it is usually long term and boosts growth especially portfolio investment which can 
change sharply their direction. Both portfolio investment and bank and trade-
related lending capital inflows could become harmful if they reverse suddenly or 
bank loans could not be rolled over. During 1991 to 1996, most countries 
experienced an increase in bank and trade-related lending relatively to overall 
private capital inflows, while foreign direct investment remained rather stable or 
slowed down marginally. The exception in bank and trade-related lending is 
Malaysia, where this kind of capital inflow was lower as in 1994 Malaysia 
introduced controls on capital inflows (due to the pressure on ringgit as discussed 
before) which were soon abolished again but together with other policies helped to 
maintain a relatively low level of this type of capital inflows. 
 
TABLE 2.3 – Net Capital Flows to East Asia (Millions of US$) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1991-96 
EAST ASIA        
Total capital inflows 39530 21251 67157 65793 94179 94129 63673 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related lending 
33962 
14072 
4260 
15630 
15531 
16529 
12118 
-11030 
61205 
42009 
28190 
-8930 
62931 
42181 
10153 
10597 
90819 
46171 
19077 
25659 
93217 
52540 
4495 
36182 
59611 
35584 
13049 
11351 
        
INDONESIA        
Total capital inflows 6648 4609 6320 7076 12128 12734 8253 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related lending 
5365 
1399 
- 
3965 
3201 
1536 
- 
1664 
4898 
1896 
1738 
1264 
6899 
2476 
1061 
3361 
12532 
4649 
1415 
6468 
14326 
6367 
1819 
6140 
7870 
3054 
1006 
3810 
        
KOREA        
Total capital inflows 6766 6775 3328 8425 17342 23269 10984 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related lending 
6472 
-294 
3236 
3530 
7391 
-616 
5851 
2156 
5325 
-666 
10650 
-4660 
8705 
-842 
5055 
4493 
17798 
-1825 
8671 
10953 
23754 
-1939 
11150 
14543 
11574 
-1030 
7346 
5169 
        
MALAYSIA        
Total capital inflows 5584 6607 10799 1235 7612 9416 6876 
Private capital inflows 5391 6665 11185 1089 7699 9516 6924 
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Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related lending 
3995 
-708 
2104 
5158 
3027 
1520 
5014 
9497 
-3326 
4140 
5485 
-8536 
4200 
2110 
1389 
5055 
3468 
993 
4594 
3813 
-976 
        
PHILIPPINES        
Total capital inflows 2225 2066 2664 3716 4449 8378 3916 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment  
Bank and trade-related lending 
727 
545 
136 
45 
1060 
689 
53 
318 
1414 
870 
-54 
598 
3204 
1282 
256 
1854 
3411 
1335 
222 
1854 
8210 
1340 
-168 
7037 
3004 
1010 
74 
1920 
        
THAILAND        
Total capital inflows 10511 9808 10768 12560 22529 18144 14233 
Private capital inflows 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Bank and trade-related lending 
10511 
1473 
- 
9037 
9696 
1560 
557 
7579 
10518 
1377 
4007 
5134 
12415 
1011 
1299 
10106 
21352 
1177 
3194 
16981 
16874 
1633 
1089 
14153 
13561 
1372 
1691 
10498 
Source: Athukorala, 2001, pp. 30-31. Net capital flows: comprise net direct foreign investment, net portfolio investment 
(equity and bond flows) and official and private bank borrowings. Changes in national foreign exchange reserves are not 
included. For each country, the difference between total and private flows represents net official flows. East Asia: consists 
of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, China (mainland), Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The period of 
“1990-1996” is annual average. 
  
Table 2.4 shows the origin of loans (by country of origin). Here it can be seen that 
Japan was the largest single creditor for the five crisis countries – Japanese 
financial industry had an incentive to invest in the region as in Japan profitable 
investment opportunities became scarce while investments in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were more profitable and ‘refurbished’ the 
Japanese balance sheets due to international regulations and practices (e.g. Basel 
Standards).  
 
TABLE 2.4 – Distribution of Loans by Country of Origin (Major Creditor’s Country of 
Provenience) – End of June 1997 (Millions of US$)  
 Total France Germany Japan UK US 
Indonesia 
58,726 
(100.00%) 
4,787 
(8.15%) 
5,610 
(9.55%) 
23,153 
(39.42%) 
4,332 
(7.38%) 
4,591 
(7.82%) 
South 
Korea 
103,432 
(100.00%) 
10,070 
(9.74%) 
10,794 
(10.44%) 
23,732 
(22.94%) 
6,064 
(5.86%) 
9,964 
(9.63%) 
Malaysia 
28,820 
(100.00%) 
2,934 
(10.18%) 
5,716 
(19.83%) 
10,489 
(36.39%) 
2,011 
(6.98%) 
2,400 
(8.33%) 
Philippines 
14,115 
(100.00%) 
1,678 
(11.89%) 
1,991 
(14.11%) 
2,109 
(14.94%) 
1,076 
(7.62%) 
2,816 
(19.95%) 
Thailand 
69,382 
(100.00%) 
5,089 
(7.33%) 
7,557 
(10.89%) 
37,749 
(54.41%) 
2,818 
(4.06%) 
4,008 
(5.78%) 
Adapted from: Bank of International Settlements (BIS), 1998. 
 
2) Banking fragility:  
The countries affected by the crisis gradually liberalized the banking sector during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in line with the so-called ‘Washington consensus’. 
In some countries former state-owned banks were privatized or entrance of new 
banks into the market was eased (e.g. Indonesia). As most countries had 
experienced in the past a relatively closed banking sector with only a few 
regulations and some ties between political leadership and management this 
opening should have been accompanied with a reform of the financial sector 
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introducing more stringent regulations for banks and bank lending. Usually, this 
was not done properly as the long-term reliance of politics in guiding of funds by 
banks to the economy was not broken up; moral hazard was common (e.g. 
investing too much into risky projects).  Financial sector liberalization and 
supervision was not balanced giving more weight to liberalization and less to 
supervision. In the period of the crisis this caused difficulties as non-performing 
loans suddenly increased on bank’s balance sheet. 
Table 2.5 shows the structure of loan maturity shortly before the crisis. Again, the 
picture is the same for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The 
biggest shares of all loans were short term (maturity under one year) and the 
volume of total loans was increasing before the outbreak of the crisis. These 
numbers can be explained again by the international banking regulations and 
standards effective at that time which encouraged short-term loans (maturity 
below one year) directed from OECD countries to emerging economies. 
 
TABLE 2.5 – Loan Maturity: Maturity Distribution of Lending of BIS Reporting Banks 
– Until June 1997 (Millions of US$) 
 Total Under 1 Year 
 June 1996 December 1996 June 1997 June 1996 December 1996 June 1997 
Indonesia 49,306 55,523 58,726 29,587 34,248 34,661 
South 
Korea 
88,027 99,953 103,432 62,332 67,506 70,182 
Malaysia 20,100 22,234 28,820 9,991 11,178 16,268 
Philippines 10,795 13,289 14,115 5,948 7,737 8,293 
Thailand 69,409 70,147 69,382 47,834 45,702 45,567 
 1-2 Years Over 2 Years 
 June 1996 December 1996 June 1997 June 1996 December 1996 June 1997 
Indonesia 3,473 3,589 3,541 14,177 15,331 17,008 
South 
Korea 
3,438 4,107 4,139 13,434 15,884 16,366 
Malaysia 834 721 615 7,425 7,326 8,248 
Philippines 531 565 326 3,710 4,111 4,001 
Thailand 4,083 4,829 4,592 14,931 16,344 16,491 
   Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
   Note: Consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies. 
 
3) Currency and maturity mismatches:  
Most companies and financial institutions borrowed in foreign currency as there 
was an incentive to do this: their home currency was usually effectively pegged to 
the US dollar and therefore there was a strong belief that no currency risk would 
be incurred. Therefore they did not properly hedge against currency risk. 
Maturity mismatches occurred in financial institutions as they usually borrowed 
short term (one year or less – as can be seen above; there was an incentive of 
Japanese banks to lend short term capital to Asian countries as interest rates in 
Asia were higher than in Japan) while lending was mid to long term. This 
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fundamental maturity mismatch does not cause any problems if it is only a small 
share of total loans or if the investor sentiment is positive and they are willing to 
roll over existing loans. If investor sentiment change i.e., no willingness to roll over 
existing loans then banks soon could become illiquid (which is not to be confused 
with insolvent) which could lead to credit crunch in domestic sectors as banks call 
back their loans and are no longer willing to lend even for profitable projects. 
Table 2.6 shows that the highest indebted sector was by end of June 1997 the 
private sector, where the non-bank sector was indebted more than the banking 
sector. This is an important fact as it shows the exposure of the private sector to 
foreign debt. This indicates that East Asia could not have faced a sovereign debt 
crisis (i.e. a first-generation crisis) nor problems and non-linearities in government 
behaviour (second-generation crisis). The figures in Table 2.6 and those discussed 
before indicate that the underlying problems could be found in the private sector. 
 
TABLE 2.6 – Lending by BIS Reporting Banks – End of June 1997 (Millions of US$) 
 Total Banks Public Sector Non-Bank Private 
Sector 
Indonesia 58,726 12,393 6,506 39,742 
South Korea 103,432 67,290 4,390 31,680 
Malaysia 28,820 10,486 1,851 16,460 
Philippines 14,115 5,485 1,855 6,772 
Thailand 69,382 26,069 1,968 41,262 
   Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
   Note: Consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies. 
 
4) Macroeconomic evolution:  
During the period before the outbreak of the crisis aggregate demand and assets 
prices grew and real estate prices increased substantially. 
 
5) Poor institutional infrastructure:  
The supporters of this cause of the crisis argue that the institutional infrastructure 
was very poor as there were inadequate bankruptcy laws, lack of transparency, 
close ties with political leadership or parties etc..  
 
6) Currency regime:  
Scholars supporting this view argue that fixed or crawling pegs seem to increase 
the probability of a crisis. These two currency regimes are usually attacked more 
often by speculators as they need to be backed up by international reserves; 
speculators expect that central banks will defend their level of exchange rate in 
order to maintain internal economic stability respectively trade competitiveness. 
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The currencies of the countries that were affected by the East Asian crisis were 
pegged to a basket of currencies, but effectively pegged to the US dollar as it was 
the major share. The competitiveness in external trade was therefore not only 
determined by internal factors such as the level of wages or qualification of labour 
but additionally by the movement of the US dollar against major other currencies. 
In the case of the crisis countries the movement of the US dollar against the 
Japanese yen was very important as Japan was investing in late 1980s (due to 
their lower external trade competitiveness) in Asia and their major trading partner. 
Table 2.7 summarizes key economic variables in East Asian economies before the 
crisis and which were discussed above. 
 
TABLE 2.7 – Key Economic Variables of East Asian Economies Before the Crisis 
 Indonesia Korea Thailand Philippines Malaysia Taiwan 
Exchange rate Crawling 
peg 
Managed float Peg Managed float Managed float Managed float 
Significant 
accumulation of 
short-term foreign 
debt in relation to 
exchange reserves 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Significant real 
exchange rate 
appreciation 1996 
Partial No Yes Yes Yes No 
Capital account 
liberalisation 
Yes Partial Yes Yes Yes Partial 
Inadequate 
prudential 
regulation 
Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial Partial 
Current account 
deficit 1996 
Moderate Moderate  Large Moderate Moderate No 
   Source: Noble, Gregory W. and John Ravenhill ed. (2000), p. 7 
 
According to Tirole (2000, pp. 37-46) there are two major views regarding the reasons 
why the crisis spread so quickly to other economies, even though they were not connected 
directly. One is the ‘fundamental’ view while the second is the ‘panic’ or ‘multiple equilibria’ 
view. 
Major supporters of the ‘fundamental’ view are for example Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 
(1998) who argue that investors became aware of inconsistencies of macroeconomic 
fundamentals (low financial sector capitalization and poor risk management implicitly 
deteriorated macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy exposing them to higher 
liabilities than officially recorded; the Japanese banking sector problems and influence as 
an economic stimulator all over the region) and  quickly withdrew capital from the 
countries which resulted in the sharp reversals of capital flows.  
On the other hand, there are supporters of the ‘panic’ or ‘multiple equilibria’ view (for 
example Radelet and Sachs (1998), Feldstein (1998)) who claim that this kind of crisis 
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could start as creditors may refuse to roll over short-term claims, which could be rational 
for a single investor but socially not desirable. In this sense, the term ‘self-fulfilling crisis’ is 
also used, which describes the situation when expectations about development of 
economies shift, crises become self-fulfilling even though the countries have good 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
Another overview of some different views is given by Sharma (2003, pp. 10-26) who 
identifies three perspectives in the literature and argues that ‘the Asian financial crisis was 
caused by many factors and the conjunctural interactions among them’ (Sharma, 2003, p. 
10). The three perspectives identified by Sharma are: 
1. Investor panic and the instability of international capital markets: 
There exist two points of view: an asymmetric information view and an irrational 
movement of investors out of the markets. 
The asymmetric information view defines a financial crisis as being a non-linear 
disruption of financial markets where asymmetric information problems (i.e. 
adverse selection and moral hazard) become serious in the way that these markets 
are unable to channel funds efficiently to the most productive investment 
opportunities. This view is supported by Frederic Mishkin (1999) who argues that 
there are financial market imperfections that are endemic problems of asymmetric 
information in international lending and that reduce the efficiency of financial 
markets, often contributing to overshooting and instability as well. In emerging 
markets, information about market participants is less available and the resulting 
adverse selection, resulting from over-lending to poorly managed and unsound 
local banks and companies, as well as from panic withdrawals at first signs of 
trouble, could lead to credit rationing where some borrowers will not receive loans 
although they are willing to pay a higher interest rate.  
As investors widely belief that in most emerging markets there exists an implicit 
guarantee of the government in maintaining fixed exchange rates and bail out local 
borrowers, this will not only boost the process of lending but also of borrowing as 
borrowers will bear more risk as they otherwise would. These market failures 
increase not only the risks of international lending but also additionally the 
vulnerability of markets for crises where individual lenders are willing to follow the 
herd when signs of a crisis emerge. As Mishkin (1999) argues the case of East Asia 
shows how this herding phenomenon generated a self-fulfilling panic leading to 
market overreactions that were not completely in line with economic fundamentals 
(Sharma, 2003, pp. 10-11). 
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A different perspective can be found in Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and to a similar 
extent in Radelet and Sachs (1998; 1998a). Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that 
the depth and the extent of the crisis cannot be explained by the deterioration in 
fundamentals (there could be observed a deterioration of some fundamentals but 
they were not huge) but instead by a panic reaction of foreign and domestic 
investors. Radelet and Sachs (1998; 1998a) argue that the main problem in East 
Asia was liquidity rather than insolvency as financial institutions were not insolvent 
but they had undertaken a huge amount of short-term liquid external liabilities 
without backing them with liquid assets (mismatching of maturities), and banks 
and companies did not hedge properly or at all against exchange rate risk. 
Therefore in mid-1997 the East Asian countries experienced problems of liquidity as 
investors refused to rollover short-term loans. Furthermore, Radelet and Sachs 
argue that this was due to a shift in investor expectation and therefore the crisis 
became self-fulfilling (Sharma, 2003, pp. 11-12). As the financial world gets closer 
and closer due to technology only small bad news can lead to a major speculative 
attack (Sharma, 2003, p. 13).  
Furthermore, Calvo (1996) argues that in emerging markets it is too costly for 
investors to survey each economy and therefore it could be optimal to get out of a 
group of similar markets once there are signs of problems in any of them. As a 
result, emerging markets are more vulnerable to herd mentality among investors. 
The argument of Masson (1998) is that just small triggers can initialize a loss of 
confidence in a group of economies of investors that hold investments in these 
economies and the herd behaviour of them can lead to financial distress of these 
economies. Furthermore, a crisis in one country could even affect another or a 
group of countries with which this country has close trade and financial links 
(Sharma, 2003, pp. 13-15). 
The study of Goldfajn and Baig (1998) shows that there was a high correlation 
between sovereign spreads across the five crisis countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and South Korea) from July 1997 to May 1998 and that 
therefore investors asked higher risk premiums for all countries as they feared 
about private debt default. Another main driver in the speed of the crisis was the 
downgrading of sovereign ratings by international rating agencies. However, the 
external shock was not the only cause of the crisis: the combination of the external 
shock with the inefficiencies and weak financial systems in domestic markets lead 
to a kind of domino effect across the region (Goldfajn and Baig, 1998). 
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2. Unfavourable external economic developments: 
Sharma (2003, p. 15) identifies three events: the devaluation of China’s currency, 
the Yuan, in 1994, Japan’s prolonged recession and the appreciation of the US 
dollar. 
The devaluation of the Chinese currency in 1994: China changed from a relatively 
closed economy to a more open economy in late 1980s. In early 1990s foreign 
trade accounted for US$200 billion or roughly 40 % of GNP (Cerra and Dayal-
Gulati, 1999).  On January 1st 1994 China unified its exchange rate (bringing into 
line the official rate with the prevailing swap-market rate) and which resulted into a 
50 % depreciation of the official rate (which was in effect a devaluation of the 
Yuan by 50 %). This movement created a better position for China on international 
markets, and exports increased rapidly while competitiveness of the other 
Southeast Asian countries was lowered as they experienced a real appreciation 
with respect to the Yuan (their currencies were effectively pegged to the US 
dollar). The depreciation was accompanied as well with other trade promoting 
policies. However, the shift to higher competitiveness of China was not as strong 
as the real depreciation was smaller as China experienced higher inflation since 
1995 than those of its trading partners.  Additionally, Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s 
competitiveness gradually eroded as domestic costs in production (e.g. wage costs) 
increased and their movement from labour-intensive industries to higher levels was 
not very effective (Sharma, 2003, p. 16).  Therefore it should be concluded that 
the Chinese devaluation was ‘at best a contributing factor to the Asian financial 
crisis, not the primary cause’ (Liu et al., 1998, p. 1). 
The Japanese recession: Japan entered into economic problems in late 1980s and 
with the burst of the asset-price bubble economic growth stagnated. The financial 
system weakened in these years as not only the sharp decrease in asset prices 
caused problems but also the increase of bad loans (real estate loans became 
problem loans) (Sharma, 2003, p. 17). 
In late 1980s and in 1990s many Japanese manufacturers transferred their 
production to lower-labour-cost countries in Asia and elsewhere. Therefore, 
Japanese banks could increase their global presence and were lending heavily to 
Japanese manufacturers, which were increasing their foreign direct investment 
(FDI) share in Asia. Additionally a stimulus for increased lending resulted from the 
low discount rate of 1 % since April 1995; this resulted in a more aggressive 
lending of Japanese financial institutions especially for loans directed to East and 
Southeast Asian economies. This can be seen from Table 2.4, which shows loans 
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by country of origin directed to selected Asian economies where it can be seen that 
the largest share of loans originated from Japan. As the economic situation in 
Japan further worsened by the end of 1997 Japanese financial institutions 
experienced a further decrease of profitability and had to write off bad loans. Again 
as the crisis in Japan deepened, Japanese banks suffered large capital losses and 
therefore they needed to rebalance their loan portfolios in order to meet capital 
adequacy standards. Many banks reclaimed the foreign loans as there were higher 
capital adequacy requirements for international banks than for national banks while 
at the same time East- and Southeast Asian financial institutions that had borrowed 
from Japanese banks, suffered from the outbreak of the crisis in East Asia. 
Japanese banks not only refused to roll over existing loans, they also refused to 
extend new ones and also closed foreign branches and sold off parts of their 
overseas operations. During the second half of the 1980s Japan added US$ 69 
billion in net liquidity (i.e. consisting of aggregate trade, foreign direct investment, 
portfolio investment and bank credit flows) to East and Southeast Asia while the 
net liquidity inflow reversed to a net outflow of US$ 126 billion during 1991-1995 
and to a net outflow of US$374 billion during 1996-2000 (Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, 2001). These actions contributed to the illiquidity problems in East and 
Southeast Asia and the resultant insolvency and regional credit crunches (Sharma, 
2003, p. 16-21).  
The US dollar appreciation: The economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and the Philippines adopted a currency basket system 
where the US dollar had a high weight and which resulted in a de-facto pegged 
nominal exchange rate to the US dollar. This de-facto peg helped to maintain 
macroeconomic stability until mid-1995, generated higher inflows of direct and 
portfolio investments, sustained export-led growth and attracted Japanese FDI as 
the yen gradually appreciated against the US dollar after the 1985 Plaza Accord 
and the following interventions on international currency markets. 
After the Plaza Accord in 1985 the US dollar was depreciating against the yen; 
between 1985 and 1988 the yen doubled almost against the US dollar and other 
Asian currencies tied to the US dollar. The appreciation of the yen against the US 
dollar forced, as mentioned above, the Japanese companies to move outside Japan 
as their competitiveness declined. The high-performing countries in East and 
Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and Malaysia) were the main destinations of 
Japanese foreign investment (Sharma, 2003, p. 21). Japanese foreign investment 
in ASEAN countries doubled in the period from 1985 to 1990 from US$11 billion to 
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US$21 billion; most flows were going to textiles and electronics component 
manufacturers (Tan, 2000, p. 28).  
In the mid-1990s the situation changed as the strong yen era reversed into a 
period of sharp appreciation of the US dollar especially against the yen; this began 
in 1995.  Therefore, Asian countries, which maintained a de facto or quasi peg 
against the dollar, experienced a loss of export competitiveness especially in 
relation to Japan.  This external shock also contributed to the East Asian financial 
crisis as these countries became less competitive with respect to Japan and as their 
currency appreciation against the yen increased short-term flows to these countries 
from Japan i.e. investments in these countries became more attractive for Japan as 
the yen depreciated against the countries’ currencies; most flows were directed to 
high-yielding risky foreign bonds, real estate and consumer loan services (Sharma, 
2003, pp. 21-23). 
According to Sharma (2003, p. 23), these three factors did not by themselves 
cause the crisis but they contributed to severity and duration. 
 
3. Domestic structural weakness and mismanagement: 
During the period of 1965 to 1990 the economies of East and Southeast Asia, 
which were sometimes, called ‘tiger economies’ or ‘miracle economies’ were 
considered as a model to follow and to copy. The economies of Japan, the four 
‘original’ tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) and the three emerging 
tigers or newly-industrializing economies (NIEs) of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand) experienced high growth rates, higher than any other 
group of economies in the world (since mid-1970s at an annual average of 7 % in 
real terms and over 9 % annually since the late 1980s). These economies were 
doubling their real GDP approximately every 7 years during the 1960s and 1970s 
and every 7 to 10 years during the 1980s (World Bank, 1993). Real per capita 
income grew as well: Over the period of 1965 to 1995 in South Korea and 
Singapore by more than 700 %, in Taiwan and Hong Kong by 400 %, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia by 300 % (Crafts, 1999).  
Numerous books published which praised the ‘Asian model’ like Jim Rohwer’s 
(1995) ‘Asia Rising: Why America will Prosper as Asia’s Economies Boom’ and John 
Naisbitt’s (1995) bestseller ‘Megatrends Asia’ as well as a large volume of academic 
work like the study of the World Bank (1993) ‘The East-Asian Miracle: Economic 
Growth and Public Policy’. The latter argued that Asia’s economic development was 
in line with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, i.e. by adopting a higher degree 
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of openness of capital accounts, open trade and foreign investment policies, a 
single competitive exchange rate and a commitment to the principles of 
comparative advantage, economic integration and export-led growth. The 
economies’ growth was therefore based on the accumulation of factors of 
production and increases in total factor productivity. Many economists agreed upon 
these factors and the Asian experience as a pattern to follow (e.g. Jagdish 
Bhagwati, 1996). 
During this period of enthusiasm the arguments of Paul Krugman (1994) were not 
in line with the findings of the study of the World Bank. He argued that growth was 
achieved as a result of increased inputs and not as a result of greater factor 
productivity by just working harder but not smarter and called these economies 
therefore as ‘paper tigers’. Paul Krugman did not predict a sudden crisis but a 
gradual slow down of economic growth. 
After the crisis many economists referred that there were indeed problems before 
the outbreak of the crisis and one of the most important factor for the crisis was 
‘crony capitalism’, which means that there was a widespread political interference 
with market process causing a lack of transparency, nepotism and close ties 
between political and business institutions therefore causing moral hazard 
problems like misallocation of investment (Sharma, 2003, pp. 23-26). 
 
A different view of the causes of crisis is given by J. Lim (2004, p. 40-44) identifying three 
different simplified opinions on the crisis: 
1. The IMF View: 
The view of the IMF on the causes of the crisis was that happenings in East Asia 
were mainly driven by overspending and over borrowing accompanied with a lack 
of transparency, appropriate financial supervision and regulation. Additionally, the 
IMF pointed out that there were some underlying macroeconomic weaknesses, 
such as high or growing current account deficits, some overvaluations of the 
currency and relative price distortions against exportable and traceable.  
After the outbreak of the crisis the East Asian countries were criticised as being 
corrupted, experiencing cronyism, lack of transparency, over-protection of domestic 
firms, as well as harmful government guarantees of private loans and automatic 
bailouts of distressed financial institutions leading to over lending and over 
borrowing by domestic banks and financial institutions. This is an orthodox 
approach to the crisis. 
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2. ‘Liquidity Crisis’: 
The view of Radelet and Sachs (1998, 1999) is that the East Asian crisis is a kind of 
‘liquidity crisis’ and ‘co-ordination failure’. This view is applicable to countries with 
strong external positions where speculative attacks were carried out, as in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. This view is more controversial if applied to the five hardest 
hit economies as they experienced some speculative financial bubbles (over-
exposed short-run debts and capital flows; large or growing current account 
deficits). 
The two authors, Radelet and Sachs (1998) accepted the view of moral hazard that 
was increased by guarantees and automatic bailouts of governments by the IMF 
and others (e.g. McKinnon and Pill, 1998, 1999).  Radelet and Sachs (1998) also 
thought of the crisis as being a multiple equilibria problem: a ‘good’ equilibrium 
occurred in times of high confidence and if the economies were performing well, 
while a ‘bad’ equilibrium would occur during times of low or deteriorating 
confidence succeeded by panic-induced bank runs and self-fulfilling crises. In this 
context the two authors recognized that the IMF failed to undertake specific 
measures in order to prevent liquidity problems, which could in turn become 
insolvency problems leading to financial collapse. 
3. ‘Systemic Financial Failure’: 
This last view identifies crisis causes systemic failures in the financial system, which 
was induced by moral hazard, over exuberance and panic, and capital account 
liberalization without providing proper regulation. This view is rather critical against 
the steps taken by the IMF and the approach taken in resolving the crisis 
contributing to the deepening of the crisis. Variations of this view can be found by 
Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b), Bhagwati (1998), Rodrik (1998) and Krugman (1998a, 
1998b) and for a criticism of the policies taken by the IMF, Martin Feldstein (1998). 
Supporters of this third view share as well some ideas of the second view including 
the view that macroeconomic fundamentals were strong before the crisis. The 
supporters believed that the opening of the capital account to short-term capital 
created large difficulties and questioned about the appropriateness of liberalizing 
and making convertible the capital account in order to get similar efficiency and 
productivity as liberalization in the trade of goods and services. Their central 
argument was related to ‘market failures’ (i.e. moral hazard, asymmetric 
information, adverse selection and adverse incentives) that can always be found in 
financial markets which involve forward contracts and that a removal of 
government guarantees for loans, an automatic ending of bailouts or increasing 
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transparency would not automatically stop market failures. Therefore capital or 
exchange controls might be one of the key long-term measures in order to prevent 
a replication of the crisis, which should be accompanied by strong prudential 
regulation and monitoring.  
 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) argue that financial contagion which has been 
intense in the past years has been characterized by a so-called ‘unholy trinity’: Firstly, a 
large surge of capital inflows in the economies; secondly, contagion comes as a surprise; 
thirdly and lastly, there is a leveraged common creditor. Furthermore they argue that the 
large surge of capital inflows in the economies is often reversed abruptly by a so-called 
‘sudden stop’; contagion comes as a shock as it seems that announcements which create 
chain reactions come as a surprise to financial markets; in order to spread the contagion 
inside the domestic market usually a common creditor, i.e. commercial banks, hedge 
funds, mutual funds or individual bondholders, was involved. They conclude that the three 
patterns could be seen in many financial crises over the past years and therefore 
governments could direct their attention to deal with these three identified characteristics. 
 
From the above explanations it can be seen that there are many competing views upon 
the causes of the crisis. The following two figures can be taken as examples on the 
disagreement of the underlying factors that caused the crisis, as they show how one event 
could lead to different opinions and views of the matter.  
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FIGURE 2.1 – Vulnerability in Southeast Asia 
 
Source: Jomo (1998, xiii) 
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FIGURE 2.2 – The Process Leading to the Crisis 
 
Source: Islam (2000, p. 14) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows a simple picture by Jomo (1998, xiii) who shows how opportunities for 
speculative currency attacks or vulnerabilities in the financial sector could be created. The 
path of the East Asian Crisis economies has been the one of financial liberalization 
promoting international capital flows leading to an inflationary asset price spiral. This 
figure shows no feedbacks, it is very simple and gives a rough and clear view. The second 
figure – Figure 2.2 – shows a more complex picture, a system of feedback. 
In summary, both Figure 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the causes of the crises, and demonstrate 
how broad and varied the reasons for the crises are and support the reasons as explained 
in the above. Furthermore, the starting point for explanations also varies. Therefore it is 
not surprising that the analytical models explaining the East Asian Crisis (grouped as 
‘third-generation crisis models’) differ in their construction.  An explanation of the 
analytical models will follow soon. 
 
In the first stage during and after the crisis there was a disagreement among economists 
about the causes of the crisis, especially between those claiming that there were problems 
in macroeconomic fundamentals, following therefore the opinion of the IMF and other 
Bretton Woods institutions, and those claiming that the crisis was mainly due to 
speculation, herding and a credit crunch in the economies. The third-generation models 
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exports 
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term loans and portfolio investment 
- Rapid growth of domestic credit 
- Currency and maturity mismatch in 
financial institutions’ portfolios 
- Oversupply and falling prices of real estate 
- Stock market bubble and meltdown 
- Rapid increase in non-performing loans 
Dramatic decline in stock market indices 
- Loss of confidence in the financial sector 
- Large capital flight/herd reaction 
- Relatively high interest rate to 
support exchange rate and 
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efforts 
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in pension and mutual funds in 
developed countries 
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presented later in this chapter show that macroeconomic fundamentals were not the main 
cause of the crisis in East Asia. Nowadays most economists agree that the crisis was not 
caused by ‘bad’ macroeconomic fundamentals and it is recognized that the East Asian 
Crisis was a kind of ‘liquidity’ crisis as it affected the liquidity of the private sector although 
there is some disagreement about the details. What can be seen from the discussion 
above is that there might not be one single factor but a set of different factors leading to 
the crisis: inflows of capital increased the fragility of the corporate and banking crisis to 
changes of expectations, problems within the institutional sector in the different countries 
like weaker regulations on banking supervision or incentives of foreign banks to invest in 
emerging market countries (like the Basel core standards), currency and maturity 
mismatches i.e. low incentives of corporations to hedge against their currency risk and the 
liberalization of capital flows in the late 1980s and 1990s. Finally, a currency system, 
which neglected the standard textbook description of the ‘trilemma’ in open economies 
and seemed to work well. 
 
2.2.2 Theoretical Models 
Until the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis the academic world evolved two different crisis 
models: the so-called ‘first-generation’ and ‘second-generation’ crisis models. However, 
the unprecedented development of the crisis in East Asia required the development of a 
new model, the so-called ‘third-generation’ crisis model. History shows that there is a 
tendency that only after the outbreak of a crisis new theoretical explanation will be 
developed and therefore lags behind reality. 
The following section will show the most important patterns of the first- and second-
generation crisis models while the third-generation crisis model will be explained in more 
detail as this theoretical model tries to explain the East Asian Crisis. 
 
A different view to crisis and their occurrence will be given by the ‘Financial Instability 
Hypothesis’ of Hyman Minsky. This very general theory, that follows financial 
Keynesianism, claims that capitalist systems are moving from more stable to unstable 
periods and that therefore not an exogenous shock is causing a crisis. This theory will be 
explained in the second part of this section. 
 
The last part of the section will summarize the theories. 
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2.2.2.1 The Three Generations of Crisis Models 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, different types of crises occurred. 
After those different economists tried to understand why these events happened and 
created some crisis models. The different crises models evolved over time in order to 
match the specific features of the crisis. According to the convention introduced by 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) they were grouped into ‘first-generation’ and 
‘second-generation’ and with the rise of the East Asian Crisis the ‘third-generation’ has 
been added.  
One shortcoming of these models is that they failed to predict upcoming crisis i.e. the 
first-generation crisis models help to explain the crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s while 
not giving insights to speculative attacks on currencies of the European Monetary System 
in 1992/1993. For the latter, academics developed the second-generation crisis models 
which again did not predict the rise of crisis in East Asia. The theoretical models trying to 
explain the East Asian Crisis are the so-called third-generation crisis models. 
There will be a short overview of the first-generation and second-generation crisis models 
and their key argumentation. A more detailed overview of the crisis literature of the first- 
and second-generation can be found in the paper by Flood and Marion (1998). Instead a 
detailed look will be given at the third-generation crisis models, which are of more interest 
as they try to formulate a theoretical model for understanding the East Asian Crisis. 
 
2.2.2.1.A First-Generation Crisis Model 
The first-generation crisis models were developed in order to understand the mechanisms 
of currency crisis in developing countries like Mexico (1973-1982) and Argentina (1978-
1981). 
Main contributions to this type of model can be found in Krugman (1979) and Flood and 
Garber (1984).  
The first-generation crisis models have the following patterns: 
A small country fixes the price of its currency with respect to a currency of a large foreign 
partner i.e. the central bank of the small country is pegging the exchange rate. In order to 
maintain the exchange rate the central bank backs domestic money supply by two central 
bank assets: domestic credit and international reserves. Additionally, domestic interest 
rates are equal to the foreign-currency interest rate and international reserves are used to 
balance the money market quantities. In order to understand the time of the attack a 
‘shadow exchange rate’ is introduced which is defined as the floating exchange rate that 
would prevail if speculators purchase the remaining stock of foreign resources or foreign 
exchange were all to be sold; this shadow exchange rate is important to assess the profits 
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available to speculators in a crisis because it is the price at which speculators sell the 
international reserves bought from the government. In this sense the shadow exchange 
rate balances the money market following an attack at which foreign exchange reserves 
are exhausted.  Therefore, a key point of the first-generation models is that at the time of 
a foreseen speculative attack the ‘domestic-currency interest rate’ has to jump upward in 
order to reflect prospective currency depreciation. Firstly, at the time of the attack the 
high-powered money supply drops by the size of the attack and secondly, the demand for 
domestic currency drops as the domestic-currency interest rate increases reflecting 
prospective currency depreciation. The attack time is influenced by the initial stock of 
reserves and the rate of credit expansion, i.e. a high rate of initial stock of reserves or a 
low rate of credit expansion will lead to a later time of collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
regime (Flood and Marion, 1998). 
As Krugman (2001) states there are three main features at the bottom of the discussion of 
this model: 
1. Krugmann (2001) argues that the crisis is formed based on poor government 
policy and the source of the upward trend of the shadow exchange rate is 
seignorage of the government. Therefore the remedy would be to solve the 
fiscal problems. The speculative attack is fuelled by inconsistent policies, which 
the government is pursuing i.e. persistent deficits combined with an exchange 
rate peg. 
‘So the models basically imply that governments get the crisis they deserve.’  
(Krugman, 2001, p.4) 
2. Although the crisis is sudden, it is deterministic and inevitable given the 
policies.  The timing of the attack (i.e. when the shadow exchange rate is equal 
or greater than the real exchange rate) can be predicted in theory although in 
practice, as the models admit, it might be very difficult. 
3. The first-generation crisis models lead to the result that there will be no 
recession, i.e. a worsening of the real economy in the post-crisis era is by 
construction of the first-crisis models not predictable as they only reveal that 
there is an economic problem that was there before (the crises in the 1970s 
seemed inevitable while the Latin American Crisis in 1982 was followed by a 
recession but the runs on the currency were combined with sovereign debt 
crisis). 
 
Flood and Marion (1998) add that any sterilization effort of the central bank cannot stave 
off the speculative attack if the plans of intervention are understood by the speculators. 
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This is true for any level of fixed exchange rate and any quantity of international reserves 
if there is free mobility of capital. Furthermore, if uncertainty is added to the models then 
the fixed exchange rate system provides speculators a free call option, where the fixed 
exchange rate is the strike price of the option and the international reserves backing the 
fixed exchange rate are the quantity optioned. 
 
2.2.2.1.B Second-Generation Crisis Model 
In the early 1990s new crises evolved: economies in Europe and in Mexico had to deal 
with speculative attacks against their currencies. This time at the bottom of the crisis were 
in contrast to first-generation crisis models not the seignorage of governments 
(governments maintained access to capital markets and monetary policy was determined 
by the macroeconomic policies and not by budget needs; most of the countries involved in 
the attacks maintained stable macroeconomic policies), the long-run upward trend of the 
shadow exchange rate and the link between capital flight and abandonment of the 
exchange rate peg. If first-generation crisis models are characterized by linearities of the 
behaviour of the private sector (money demand function) and the government (domestic 
credit growth) then second-generation crisis models have to be characterized by 
nonlinearities in behaviour leading to multiple solutions, i.e. the focus of second-
generation crisis models is on nonlinearities in government behaviour, how the 
government behaviour is influenced by changes in private behaviour or the reaction of 
government to changes in the trade-off between the fixed exchange-rate policy and other 
objectives. Furthermore, newer second-generation crisis models show that ‘even when 
policies are consistent with the fixed exchange rate, attack-conditional policy changes can 
pull the economy into an attack. In contrast, first-generation models generate an attack by 
having inconsistent policies before the attack [and] push the economy into a crisis.’ (Flood 
and Marion, 1998) Good examples of the characteristic of this kind of models are shown 
by Obstfeld (1994a, b) or in Flood and Marion (1998). 
Krugman (2001) shows two differences and one common point of the first- and second-
generation crisis models: 
1. Difference: Crises are not the result of irresponsible policies. The countries affected 
by the second-generation crisis were not pursuing unsustainable policies like 
exploiting seignorage. 
2. Difference: A crisis is not anymore deterministic. The crisis occurs suddenly and in 
a situation where no crisis seems inevitable. 
3. Commonality: If the peg will be abandoned due to a speculative attack this does 
not necessarily imply that there will be a negative shock on employment and 
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output, at least not in the short-run; in the first-generation crisis models a similar 
result can be found by construction they do not suggest a recession after the 
speculative attack.  Empirically this could be seen in Britain after the EMS crisis 
when Britain did quite well after leaving the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
 
According to Krugman (2001) the biggest change moving from first-generation to second-
generation crisis models has been the role of government policies leading to a crisis. While 
the first-generation crisis models describe a currency crisis that is predictable and not 
harmful for the economy, i.e. showing that government’s policies were unsustainable and 
making economic fundamentals visible, the second-generation crisis models cannot show 
clearly that the government triggered a crisis. The second-generation crises are less 
predictable but remained relatively harmless. 
Even a bigger change can be observed by moving from the second-generation to the 
third-generation crisis models: crises are no longer harmless to real economy (e.g. output, 
employment) and not anymore exclusively focusing on monetary policies as the 
interactions between a company’s balance sheets and the nominal exchange rate are 
becoming the main drivers of the crisis. 
Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) argue that first-generation and second-generation 
crisis models share the view that the government mismanagement of the economy and/or 
the lack of credibility of government actions form the basis of the crisis. 
 
2.2.2.1C Third-Generation Crisis Model 
The East Asian Crisis was in contrast to the preceding crises not driven by a 
mismanagement of the economy by the government and by a lack of credibility of 
government actions. As Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) argue most of the affected 
countries enjoyed government surpluses and increasing foreign exchange reserves, low 
unemployment and a booming export sector. Nevertheless, there seems to be evidence of 
a lack of regulation of the financial sector in these countries. Furthermore, the authors 
argue that a lack of transparency in the financial sector was known among market 
participants and most of the countries recovered very fast, not experiencing interest rates 
significantly higher than in the period before the crisis and without a significant overhaul 
of the financial sector. 
According to Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) the third-generation models, 
developed after the East Asian Crisis, have in common the idea that a shock can be 
amplified by the so-called ‘financial accelerator mechanism’ (Bernanke et al., 1999). Some 
models (e.g. Aghion et al., 1999a, and b) introduce a real shock that is amplified while 
  75
other models introduce multiple equilibria where the crisis is caused by a pure shift in 
expectations (e.g. Krugman, 1999a; Chang and Velasco, 1999). As Ahgion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2001) point out the common feature of the models is that ‘a real currency 
depreciation can have a large effect on output if it affects the credit access of some subset 
of agents; moreover this effect on output may in turn affect the exchange rate, further 
amplifying the shock and causing it to persist.’ 
The three contributions to the third-generation crisis models by Ahgion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2000; 2001; 2004), Chang and Velasco (1998a,b) respectively Cèspedes, Chang 
and Velasco (2000) and Krugman (1999a,b; 2001) will be discussed next, giving an 
overview of the models and showing their major results. It is worth mentioning, that all 
the papers demonstrate that there are multiple equilibriums (in Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2000; 2001) but only one equilibria is analyzed with the exception of the paper 
of Cèspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) where the model has a unique equilibrium to an 
interest rate shock under flexible wages. 
 
2.2.2.1C.a Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000; 2001; 2004) 
Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee constructed over time two slightly different third-
generation crisis models: The first papers (Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2000 and 
2001) analyze unique equilibria on condition that monetary policies have only real effects 
through changes in the real exchange rate while the last paper (Ahgion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee, 2004) discusses a model where multiple equilibria are possible and monetary 
policies have real effects on the cost of lending. Both types of the third-generation crisis 
models will be discussed here. 
 
2.2.1.C.a1 Ahgion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000; 2001) 
The first type of third-generation crisis model discussed in this paragraph is an infinite-
horizon monetary model of a small open economy with the following characteristics: 
- Goods prices are determined at the beginning of each period; they remain fixed for 
the entire period. 
- A single good is produced and purchasing power parity (PPP) holds ex ante. 
- A shock occurs in period one after the price of that period has been set: the shock 
may be real (e.g. change in productivity or competitiveness or risk perceptions of 
bondholders) or it may be a pure shift in expectations; PPP will deviate after the 
shock, i.e. prices will not move during period one, therefore the nominal exchange 
rate will move and absorb the shock. 
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- Credit markets are imperfect: The authors assume identical entrepreneurs in the 
economy that face a credit limit that is a fixed multiple of their current real wealth 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) and the wealth of the entrepreneurs determines 
investment and output. 
- Other things are standard: Output is produced by using capital; the production 
function has standard concave shape; there is full capital mobility and uncovered 
interest parity holds; there can be a floating or fixed exchange rate; consumers 
need money for their transactions; the central bank can change the interest rate or 
the exchange rate by using money supply.  
- The timing of the events in the model is following: The price level will be preset in 
the first period and firms will invest. Then an unanticipated shock occurs and the 
monetary sector adjusts by changing nominal interest rates which have to be paid 
in period two (interest rates are set for one period ahead in this model) and the 
nominal exchange rate changes (if the exchange rate is not fixed). Thereafter, 
output and profit of period one are generated and the debt of the firms repaid. A 
fraction of net retained earnings after debt repayment are saved for the investment 
in period two.  The periods following period one are identical to the first period 
with the exception that after period two no further shock occurs and the economy 
converges to steady state. 
 
Next, basic equations of the model presented in the paper of Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2001; the model in the paper presented in 2000 is a simple precursor of the 
model presented here) will be shown: 
- The interest parity condition: 
 
Where  is the domestic short term nominal interest rate,  is the foreign rate 
(assumed constant over time) and  is the expected nominal exchange rate at 
the beginning of period . 
- The money market equilibrium expressed by the LM-equation: 
 
where  is the nominal money supply at time ,  is the domestic price and 
 is the standard real money demand function that consumers face 
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(properties and assumptions of the function  are: it is increasing in , 
decreasing in  and ) 
- The equation determining the inflation rate: 
 
Where  denotes the inflation rate,  denotes the rate of nominal money supply 
growth between periods  and  such that . 
- The interest rate in period one which adjusts to equilibrate the money market is 
determined in the following way: 
 
Where  is the inverse of the  function with respect to  and the relationship 
between  and  is negative due to the standard liquidity effect. Therefore both 
variables can be used for a discussion of the effect of monetary policy in period 
one. 
- Output functions: 
Current output is a function of the current wealth of the entrepreneurs whenever 
the credit constraint allows this, i.e. at date  entrepreneurs can borrow up to the 
amount  which is proportional to their cash flow , where  
denotes current real wealth and  denotes the credit multiplier which is assumed 
to be constant - ; furthermore the entrepreneurs can borrow in domestic 
currency at interest rate  or in foreign currency at , and can be written as 
. Additionally, the domestic investors face a choice between 
domestic and foreign currency debt, where the former is assumed to be  in 
period . 
The aggregate nominal profits net of debt repayment at the end of any period  
can then be expressed as . For 
any positive profits the entrepreneurs retain a proportion  of profits and use 
this share to finance future investments. Therefore, total net wealth available for 
the next production period  is equal zero (i.e. net profits in period  are 
negative) or . 
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From above second period output  follows to be 
 
Where  is the real interest rate defined as  and .  
There can be seen that output reacts negatively on an increase in the debt burden 
induced by a currency depreciation (i.e. by an increase of ) while changes in the 
nominal interest rate  do not affect the debt burden in period 1 and output in 
period 2 because the interest rate  is only applying to the second period and will 
affect the cost of domestic currency debt and therefore the debt burden in period 2 
positively and output in period 3 negatively. 
Third period output can be written as 
 
In addition, for any  output  can be written as 
 
Where the PPP condition continues to hold but the discrepancy between  and  
no longer affects the total debt burden of entrepreneurs (i.e. domestic and foreign 
currency debt become equivalent). 
- Equilibrium of this model is therefore a sequence of prices, exchange rates and 
output levels, which for a given monetary policy in period one satisfy the above 
equations for all . 
- Next, the authors show that the relationship of the current exchange rate  and 
period-2 output  is negative, i.e. 
 (IPLM – ‘Interest-Parity-LM’ – curve) 
In addition, there can be seen that an increase in (expected) future output  
increases the demand for money (i.e. for domestic currency) in period two, which 
in turn will generate a nominal currency appreciation in that period, i.e. a reduction 
in . Moreover, the anticipation of a currency appreciation in the next period 
will increase the demand for holding domestic currency in this period and induces a 
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reduction in  i.e. a currency appreciation. Changes in monetary policies in period 
 can shift the IPLM-curve. 
The second curve for equilibrium is given by the second period output equation 
shown before which can be written as 
 (W-curve) 
The intersection of the aforementioned curves defines the short-run equilibrium. 
- The authors define that a sufficient condition for multiple equilibria, which includes 
a ‘currency crisis’ equilibrium, is that  or 
. Therefore, in the case of multiple equilibria, 
the crisis could be activated by a pure expectational shift, i.e. if everyone believes 
that a crisis will occur then a crisis will occur. 
- Looking at the slope of the W-curve it can be seen that in an intermediate 
situation, where  is neither 0 nor very large, a substantial amount of borrowing 
is outstanding but credit constraint still holds, and the W-curve can be downward-
sloping and relatively flat which happens in currency crises. Therefore currency 
crises can be associated with countries where development of financial markets is 
on an intermediate level. 
Additionally, as the authors show in their paper, an expansionary policy can only be 
justified in situations where the W-curve is upward sloping i.e., in a situation where 
no currency crisis occurs and therefore in a currency crisis the only possible 
monetary policy is tight one. 
 
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee conclude with five main findings: 
1. A currency crisis associated with large recessions and currency devaluations is 
more likely to occur in an economy where a large proportion of foreign 
currency debt can be found. 
2. Because the main contributor to a currency crisis analyzed in the paper 
presented are deteriorating balance sheets it can be deduced that a currency 
crisis can occur under a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime. 
3. Public sector imbalances can destabilize domestic currencies through crowding-
out effects of public debt on balance sheets and credit access of private firms. 
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4. If credit supply does not strongly react to changes in nominal interest rate then 
it is desirable to increase nominal interest rates as a primary remedy against 
currency crisis. 
5. Tight monetary policy produces a ‘debt-burden effect’ on economic activity on 
the medium term. 
 
The follow section will demonstrate the second type of the third-generation crisis model 
constructed by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004). 
 
2.2.1.C.a2 Ahgion Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004) 
As mentioned above, this model is different from the one considered previously as in this 
paper the authors assume a monetary policy that affects the real cost of lending on the 
basis of optimal choice of cash holdings by banks that are lending; furthermore, the 
authors analyze in this paper exclusively the situation of multiple equilibrium. 
The setting of the model is following: 
- There is an infinite-horizon monetary model of a small open economy analyzed. 
- There are four types of agents in the economy (entrepreneurs producing 
manufacturing goods; non-entrepreneurs working in the manufacturing sector at a 
preset wage or working on their own and producing commodities according to a 
linear one-for-one technology; commercial banks lending to entrepreneurs and 
holding reserves; central bank deciding about the monetary policy by using open 
market operations or short term lending facilities). 
- The manufacturing sector is characterized by the production of differentiated 
goods but by using the same production function and inverse demand function; by 
presetting prices for each period before the actual exchange rate is known and 
maintaining the price fixed until the end of each period; by the borrowing from 
banks whereas a credit contract is only enforceable partially creating a credit 
constraint for the companies. Furthermore the companies prefer to borrow in 
foreign currency due to moral hazard and the domestic demand for manufacturing 
goods is always larger than their domestic production (international producers sell 
in the domestic market at a constant price equal to one unit of the foreign 
currency). 
- If unexpected currency depreciation occurs then it has a negative aggregate 
impact on the output as it increases the foreign currency debt burden in this 
model.  
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- The existence of a multiple expectation equilibria, i.e. a ‘sunspot’ equilibrium is 
realized which causes a shift of expectations during the period. A currency crisis in 
this model occurs if the exchange rate takes the high value of  (  defines the 
equilibrium exchange rate in period 1 which is randomly distributed and equal to a 
low value  with probability  and to a high value  with probability ) and 
the manufacturing output is low and firms are unable to meet their debt 
obligations. 
- Purchasing power parity (PPP) holds ex ante at the beginning of every period. The 
only deviation from PPP will be in period 1 in the manufacturing sector when the 
expectational shock cannot be accommodated at once by the domestic price 
setting in the manufacturing sector. 
- The timing of the events in the model is as follows: The price level in the 
manufacturing sector will be preset at the beginning of each period  for the entire 
period; the other variables are determined at the end of the period.  
As soon as the expectational shock occurs a nominal exchange rate  is realized.  
Subsequently the monetary policy set by the central bank will change influencing 
the demand for reserves  from commercial banks and the lending rate  
charged by banks to firms in period . Then, entrepreneurs decide if they 
should repay their debts from the previous period and choose the fraction  of 
their net earnings that they will save. Having decided about the savings  the 
entrepreneurs will decide how much to borrow for the subsequent period ( ) and 
how much to invest ( ). The authors concentrate on expectational shocks 
on the nominal exchange rate  that occur in the first period with an unique 
equilibrium exchange rate in all subsequent periods. 
- The production of manufacturing goods is achieved according to the same Cobb-
Douglas technology for all manufacturing firms. Furthermore, in this paper the 
attention is restricted to parameter values such that in equilibrium entrepreneurs 
do indeed prefer to invest their savings in their own projects rather than in 
government bonds or in bank deposits. Additionally, it is assumed that 
manufacturing prices are fixed but the domestic currency price of commodities is 
assumed to be flexible in any period  and simply equal to  (  denotes the 
foreign currency commodity price). 
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- Full capital mobility is assumed such that uncovered interest parity (IP) holds 
perfectly (  - IP). Furthermore, the model relies heavily on a 
balance-sheet effect of Bernanke-Gertler (1989) which is shown in this model by a 
positive relation between  and . Credit contracts are considered as being only 
partially enforceable, the borrower has the option of voluntarily defaulting on any 
specific loan even if he has the money to repay (i.e. the borrower can refuse to 
repay the loan). Loan contracts are short term and there is perfect competition 
among lenders (entrepreneurs have therefore full bargaining power upon 
contracting their loans). And last of all , as mentioned previously, companies prefer 
to borrow in foreign currency due to moral hazard (i.e. foreign currency debt 
implies a lower interest rate in the good state of the world but a much larger 
repayment in the bad state where firms default and only partially repay their debt). 
 
The basic equations of this model can be summarized in the following way: 
- The monetary sector can be described by some equations: 
Optimal demand for reserves by commercial banks 
 
where  is the quantity of reserve deposits of banks held at the central 
bank and  is the opportunity cost of holding these reserve deposits;  is 
the liquidity need of the firm which is proportional to the amount borrowed 
by the firm ( );  is the probability that a manufacturing firm faces an 
aggregate liquidity shock (and therefore this is the probability at which the 
bank needs to provide the liquidity need  to the firm), and  is the 
penalty rate at which banks can borrow at the discount window.  
The LM relationship is then 
 
Where  is the nominal quantity of reserves supplied by the central bank 
and  is the consumer price index for domestic manufactured goods. 
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Assuming that changes in monetary policy are unanticipated in period one, 
the price level is fixed and from the equations above the interest rate in 
period one can be rewritten as 
 
Here it can be seen that the central bank can increase the nominal risk-free 
interest rate  by decreasing the monetary base  or by increasing the 
discount window rate . 
The cost of the loan under perfect competition is equal to net expected 
nominal earnings in domestic currency units (banks lend to manufacturing 
firms at a nominal interest rate  in foreign currency units) 
 
where  is the probability that banks retrieve the full loan plus 
interest,  is the probability that the firm defaults and in that case the 
bank gets the proportion of the profits net of wage payments of the firm of 
, and  and  are the inflation respectively real interest rate at 
date . Using the interest parity and the above equations the nominal 
interest rate can be reformulated in the following way 
 
Where  denotes the credit multiplier. From this equation it  can be seen 
that  is depending on the risk-free rate   and indirectly on the supply of 
reserves  and directly on the discount window . 
Lastly, the IPLM-curve is 
 
Assuming that , it can be seen from the IPLM-curve that  is a 
decreasing function in . 
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- The real sector can be described by the W-curve which is a combination of 
the entrepreneurs’ wealth in period two and three and the fact that 
 and therefore 
This curve has three different segments (an upward sloping, downward 
sloping and again an upward sloping segment with different impacts on 
output and real interest rate). 
- One interesting result of the equilibrium analysis from the three authors is 
that they conclude that countries with very low levels of financial 
development (i.e. a very low  and a high ) are unlikely to experience 
expectational shocks and currency crises while countries at an intermediate 
level of financial development (i.e.  is not too small or  is not too large 
but where firms are still credit-constrained) may experience currency crises. 
- Finally, the authors look at the policy analysis in the equilibrium, i.e. looking 
at two intersections of the IPLM- and W-curve which are stable (one is a 
crisis equilibrium and the other a non-crisis equilibrium). They conclude that 
in the non-crisis equilibrium a fixed exchange rate is sustained while in the 
crisis-equilibrium it is not. This is a very interesting and important result, 
however the model is simplified and therefore the results have to be used 
with caution. 
 
Summarizing, it can be said that the above models lend support to the policies used by the 
IMF during the East Asian Crisis (e.g. shift from a fixed exchange rate to a floating 
exchange rate or tight monetary policy as happened in Indonesia in 1997/98). 
The next paragraphs will show two other types of third-generation crisis models. 
 
2.2.2.1C.b Chang and Velasco (1998a, b) and Cèspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) 
The two papers by Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b) are a simple attempt to explain the 
causes of the East Asian Crisis by focusing on the liquidity problems of the domestic 
financial system and the financial system (i.e. exchange rates, banking system and role of 
central banks). The paper by Cèspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) differs from the two 
mentioned before as it analyzes explicitly the relation between balance sheets, exchange 
rates and macroeconomic outcomes in small open economies. Furthermore, the authors 
incorporate one effect, the Bernanke-Gertler effect, which is a common and crucial point in 
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all papers discussed in this section. This section will focus on the model proposed by 
Cèspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000). 
The model can be characterized as follows: 
- The object of investigation is an infinite-horizon, small and open economy, 
where one single good is produced by competitive firms, which use labour 
and capital and sell or export the good to agents. There are two different 
agents, workers and capitalists, who supply labour and capital; the agents 
consume and in the case of capitalists they invest (both at home and in the 
single imported good). The capitalists borrow from foreigners the difference 
of their own net worth and the amount needed to invest. Therefore, as 
mentioned before, one crucial point in this paper is the Bernanke-Gertler 
effect (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) which states that the cost of borrowing 
depends inversely on net worth relative to the amount borrowed. 
- Domestic production is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas function 
, where  denotes home output in period ,  
denotes capital input,  denotes labour input and  is a positive constant. 
The price is taken as given and workers are heterogeneous. Therefore,  
is an aggregate of the services of the different workers in the economy and 
can be written as  and where  denotes the index 
for workers,  denotes the services purchased from worker  and  
denotes the elasticity of demand for worker  services. 
Firms face a problem of maximization of their profits and therefore 
minimum cost of a unit of  (i.e. aggregate wage) is  
and where  is the worker  wage rate. 
In equilibrium, factor prices are equal to the marginal productivities which is 
 and  and where  is the price of the good 
produced domestically and  the rate of return of capital. 
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Furthermore, cost minimization leads to the demand of labour of worker  
of ; profits are zero in equilibrium. 
- The Workers: The model assumes a market for labour which is 
characterized by monopolistic competition and allows therefore for nominal 
wage rigidities and some monetary policies; this assumption will be relaxed 
first (i.e. flexible wages) and then strengthened (i.e. fixed wages). The 
preferences of worker  are characterized by  
where the elasticity of labour is characterized by  and  is a 
constant. 
Consumption quantity  is an aggregate of goods imported and produced 
domestically and is  where  denotes the purchases 
of the good produced domestically,  is the consumption of the imported 
good and  is an irrelevant constant. 
The imported good is assumed to have a fixed price and normalized to one 
in terms of foreign currency. Moreover imports are assumed to be traded 
freely and the Law of One Price holds, i.e. the price of imports in domestic 
currency is equal to the nominal exchange rate . 
Additionally, the budget constraint of worker  is  and 
the real exchange rate  can be defined as .  
Therefore, the minimum cost of one unit of consumption is  and 
it can be shown that for flexible wages  and for sticky wages  
(where the notation  denotes the expectation of variable  
conditional on information available at time  - this notation is used for the 
whole model) 
- The Capitalists: The authors define the capitalists as key players in their 
model because they finance the investments in part by foreign loans and 
foreign borrowing is subject to frictions (frictions can be due to 
informational or enforcement problems). The net worth of capitalists in 
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period  is  (expressed in local currency) and they have access to the 
world capital market where the safe interest rate of the foreign currency 
borrowed from  to  is given by  (which is random but known in 
). 
The budget constraint of capitalists is given by  where 
 denotes the amount borrowed abroad and  is the investment of 
capital in . 
More important is the fact, that capitalists are not borrowing at the safe 
world interest rate  but borrow at the gross interest rate 
 where  is a risk premium. Therefore, following 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the risk premium is given by 
. This equation shows that the risk 
premium is an increasing function of the value of investment relative to net 
worth and  has the form . 
Moreover, capitalists are risk neutral and they choose  and  in 
order to equate the return on investment to the cost of foreign borrowing 
(assumption: in production capital depreciates completely). 
The expected return on investment is equal to the cost of foreign borrowing 
and is . 
The capitalists collect the income from capital and repay foreign debt at the 
beginning of the period. Furthermore, they consume a portion  of the 
rest and consume only imported goods. Therefore their net worth is defined 
as  or 
.  The authors note, that by holding real 
income constant, a real devaluation will be defined as an increase in 
 and will have a negative impact on net worth and increase the 
risk premium. Furthermore if  i.e., all capital is composed of foreign 
goods then the risk premium would be independent of the real exchange 
rate. The reason for this is that the productive assets and liabilities of the 
capitalists in the domestic economy consist of different goods, changes in 
relative prices affect their creditworthiness. 
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- Equilibrium: The domestic output must be equal to domestic demand where 
the domestic supply, i.e., market for domestically produced goods is 
characterized by the equation  and the demand 
i.e., the clearing of consumption is  where  is 
some random process of the value of home exports in foreign currency 
which is also exogenous. 
The monetary side of the model is not explicitly defined in the paper of 
Cèspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000). 
 
Next, the equations of the steady state, the interaction of interest rate shocks and flexible 
wages, and exchange rate policy under sticky wages will be demonstrated: 
- In steady state  and prices are normalized to ; therefore the 
nominal exchange rate  coincides with the real exchange rate  and the 
cost of investment  is measured by the price of the domestic output. The 
steady state can be characterized by the following equations: 
,  , , , , 
 and . 
Here it can be shown that an unique, nontrivial steady state exists by 
rearranging some equations which leads to 
 and as  cannot be equal to  if net 
worth is positive,  must be equal to 1 or . 
If  then a value for  is required i.e.,  must be small 
enough. 
Furthermore, the value of investment in steady state is equal to the fraction 
of capital income that is not consumed and therefore . 
Now, a kind of ‘IS-Curve’ in the steady state can be constructed and has the 
form of . 
In steady state , i.e. income invested is equal to the value 
of capital bought and can be rewritten as  which is a 
hyperbola in  space and it can be seen that a unique positive solution 
exists. 
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The ratio of the value of investment to the value of foreign debt in steady 
state is crucial and depends only on the risk premium and the parameter 
, which is illustrated by the following equation  
. 
Lastly, the equations characterizing the equilibrium around the steady state 
can be expressed in a log-linearized manner (independently of sticky or 
flexible wages) and are as follows: 
-  - the production function, 
-  - the definition of the price index, 
-  - the market equilibrium for 
domestic goods, 
-  - the interest 
arbitrage equation, 
-  - the 
equation of the evolution of the risk premium, 
Where ,  and lower case letters 
denote the percentage deviation from steady state values and  and  
denote deviations from their steady state levels. 
The last equation can be re written in the following way 
 
Where . From this equation it can be seen that the change in the 
risk premium can be decomposed into three effects (right-hand side): First, 
the exogenous shocks to export demands; the second is a similar effect and 
reflects increases of outputs measured in foreign currency; the third and 
last effect reflects the unexpected changes in net worth. 
It should be noted, that by holding constant the previous expectations, a 
fall in output in foreign currency due to a real devaluation (an increase in 
) or a reduction in domestic output (a fall in ) may be associated with 
either an increase or a decrease of the risk premium .  
- Interest rate shocks with flexible wages: If wages are assumed to be 
flexible, and hence , and all shocks are independently and identically 
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distributed it can be demonstrated that investment in period 0 and output in 
period one must fall with a real devaluation (an increase in ), i.e. the 
interest arbitrage reduces in period 0 to  and 
the output function to .  
The risk premium in period 0 is then  where 
 is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to a 
change in the real exchange rate. Furthermore, it is essential to distinguish 
between financial robust (i.e. those with ) and financial vulnerable 
economies (i.e. ). Intuitively, balance sheet effects are not strong in 
robust economies while being large in vulnerable economies. Additionally, 
the definition of financial robustness by using  depends on the size of  
with respect to  and in particular, when the steady state ratio of 
debt to investment (i.e. ) is large, then  is also large and the 
economy is more likely to be financial vulnerable. 
Next, the authors introduce a so-called ‘EE-curve’ which is an important 
relation between the real exchange rates in period 0 and 1 and can be 
written as , where the slope of this EE-curve in 
the  space may be positive or negative depending on the sign and 
magnitude of . 
The next relation between  and  is the so-called ‘FF-curve’ which is 
derived from the fact that from period 1 onwards, the economy must be on 
a saddle path and converging to the steady state; the relation can be 
written as . As before, the slope may be positive 
or negative depending on the elasticity . 
Looking at the response of the real exchange rates  and  to an interest 
rate shock  is the intersection of the EE- and FF-curves and the solutions 
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can be written as  and , where 
. 
In financial robust economies a real devaluation in period 0 lowers the risk 
premium. Therefore, an unanticipated increase of world interest rates 
causes a real depreciation, which is reversed in the next period. The 
domestic output will then fall in period one, as well as the output in foreign 
currency value.  The latter is only temporary as it is already above steady 
state levels in period one and will return to steady state levels while  
rises. To summarize, the response of financial robust economies is rather 
conventional and balance sheet effects are rather small. 
In financial vulnerable economies a real devaluation in period 0 increases 
the risk premium. However, the response of the economy depends on the 
parameter of the economy and two possible situations can emerge: Firstly, 
the real devaluation might have an impact on the sensitivity of the initial 
real exchange rate to movements in world interest rates but the qualitative 
behaviour of the domestic output is the same as in the robust economy. 
The debt ratio  and risk premium  increase with initial depreciation and 
therefore the output in foreign currency must fall in period one while 
converging thereafter to the saddle path. In period one the real exchange 
rate may be below or above the steady state level. Consequently, 
convergence starts and the output in foreign currency increase while the 
risk premium falls.  Secondly, it could be possible that  and therefore 
large values of  would be possible. This would imply that an increase in 
interest rates would cause an initial appreciation of the home currency. 
Although it is counterintuitive it is logically possible if there are large enough 
balance sheet effects. Furthermore, the risk premium  has to fall while 
the investment in period 0, output in period one and output in foreign 
currency in periods 0 and one all have to increase in response to the shock. 
Empirically this last case is questionable although logically possible. 
To summarize, the balance sheet effects exist in financial robust economies 
but are mild and therefore the response of an economy to an interest rate 
shock is similar to the conventional view. In contrast, large balance sheet 
effects cause an increase of the risk premium and a devaluation, such that 
the vulnerable economy depends on parameter effects – with the exception 
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of empirically implausible situations the response of a vulnerable economy 
to interest rate shocks are more persistent contractions of domestic output 
and output in foreign currency. 
- Sticky wages and exchange rate policy: The assumption is that nominal 
wages are predetermined for one period, and allowed to move to market-
clearing levels thereafter. This assumption ensures that monetary policies 
have real effects. The pre-set wage in period  must be  and the 
demand for labour is . Starting from steady state in period 0 
a kind of simple expectational Phillips-curve can be constructed which has 
the form . Further assumptions include that 
shocks are independently and identically distributed and that after period 
one all variables are free to adjust, from  onwards the equilibrium of 
the model is identical to the one described just before, where the economy 
settles on the saddle path and converges to the steady state. 
Looking at flexible exchange rates, it can be seen that the real exchange 
rate conditional to the price targeting rule for keeping the price level 
constant in response to shocks (i.e.  for all ) is  for all 
, i.e. all movements in the nominal exchange rate are fully translated into 
movements in the real exchange rate. Additionally, there can be shown, 
that nominal and real wages are always at their steady state level and 
labour supply is constant and equal to its steady state level of one. 
Therefore, the economy behaves in this case just as in the flexible wages 
case and hence, all results of the previous section apply here. 
Looking at fixed exchange rates, which means that  for all  and 
, i.e. real depreciations (appreciations) can only be accomplished 
by deflation (inflation). Assuming an unexpected increase of the world real 
interest rate at time 0 the initial output will be  and using the 
equilibrium labour the equation can be rewritten as 
, i.e. because of fixed wages in nominal terms, 
the real wage will fall and output will increase if there is unexpected 
inflation.  The level of investment in period 0 is then 
 and solving for  the equation 
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becomes  such that unexpected inflation 
must increase investment. Intuitively, with fixed exchange rates inflation 
means appreciation and therefore the domestic goods value of exports 
decrease, leaving more room for investment.  Additionally, unexpected 
inflation increases output and investment, too. 
Next, the risk premium can be derived:   
; the response of 
the risk premium on a real devaluation depends on the relative size of  
and , the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the initial real 
exchange rate is the same with flexible wages, scaled up by . Intuitively 
this can be explained by the following: an increase of real exchange rates 
reduces net worth and this pushes the risk premium (i.e. the burden of 
foreign debt increases and the output and capital income reduces). These 
effects have the same sign due to the fixed exchange rates i.e. a real 
depreciation is accompanied by deflation, which reduces output. 
In a financially robust economy, a real devaluation in period 0 reduces the 
risk premium. An increase in the world interest rate causes an initial real 
depreciation, which is reversed in the next period via an unexpected price 
deflation in period 0. The deflation decreases in period 0 the domestic 
output, investment and therefore in period one output falls. The output in 
foreign currency falls because of real depreciation and the fall of domestic 
output; this fall is temporary and is already above its steady state level in 
period one.  Next  rises and output in foreign currency falls until reaching 
steady state. 
In a financially vulnerable economy the shock could have positive or 
negative implications, depending on , i.e. if  is positive, then the interest 
rate shock causes a real devaluation on impact which is accompanied by an 
unexpected deflation and output contracts; if  is negative then the reverse 
occurs. 
Hence, it can be seen that in the case of sticky wages it is not the degree of 
financial stability of the economy, which is important, but rather the 
adjustment process to the adverse interest rate shock requires a real 
appreciation or devaluation. It can be shown that an expected real 
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depreciation and the fall of output are larger under fixed exchange rates 
when compared with flexible exchange rates. If the interest rate shock is 
followed by a real appreciation than a larger expansion of domestic output 
would be in the case of fixed exchange rates. 
- Finally, it should be mentioned, that this model shows that financial fragility 
alone does not imply a shift to fixed exchange rates and that the model has 
some limitations (e.g. households cannot access capital markets) which 
should be considered in the analysis. 
 
This model has shown a different approach to explain the events leading to the East Asian 
Crisis in 1997/1998. The last third-generation model discussed here will be the one 
proposed by Krugman (1999a, b; 2001). 
 
2.2.2.1C.c Krugman (1999a, b; 2001) 
In this section the so-called ‘cartoon version’ of Krugman’s proposed third-generation crisis 
model will be shown. The more detailed version of this model can be found in Krugman 
(1999a). The model in the paper of 2001 is nearly the same as Krugman 1999b.  
According to Krugman (1999b) the Mundell-Fleming model could be used to describe the 
crisis; the basic model consists of the following three equations: 
(1) ; Aggregate demand equation relating domestic 
spending to real income and interest rate and net exports that depend on the 
real exchange rate; 
(2) ; Money-demand equation 
(3) ; Interest-arbitrage equation (with risk-neutral investors and static 
expectations about the exchange rate). 
As this model is too simple to describe the situation in East Asia in a satisfactory way, the 
first equation could be modified into the following, adding a strong open-economy 
Bernanke-Gertler effect, 
(1’) , 
Where firms are highly leveraged, a substantial part of their debt is denominated in 
foreign currency, and their investment will be constrained by their balance sheets. In this 
modified equation the domestic demand depends directly on the real exchange rate. 
The modified model implies that at favourable real exchange rates only few firms have 
constrained balance sheets and the direct effect on aggregate demand would be small.  
However, at unfavourable real exchange rates companies would be unable to invest and 
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the direct effect on aggregate demand would be substantial. The consequence of this is a 
corporate sector which is bankrupt, unable to invest and where only small firms and 
farmers would be benefiting from a weak currency. The middle course would outweigh the 
direct effect of the competitive position on exports and as such the depreciation would 
lead to a contraction rather than an expansion of the economy (Krugman (1999b)).  
These results lead to no clear policy prescription and suggest difficulties in choosing the 
right policies, which was true in the real world as there are many discussions upon the 
adequacy of the policies imposed by the IMF. 
 
One common feature of the models just presented is the economic theory they are 
adopting.  In this sense they represent monetarist views about the crisis. The last part of 
this chapter will show a completely different view which argues that financial crisis are 
intrinsic in capitalist economies as explained by the theories of Hyman Minsky. 
 
2.2.2.2 The ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ by Hyman P. Minsky 
Hyman P. Minsky (1919-1996) could be defined as a fellow of ‘financial Keynesianism’ 
(Papadimitriou and Wray, 1997) as he interpreted the main thoughts of Keynes ‘General 
Theory’ in such a way to incorporate it in  financial systems and institutions. In contrast to 
the views given by Smith and Walras which assume that the economy is constantly an 
equilibrium seeking and sustaining system, he argues that the economy is moving over 
time from a robust structure to a fragile structure in other words from stability to 
instability. 
One of the most important theoretical developments of Hyman P. Minsky is the ‘financial 
instability hypothesis’ which is applicable to capitalist economies with complex financing of 
long-lived capital assets. Minsky (1992) claims that ‘from time to time, capitalist economies 
exhibit inflations and debt deflations, which seem to have the potential to spin out of 
control’. He characterizes the economy as a capitalist economy where expensive capital 
assets and a complex and sophisticated financial system prevail. The development of 
capital in the economy is characterized by the exchange of present money for future 
money and therefore the balance sheets of companies reflect the development of capital 
and the future expectations about their flows of money. Minsky (1992) claims further that 
‘in a capitalist economy the past, the present, and the future are linked not only by capital 
assets and labour force characteristics but also by financial relations’; furthermore, he 
argues that ‘the much greater participation of national governments in assuring that 
finance does not degenerate as in the 1929-1933 period means that the down side 
vulnerability of aggregate profit flows has been much diminished’ (Minsky, 1992, p. 5). 
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The focus of the theory from Minsky deals with financial interactions in an economy, 
included in the analysis are banks and financial intermediaries. According to Minsky (1992, 
p. 6) ‘[T]he financial instability hypothesis […] is a theory of the impact of debt on system 
behaviour and incorporates the manner in which debt is validated’. Minsky distinguishes in 
his paper three different finance forms: 
1. ‘Hedge financing units’: The subjects using these finance instruments can fulfil all 
contractual payment obligations by their cash flows. A large weight of equity with 
respect to liabilities in the balance sheet is an indicator for hedge financing units. 
2. ‘Speculative financing units’: These subjects can meet usually the payment of 
interests but not the principal and they need to ‘rollover’ their liabilities. 
3. ‘Ponzi units’: These subjects can pay neither the interest nor the principal of their 
outstanding liabilities. In order to fulfil their obligations they can sell assets or 
borrow further liabilities. By borrowing additional funds or selling assets in order to 
fulfil contractual obligations these subjects decrease the margin of safety of the 
debt holders. 
The outcome of the classification of the financial funds into these three groups, according 
to Minsky, shows how vulnerable an economy is. 
 
‘It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and 
containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood 
that the economy is a deviation amplifying system.’  (Minsky, 1992, p. 7) 
 
This leads Minsky to formulate two theorems: 
 
‘The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it 
is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis 
is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.’  (Minsky, 1992, pp. 7-8) 
 
He concludes that over time a capitalist system moves into different stages of stability, this 
means that from a time of stability i.e. where hedge finance dominates they move to a 
period of more instability where speculative and Ponzi finance dominate. 
One important point made in this paper is worth mentioning as it shows some similarities 
to the policies applied by some East Asian governments during the crisis (e.g. Indonesia 
under the IMF). 
‘[…] if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities 
attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net 
worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced 
to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.’  (Minsky, 1992, p. 
8) 
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As Minsky stresses the financial instability hypothesis is not based on exogenous shocks 
but on changes that are due to the ‘internal dynamics of capitalist economies’ and due to 
‘the system of interventions and regulations that are designed to keep the economy 
operating within reasonable bounds’ (Minsky, 1992, p. 8). 
Although not being very formal this ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ can give a wider 
explanation on the events in East Asia. The two theorems quoted above try to explain the 
causes of ‘instable’ periods happen. Minsky focuses more on the grouping and the 
respective characteristics. As a result he concludes that specific policies should not be 
applied (see last quote) in order to prevent a deterioration of an instable position. 
The theories of Hyman P. Minsky are an interesting starting point for a different 
explanation of the East Asian crisis as they show how a changing weight of the three 
financial forms can lead to instable economic periods. However, it is not very accurate and 
must be integrated (as in the case of East Asia) by interactions of financial markets and its 
behaviour as well as international financial transactions (e.g. exchange rate movements). 
 
  98
2.3 Conclusion 
Chapter two deals with a controversial topic: the causes of the crisis.  During and after the 
East Asian Crisis there were debates about the causes of the crisis and as can be seen 
from the above discussion there are different views.  Nowadays it is widely agreed that the 
crisis was not due to decline of macroeconomic fundamentals but instead it was like a 
‘liquidity’ crisis (opposing therefore the view held by the IMF that fundamentals were 
wrong in the economies).  This can be seen by theoretical explanations of the crisis 
models: most of them incorporate a Bernake-Gertler effect which shows that the private 
sector played an important role in the crisis; first- and second-generation crisis models 
which were mainly based on governments and their role in causing a crisis do not explain 
the East Asian Crisis.  Searching and identifying the underlying causes, it is difficult to find 
one single factor that caused the crisis, instead a set of factors increased vulnerability and 
exposure: currency and maturity mismatches, as corporations and banks had no incentives 
of hedging against currency risk due to the exchange rate policy; the currency system, 
which seemed to overcome the predicted standard-textbook problems of the ‘trilemma’ in 
open economies; inflows of capital, which was encouraged as well by a set of factors as 
the exchange rate system (i.e. the peg to the US dollar); capital account liberalization and 
the opening of local stock markets to foreign investors (and in Malaysia, the creation of an 
offshore ringgit market). The role of institutions before and during the crisis is not very 
clear but there were in effect some factors like regulations i.e. Basel Core Standards that 
implicitly encouraged investments in emerging economies by international investors (e.g. 
hedge funds, commercial banks) and the balancing of supervision and liberalization of the 
capital account. 
 
As previously mentioned, most third-generation crisis models incorporate a Bernanke-
Gertler effect and show that there were liquidity problems in the economy during the 
crisis.  As opposed to the view of the IMF, where the main problem of the East Asian Crisis 
has been declared as being based on macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional 
problems as well as ‘corruption, cronyism and nepotism’, the third-generation crisis models 
show that the private sector has been the key driver.  Liquidity problems of corporations, 
which spread rapidly across the entire region occurred as banks were not willing to 
rollover short-term credits.  The currency downturns worsened the situation of troubled 
companies and increased the pressure in domestic corporate sectors as viable corporations 
became unviable.  The result was in most countries a credit crunch, which led to a sharp 
slowdown of investment and to a slowdown of the economies. 
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On the other hand, the thesis of Hyman P. Minsky is interesting, in addition,  as it tries to 
explain the intrinsic instability of capitalist systems but it fails to give a more detailed 
picture about the factors that caused the crisis, i.e. it is very broad.  As discussed before 
the ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ is a very interesting starting point with some 
shortcomings.  
Therefore the author will consider only the implications of the third-generation models as 
being relevant for an analytical explanation of the East Asian Crisis. 
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3  
Remedies at Disposal for Countries 
 
This chapter will show the policy responses that countries in crisis situations like the East 
Asian liquidity crisis have at disposal. The responses will be split up in policies that 
countries can implement on their own (i.e. sticking to economic theory) and what the 
international community can do in order to manage such a situation of distress. 
The first section will be dedicated to domestic policies, while the second will discuss the 
type of aid the countries could expect from the outside. 
 
One precondition of this chapter is to ascertain which type of crisis happened in East Asia 
in 1997/1998. Since, as was discussed previously, the policy responses differ from one 
crisis-generation to the next. Chapter 2, gave various theoretical explanations into the 
causes of the crisis.  Among economists it is now widely agreed that the East Asian Crisis 
was a crisis  which could not be explained by first- or second-generation models. For this 
reason we will follow the general view that the crisis in East Asia in 1997/1998 was a 
‘liquidity’ crisis, as explained in the last chapter, and that it can be characterized by the 
third-generation crisis model. 
 
3.1 Domestic Policies: Countries and their Instruments at Disposal 
The following paragraphs will discuss the policies that domestic governments can choose 
without relying on international aid or the international community.  
 
The initial point for the analysis of domestic policies will be the so-called ‘trilemma’ in open 
economies which includes the tradeoffs in exchange rate, monetary policies and capital 
mobility. The resulting discussions that arise from trilemma is very controversial (see for 
example the ongoing discussion on the ‘bipolar view’ i.e. the choice between fixed and 
flexible exchange rates) as it does not give a common solution that holds for every 
economy. A good example of this is in the case of developed countries like the US or the 
European Monetary Union it might be feasible to follow a flexible exchange rate but the 
choice that developing and emerging countries should make is much more difficult as 
advantages and disadvantages have to be weighed against each other. 
 
The trilemma in open economies shows that of the three goals that most countries share, 
i.e. independence in monetary policy, stability of the exchange rate and free movement of 
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capital, only two can be reached simultaneously; therefore policymakers face a trilemma 
as they have to decide which one to give up. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) 
show in their empirical study that the constraints imposed by the trilemma (i.e. that the 
choice of exchange rate and its tradeoff with monetary policy) are tight and that 
policymakers should be aware of it. 
A graphical representation of the choices of the trilemma and its consequences for 
choosing an appropriate exchange rate system can be found in the Figure 3.1 below. This 
figure shows on the three corners of the triangle the three policy instruments in an open 
economy (full capital controls, pure float and monetary union) while on the three sides of 
the triangle the three goals are listed: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and 
full financial integration. Capital mobility increases by moving from the top to bottom of 
the triangle. Policymakers can only choose to pursue two policies contemporaneously i.e. 
monetary independence and exchange rate stability which leads to full capital controls or 
monetary independence and full financial integration leading to a pure float and lastly, 
exchange rate stability and full financial integration which lead to a monetary union. 
From Figure 2, it can be clearly seen that any combination of all three policies can not be 
reached at the same time and will create instability in the system. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 – Impossible Trinity 
 
Source: Frankel (1999) 
 
As Obstfeld (NBER Reporter, Fall 2000) argues, the trilemma is often associated with 
Robert A. Mundell but goes back to earlier writers such as J.M. Keynes. By starting from 
the Mundell-Fleming model for open economies one has to consider its drawbacks, e.g. 
assuming perfect capital mobility or neglecting intertemporal constraints, and therefore 
over the years the model was adjusted and extended. 
Full capital controls 
Pure float Monetary union Full financial integration 
Exchange rate stability Monetary independence 
Increased capital 
mobility 
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The main focus of this chapter is not to give a detailed explanation of the Mundell-Fleming 
model but instead to focus on more fundamental question regarding the choice of the 
exchange rate and its consequences for policymakers; a detailed discussion of the 
Mundell-Fleming model and its extensions would be beyond the scope of this text. In East 
Asia this trilemma played an important role before and during the outbreak of the crisis as 
will be shown subsequently. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, the economies in East Asia which were subsequently 
harmed by the crisis, began to liberalize their capital account by the late 1980s. Their 
exchange rate remained fixed, effectively pegging (officially only in Thailand, in the other 
countries they were effectively pegged) their currency to the US dollar. The different 
official exchange rate systems in the crisis countries were the following: 
 
TABLE 3.1 – Exchange Rate Regimes in the Crisis Countries before the East Asian Crisis 
 Indonesia Korea Thailand Philippines Malaysia Taiwan 
Exchange rate Crawling peg Managed float Peg Managed float Managed float Managed float 
Source: Noble and Ravenhill ed. (2000), p. 7 
 
By allowing capital to move freely, the policymakers should have moved away from 
intervention with monetary policy instruments in the market which should have resulted, 
by applying textbook specifications, in a monetary union or a currency board. During the 
1990s a discussion was going on about establishing a monetary union in Asia but while it 
did not result in a practical outcome it left much room for discussion. In 2000 the ‘Chiang 
Mai Initiative’ was launched by the finance ministers of the region. This was an attempt to 
improve financial cooperation and assistance in the region (Akyüz and Flassbeck, 2002, 
pp. 110-111), but still details are to be agreed.  
 
Moving on to the interest rates it can be seen from Appendix Table A.3.1 and Figure 3.2 
below that the interest rate in Indonesia was higher compared to the interest rate in the 
USA, while in Malaysia it was only slightly higher for some periods. This is especially true 
before the introduction of capital controls on inflows in 1994 and the period between the 
relaxation of these controls and the introduction of the capital controls on outflows in 
September 1998. This encouraged the inflow of capital, due to the effectively pegged 
exchange rate and their good economic performance over the past, especially after their 
opening of the capital accounts. International investors and local borrowers were not 
aware of the risk associated with the increased capital inflows which lacked hedging. 
According to theory, after liberalizing capital flows and maintaining a stable exchange rate 
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the spread between the different interest rates should have become narrower but in fact it 
did not as the governments relied on monetary instruments even after this change of 
exchange rate policy. The East Asian countries in fact neglected the tight impact of the 
impossible trinity and some economists (e.g. Rose (1996)) argued that the impact of the 
impossible trinity was not that tight as expected in the past. Nevertheless history showed 
that the impossible trinity still has importance and that their choices for policymakers 
should be respected (as in the example of the East Asian Crisis). 
 
FIGURE 3.2 – Monthly Interest Rates in Indonesia, Malaysia and the USA 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
 
Pegged exchange rates are vulnerable for speculative attacks compared to the two 
extreme cases of fixed and flexible exchange rates. The stabilization of the pegged 
exchange rate is usually provided by the intervention of authorities in the foreign 
exchange market; for speculators this type of exchange rate commitment gives an 
incentive for betting against a currency if the exchange rate that prevails in the case of a 
flexible exchange rate regime will be equal or greater than the pegged exchange rate. 
Therefore a pegged exchange rate could be easily attacked and the commitment of 
authorities to intervene in periods of attacks comes at a high cost (e.g. the slump of 
reserves of central banks in East-Asia during the early stage of the crisis). In most cases 
the authorities have to abandon the commitment and the exchange rate arrangement 
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after a short period of time. For example, in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea the authorities 
floated the currencies after the speculative attack. 
 
In the case of the East Asian Crisis countries the policymakers had different policies at 
their disposal which they could have adopted by themselves. These policies are derived 
from the trilemma that policymakers face in an open economy, and include the following 
possibilities which have to be weighted against its costs for the economy: 
1. Move to a floating exchange rate: The government could maintain their monetary 
policy autonomy and free capital movements. According to theory (i.e. simple 
Mundell-Fleming model) monetary policy is very effective in a floating exchange 
rate system. Regarding monetary policy it has been argued that emerging 
countries do not have the institutional requirements in order to implement effective 
monetary policies (Summers, 2000). According to this opinion, countries with 
floating exchange rates would not be able to implement an effective and complex 
feedback rule in order to have an effective inflation targeting system (Eichengreen 
and Masson, 1998, pp. 18-19). Additionally a different objection against floating 
exchange rates in emerging countries has been raised, i.e. the ‘fear of floating’ 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) arguing that in a world of high capital mobility, 
incomplete information, fads, rumours and dollar-denominated liabilities, the 
authorities fear to float their currency as the exchange rate will move significantly, 
and large depreciations will have a negative impact on inflation and on corporate 
debt. But as Edwards (2003, p. 75) argues this criticism seems to be based on a 
small number of historical episodes or that they have underestimated the 
difficulties with super-fixed systems. Furthermore, studies of Mexico after its 
collapse of 1994 and its floating exchange rate show that emerging countries could 
have a floating exchange rate but that the monetary authorities need to 
communicate their policies (Edwards and Savastano, 1999). 
The remaining question is therefore not on the monetary policy and its 
commitments but rather whether free capital mobility should be maintained and if 
its costs could outweigh the benefits of a free floating exchange rate (i.e. monetary 
independency). The advantage of this policy would be that capital movements 
remain free, which is regarded as a positive sign in the international financial 
community, and that the government could use monetary policies for intervention 
in the economy. The costs of free capital movements could lead to a large outflow 
of funds which could hurt (as in the case of East Asia) the private sector leading to 
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a credit crunch and to bankruptcies in the economy which would lead to a further 
drop in aggregate demand and to a recession in the economy. 
Other advantages of a flexible exchange rate are that governments retain 
seignorage and that the float allows smooth adjustment to real shocks even in the 
presence of price frictions (Frankel, 1999). Another cost that might come with a 
floating exchange rate is the exchange rate risk, but this could be limited by 
introduction and implementation of hedge instruments. 
 
2. Establishing a monetary union or a currency board: The establishment of a 
monetary union or a currency board implies that the authorities keep stable 
exchange rates and free capital movements. The main advantages of a fixed 
exchange rate are the reduction of transaction costs and exchange rate risk, and 
providing a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy (by pegging to a hard 
currency and therefore exhibiting to strong monetary policy), and to a minor 
degree that competitive depreciations or appreciations are not possible (Frankel, 
1999). Monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate system with free capital 
movements is in some sense not beneficial as domestic interest rates will be tied to 
foreign interest rates and for example an expansion of money supply would have 
no impact on the economy as the new money will flow out of the economy through 
a balance of payments deficit. Therefore the drawback of this exchange rate 
system is that the authorities loose in the case of an emergency an important tool 
of intervention in the economy: monetary policy. Instead they must resort to a 
fiscal policy in order to intervene effectively in the economy with the disadvantage 
to build up government indebtness. 
Another disadvantage connected with this exchange rate system could be that 
corporations etc. will not hedge against currency risks. Instead they would leave 
their balance sheets with foreign currency debts and end in a period of a 
speculative attack, bubble or something similar involving the abandonment of the 
fixed exchange rate, in a bad state consequently  driving the economy towards a 
bad equilibrium (Frankel, 1999). 
As mentioned earlier the debate regarding free capital movement is very 
controversial leading to opposing views about the pertinence of free capital 
movements for the countries. 
One result of the discussion is about optimal currency areas. There is an attempt in 
Asia, as mentioned above, to work more closely together (i.e. Chiang Mai Initiative) 
which should lead to a monetary union in the future. 
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3. Imposition of capital controls: The discussion on capital controls is controversial. By 
imposing capital controls governments can enjoy the benefits of monetary policy 
autonomy and stable exchange rates. The benefits of monetary policy autonomy 
were discussed in Chapter 2 and they include the benefit of a possible rapid and 
effective response to sudden shocks in the economy. 
A more controversial discussion is about capital controls. Isard (2005, p. 246) 
argues that the main arguments against capital controls are derived from economic 
theory and historical experience. Theory suggests that markets have a better 
allocation of resources i.e., profit incentives for firms, income allocation of 
households. While experience suggests that such systems are relatively efficient in 
encouraging technological innovation and economic growth over time, leaving the 
government to allocate capital could result in corruption and the financing of 
unproductive activities. Additionally, capital controls provide an incentive to delay 
or to try to avoid fiscal or monetary policy actions in order to deal with 
macroeconomic imbalances.  
Furthermore, Isard (2005, pp. 246-248) argues that these arguments against 
capital controls have to be weighed against arguments in favour of it. These 
arguments include the theory of the second best, i.e. if the market allocates the 
resources with distortions, the imposition of capital controls, and therefore 
imposing another distortion, will lead to a welfare improvement. Distortions in the 
market could arise in financial markets due to informational frictions i.e. costs of 
screening borrowers and monitoring their behaviour. The consequence of such 
frictions are an incomplete and asymmetric information for lenders and to adverse 
selection of borrowers which could ultimately result in excessive volatility in 
financial markets i.e., herding behaviour. Additionally, Isard argues that capital 
controls might be beneficial if the government wants to provide macroeconomic 
stability resulting in an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves – smoothing 
national consumption –  and providing an explicit or implicit insurance to the 
domestic financial system. Furthermore, an argument in favour of capital controls is 
that governments care about national welfare while financial markets do not 
(‘greed and fear’ motivation) and therefore the imposition of capital controls could 
give authorities in times of panic or pressure from financial markets some 
breathing space. A different point of view is that longterm capital flows are 
beneficial for the growth of an economy and in order to maintain this growth 
economies should open themselves at their own speed to free capital movement.  
 107 
Overall one problem with capital controls is the implementation and enforcement  
which has to be ensured. Capital controls are not effective for highly developed 
countries but empirical evidence suggests that capital controls have effectiveness in 
countries without highly developed financial sectors (Isard, 2005, p.249). The 
relationship between opening the capital account and growth is rather mixed. 
However, there is a trend that growth and liberalization are not strong positively 
correlated (Jomo, 2005).  
There are different types of capital controls and dealing with them can be 
problematic as investors might try to evade capital controls and authorities might 
not give incentives for the promotion of long-term capital investments which 
usually are excluded from controls. It is widely agreed that market-based capital 
controls, such as interest rate ceilings or reserve requirements are preferred over 
quotas, licenses, or other controls which require administration (Isard, 2005, p. 
255). The distinction on controls over inflows and outflows is usually much more 
controversial. While there is a broader agreement that controls on inflows are 
effective (Edwards, 2003, p. 49; Isard, 2005, p. 255), effectiveness of controls on 
outflows is much more controversial (against effectiveness: Eichengreen, Mussa et 
al., 1998; suggesting effectiveness: Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). A theoretical 
approach which should discourage short term capital flows was the proposal of 
Tobin in 1978: The imposition of a Tobin tax should limit short-term flows in theory 
but in practice it would only work if all countries agreed to adopt this measure. A 
more detailed discussion about capital controls can be found in Chapter 4, as an 
excursus on the Malaysian experience. 
From the above paragraph it is evident the topic of on the imposition of capital 
controls is very controversial in academic debates. As opposite to the other two 
possibilities this option was usually not regarded as being an option by countries; 
the international community, and especially the Bretton Woods institutions, did not 
like impositions of capital controls although the combination of monetary policy 
autonomy and a stabile exchange rate might be preferable to the other two choices 
in certain cases (e.g. if the business sector has non-hedged foreign currency 
denominated liabilities combined with the fear of a large currency depreciation). 
 
Following the discussion above the East Asian Crisis countries had options to use in order 
to deal with the sudden crisis: anticipating the results there is no single solution that fits 
the need of every economy in trouble. 
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In Malaysia the huge build-up of short-term foreign portfolio investment and in Indonesia 
the business sector that accumulated huge amounts of non-hedged foreign currency 
denominated liabilities introduced a high degree of vulnerability into the domestic 
economic system. The first choice of the economies was to maintain free capital 
movement and let the exchange rate float.  Consequently, Indonesia and Malaysia 
suffered from large capital outflows, a worsening of the health of the business sector due 
to a huge depreciation of their currency and a worsening of aggregate demand in the 
economies followed. 
Indonesia called-in the IMF and the IMF maintained the combination of free capital 
movement and float of the exchange rate.  The IMF had been a promoter of capital 
account liberalization during the 1980s and 1990s and used monetary policies: the first 
response was to increase interest rates in order to regain confidence of investors and to 
close several banks. This monetary policy did not help to relieve the economies from 
pressure but put even more pressure on the economy which suffered already from huge 
capital outflows and led therefore to a worsening of the situation, see Chapter 4 for a 
chronology after the crisis. Within a few months the IMF changed its policy and permitted 
a relax in the monetary policy and to run small fiscal deficits. Nevertheless the economy 
experienced a credit crunch and distress in the private sector. The first response policy 
solution and the large list of different structural policies to be implemented by Indonesia 
seem not to be suited for a fast resolution of a sudden ‘liquidity’ crisis but were more 
suitable in the case of distress in public expenditure. 
Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia was not going to call-in the IMF and followed its own policy 
strategy which was to impose capital controls on short-term outflows. After a period of 
political standstill the leadership agreed to impose capital controls on outflows and 
changed at the same time the political landscape as well (i.e. the imprisonment of Anwar). 
Their choice was to use monetary policy autonomy and stable exchange rates in order to 
restore tranquillity in the economy. The monetary policy was expansionary as the 
economy had suffered from a contraction and the exchange rate was fixed with respect to 
the US dollar (see Chapter 4). 
 
The impossible trinity suggests that there are different choices, but each option comes 
with costs and benefits. In the case of the East Asian Crisis, the float of the exchange rate 
came at a high cost for the business sector which was exposed to unhedged foreign 
currency exposure. The benefit was that the authorities were given the possibility to rely 
on monetary policy and address the problem with these instruments. The other option, 
i.e., to return to a fixed exchange rate (like a currency board), would not have given any 
 109 
possibility of recurring to a monetary policy also as it would have required reserves from 
the central banks that were already depleted a few weeks after the outbreak of the crisis. 
The adjustment of interest rate and expansionary monetary policy in a time of contraction 
was preferred in order to restore the output of the economy. The third option, i.e. 
imposing capital controls, was not acceptable for the IMF and Bretton Woods institutions 
as they were promoting capital account liberalization in the years before the East Asian 
Crisis. The advantage of this option is that the combination of capital controls and fixed 
exchange rate could relieve the private sector from further distress and stop in a relative 
short time the sudden reversal of capital flows.  Additionally, authorities could intervene in 
the economy by using monetary policies. The cost of this policy is that it could hurt long-
term investments in the economy and lead to other distortionary policies. The case of 
Malaysia shows that a clear and transparent concept and time structure of capital controls 
does not necessarily lead to a reversal in FDI, as the share of FDI remained relatively 
stable over the period. 
In the case of East Asia the third option, i.e. imposing capital controls, benefits might have 
out weighed costs in the economies; the first option came at a high cost with a relatively 
small benefit (high exchange rates that put more pressure on business sector vs. 
monetary policy autonomy) while the second option of fixing the exchange rate by 
maintaining free capital mobility was not desirable and achievable. 
 
A different look at policies and their implications is given by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) 
which argue that the IMF was applying an ‘old’ monetary model in resolving the crisis: 
they neglected the fact of institutions and therefore the problem with possible 
bankruptcies in the crisis countries. Furthermore they argue that the IMF was concerned 
too much in restoring confidence. Stiglitz and Greenwald conclude that by considering the 
institutional side of the economic systems and therefore following ‘newer’ monetary 
models (like the one proposed in their book) would have helped choosing more 
appropriate policies not only in East-Asia but also in Latin America.  
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3.2 Aid from Outside: International Financial Community, International 
Organizations and Closely Connected Countries 
The following section is concerned with the type of aid or assistance which was possible to 
get from outside for the crisis countries.  There are different possibilities for the countries 
to get aid from outside, but one crucial question is at which cost.  
 
3.2.1 International Financial Community 
As international financial community there will be defined the community of private 
financial institutions and transnational corporations that are acting in different regions in 
the world. Since the 1970s the private players increased their importance as official 
authorities began to decrease their intervention in markets.  Both private financial 
institutions and transnational corporations play an important role as they provide funds for 
projects in different countries. These funds can be long- or short-term.  Long-term funds 
are usually defined as FDI in East Asia Japanese transnational corporations played an 
important role, as the production costs abroad were lower than those at home in Japan 
(see Chapter 1). FDI almost always comes with a cost: conditionality of transnational 
corporations with respect to domestic authorities e.g., providing cheaper land for 
transnational corporations. Therefore, although FDI is considered to be a growth promoter 
as usually a transfer of intangible goods (e.g. technical and managerial expertise) is 
involved, the drawback is that the government looses its autonomy with respect to social 
and economic policy as the transnational corporations connect investments to a clear 
policy set-up in order to protect their interests such as a wage policy or tax incentives. 
The other type of investment is short-term and usually financial institutions like investment 
banks, hedge funds or insurances are related to it.  Short-term capital flows to emerging 
markets are usually more volatile than to developed economies.  Benefits of short-term 
capital flows are not easy to determine.  Opening a country for portfolio investments 
should lead to a better accession to funds at better conditions and diversifying their 
exposure.  however, in an emerging market where institutions which should provide 
supervision are not usually well developed and this could bring in some risks as in the case 
of a sudden stop like in the East Asian Crisis. Getting rid of the negative aspects which 
such a sudden stop in an emerging country could cause, informational imperfections as 
well as specific practices like receiving large underwriting fees from being lead managers 
of bond sales for countries or maintaining overly portfolios in the countries (i.e. the 
performance of hedge funds is usually measured by a benchmark) should be re-examined 
(Isard, 2005, p. 304).  
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What kind of aid could the East Asian Crisis countries expect from the international 
financial community? 
There are different ways for reaction and help: 
1. Transnational corporations should continue to invest in the countries and not 
withdraw their investments.  This happened in East Asia as FDI remained relatively 
stable over the period, even in Malaysia where capital controls were imposed. 
2. Bank loans should be rescheduled.  The rescheduling of bank loans in East Asia 
would have been a preferable solution, as the sudden stop of rolling over short-
term loans in the crisis countries increased the number of bad loans.  As explained 
theoretically, one major problem in the East Asian crisis was herding behaviour and 
therefore not rolling over loans was preferable to the single investor. However, the 
costs were higher compared to rescheduling the loans as the resulting credit 
crunch increased pressure not only on non-viable companies and banks but also on 
viable ones.  
 
Regarding the first point, FDI in Malaysia and Indonesia remained stable and therefore the 
investment by transnational corporations was not stopped. In the case of Malaysia the IMF 
and other institutions were pointing out that the capital controls would have a negative 
impact on the long-term investment which did not realize. 
Referring to the second point, private financial institutions should have rolled over debt 
instead of recalling the bank loans of single investors. The practice of the IMF in bailing 
out distressed corporations is by socializing their debt and repaying debts of foreign 
investors.  This socialization of debt does not give the private financial institutions and 
corporations the necessary incentive to stop the practice of taking on financial risk without 
properly hedging at the lenders side or screening of borrowers.  Any attempt to control 
the behaviour of financial institutions in short-term lending needs the establishment of a 
framework that stops overlending or overborrowing to and within countries and regions.  
One such example of this is the Basel Core Standards which were changed in order to 
diminish incentives of financial institutions for overlending in emerging markets. Also, the 
change in the common practice of the IMF by socializing debts (i.e. private debts are taken 
over by the government through the creation of ‘debt restructuring’ institutions which are 
financed by injections of capital from government or other official authorities) in order to 
meet obligations of investors is an example.  
To summarize, the status of the international financial community has increased over time 
which can be seen from the past experiences (e.g. Argentina in the late 1990s, East Asian 
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Crisis) where the behaviour of the community played an important role in resolving 
situations of distress.  
 
3.2.2 International Organizations 
The definition of international organizations includes intergovernmental organizations like 
the United Nations, the Bretton Wood institutions (e.g. IMF, WB), WTO and the different 
G-groups (G-7, G-10 etc.). These organizations emerged from historical events and their 
mission also changed over time, for example the IMF was established after WWII at 
Bretton Woods in order to coordinate exchange rate arrangements among nations and in 
the first period of its existence the mission was to avoid competitive devaluations of the 
1930s and encourage the liberalization of the trading system; nowadays, this mission is no 
longer valid . The IMF changed its purpose by itself not formally but practically and 
provides today assistance during crisis situations which are in most cases beyond its 
statutory assistance of balance of payments problems. The use of stabilization or 
structural adjustment programs is still in use. 
There is an ongoing discussion about the role and the tasks that these institutions have or 
should have and how they should be changed in a changing world.  In the following 
sentences a brief overview of the different international organizations will be given along 
with how they could provide help to the East-Asian crisis countries. 
- The United Nations: 
 
‘The purposes of the United Nations, as set forth in the Charter, are to maintain international peace and security; 
to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural and 
humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a centre 
for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.’ (www.un.org) 
 
The UN consists of six principal organs and the ‘UN family’, which consists of more 
than 15 agencies, programmes and bodies. 
With regard to the East Asian Crisis the UN were not directly involved as the East 
Asian countries experienced an economic crisis and not a political crisis or 
instability within the region. But as Nayyar (2002, p. 360) points out the UN could 
empower the Economic Security Council and getting more involved in how to 
govern globalization and providing an institutional mechanism for consultations on 
global economic policies and if necessary being an international regulatory 
authority. 
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- Bretton Woods Institutions: 
As the Bretton Woods institutions are defined the IMF and the World Bank Group 
(consisting of two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction – IBRD – 
and the International Development Association – IDA). The Bretton Woods 
institutions were established in Bretton Woods after WWII in order to manage the 
international payments system and to assist in the reconstruction of Europe. 
The IMF was established to manage the international payments system which was 
based on a fixed exchange rate and capital controls; at the beginning no 
conditionality was applied, this was added later to practice. After the abandonment 
of the fixed exchange rate system and the shift to a floating exchange rate system 
the IMF had to redefine its role and shifted from capital controls to the promotion 
of liberalization of capital accounts which even should have been included in the 
statutes and which attempt was stopped by the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis in 
1997. The goal of the IMF is to manage and stabilize the international financial 
system and to provide crisis management as well as crisis prevention which was 
not always achieved (e.g. Latin America, East Asia). For countries in distress, there 
are different facilities available (all designed principally for balance of payments 
problems): 
a. Facilities at concessional interest rates: Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) for low income 
countries. 
b. Facilities not at concessional rates: They include Stand-By Arrangements 
(SBA), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the Supplemental Reserve 
Facility (SRF), and the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). SBA and 
EFF as well as SRF usually oblige the countries to commit themselves to 
tight conditionality and structural adjustment programs. 
 
As mentioned above these instruments were designed for balance of payments 
problems of sovereign countries. After the Tequila crisis in Mexico in the early 
1990s, and as a consequence of the criticism the IMF increased its transparency 
arising from the handling of the crisis. Additionally, some facilities were introduced 
which countries could access faster in order to limit the time between the outbreak 
of the crisis and the disbursement of the needed funds. 
For the East Asian countries the facilities at concessional interest rates were no 
longer applicable as they were not considered low income countries. The IMF could 
have helped by giving the countries fast loans which the governments could have 
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used in order to overcome the credit crunch; the practice during the East Asian 
Crisis was instead to use conditionality and insist on the commitment to structural 
programs although the economic policies and the economies were regarded as 
being healthy just a few weeks before the outbreak of the crisis. The following 
quotations will show the altered view of the IMF within few months. 
‘Among the developing countries in Asia, those that have had to deal with risks of overheating have 
generally been successful in dampening the growth of domestic demand. The slowdown in the region’s 
export growth in 1996 helped to contain inflationary pressures, although it has exacerbated external 
imbalances in some cases. Thailand saw a significant slowdown in growth in 1996, largely as a result of 
a disappointing export performance; concerns about the large current account deficit as well as 
fragilities in the financial system have given rise to exchange market pressures in recent months. 
Malaysia appears to have weathered the slowdown in foreign demand relatively well; the possibility of a 
rebound in demand pressures in 1997, as well as concerns about asset price inflation, warrant a 
cautious policy stance. In Indonesia, inflation has begun to diminish and growth has slowed moderately; 
the reliance on foreign saving will need to be contained through a stronger fiscal position. The 
Philippines saw a further strengthening of economic performance in 1996 and is expected to continue to 
reap the fruits of its intensified stabilization and reform efforts. […] The economic success of all of these 
economies [emerging economies, e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Chile] reflects the mutually 
reinforcing effects of sustained progress in many areas of economic policy.’ (IMF, May 1997, pp. 12-13) 
‘In Asia, despite the region’s impressive growth performance in recent years, several countries have 
recently experienced financial market pressures linked to concerns about large external deficits; in many 
cases, currencies linked to the appreciating U.S. dollar have aggravated the tensions. The pressures 
have been most acute in Thailand, where fragilities in the banking system contributed to market 
concerns. After a series of attacks on the baht, a more flexible exchange rate regime was introduced in 
early July and there has since been a depreciation of over 30 percent vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Provided 
adequate measures are adopted to strengthen the financial sector and the balance of payments, 
confidence should be restored relatively quickly. Growth in Thailand is likely to slow significantly in the 
short run but should subsequently return to its quite strong longer-term trend. Spillovers from the crisis 
in Thailand were felt by several countries in the region, especially the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. In these countries, which are also likely to experience an economic slowdown in the near 
term, the authorities will need to contain external deficits and reduce the reliance on foreign borrowing 
in order to restore investor confidence. Following a fairly widespread slowdown in foreign demand in 
1995-96, most of these economies have experienced a pickup in exports in the first half of 1997, in line 
with the general strengthening of world industrial activity and trade that began in the middle of 1996. 
[…] But while there are some parallels between Thailand and other East Asian countries, there are also 
some important differences. In particular, the economic fundamentals in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines were generally stronger than those in Thailand at the time of the crisis. […] Overall, there 
are reasons to believe that the currency turbulence will eventually wane without greatly damaging the 
region’s long-term prospects.’ (IMF, October 1997, pp. 14-16) 
‘What went wrong? Part of the answer seems to be that these countries [East Asia] became victims of 
their own success. This success had led domestic and foreign investors to underestimate the countries’ 
economic weaknesses. It had also, partly because of the large-scale financial inflows that it encouraged, 
increased the demands on policies and institutions, especially but not only in the financial sector; and 
policies and institutions had not kept pace. The fundamental policy shortcomings and their ramifications 
were fully revealed only as the crisis deepened. Past success may also have contributed to a tendency 
by policymakers to deny the need for action when problems first became apparent. Several factors – 
mainly domestic but also external, operating to different degrees in different countries, and exacerbated 
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by contagion and spillovers among the countries involved – seem to have contributed to the dramatic 
deterioration in sentiment by foreign and domestic investors.’ (IMF, May 1998, p. 3) 
 
Figure 3.3 gives a graphical representation of the problems with IMF loans in East 
Asia and its impact on the economies. There can be seen from this figure how 
contractionary policy prescriptions of the IMF result in a vicious circle and lead to 
further problems in different parts of the economy. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 - IMF Prescription/East Asia Dilemma 
 
Source: Jomo (1998, p. xiv) 
 
The World Bank Group usually does not provide countries with funds that suffer 
from exchange rate or balance of payment loan problems.  Instead they are more 
focused on granting loans for projects in order to promote specific sectors, 
industries or policies, i.e. in the case of the East Asian Crisis: 
 
‘The Bank has played an important role in the past year's positive developments. New lending operations 
numbered 55 in FY99, up from 37 in FY97; commitments over the same period more than doubled. A 
key element of Bank support was the decentralization of Bank staff to come closer to the needs and 
wishes of its borrowers […]. Strategically, assistance focused on helping put East Asia back on the road 
to recovery […]. Four areas emerged as critical: restructuring the microeconomy and strengthening 
institutions in the region's corporate and financial sectors; minimizing corruption; protecting social 
sectors; and safeguarding the environment. These areas are relevant to the five market-economy  
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countries most affected by the crisis (Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia), but also 
apply to transition countries that were spared the full brunt (China, Mongolia, and Vietnam) and to the 
region's small economies (Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Pacific Islands, and Papua New Guinea). […]Bank 
support for strengthening the corporate and financial sectors is being provided under large adjustment 
loans accompanied by policy advice and technical assistance […].’ (WB, 1999) 
 
Therefore, the help of the WB could not be based on the problems in the short-
term capital outflow but for other projects in the countries.  Nevertheless, the crisis 
countries received funds from the World Bank Group and 16 billion US dollars have 
been committed in addition to the regular spending of which only US$5.65 were 
disbursed by end of the fiscal year 1998 by supporting in the countries efforts of 
restructure of the financial sectors, reforms in corporate governance, and social 
safety nets (WB, 1998a, p. 22). In fiscal year 1999 the region of East-Asia – Pacific 
received one third of total lending (total lending was US$ 29 billion); Indonesia 
(US$ 2.7 billion) and Korea (US$ 2.0 billion) were among the top 5 largest 
borrowers in fiscal year 1999, while Thailand was among the top 10 borrowers 
(WB, 1999a, p. ii-iii). 
The discussion of the Bretton Woods lending policy is still ongoing; a more detailed 
discussion would be beyond this text. 
- Others: 
The other institutions comprise the WTO, G-7, G-10 etc. and the Asian 
Development Bank.  The task of the WTO is not to provide any financial assistance, 
while the G-7, G-10 etc. are meetings of political leadership where bilateral or 
multilateral assistance could be discussed and granted.  On the other hand, the 
Asian Development Bank committed approximately US$ 9 billion during the crisis, 
giving emergency assistance to Thailand, Korea and Indonesia and working in 
these cases close with the Bretton Woods institutions, while the Philippines 
received in late 1998 precautionary assistance (Tadao Chino, 1999). 
 
The institutions discussed above played an important role for some countries as they 
provided some funds and especially in economic policy they played a key role as the 
Bretton Woods institutions connected their funding to specific commitments of economic 
policies.  The major donor to the region was none of these international organizations but 
Japan which reacted with its own initiative and which will be discussed below.  
As can be seen from above, the East Asian Crisis countries could get financial assistance 
from the IMF and some smaller help from other institutions.  Although the countries knew 
the high costs (see for example Djiwandono, 2005) of calling in the IMF they had no 
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better choice as their external position was worsening in a very short period. The cost of 
the implementation of the structural programs came for some countries at a higher (e.g. 
Indonesia) for others at a lower cost (e.g. Korea). 
 
3.2.3 Closely Connected Countries 
Official players consist not only of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) but also of 
countries. The importance in aid and/or assistance differs largely among the countries. For 
example Japan plays a more important role in Asia, while Europe is more actively involved 
in Africa, which is mainly due to historical reasons like compensations for former colonies 
or wars (Kawai and Takagi, 2004). The importance of bilateral aid should not be neglected 
although this aid is often used as an instrument of foreign policy (e.g. aid assistance of the 
USA during the cold war in order to prevent further communist countries). In Asia the 
bilateral as well as the multilateral efforts after the East-Asian crisis involved the build-up 
of a stronger regional cooperation, where one country, i.e. Japan, played and still plays an 
important role. 
As Das (2005) points out in his paper, there were different attempts to resolve the crisis in 
the region and as mentioned before, Japan played an important role during and after the 
East Asian Crisis in the region. The following initiatives were taken shortly during and after 
the crisis (Das, 2005): 
1. Manila Framework Group 
In November 1997 the Manila Framework Group (MFG) was founded by 14 Asia-
Pacific countries (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and the United States). The purpose of MFG was to create an in-depth 
dialogue on regional economic surveillance and crisis management. The basic 
objective was a little bit changed due to the prolonged crisis focusing later on the 
enhancement of the prospects of financial stability. 
Finance ministers and central bankers of all participating countries met with 
representatives of IFIs like the IMF and the World Bank semi-annually to create a 
new framework for regional cooperation. By early 2000 the importance of the 
meetings of the MFG has decreased becoming merely a panel for the exchange of 
ideas. 
2. ASEAN Surveillance Process 
The ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) was created in October 1998. The objective 
of ASP was to coordinate and strengthen the policy making process in the ASEAN 
economies and improve macroeconomic and financial surveillance by peer 
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reviewing broad regional policy coordination. The supreme objective of the ASP 
was to strengthen national policy-making apparatuses for the ASEAN economies 
and regional policy coordination leading to institution building. The peer review and 
surveillance process was also extended to sectoral and social policies. The 
economies exchanged information on recent developments in the sub-region during 
ASP and could in this way take note of individual and collective responses to 
economic and financial events that could have a destabilizing impact.  The ASP 
evolved over time to the ASEAN-Plus-Three Surveillance Process (APTSP), 
consisting of 13 members (ten ASEAN members: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam; three additional members: China, Japan and Korea). 
In order to be effective the APTSP should work closely together with the IMF in this 
way limiting inconsistent and incompatible assessments of the sub-regional 
scenario. 
3. New Miyazawa Initiative 
The New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI) was launched in October 1998 by the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) of Japan.  The NMI was the major bilateral support mechanism 
during the East-Asian crisis and its goal was to directly assist the crisis-affected 
economies and contribute indirectly to the stability of the regional and international 
financial markets. During the first phase US$30 billion were granted, one half was 
made available to the five crisis countries for medium and long-term financial 
assistance while the other half was used for short-term financial needs during the 
implementation of macroeconomic and financial reforms. The implementation of 
NMI was carried out by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC). By 
early 2000 another US$21 billion were committed under the first phase to the five 
crisis countries as the first assistance turned out to be successful.  
The financial resources under NMI were to be used for the purpose of corporate 
debt restructuring and to strengthen the social safety net and were in the form of 
loans and not grants.  The second phase was announced in May 1999, and 
committed another US$17 billion.  These funds were used through the JBIC to 
partially guarantee government bonds issued by the crisis countries and which was 
to be provided outside the framework of the first phase of the NMI.  One objective 
of the second phase was the development of domestic currency corporate bond 
markets. 
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4. Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative 
In November 1998 the joint Japan-US Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative (AGRI) 
was launched and IFI’s were important participants and instrumental in its 
implementation.  The objective of AGRI was to introduce an integrated and 
comprehensive approach to financial restructuring of problem banks and 
corporations which was supported by adequate financing for bank recapitalization 
and incentive for creditors and debtors to actively help in the debt workouts.  An 
important project was the Asian Growth and Recovery Program (AGRP) which was 
financed partly by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and bilateral 
supports.  The AGRP used for the mobilization of substantial additional private 
capital in order to assist Asian governments to finance bank recapitalization, 
innovative and cost effective financing methods. Under AGRP, Japan, the US, the 
World Bank and the ADB provided together US$5 billion in bilateral and multilateral 
support. 
To overcome company’s lack of working capital and trade finance – needed for the 
maintenance of production, employment and exports – the Export-Import Bank of 
the United States (US ExIm), the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) and Japan 
Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agency substantially increased the size of 
their trade finance programs for the crisis countries. 
5. Asian Monetary Fund 
In September 1997 Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). 
The objective of the proposed AMF was to promote financial and monetary co-
operation and policy coordination in Asia. The proposal was to create a fund with 
US$100 billion where Japan suggested having a large financial stake in it (half of 
the funds should be provided by Japan, the rest should be provided by China, Hong 
Kong SAR and Taiwan). One goal was to give rapid disbursement and that future 
speculative attacks on the Asian currencies could be limited. Most Asian economies 
were in favour of this proposal.  
One driving factor behind the proposal was the discontentment of the Asian 
governments with the response of the IMF in the East Asian Crisis. Furthermore, in 
this way the large foreign exchange reserves of ASEAN-plus-three (APT) economies 
(which amounted to US$1,900 billion in early 2004) could be used in a beneficial 
way. 
Against this proposal were the European Union (EU), the USA and the IMF as there 
was feared that the AMF would become a duplicate of the IMF and challenge its 
global leadership. Additionally the IMF feared that the creation of the AMF could 
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encourage countries to postpone restructuring measures. At the beginning China 
was not in favour of the AMF due to the historical rivalry between China and Japan 
in Asia. One concern of academics was that this institution would not have a 
comparative advantage in identifying Asian problems but comprehend them better 
than the IMF and prescribing indigenous solutions.  
The proposal was until now not turned into reality. 
6. Other Smaller Proposals and Initiatives 
Other proposals and initiatives in Asia and outside Asia include: 
• the proposal by the Institute for International Monetary Affairs (IIMA) of a 
regional stability forum with the following objectives: promoting a regional 
policy dialogue, creating a regional framework for emergency financial 
support, and ensuring that future crises are prevented by active regional 
economic surveillance; 
• the proposal by the Asia Policy Forum where the regional institution should: 
take on the role of the lender of the last resort, engage in regional 
economic surveillance, and assist in regional financial and corporate 
restructuring, if the need arises; 
• the proposal of Heiner Flassbeck, former Vice Minister of Finance in 
Germany, to rethink the Asian currency regimes and proposing a kind of 
Asian Euro; 
• the proposal of Bernie Fraser, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 
1995, to create a small-scale BIS for Asia; this proposal lost its 
attractiveness when the BIS opened its first overseas office in Hong Kong 
SAR in 1998; 
• the establishment of the Asian Consultative Council (ACC) by the BIS in 
2001 which provides a vehicle for communications between the central 
banks in Asia and the Board of Directors and Management of the BIS. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above there were numerous initiatives, proposals and 
programmes introduced during and after the crisis.  Different initiatives resulted in 
different outcomes: while the NMI was in overall successful and the largest bilateral 
initiative during the East Asian Crisis, some other programmes, like the IMF facilities, 
resulted in a mixed outcome (e.g. the recovery of Korea was relatively fast while 
Indonesia was the slowest of the crisis countries to recover). 
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3.3 Conclusion 
As can be seen there were different possibilities for the countries during the East Asian 
Crisis. According to the discussion above it is evident that there does not appear a single 
solution for every economy and crisis as each economy and crisis has its own 
characteristic. Furthermore, many different proposals, programmes and initiatives have 
been developed accessible to the countries in East Asia.  Nevertheless, costs and benefits 
have to be balanced for each country separately. 
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4 
Country Specific Remedies: Differences of Policies Applied to 
Indonesia and Malaysia 
 
This chapter will look in more detail at the policies that Indonesia and Malaysia adopted 
during and after the East Asian Crisis. Two different approaches for solving the crisis will 
be discussed: an ‘orthodox’ path prescribed by the IMF and followed by Indonesia, and an 
‘unorthodox’ path followed by Malaysia.  
After the float of the Thai baht in July 1997 the regional turmoil came only more than a 
year later to an end as in the last quarter of 1998 the East Asian currencies began to 
strengthen and to stabilize after the US Federal Reserve lowered its interest rate. But 
while Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand recorded their first period of positive 
growth in the first quarter of 1999, Malaysia added a fifth quarter of economic contraction.  
Only at the end of 1999 Malaysia’s recovery was turned out to be the second highest in 
the region, falling behind the Republic of Korea (Jomo, 2005, p. 11). 
To understand the performance of the two countries a detailed discussion of the choices 
made by these countries and the outcome on the economy will be discussed, including the 
changes in the political landscape.  Hence, this chapter is a descriptive analysis of the 
different policies adopted by and the outcomes of the policies in the countries.  
 
 
4.1 Country Presentation: Commonalities and Differences 
The financial systems in East Asia share a history of financial repression including limits on 
interest rates and entry in the banking system, and obligatory lending to policy-preferred 
sectors and projects. Most markets experienced financial repression as it was a required 
instrument during the import-substitution era following independence.  The ‘model’ 
country of financial repression in East Asia was Japan. Financial repression led to a kind of 
informal finance where small and medium-sized companies which had not enough access 
to bank finance tended to rely on this kind of finance (Masuyama, 1999, pp. 3-4). 
Economies relied on indirect finance or intermediation by the banking system and 
financing through capital markets gained on importance only since the 1990s.  One 
problem was that there was not a fully developed Asian Bond market although nowadays 
there are some attempts to establish a more integrated bond market in this region, for 
example the initiatives of the ADB that can be seen by consulting the ARIC/ADB website.  
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Therefore the possibility of companies to lend on a long-term basis on capital markets in 
Asia was very limited since independence of the countries. Barry Eichengreen (2004, p. 7) 
argues that East Asia relies less on bonds and more on banks than other emerging 
markets.  This difference is even more dramatic with respect to developed countries.  
Table 4.1 shows the development of the Asian bond market from December 1997 to 
March 2005.  From this table it can be seen that the amount outstanding increased sharply 
during this period. With the exception of Korea, in all countries and in the region 
governments are the prevalent debtor of bonds. This pattern is a consequence of the 
assumption that government bonds could be used by corporations as a source of hedge. 
To summarize, the different initiatives of building up an Asian bond market were fruitful 
but to date a fully developed bond market in Asia does not exist. However, a step towards 
an Asian bond market gives some alternative financial instruments to local corporations 
and investors. 
 
TABLE 4.1 - Outstanding Local Currency Bonds in East Asian Crisis and East Asian 
Emerging Countries  
 Amount Outstanding (US dollar billion) % Share 
 December 
1997 
December 
2003 
March 2005 
December 
1997 
December 
2003 
March 2005 
Indonesia 
Government 
Financial Institutions 
Corporate Issuers 
Total 
 
0.90 
1.58 
2.03 
4.51 
 
60.10 
2.50 
3.10 
65.70 
 
46.00 
2.90 
3.90 
52.80 
 
20.0 
35.0 
45.0 
100.0 
 
91.5 
3.8 
4.7 
100.0 
 
87.1 
5.5 
7.4 
100.0 
South Korea 
Government 
Financial Institutions 
Corporate Issuers 
Total 
 
21.60 
51.70 
57.00 
130.30 
 
 
113.90 
164.10 
167.78 
445.79 
 
185.30 
263.80 
156.11 
605.21 
 
16.6 
39.7 
43.7 
100.0 
 
 
25.6 
36.8 
37.6 
100.0 
 
30.6 
43.6 
25.8 
100.0 
Malaysia 
Government 
Financial Institutions 
Corporate Issuers 
Total 
 
19.40 
16.80 
20.80 
57.00 
 
40.40 
13.48 
44.94 
98.82 
 
49.20 
20.28 
45.20 
114.68 
 
34.0 
29.5 
36.5 
100.0 
 
40.9 
13.6 
45.5 
100.0 
 
42.9 
17.7 
39.4 
100.0 
Thailand 
Government 
Financial Institutions 
Corporate Issuers 
Total 
 
0.30 
1.32 
9.04 
10.66 
 
30.70 
8.35 
21.30 
60.35 
 
36.60 
12.47 
22.40 
71.47 
 
2.8 
12.4 
84.8 
100.0 
 
50.9 
13.8 
35.3 
100.0 
 
51.2 
17.5 
31.3 
100.0 
Total Emerging Asia1 
Government 
Financial Institutions 
Corporate Issuers 
Total 
 
141.05 
114.10 
105.99 
361.13 
 
596.48 
329.33 
279.48 
1,205.29 
 
723.98 
483.35 
274.50 
1,481.83 
 
39.1 
31.6 
29.3 
100.0 
 
49.5 
27.3 
23.2 
100.0 
 
48.9 
32.6 
18.5 
100.0 
Notes: 1 Total Emerging Asia comprises People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam. 
Sources: ADB, Asia Bond Monitor (2005, p. 5) 
 
An interesting fact from the numbers above is the distribution of Bonds in Indonesia.  
While in December 1997 the government of Indonesia only accounted of 20 % of total 
bonds outstanding, in December 2003 this number soared to 91.5 % which can partially 
 124 
be  explained by the socialization of corporate loans by the government.  The restructuring 
of the corporate sector was promoted in Indonesia through different institutions which 
effectively swapped bad loans or non-performing loans. In all countries it can be seen that 
there was some change in distribution i.e. there was a change from December 1997 to 
December 2003 and March 2005 as the government increased its share over total bonds 
outstanding, but no where more dramatic than in Indonesia.  Such data could support the 
argument that the crisis countries effectively took over private sector debt and swapped it 
into government debt in addition to issuing new bonds e.g. through public institutions and 
funds that issued then new bonds and sold it to the market as in the case of Malaysia – 
see below. 
 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 will aid in the understanding of how the different policies applied by the 
two countries were affecting the economies i.e., net private capital flows to the crisis 
countries of the period 1990 to 2001 and short and total debt shares in Indonesia and 
Malaysia from 1991 to 2001.  As can be seen from these tables foreign bank borrowings 
and especially short-term loans increased dramatically in the early 1990s in Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand, while it remained relatively stable in Malaysia. Contrary to the other 
countries, Malaysia attracted more portfolio capital flows. 
Table 4.2 shows how the landscape with regard to net private capital flows in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Korea and Thailand changed. Here it can be seen that Indonesia experienced a 
sharp increase of net private capital flows in 1995 and 1996 more than doubling the 
average amount of the period 1990 to 1994.  While the reversal in 1997 has been 
relatively low, it increased dramatic in the subsequent periods leading to a huge outflow.  
What is very interesting is the fact that the largest share of outflows in 1998 to 2001 were 
not in the form of equity investments, which accounted for the largest part of increase of 
net private flows until 1997, but private creditors including flows from commercial banks 
and nonbanks. This also shows some problems in the interpretation of these numbers: 
according to the numbers from 1990 to 1996 it could not be assumed that Indonesia 
would be under heavy pressure by net outflows of private creditors. 
The picture for Malaysia is slightly different compared to Indonesia as illustrated in Table 
4.2. Malaysia experienced in two periods a surge of net private capital flows: from 1990 to 
1993 and in 1995 and 1996.  The slump in 1994 was due to some problems in the banking 
sector, explained in the previous chapters. While Indonesia experienced apart from the 
sharp outflow of private creditor capital and to some extent of equity investments, 
Malaysia experienced only a marginal reversal of flows in portfolio investments, inflows in 
 125 
direct investment but outflows of private creditor capital. Overall, Malaysia experienced not 
such a sharp decrease of capital flows or even a huge reversal as Indonesia. 
Table 4.2 demonstrates that the largest outflows for all four countries in capital flows of 
private creditors which shows the importance of specific rules and regulations and policies 
for sudden reversals of this kind of capital flows.  
 
A closer look at Table 4.3 shows that Indonesia has built up a higher share of short-term 
external debt in relative and absolute values highlighting the higher degree of vulnerability 
to speculative attacks. 
 
TABLE 4.2 – Net Private Capital Flows to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand (1990-2001) (Billions of US$) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Indonesia 
Private flows, net 
 
Equity investments, net 
Direct investment, net 
Portfolio investment, net 
 
Private creditors, net 
Commercial banks, net 
Nonbank, net 
 
 
4.02 
 
1.00 
1.09 
-0.09 
 
3.02 
0.00 
3.02 
 
4.40 
 
1.47 
1.48 
-0.01 
 
2.93 
0.00 
2.93 
 
5.27 
 
1.69 
1.78 
-0.09 
 
3.58 
0.00 
3.58 
 
5.08 
 
3.45 
1.65 
1.81 
 
1.63 
1.36 
0.27 
 
3.70 
 
5.38 
1.50 
3.88 
 
-1.68 
0.53 
-2.20 
 
10.25 
 
7.84 
3.74 
4.10 
 
2.41 
1.95 
0.46 
 
11.51 
 
10.60 
5.59 
5.01 
 
0.91 
-0.76 
1.67 
 
-0.34 
 
1.87 
4.50 
-2.63 
 
-2.21 
-0.28 
-1.93 
 
-13.85 
 
-2.23 
-0.36 
-1.88 
 
-11.61 
-2.27 
-9.34 
 
-9.92 
 
-4.54 
-2.75 
-1.79 
 
-5.38 
0.13 
-5.51 
 
-9.99 
 
-6.46 
-4.55 
-1.91 
 
-3.53 
-1.42 
-2.11 
 
-8.25 
 
-3.52 
-3.28 
-0.24 
 
-4.73 
-1.87 
-2.86 
Malaysia 
Private flows, net 
 
Equity investments, net 
Direct investment, net 
Portfolio investment, net 
 
Private creditors, net 
Commercial banks, net 
Nonbank, net 
 
 
1.82 
 
2.08 
2.33 
-0.25 
 
-0.26 
0.85 
-1.11 
 
5.77 
 
4.17 
4.00 
0.17 
 
1.60 
1.31 
0.29 
 
8.91 
 
4.06 
5.18 
-1.12 
 
4.85 
3.63 
1.22 
 
11.37 
 
4.30 
5.01 
-0.71 
 
7.07 
4.22 
2.85 
 
1.51 
 
2.69 
4.34 
-1.65 
 
-1.19 
-5.07 
3.88 
 
7.85 
 
3.74 
4.18 
-0.44 
 
4.11 
0.03 
4.08 
 
10.04 
 
4.81 
5.08 
-0.27 
 
5.23 
3.34 
1.89 
 
2.56 
 
4.89 
5.14 
-0.25 
 
-2.33 
-0.98 
-1.35 
 
-2.72 
 
2.45 
2.16 
0.28 
 
-5.17 
-2.68 
-2.49 
 
1.45 
 
1.45 
2.47 
-1.02 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
-0.77 
 
-0.77 
1.76 
-2.53 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.12 
0.29 
-0.41 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Republic of Korea 
Private flows, net 
 
Equity investments, net 
Direct investment, net 
Portfolio investment, net 
 
Private creditors, net 
Commercial banks, net 
Nonbank, net 
 
 
3.75 
 
-0.10 
-0.26 
0.16 
 
3.85 
-0.30 
4.15 
 
7.87 
 
2.79 
-0.31 
3.10 
 
5.07 
2.44 
2.64 
 
8.07 
 
5.52 
-0.43 
5.95 
 
2.55 
-1.47 
4.03 
 
5.80 
 
9.35 
-0.75 
10.10 
 
-3.55 
-3.27 
-0.28 
 
11.55 
 
4.58 
-1.65 
6.23 
 
6.97 
2.31 
4.66 
 
18.19 
 
9.94 
-1.78 
11.71 
 
8.25 
2.19 
6.06 
 
24.91 
 
12.76 
-2.34 
15.10 
 
12.15 
1.78 
10.37 
 
-13.56 
 
12.78 
-1.61 
14.38 
 
-26.34 
-18.12 
-8.22 
 
-12.30 
 
-0.55 
0.67 
-1.22 
 
-11.75 
0.74 
-12.48 
 
10.10 
 
14.33 
5.14 
9.19 
 
-4.23 
1.22 
-5.44 
 
12.96 
 
16.46 
4.28 
12.18 
 
-3.50 
-5.76 
2.26 
 
3.53 
 
6.96 
0.60 
6.36 
 
-3.43 
3.73 
-7.16 
Thailand 
Private flows, net 
 
Equity investments, net 
Direct investment, net 
Portfolio investment, net 
 
Private creditors, net 
Commercial banks, net 
Nonbank, net 
 
 
10.32 
 
2.27 
2.30 
-0.04 
 
8.05 
1.03 
7.03 
 
11.50 
 
1.77 
1.85 
-0.08 
 
9.74 
0.21 
9.52 
 
10.09 
 
2.89 
1.97 
0.92 
 
7.19 
1.86 
5.33 
 
10.96 
 
7.03 
1.57 
5.46 
 
3.94 
3.32 
0.61 
 
12.87 
 
3.35 
0.87 
2.48 
 
9.52 
13.27 
-3.75 
 
21.86 
 
5.26 
1.18 
4.08 
 
16.60 
10.48 
6.12 
 
19.54 
 
4.95 
1.40 
3.54 
 
14.59 
5.65 
8.94 
 
-7.53 
 
7.84 
3.31 
4.53 
 
-15.37 
-5.65 
-9.72 
 
-14.87 
 
7.54 
7.18 
0.36 
 
-22.41 
-15.24 
-7.17 
 
-13.73 
 
5.94 
5.87 
0.07 
 
-19.68 
-13.27 
-6.40 
 
-10.57 
 
2.68 
3.39 
-0.71 
 
-13.25 
-6.99 
-6.26 
 
-5.04 
 
2.44 
3.66 
-1.22 
 
-7.48 
-1.85 
-5.63 
Source: Jomo (2005, p. 5) 
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TABLE 4.3 – Short and Total Debt in Indonesia and Malaysia (1991-2004) 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt as 
% of 
GIR 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt as % 
of Total 
External 
Debt 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt, 
end of 
period 
(in 
Millions 
US$) 
Total 
External 
Debt as 
% of GDP 
Total 
External 
Debt, end 
of period 
(in 
Millions 
US$) 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt as 
% of 
GIR 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt as 
% of 
Total 
External 
Debt 
Short-
Term 
External 
Debt, end 
of period 
(in 
Millions 
US$) 
Total 
External 
Debt as 
% of 
GDP 
Total 
External 
Debt, end 
of period 
(in Millions 
of US$) 
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.0 14.1 n.a. 37.8 n.a. 
1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.2 23.5 n.a. 37.3 n.a. 
1993 n.a. n.a. 21,306 n.a. n.a. 24.8 25.0 10,170 40.4 n.a. 
1994 n.a. n.a. 24,178 n.a. n.a. 21.9 19.3 7,529 38.5 n.a. 
1995 201.2 n.a. 30,157 n.a. n.a. 26.9 19.1 9,665 37.8 n.a. 
1996 234.0 38.8 37,576 n.a. 110,171 37.0 25.7 13,334 38.5 37,099 
1997 218.2 26.6 38,335 n.a. 136,087 59.8 25.3 16,773 48.5 41,934 
1998 110.5 16.6 27,044 n.a. 150,886 36.9 21.1 10,923 61.9 36,031 
1999 67.3 12.0 21,302 n.a. 148,098 19.3 13.8 8,781 53.9 35,580 
2000 70.5 14.2 22,800 85.4 141,694 15.7 10.9 8,801 46.9 35,665 
2001 92.3 18.9 19,051 80.8 133,071 20.8 13.9 9,602 51.9 33,598 
2002 43.1 10.2 n.a. 65.4 131,343 24.9 17.5 n.a. 51.3 n.a. 
2003 38.1 9.8 n.a. 56.7 135,400 19.8 17.9 n.a. 47.3 n.a. 
2004 46.1 11.7 n.a. 53.2 137,024 17.4 21.8 n.a. 44.6 n.a. 
Note:  Total External Debt includes outstanding debt by public and private sector 
 GIR = Gross International Reserves  
Short-Term External Debt includes liabilities includes outstanding foreign liabilities of the public and private sector 
due in one year or less. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, ARIC Indicators. 
 
In Malaysia portfolio investments flowing out of the economy ranged from RM30 billion 
during the last three quarters of 1997. This was much more than the total net inflows from 
1995 and equal to almost one fifth of annual GNP. Looking at the quarter July to 
September 1997 RM16 billion of net portfolio investments flew out of the country (Jomo, 
2005, p. 6).  This might be due to the offshore market in ringgit, which was perhaps the 
only case of an offshore market in an emerging country and Rajaraman (2003) argues that 
this was developed mainly in Singapore due to the absence of a domestic market in 
Malaysia for hedging instruments. This offshore market seems to have facilitated exchange 
rate turbulence in 1997 – 98 by allowing for speculative offshore borrowing of ringgit to 
finance dollar purchases in anticipation of a crash in the ringgit’s value and putting 
therefore more pressure on the ringgit interest rates from the second half of 1997 (Jomo, 
2005, pp. 11-12). 
 
Jomo (2005, p. 7) argues that the experience of Malaysia was in four points different from 
those of the other crisis-hit economies: 
1. Malaysia was more cautious than the other countries with respect to international 
financial liberalization as they experienced in the late 1980s a banking crisis and 
had changed their policies. 
2. Capital market flows, especially into the stock market, were more significant than 
foreign bank loans in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the Malaysian banking system had 
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contributed to asset price inflation but was not as heavily exposed to international 
borrowing as banks in the other crisis-hit economies. 
3. Due to its lower exposure of foreign bank borrowing, Malaysia did not have to call 
in the IMF or others in order to get emergency international credit facilities. 
4. In the second half of 1997 and, after a short break where more ‘orthodox’ policies 
were adopted, from September 1998 onwards the Malaysian authorities pursued 
more unconventional and ‘unorthodox’ policies. 
Another difference between the two countries is the experience of inflation, which was 
worsening in Indonesia and Malaysia at the outbreak of the crisis but with very different 
evolution. Due to their open economy both countries experienced a worsening of inflation 
in the second half of 1997 to 1998. But Malaysia returned faster to low inflation as it 
introduced their capital controls and fixed the exchange rates and, hence, regained the 
autonomy on monetary policy. In Indonesia annual inflation rate not only increased but it 
exploded from 1997 to 1998 from 6.2 % to 58.5 % and returned to a single digit inflation 
rate only in 1999 while the other crisis-hit countries (Malaysia, Republic of Korea and 
Thailand) returned to even lower inflation rates in 1999 than in the pre-crisis period (Table 
4.4, below). 
 
TABLE 4.4 – Inflation in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand (1991-
2005) (percentage Change of Consumer Price Index Over Previous Year) 
 Indonesia Malaysia Republic of Korea Thailand 
1991 9.4 4.4 9.4 5.7 
1992 7.5 4.8 6.2 4.1 
1993 9.7 3.6 4.8 3.3 
1994 8.5 4.9 6.3 5.1 
1995 9.4 4.1 4.4 5.8 
1996 8.0 3.5 4.9 5.8 
1997 6.2 2.7 4.4 5.6 
1998 58.5 5.3 7.5 8.1 
1999 20.5 2.7 0.8 0.3 
2000 3.7 1.4 2.3 1.5 
2001 11.5 1.4 4.1 1.7 
2002 11.9 1.8 2.8 0.6 
2003 6.7 1.1 3.5 1.8 
2004 6.1 1.4 3.6 2.8 
2005 10.5 n.a. 2.7 4.5 
Source: Asian Development Bank, ARIC Indicators. 
 
Looking at the monthly changes of the exchange rates of rupiah and ringgit it can be seen, 
that the movement of the two currencies was similar with respect to the US dollar was 
before the crisis (close to 0 %) while there was a huge difference during and after the 
crisis, with the exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah fluctuating immensely while the 
Malaysian ringgit was stabilized with its peg to the US dollar in September 1998 (negative 
percentage rates represent depreciations).  
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From Figure 4.1 it can be seen that the exchange rate of Indonesia remained volatile for a 
long period. A higher volatility in exchange rates with respect to the US dollar has a strong 
impact for local corporations with a high exposure on foreign markets and currencies. It 
increases the risk on foreign exchange for local companies.  Furthermore, foreign 
denominated debt becomes difficult to be rated in local currency and therefore uncertainty 
and costs increase for local corporations. This was true for Indonesia, where the large 
volatility and depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah vs. the US dollar increased uncertainty 
for local corporations and the costs of repayments of foreign denominated debt.  
Furthermore from Figure 4.1 it is obvious that Malaysia experienced less volatility during 
the first phase of the crisis and eliminated volatility by fixing the exchange rate to the US 
dollar.  The effect of such a policy is mainly to eliminate uncertainty in the markets and 
corporations. 
 
FIGURE 4.1 – Monthly Change of Exchange Rates (vs. the US Dollar) of Indonesian Rupiah 
and Malaysian Ringgit 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data of IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
 
One other commonality and at the same time a difference is petroleum production in the 
two countries. Indonesia and Malaysia are oil and natural gas producer but while 
Indonesia, an OPEC founding member, has become a marginal net importer in 2004 and 
oil production has declined, Malaysia still not an OPEC member but an oil exporting 
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FIGURE 4.3 – Malaysia’s Oil Production and Consumption 
 
Source: EIA, 2006. 
 
Indonesia’s oil production continued to decline over the years due to the natural fall off of 
aging oil fields, a lack of new investment in exploration and development and some 
regulatory problems. Indonesia is producing below its OPEC quota and has been 
considering leaving OPEC. The major oil fields of Indonesia are onshore mainly in West 
Indonesia (Central Sumatra) with some smaller oil fields offshore in Java, East Kalimantan 
and the Natuna Sea. In September 2005 a contract between PERTAMINA, the national oil 
organization, and ExxonMobil for the development of reserves in Central/East Java was 
signed. Another large offshore oil producer in Indonesia is China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC).  The monopoly of PERTAMINA was limited in 2003 by the 
introduction of the Oil and Gas Law 22/2001 in October 2001.  In July 2004 there were 
given the first licences for retail petroleum products to BP and PETRONAS (Malaysia) and 
PERTAMINA was changed into a limited liability company by presidential decree in 2003 
and it was planned to become a fully privatized corporation in 2006.  The consumption 
subsidies for domestic retail fuel consumers were cut in September 2005 which doubled 
the retail price of gasoline and diesel (EIA, 2005). 
Indonesia was the world’s leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter but is facing a 
declining share of global LNG markets.  About 68 % of its exports go to Japan, 19 % to 
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South Korea and the remainder to Taiwan. The major natural gas reserves are located 
near the Arun field in Aceh, around the Badak field in East Kalimantan and some other 
fields in Java, Irian Jaya and in the Natuna D-Alpha field. The natural gas distribution 
infrastructure is inadequate and Indonesia still relies on oil to supply about half of its own 
energy needs. The natural gas sector faced some restructuring under the terms of the 
World Bank and the IMF lending agreements (EIA, 2005). 
 
Malaysia’s oil reserves are declining but the oil production has been rising since 2002 due 
to new offshore development. The oil demand in Malaysia has been growing at a lower 
rate than its supply due to the conversion of oil-fired to natural gas power plants. 
PETRONAS, the national oil and gas company, is investing in oversee oil exploration and 
production projects (e.g. Syria, Turkmenistan, Iran). Oil exports go mainly to Japan, 
Thailand, South Korea and Singapore.  The oil production in Malaysia is mainly offshore; 
primarily in Peninsular Malaysia with most of the oil being of high quality and low in 
sulphur content (EIA, 2006).  Retail petroleum products are subsidized, but in late 
February 2006 the government decided to increase the retail fuel prices up to 23 % still 
relatively cheap compared to most other ASEAN countries (except Brunei). 
The natural gas production in Malaysia has been increased over the last years.  An active 
gas exploration and development area can be found in the lower part of the Gulf of 
Thailand in the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) and administered by the 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA).  Malaysia was exporting approximately 16 % of 
total world liquefied natural gas exports in 2004 (EIA, 2006). 
 
From the discussion above it can be seen that for both countries oil and gas production is 
important.  There are some differences between Indonesia and Malaysia: Firstly, 
Indonesia’s supply of oil has not kept pace with internal demand in 2004 it became for the 
first time a net importer while Malaysia is still a net exporter.  Secondly, Malaysia uses 
more gas for its energy production while Indonesia is still relying on oil. Thirdly, 
Indonesia’s oil and gas infrastructure is relatively old while Malaysia has newer and a more 
efficient infrastructure.  And finally, Indonesia is an OPEC member while Malaysia is non-
OPEC oil exporting country.  One commonality is that both countries rely on subsidies for 
retail petroleum products and both countries cut their subsidies in the past years.  
Indonesia was forced by the IMF lending agreement to cut subsidies, while Malaysia 
decided to cut them due to the higher costs caused by the increase in world market prices. 
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4.2 Policies Applied by Indonesia 
In July 1997 the East Asian crisis broke out in Thailand and Indonesia was believed to 
escape the economic crisis. Indonesia was long praised as a model of successful economic 
development as its neighbours Malaysia and Thailand, which were soon pulled into the 
maelstrom of the crisis.  Between June and August 1997 Indonesia remained relatively 
stable while Thailand fell into deep crisis (Sharma, 2003, p. 123) and even the World Bank 
(1997a) maintained its positive short-term outlook for Indonesia and believed that its 
widening of the intervention band from 8 to 12 % would be sufficient to stave off the 
contagion. The Indonesian government received much praise from outside for its quick 
and decisive response. But the East Asian Crisis did not omit Indonesia. The country 
experienced the largest slowdown and economic contraction of the affected crisis 
countries with a slump of 15 % in output in 1998 which was the most severe economic 
collapse recorded for any country in a single year since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Sharma, 2003, p. 123).  For this reason in late 1997 the Indonesian government decided 
to call-in the IMF after almost 30 years without assistance. 
The period from 1998 onwards is often referred to as reformasi – a period of political 
change and reform. This period is characterized by changes in the political climate, the 
break with the Soeharto regime and free, democratic elections, as well as in the economic 
sphere i.e. the recession and the implementation of policies prescribed by the IMF. After 
the break down in late 1997 and 1998 the banking crisis was tackled and macroeconomic 
stability was regained by reaching a stabilized exchange rate, inflation, interest rates and 
an increase in export growth although not reaching pre-crisis growth rates and not 
bouncing back like the other crisis hit countries (van der Eng, 2004, p.1).  
One major point of interest worth mentioning is that the Indonesian economy was 
considered to be sound by observing macroeconomic data. There was an annual GDP 
growth rates in the preceding two years before the outbreak of the crisis of nearly 8 % 
and a current account deficit at 4 % with only one ratio that seemed of being an outlier: 
short-term debt to total debt jumped up from 17.7 % in 1994, to 20.9 % in 1995 and to 
24.8 % in 1996 (Montes and Abdusalamov, 1998, p.175). 
 
On July 2nd 1997 the peg of the Thai baht was abandoned and it depreciated sharply 
against the US dollar. Subsequently the pressure spread to the Malaysian ringgit and 
Philippine peso.  On July 8th 1997 the Indonesian Rupiah also came under pressure but as 
the economy had stronger fundamentals i.e., lower current account deficit which averaged 
in the 1990s only about 2.6 % of GDP and low compared to those in Thailand and 
Malaysia, the exchange rate was not truly misaligned as in the case of Thailand. As 
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Indonesia relaxed gradually its exchange rate through a widening of the intervention band 
and therefore competitiveness in the region was maintained, especially with respect to 
China.  
The Indonesian government decided not to deplete the central banks foreign exchange 
reserves, which were growing during the preceding years, see Table 4.5 below, and were  
relatively high compared to other countries in the region, Thailand’s reserves were 
reported in August 1997 at US$28.6 billion, Korea’s were in December 1997 at US$9.1 
billion. Instead Bank Indonesia widened the intervention band from Rp192, 8 % of the 
central rate, to Rp304, 12 % of the central rate. Additionally non-resident transactions in 
the forward market were limited, sales were limited to a maximum of US$5 million – 
transactions for financing investments, exports and imports were excluded from the limit – 
and tight monetary policies accompanied with administrative measures to limit external 
borrowing of commercial banks. 
 
TABLE 4.5 – Indonesia’s Official Reserves 
Date Official Reserves (US$ billion) 
January 1993 11,77 
March 1993 11,98 
January 1994 12,42 
January 1995 12,97 
January 1996 14,79 
January 1997 19,83 
July 1997 21,10 
August 1997 20,40 
September 1997 20,05 
October 1997 19,10 
November 1997 18,95 
December 1997 17,42 
January 1998 14,03* 
February 1998 12,46* 
March 1998 13,18* 
Note: * - Net International Reserves (NIR) 
Source: Dijwandono (2005, p. 50) 
 
While Indonesia was not in these early months suffering like the other countries, it 
experienced a different situation than previous years i.e., every time Bank Indonesia had 
widened its intervention band during 1994 to 1997, a total of five times, the currency 
appreciated, while in July 1997 the currency for the first time depreciated rapidly. This 
could be attributed to the reduction of exposure of foreign creditors and large domestic 
conglomerates bought in US dollars to hedge, at least in part, their foreign currency 
denominated debts (Sharma, 2003, pp. 140-141). The Indonesian rupiah depreciated 
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country. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 below show the countries oil production and consumption over 
time. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 – Indonesia’s Oil Production and Consumption 
 
Source: EIA, 2005. 
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towards its lower band although the central bank was intervening in order to stabilize the 
currency and by raising interest rates from 12 % to 13 %. Theses interventions could not 
give the rupiah an upswing and therefore on August 13th 1997 the decision to float was 
taken at a meeting at the residence of President Soeharto. The decision that the 
Indonesian rupiah would float was announced on the morning of August 14th 1997 
(Djiwandono, 2005, pp. 46-47). 
The currency depreciated further after the introduction of the free float and as a result not 
only the foreign currency denominated debt surged in terms of rupiah but also Indonesian 
banks could not attract any more funds from outside. The exchange rate float did not 
bring the effect of stabilizing the rupiah, instead, people wanted to get out of the currency 
as fast as possible (McLeod, 1997, pp. 43-44). Therefore the Indonesian government 
increased the rupiah interest rates: the overnight Jakarta interbank rupiah rate (JIBOR) on 
August 11th 1997 was 15.8 %, increased to 51.4 % on August 18th 1997 and even to 87.7 
% on August 22nd 1997. As the exchange rate worsened the raise of interest rates did not 
lead to the proposed outcome and therefore the Ministry of Finance responded by cutting 
government spending (rescheduling projects of around US$16 billion) and limiting routine 
expenditures on non-priority items (Pincus and Ramli, 1998, p. 725). Furthermore, the 
public sector was instructed to shift their deposits from commercial banks to Bank 
Indonesia.  Nevertheless the rupiah did not recover. For this reason and in order to reduce 
currency speculation Bank Indonesia introduced limitations on forward sales of dollars for 
non-residents to US$5 million (Sharma, 2003, p. 141). 
In the banking sector additional problems arose: the banks were using their funds held by 
Bank Indonesia to cover their liquidity mismatches and most banks no longer met the 5 % 
required depository fund at Bank Indonesia. The situation became even worse and some 
banks did not only not comply or even violate banking rules, but started to experience 
negative balances with Bank Indonesia, resulting in very high rates of interest (the penalty 
rate for holding a negative balance with Bank Indonesia in mid-August 1997 was at 52 %)  
(Djiwandono, 2005, pp. 60-61).  
The Jakarta composite equity index slipped from 612 points in mid-August 1997 to 475 in 
early September 1997 (29 % in two weeks). The pressure on the banks went further and 
so the real sector was also affected, and confidence in the economy and the government 
went down. To deal with these problems the government announced a ten-point policy on 
September 3rd 1997, which not only tried to address policies to the monetary and fiscal 
area but as well to the real sector, which included a cut of spending of large government 
projects as mentioned above. Bank Indonesia was advised by this policy to take three 
steps:  
 135 
1. Healthy banks that faced liquidity problems should be given temporarily 
assistance;  
2. Unsound banks should be consolidated by merger or acquisition by sound banks;  
3. Should these rescue operations of the unsound banks fail, they should be 
liquidated by applying current regulation and try to save the funds of depositors 
(Djiwandono, 2005, p. 62). 
In September 1997 the interest rates were lowered upon request of the business sector 
which suffered from high interest rates and the resulting pressure. Other steps followed in 
order to ease the monetary stand (e.g. rediscount facility). In the following weeks the 
rupiah weakened further and banks faced more pressure and distress (see Figure 4.1 a). 
 
By late September 1997 the Minister of Finance and the Governor of Bank Indonesia 
initiated the discussion of calling in the IMF.  This was followed by a letter of intent to ask 
for a stand-by arrangement of the IMF by the Minister of Finance. The IMF immediately 
responded and agreed upon sending two missions and to supply Indonesia with funds.  As 
the rupiah further depreciated by the end-September/beginning of October 1997 the IMF 
sent their missions earlier than scheduled and during this rescheduling the IMF facility was 
changed from ‘precautionary’ to ‘stand-by’ facility (Djiwandono, 2005, p. 66). 
On October 31st 1997 the ‘Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies’ (MEFP), 
including a letter of intent of the government, was signed and sent to the Managing 
Director, Michael Camdessus, for approval and on November 5th 1997 the proposal was 
approved by the Executive board.  Indonesia got additionally standby loans from the 
World Bank, the ADB and contingency loans from individual countries such as Japan and 
Singapore (Thee, 2002, p. 231). 
The stand-by arrangement consisted of a loan amounting SDR 7.3 billion for three years.  
This stand-by loan was under an emergency procedure (Emergency Finance Mechanism – 
EFM), which implied faster negotiations and board decisions.  The stand-by loan in 1997 
was the first after more than 20 years (the last one was in 1970) although Indonesia had 
used in 1975, 1983 and 1987 the Compensatory Financing Facility (CEF) which allows the 
users to buy foreign currencies in exchange for their own currencies and had called on 
technical assistance. Since the mid-1980s Indonesia received stand-by loans from 
international commercial banks of around US$2 billion (Djiwandono, 2005, pp. 67-69). 
The programme was designed around three pillars: 
 
‘First, a strong macroeconomic framework designed to achieve an orderly adjustment as well as a tight 
monetary stance; second, a comprehensive strategy to restructure the financial sector, including early closing of 
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insolvent institutions; and third, a broad range of structural measures which also improve governance’ (IMF, 1997, 
III.7.). 
 
This programme included the following policies (IMF, 1997): 
Macroeconomic Policies:  
- Fiscal Policies: Cutting spending and introducing revenue measures which together 
should amount to budget savings of approximately 1 % of GDP in 1997/98; Cutting 
of spending on infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, transmigration, irrigation, energy 
projects); Removal of VAT exemptions and raise of price for tobacco and alcohol; 
Adjustment of prices of petroleum products and electricity; Improvements of tax 
administration and structure of tax system; Introduction of more transparency in 
the disclosure of public sector statistics. These policies should lead to a surplus of 
the budget.  
- Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: A tightened monetary policy in order to 
support the exchange rate; If necessary foreign exchange intervention supported 
by restrictive monetary policy. 
- External Position and Financing: Providing confidence for international investors 
and creditors in order that short-term debts would be rolled over. 
Financial Sector Restructuring:  
- The first element consisted of the restructuring of troubled financial institutions as 
the ratio for nonperforming loans to total loans was 8 %, and an even higher ratio 
for state-owned banks. The isolation and closing of unsound financial institutions 
was important. On November 1st 1997, 16 banks were closed but Bank Indonesia 
was only preparing thereafter plans for effective asset recovery. Only small 
depositors were compensated promptly for up to Rp20 million per depositor per 
bank. Other foreign or domestic liabilities were not guaranteed. 
- The second element introduced procedures and policies to deal with weak but 
viable financial institutions in order to help for recovery. Ten banks were under 
close monitoring of Bank Indonesia and should have been reviewed by April 1998 
and if necessary be closed. 
- The third element tried to resolve problems of state and regional development 
banks, encouraging mergers and other strategic tools with the ultimate goal of 
accelerating privatization of the state banks. Weak regional development banks 
should be rehabilitated and capital adequacy and provisioning standards raised to 
those applicable to commercial banks. The domestic bond market should have 
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been strengthened with the help of the ADB. Costs associated with bank closure 
and state bank rehabilitation were to be fully covered by government budget. 
- The fourth element was focusing on the institutional, legal, and regulatory 
framework for banking operations in order to ensure the emergence of a sound 
and efficient financial system. This included the enforcement of the Basle 
Committee’s Core Principles of Banking Supervision, relaxing on restrictions on 
bank lending and to modernization of the role of Bank Indonesia as a lender of last 
resort. 
Structural Reforms: 
- The government wanted to promote greater transparency in policymaking and 
competition by accelerating the structural reform program through further trade 
and investment reform, deregulation and privatization. 
- Foreign trade and investment: The reduction of tariffs was to be further 
implemented and the list of activities open to foreign investors was supposed to be 
simplified and expanded. 
- Deregulation and privatization: Increase in domestic competition was to be 
promoted, as well as privatization and the expanding of the role of the private 
sector in the provision of infrastructure. For privatization purposes the assets of the 
government were to be analyzed; enterprises were categorized into those that 
should be closed, restructured or fully privatized and the privatization process 
should be a transparent sales process maximizing the return to government from 
sales treating all bidders equally. 
- Environment: The government was supposed to realign key resource prices and 
usage charges especially for forestry and water use. 
- Social Safety Net: Measures that were necessary to achieve fiscal targets were not 
supposed to touch expenditures on health and education and efforts to target 
assistance to the poor should have been intensified.  
Program Monitoring and Data Issues: 
- The quarterly quantitative performance criteria were the following:  
o Ceiling on base money; 
o Floor on the net international reserves of Bank Indonesia; 
o Floor on the overall government surplus; 
o Ceiling on the contracting of external public and publicly-guaranteed loans 
with maturity of more than one year; 
o Ceiling on the stock of public and public guaranteed short-term external 
debt. 
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The government was not allowed to accumulate any new external payments 
arrears during the period of the arrangement. The assessment, the publication and 
dissemination of key economic data was meant to be improved substantially. 
 
In Annex E of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (IMF, 1997) the 
Structural Measures were summarized as follows: 
‘Performance criteria/Benchmarks for end-December 1997: 
1. Closure of banks placed under intensified supervision or conservatorship that do not submit rehabilitation plans or 
whose plans are not approved by Bank Indonesia. 
2. Establishment of quantitative performance targets for state-owned banks together with monitoring mechanisms.  
These are to be agreed by Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia and state-owned banks. 
3. Issuance of implementation regulations on procurement and contracting procedures. 
Performance Criteria/Benchmarks for end-March/April 1998 
- Introduction of full tax deductibility of loan loss provisions (by end-March 1998). 
- Audits of state-owned banks by internationally recognized accounting firms (by end-March 1998). 
- Completion of public expenditure review (by end-March 1998). 
- Increase in prices of petroleum products to eliminate subsidies (by end-March 1998). 
- Increase in electricity prices by 30 % (by end-March 1998).’ (IMF, 1997, ANNEX E). 
 
As can be seen above the agreement of the IMF and the Indonesian government focused 
mainly on the banking sector and included 50 banks, representing 34.3 % of the banking 
system (Sharma, 2003, p.145). The 16 banks, which counted only 2.5 % of the total 
banking assets, were closed on November 1st 1997, within 24 hours after the agreement 
was reached. The action did not create confidence but instead created panic among 
investors and population. 
Looking at the causes of this panic reaction Sharma (2003, pp. 145-147) argues that the 
sudden closure did not harm the financial system, however the way in which the banks 
were closed was more harmful and adds that: 
4. There were only closed 16 banks (identified as insolvent) while the agreement 
mentioned 50 banks; the other 34 banks were not identified and therefore the 
mood of the general public was fuelled with uncertainty to all other banks.  
Additionally there were not listed some well politically connected banks and the 
IMF agreement mentioned nothing about provisions for a deposit insurance. 
5. The closure happened in a time of volatile capital withdrawals and there were no 
comprehensive and prepared financial restructuring plans.  This increased the 
panic. 
6. There were no guidelines on how to deal with liabilities and assets of the closed 
and of the remaining banks.  There was a lack of disclosure not only about the 
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closed banks but also especially for the banks which remained open and created 
uncertainty about the health of the banking sector.  
7. The 16 banks accounted only of less than 2.5 % of total bank assets in Indonesia 
and the public was aware that this closure would not affect the health of the 
banking sector and wanted even more closures. The deposit guarantee was not 
generating confidence and domestic investors transferred deposits from private to 
state banks (flight from quality to safety) and many transferred their funds to 
foreign banks or exchanged their rupiah for dollars and repatriated their funds. 
8. The lawsuit of Bamband Trihatmodjo on November 5th 1997 against the Governor 
of Bank Indonesia and the Minister of Finance over the closure of his Bank 
Andromeda and the fact that this bank went back to business soon thereafter 
under a new name (Bank Alfa) and that several cancelled ‘development’ projects of 
Suharto’s family and cronies were suddenly back in operation was causing even 
more rumour.  Additionally, large deposit withdrawals from private banks prompted 
the central bank to issue emergency credits in increasing amounts to prevent these 
banks from failing.  Some of these funds were channelled to banks of politically 
connected people. Such developments further increased panic as the general public 
perceived it as a sign that the regime was not serious about implementing the 
strict regulations of the agreement and reforms. 
 
The situation in Indonesia did not improve as hoped but rather it worsened. The sudden 
closures of these small banks under IMF guidance did not induce more confidence into the 
economy, instead uncertainty grew further.  The prescription of the fiscal surplus was not 
in line with the underlying problem: Indonesia was neither facing high inflation nor a high 
government debt; instead, the public sector burdened only a small part of foreign debt 
while most of it was incurred by the private sector (the figures were stated in the 
programme as: total foreign debt US$140 billion, where government foreign debt was 
US$60 billion and the private sector US$80 billion). The arranged memorandum was very 
detailed and strict and the structural changes could not be completed within a few months 
as suggested by the IMF-arrangement but within a longer period of time (e.g. institutional 
change). As Hill (1999, pp. 52-53) attacks the IMF’s ‘scutter-gun’ approach which 
‘overloaded the reform agenda, forcing bureaucratically stretched governments to quickly 
tackle a vast array of highly complex and sensitive policy issues’ and when ‘it attempted to 
resolve banking sector distress too quickly, aggravated the general loss of confidence’. 
The social safety net programme was only addressed very briefly and the biggest 
challenge was to spend funds for this purpose while the Indonesian government had to 
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run a surplus. As Djiwandono (2005, pp. 104-105) states the IMF did not include two 
important problems in the first programme.  Firstly, the social implications of the crisis and 
what measures to be taken and secondly, the corporate debt and its consequences on the 
evolution of the economy. 
During the first week of November the rupiah gained against the US dollar again (from 
3,640 rupiah in October 31st 1997 to 3,295 rupiah in November 7th or an appreciation of 
10 % (Djiwandono, 2005, p.97)) by intervention into the market (Bank Indonesia, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Bank of Japan).  But in late November the rupiah went 
back to its end-October level.  As for the interbank money market, this market worked 
only for banks that knew each other very well. The JIBOR, which consisted of records of 
interest rates of 24 large banks, was relatively low as they did not experience heavy 
liquidity problems. But for the other banks the interest rates were much higher and theses 
banks experienced a liquidity squeeze (e.g. the JIBOR was around 30 % in late November 
while the rate for other banks was more than 100 %). The IMF was only looking at JIBOR 
and therefore did not worry about the interest rate (Djiwandono, 2005, p.100). 
In late November the economic situation worsened again and the private sector faced 
huge liquidity problems and international financial markets refused to roll over short term 
debts and to accept letters of credit. More and more banks faced liquidity problems and 
default by corporate borrowers increased. The increase of liquidity support by Bank 
Indonesia (in the form of Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia or BLBI) was needed in order 
to induce money for the lost of capital flight from banks, which reduced in this way the 
dollar deposits and resulted in higher pressure on the exchange rate. The rupiah 
fluctuated in late December 1997 around Rp 5,000 to 6,000 per US dollar (Sharma, 2003, 
p. 147-148). 
On the political side new uncertainties arose: firstly, in early December 1997 President 
Soeharto cancelled for two weeks almost all meetings which fuelled rumours about the 
status of his health and secondly, on December 19th 1997 the President dismissed four of 
the seven managing directors of Bank Indonesia (Djiwandono, 2005, p.148). 
 
On January 6th 1998 President Suharto presented to the parliament a draft of the budget 
for FY 1998/1999 which showed an increase of 32.1 % of the budget compared to the 
year before (from Rp101 trillion to Rp133 trillion). This was not in line with the IMF 
agreement, which stated that the government should run a 1 % surplus. The markets 
reacted negatively to this proposal (Sharma, 2003, p. 148). 
The review of the first programme was issued on January 7th 1998 and stated that 
‘performance under the programme so far has been decidedly been disappointing’ and 
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that ‘although some progress has been made, there have also been policy slippages in 
every area of the programme’ (IMF, 1998a). 
The rupiah fell from Rp 5,450 per US$1 on January 1st to more than Rp 10,000 per US$1 
on January 8th 1998. A campaign in favour of the rupiah was initiated by the president’s 
daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukama (Tutut), and when the prominent non-pribumi i.e. 
Chinese-Indonesian businessman Sofyan Wanandi refused to join the campaign some 
racial touched attacks on this business group started. On January 11th 1998 the rupiah 
reached RP 10,200 per US$1. On January 13th 1998 Peregrine Investment Holdings (a 
Hong Kong based finance company) collapsed as they had undertaken too big loans in 
Indonesia. In Indonesia the general public became aware about future developments and 
many citizens were panic buying of food as rumours grew that the government would ban 
food imports and setting large-scale rationing in order to prevent a further plunge of the 
currency (Sharma, 2003, pp. 148-149).  
On January 15th 1998 President Soeharto himself, as opposed to the first letter of intent 
when the Minister of Finance and the Governor of Bank Indonesia, signed the second 
letter of intent, where the picture of the IMF managing director Michel Camdessus 
watching the singing of the documents with his arms crossed standing behind Soeharto, 
became very well known in Indonesia and many Indonesians considered this as an 
arrogance in confront to their President (Djiwandono, 2005, p. 162). The second letter of 
intent was even more packed with structural reforms than the first one and as the IMF 
managing director Michel Camdessus stated  
 
‘[…] the government of Indonesia and the IMF have reached agreement on a much strengthened and reinforced 
economic program.  Many of the measures in this program are new, others have been there from the beginning 
but are now being accelerated, but all have one common purpose: they aim to restore confidence in the currency 
and in the economy, by demonstrating that the government recognizes the problems confronting the country and 
is prepared to take the necessary measures to overcome them, even if they are difficult and painful.’  (IMF, 
1998b) 
 
The new programme consisted of 50 points and included different provisions, this time 
also including provisions for restructuring corporate debt and safety social net. The most 
important were (IMF, 1998b): 
- Macroeconomic framework: Limiting the inflation at 20 % for 1998 but targeting a 
single digit inflation rate for the year thereafter and the expectation that the 
external current account would move from a deficit into a surplus and thereby 
generating additional foreign exchange. 
- Fiscal policy: The revision of the budget for FY 1998/1999; the IMF allowed 
running a 1 % GDP deficit (making a 180° turn from pressuring to run a surplus to 
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allow a deficit).  The deficit was not allowed to be run through incurring new debts 
but instead by reducing fuel and energy subsidies. 
- Fiscal transparency measures: The Indonesian government was obliged to include 
non-budget expenditures into the central government budget as the Reforestation 
and Investment Fund. 
- Public sector projects: The 12 projects that were postponed or placed under review 
were to be cancelled and support for IPTN’s airplane projects should have been 
stopped immediately. 
- Monetary policy: Bank Indonesia would be given full autonomy and had to 
maintain a tight monetary policy. 
- Bank and corporate sector restructuring: The prime goal was to restore confidence 
in the banking sector and specific plans were to be announced only a few days 
after the publication of the programme. 
- Structural reforms: All restrictions were to be abolished as the BULOG’s monopoly 
which would be limited only to rice and the market for agricultural products had to 
be fully deregulated in order to promote more competition. Additionally, marketing 
agreements had to be abolished, especially for the cartels in the cement, paper 
and plywood sector. 
- Foreign investment: All barriers to foreign investment, as for example in the palm 
oil plantation, had to be removed by February 1st 1998.  
- Drought: In order to overcome the difficulties in rural regions due to the drought 
there should be introduced ‘community-based work programmes’ for lifting the 
purchasing power of poor people.  Additionally, all tariffs on food were to be cut to 
a maximum of 5 % while non-food tariffs had to be lowered by 5 percentage 
points. 
One interesting fact should be added: This letter of intent was signed by the President and 
he also executed negotiations with the IMF on his own. All the other letter of intents were 
signed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of Bank Indonesia, and since April 
1998 also signed by the Minister coordinator for Economy and Finance. In this sense the 
letter of intent of January was very special.  But the President did not really want this 
programme and instead went on as before (Sharma, 2003, p.150; Djiwandono, 2005, p. 
163). 
As Radelet (1999) notes the second IMF programme was in essence the same as the first 
one with the exception that fiscal policy was slightly eased and introduced capital 
adequacy ratios for banks and that it was misguided. The economy was contracting and 
not experiencing excess demand which meant that the initial fiscal tightening added to the 
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contraction, undermining investor confidence and fuelling capital flight. While the 
programme included specific structural reforms in the long run it did not provide concrete 
solutions for the problems of the banking sector and the currency crisis, failing to provide 
a clear strategy for getting out of large depreciations and how to deal with the banking 
crisis and short term debt.  The downward pressure of the currency further increased and 
on January 22nd the rupiah fell to an all-time low of Rp 17,000 per US$1 (Sharma, 2003, p. 
151).  
On January 27th 1998 the IMF and the Indonesian government had to introduce a three 
point emergency plan in order to get rid of the troubles in the banking sector (Sharma, 
2003, pp. 151-152; Djiwandono, 2005, pp. 159-160): 
1. The imposition of a blanket guarantee by the government. Bank Indonesia 
announced that it would use a blanket guarantee of the rupiah and foreign 
currency denominated debts of all domestically incorporated banks for two years 
therefore effectively accepting banking sector risk. This blanket guarantee was 
designed to prevent further bank runs and stabilize the banking system. 
Additionally Bank Indonesia imposed restrictions on credit growth and announced 
an issue of weekly ceilings on the maximum interest rates that banks could pay on 
deposits. 
2. Establishment of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). The task of 
IBRA was to take over and rehabilitate weak banks and administer the 
governments guarantee program for bank debts. Additionally IBRA was allowed to 
establish a separate asset-management entity (Asset Management Unit – AMU) 
which should take over non-performing assets from banks that were to be 
liquidated or merged into stronger institutions.  Furthermore, all banks were 
required to submit their loan portfolios to audit firms by the end of 1998. Lastly, 
IBRA was given the power to enforce collection of funds from shareholders of 
private banks that owed funds to Bank Indonesia. 
3. The proposal of a framework for handling corporate restructuring. This plan 
recommended a temporary voluntary suspension of corporate external debt 
payment.  In this context the government stated clearly that there would be no use 
of public financing, guarantee or subsidy to bail out the debt and reimburse 
unguaranteed creditors. 
 
IBRA was not truly an autonomous agency as it ‘had to operate subject to intense political 
oversight, its effectiveness was compromised by a weak legal and regulatory framework 
and its need to obtain political authority, even form technical operations’ (Enoch et al., 
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2001, 15).  The agency divided banks after the revision of the financial position of banks 
which had received more than 500 % of their total equity from Bank Indonesia into 
categories A and B, where category A banks had to be liquidated (they had received 
liquidity support equal to or in excess of 75 % of their total assets) and category B banks 
(banks that had received less than 75 %) were to have the rights of their shareholders 
suspended and their existing managers replaced by IBRA (Republic of Indonesia 
Presidential Decree No. 27/1998). This and the announcement of IBRA that the former 
majority shareholders of suspended banks should pay the outstanding negative balance 
with their bank which had accumulated with Bank Indonesia and the amount by which 
their bank’s intra-group lending exceeded the affiliated lending limits before September 
21st 1998 (Witcher and Solomon, 1998). IBRA closed by February 14th 1998, 54 distressed 
banks (4 state banks, 39 private national banks and 11 regional development banks, 
compromising 36.7 % of the banking sector). The four state banks accounted for 24.7 % 
of the liabilities of the banking sector (Lindgren et al., 1999, p. 59).  The exchange rate 
recovered during January and February 1998 (from Rp 12,500 per US dollar on January 
28th 1998 to Rp 9,950 per US dollar on February 16th 1998) (Sharma, 2003, p. 153). 
But the political interference remained strong and on January 27th 1998 President 
Soeharto fired the Governor of Bank Indonesia, Sudradjad Djiwandono, only two weeks 
before the official end of his tenure, while in late February 1998 he fired the senior 
Finance Minister official, Dr Bambang Subianto, being only one month in charge of his job 
at the top of IBRA and accused to ‘reportedly for being too diligent in pursuing his 
responsibilities’ (Enoch et al., 2001, p. 15). 
During late January a rumour in markets spread that President Soeharto wanted to set up 
a currency board.  Djiwandono (2005, pp. 187-191) argues that this movement was a 
serious step of President Soeharto as the president was thinking of the crisis as being a 
purely monetary or financial problem.  In other words that the currency depreciation 
would last only a few weeks, that the institutions dealing with the crisis should find a 
solution very rapid, that the trust in monetary authorities was deteriorating especially after 
the bank closures.  It is evident that he was aware of the huge depreciation of the rupiah 
and wanted to settle the problem before his re-election in the General Assembly of the 
People Consultative Assembly in March 1st 1998, and that he instructed many high officials 
at Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance to draft a bill on the adoption of a currency 
board. As a possible motivation of the adoption of a currency board could be that the so-
called ‘cronies’ and Soeharto’s children were pushing him to create a fixed exchange rate 
as the corporate sector was facing problems since the floating of the rupiah (Soesastro, 
2000, p. 133; Djiwandono, 2005, pp. 189-190). On February 17th 1998 the new governor 
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of Bank Indonesia Sjahril Sabrin was appointed. On the same day, following a formal 
invitation of the newly established Council for Enhancing the Resiliency of Economics and 
Finance (henceforth the Economic Resiliency Council, DPK-EKU), Prof. Steven Hanke of 
John Hopkins University, Baltimore, a strong-currency advocate, was introduced as an 
advisor for the council.  The proposal to appreciate the exchange rate at Rp 5,000 per US 
dollar at this stage when it was actually moving around Rp 10,000 to Rp 8,000 was 
considered as being not credible for markets (Sharma, 2003, p. 155). This appreciation 
could also result in an immense capital flight as there was the fear that President 
Soeharto’s children and cronies could change large amounts of rupiah into US dollars and 
moving them into offshore accounts and some estimates indicated that if a sustained 
capital flight emerged after pegging the exchange rate at Rp 5,000 per US dollar than the 
country would have only reserves for the defence of their peg for less than one week 
(Enoch et al., 2001, p. 86). 
The IMF in addition to the G-7 countries was strongly against the adoption of a currency 
board. The IMF argued that an appreciation of the exchange rate could only be reached by 
following reasonable macroeconomic and financial policies and a currency board was at 
this stage out of question as the banking system was not supposed to be in the position of 
dealing with significant movements in domestic interest rates (Sharma, 2003, p. 155). The 
G7 was putting some political pressure on President Soeharto e.g. issuing statements, 
making telephone calls and visits to Indonesia (Djiwandono, 2005, p. 192). These were 
external pressures but some internal pressures also arose as well.  For instance the 
Monetary Board submitted a memorandum to the President which stated that first various 
requirements should be met and only then could a switch to a currency board commence, 
i.e. the memorandum was not stating directly to avoid the adoption of a currency board 
but the message was that there should be no currency board at this point of time 
(Dijwandono, 2005, p.192). 
The following weeks were characterized by tensions between the IMF and President 
Soeharto, by a continuing economic downturn and by the erosion of public confidence of 
the health of the banking sector. On March 6th 1998 the IMF announced the suspension of 
the second instalment of Indonesia’s bailout package (a tranche of US$3 billion) which was 
also based on the choice of Soeharto new cabinet (Johnson, 1998, pp. 27-28). On March 
10th 1998, the People’s Consultative Assembly voted by acclamation Soeharto as President 
and B.J. Habibie as vice-president. The dispute between President Soeharto and the IMF 
and other donor countries such as the US was not settled with this ‘election’, on contrary, 
the president did not choose reformers for being part of the government but instead chose 
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close family and business associates (e.g. Tutut, his eldest daughter, Bob Hasan who 
became the Ministry of Trade and Industry) (Sharma, 2003, pp. 156-157). 
As unemployment raised and the prices of basic commodities increased drastically, the 
latter merely the result of reductions of government subsidies, rumours and 
demonstrations took place asking for the dismissal of the president. As the USA were 
afraid about the increasing social unrest in Indonesia it encouraged the IMF to keep on 
talking with Indonesia and on March 17th 1998 the third round of negotiations between the 
IMF and Indonesia began. On April 9th 1998 the IMF and the Indonesian government 
reached an agreement by making concessions on both sides (the IMF allowed BULOG to 
continue retaining the subsidies on basic commodities while the president dropped his idea 
of the currency board) (Sharma, 2003, p. 157). The agreement consisted of 117 points 
repeating the points agreed in two former memorandums and adding new ones including 
more specific targets and a timetable for implementation. The tranche of US$3 billion was 
disbursed not in a single total disbursement but instead in three disbursements, i.e. US$1 
billion per month (IMF, 1998c). 
Markets did not react to the signature of the agreement as they predicted that the 
president would not stick to the agreement which in fact happened. During this period the 
opposition in the population against Soeharto grew and after weeks of peaceful student 
demonstrations at many universities in Indonesia they became violent caused by a harsh 
crackdown by the security forces. On May 4th 1998 the situation grew even worse: on this 
day the IMF released its first US$1 billion monthly tranche, the Soeharto government 
increased fuel prices heavily (71 % for gasoline and 25 % for kerosene) claiming that this 
price increase was mandated by the IMF in order to redirect discontent of the population 
to the IMF. But this did not work; on the contrary the discontent even grew further and in 
desperation, regime supporters claimed that the price rise was to be driven by non-
pribumi ethnic Chinese (the Minister of Interior Syarwan Hamid called them ‘rats disloyal 
to Indonesia’, for more details see Eklof, 1999, 134-143) (Sharma, 2003, p.157). 
Only a few days later the situation in Indonesia exploded (between May 12th and May 17th 
1998). On May 12th around 20,000 students protested at Gajah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta for the resignation of Soeharto while at Trisakti University in Jakarta six 
student protesters were killed by soldiers. On May 13th 1998 simultaneously student 
protests erupted in violence in many cities and towns throughout the country and in 
Jakarta over a thousand people were killed (mostly ethnic Chinese) by mobs (Suryadinata, 
2001, p. 506). In Jakarta some ‘5,000 buildings were damaged or burned and close to 
2,000 vehicles were torched’ (Azis, 1999, p. 86). Due to the uncertain and chaotic 
situation many expatriates, businesses, capital and even the staff of the IMF and the WB 
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moved out of the country. On May 18th 1998 thousands of students occupied the 
parliament grounds and asked for an immediate special session of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly and Soeharto’s resignation. The students were supported by 
prominent opposition leaders as Dr Amien Rais and Professor Emil Salim (Sharma, 2003, p. 
158). 
President Soeharto announced soon thereafter that he would not step down immediately 
but promised to revise the political laws through a reform committee at which some 
students should join. Additionally, he announced to reshuffle the cabinet which would deal 
with the growing economic and political crisis and promised to hold new elections as soon 
as possible.  But instead of calming the mass of student protestors, the opposite occurred 
and on May, 20th 1998 parliament was occupied by 30,000 people. On May 21st 1998 the 
Speaker of the parliament announced that all members parliament, including the military, 
agreed that President Soeharto should immediately step down.  He did this the same day 
after thirty-two years as president, since there was no possibility to move on without the 
support of the military (Sharma, 2003, p. 158). 
After the step down of Soeharto, Vice-president B. J. Habibie became interim president.  
During that period the nation was in crisis and the economy suffered even more than in 
early 1998: the destruction of property and infrastructure undermined the ongoing of the 
economy as the service sector, including financial and business services, trade, hotels and 
restaurants, suffered huge losses and some foreign buyers even temporarily stopped 
placing orders for Indonesian exports. But even worse, there were massive bank runs 
during and immediately after the riots, in particular Bank Central Asia (the largest private 
bank accounting for 12 % of the total banking sector liabilities; furthermore it was owned 
by two of Soeharto’s children and his crony Liem Sioe Liong). After weeks of deposits 
withdrawal, Bank Central Asia was brought under the governance of IBRA. The rupiah fell 
by the end of May below Rp12,000 per US dollar and continued to fall reaching a low of 
Rp16,500 per US dollar on June 17th 1998 (a cumulative depreciation of 85 % since June 
1997) (Sharma, 2003, p. 159). 
As the country did not calm down President Habibie changed political direction declaring 
that the New Order regime was undemocratic and promised rapid implementation of the 
keterbukaan (political openness) and the establishment of the Orde Reformasi 
(Reformation Order). In order to convince people of his intentions he abolished reporting 
restrictions and dismissed Prabowo, Soeharto’s son-in-law, from the Indonesian armed 
forces (Mietzner, 1999, pp. 88-89); the government revoked the law that limited the 
number of parties to two, released political prisoners and supported the view for legal 
reforms (particularly the protection of human rights) (Anwar, 1999, pp. 39-43). 
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Furthermore President Habibie announced that parliamentary elections would be held in 
June 1999 and followed by an approach of political and economical decentralization and 
began to repair the distribution system of food and other necessities all over the country 
(Sharma, 2003, p. 159). 
As Kenward (1999, p. 124) states ‘President Habibie and most of the new cabinet showed 
a greatly increased commitment to implementing the IMF program. Specifically, immediate 
pressure was off Bank Indonesia to do anything more than restore financial stability. 
There was significant easing of political pressures to bail out banks and no apparent 
pressure on Bank Indonesia to reduce interest rates prematurely again’.  Furthermore, 
President Habibie announced that one of the most trusted persons by the IMF, 
Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, would remain in office and 
that Widjojo Nitisastro, Professor of economics at University of Indonesia, would become 
advisor of the Indonesian government. On June 24th 1998 the IMF and the Indonesian 
government signed the ‘Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies’ (IMF, 1998d) which was a revised version of the economic program signed on 
April 10th 1998 (IMF, 1998c). According to the IMF the outlook for GDP was a real GDP 
decline by more than 10 % in 1998 (IMF, 1998d) (Sharma, 2003, p. 160). 
Bad news did not stop – apart from the country experiencing a deep economic recession 
there was also problems in agriculture for the first time in a decade they had to import 
huge amounts of rice. In 1998 the economy contracted by around 13.2 %, which is one of 
the most abrupt one-year downturns in recent world history, and nominal per capita 
income declined by 65 % between 1997 and 1998 (from US$1079 to US$380) (Tan, 2000, 
p. 118).  The problem of the economy was the increasing unemployment rate, the 
bankruptcies of companies and the huge increases of inflation caused by price increases of 
basic commodities such as rice and fuel. The result was that many Indonesian households 
living just above the poverty line dropped below it. After consultation with the IMF the 
Indonesian government introduced a special market program (OPK) under which BULOG 
was allowed to sell rice to 7.5 million low-income families at a low subsidized price (at Rp 
1,000 per kg rice instead of the valid market price ranging between Rp 2,000 - 5,000 per 
kg rice), where each family was entitled to get ten kilograms per month at this subsidized 
price (Sharma, 2003, p. 160). 
The results of the audit of banks conducted during spring and summer of 1998 by 
international auditors showed that the banks were used for direct lending to non-
productive ventures. The level of overall non-performing loans ranged from 55 % to more 
than 90 % of the portfolio of banks (Enoch, 2000, p. 16). Even the reviews of 16 large 
banks were bad and showed that the banks were very weak and given that these banks 
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were considered to be among the strongest in the economy this confirmed the deep 
insolvency of the banking system as a whole. Thereafter authorities recognized that 
banking reforms were needed (Sharma, 2003, p. 161). 
In September 1998 Bank Indonesia with support of the IMF outlined a multi-billion-dollar 
bank recapitalization plan and in October 1998 the Indonesian parliament passed 
amendments to the banking law that modified previous requirements regarding the 
banking sector (bank secrecy and allowance of foreign ownership in banks) and 
strengthening the legal powers of IBRA and AMU. In mid-September the government 
announced that IBRA would play a significant role in reducing the number of small, poorly 
capitalized banks in the country which was effectively done by bank mergers. The four 
state-owned banks, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Ekspor-Impor/EXIM Bank, Bank Bumi 
Daya and Bapindo were merged and the corporate business of a fifth state bank (Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia) was incorporated into a new institution, Bank Manidris, which was 
established on September 30th 1998 and was the holder of 100 % of the shares of the 
component banks, whereby this large capital infliction was done to build up a financially 
strong institution. By the end of 2001 there were 5 state-owned banks, 26 regional banks 
and the 160 private banks were consolidated into 85. This restructuring accounted for 
about 90 % of total commercial banking assets of the country (Sharma, 2003, p. 162). 
The government reviewed and strengthened the regulatory framework of the banking 
system by improving the quality of the banking supervision and getting it closer to 
international standards. In late December 1998 three new regulations in the area of loan 
classification, provisioning and debt-restructuring operations came into effect. Since early 
1999 banks are required to submit a liquidity report twice a month for their global 
consolidated operations. Additionally, financial institutions have to publish unaudited 
quarterly financial statements within two months of a quarter’s end, respectively audited 
financial statements within four months of the end of the reporting year and the legal 
lending limit amounts have been significantly tightened as lending to individual debtors or 
group of debtors had been a major problem before. The capital adequacy requirement 
was tightened as well, imposing a compliance  with the minimum capital adequacy of 8 % 
by end of 2000 and from January 2002 onwards IBRA was allowed to control and to take 
over action if they failed to meet the standards. Furthermore, the communication between 
banks and Bank Indonesia improved as the banks have to report on a weekly basis for the 
consolidated domestic operations and consolidated domestic and foreign operations. 
Minimum paid-up capital requirements for new banks were increased as well (Sharma, 
2003, pp. 162-163). 
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Bank recapitalization, an important but difficult task, began in Indonesia in early 1999 
after the government completed an audit in December 1998 in order to distinguish 
between sound banks, salvageable banks and bad banks. Non-performing loans were 
estimated at 60-85 % of all loans and bank recapitalization costs are estimated at Rp643 
trillion or 60 % of GDP (Lindgren et al., 1999, p. 65). In March 1999 the government 
announced, after having given the owners of banks with a capital adequacy ratio of less 
than -25 % the possibility to inject new equity and to avoid liquidation, that 38 banks, all 
insolvent, were to be closed and ‘their owners will be required to repay their connected 
lending’ (Government of Indonesia (GoI), 1999). The government not only published a list 
with the 200 largest defaulting borrowers but also began to collect funds from the 20 
largest defaulters (Enoch et al., 2001, p. 19).  Banks with a ratio of 25 % to less than 4 % 
were eligible to participate in the recapitalization program provided that their owners 
injected 20 % of the new capital required to attain a capital adequacy ratio of 4 %; 9 
banks were deemed eligible for recapitalization while 7 banks were taken over by IBRA 
(Sharma, 2003, p. 163). The remaining 74 banks that had a capital adequacy ratio of 4 % 
or higher were allowed to continue business after being subjected to ‘fit and proper’ tests 
(GoI, 1999). 
The recapitalization of the banks included two conditions because of funds provided by 
taxpayers: a) all banks had to hand in business plans for a three-year period and the 
management had to attend a test and pass it in order to show their technical competence 
of running a bank; b) some of the banks were owned by some major Indonesian 
conglomerates and therefore the existing shareholders had to provide at least 20 % in 
cash of the total funds necessary to restore the bank’s capital adequacy ratio to 4 % 
before IBRA would put in any funds. This meant that the government agreed to take on 
80 % of the cost of bank recapitalization, but the bank owners had the option to 
repurchase the government’s share within three years and to swap some of their non-
performing loans for government bonds (Sharma, 2003, p.164). 
The recapitalization of the banks at favourable terms was attractive to many banks and by 
the end of 2000 the Indonesian-banking sector has been significantly consolidated 
because the number of private domestic banks has been nearly halved through closures 
and state takeovers since mid-1997. Compared to 40 % of liabilities under state control 
before the crisis, by end of 1999 they held around 70 % (Lindgren et al., 1999, p. 65). 
The public contribution to financial sector restructuring has been equal to 51 % of GDP by 
mid-1999 and the largest share has been used to recapitalize banks and provide liquidity 
support (Sharma, 2003, p. 164). 
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In May 1999 a new central bank law increased the power and authority of Indonesia’s 
central bank. The new law regulates periodic presentations by the bank governor to 
parliament (increasing accountability) and one major goal which is to achieve and maintain 
the stability of the value of the rupiah. Furthermore, Bank Indonesia was established as a 
state institution outside the administration of the Executive, increasing therefore its 
independence (Sharma, 2003, p. 161).  
The political landscape changed as well during the following period. On June 7th 1999 
Indonesia elected for the first time since 1955 in a democratic way not only on the 
national level (i.e. parliament) but as well on provincial and municipal level. Over 90 % of 
registered voters went to the polls. On October 20th 1999, the 700 member of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly elected a new president and 
vice-president for the next five years. The election showed a shift away from the former 
political leadership i.e. the party of former President Habibie, Golkar, performed poorly and 
therefore Habibie resigned from candidacy for president. Although the party of the 
president candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri gained the highest share in the elections the 
People’s Consultative Assembly elected Abdurraham Wahid (also known as Gus Dur and 
leader of the largest Islamic group) as president because the Muslim parties and Golkar 
cooperated. After large protests in Jakarta and all over the country, on October 21st 1999 
Megawati was elected as vice-president (Sharma, 2003, pp. 168-169). In 1999 the growth 
rate of the economy showed a first sign of recovery and grew at 0.8 % while in 2000 at 
4.8 %.  Inflation which rose in 1998 to 58.5 % dropped in 1999 back to 20.7 % and in 
2000 to 3.8 % (ADB, 2001, p. 21). 
In 2000 President Wahid began to implement his policies and committed his government 
to the rapid implementation of economic reform measures and after the election in 
October 1999 there was a new letter of intent with the IMF signed. The implementation of 
the policies was difficult as within the government decision-making was delayed by its 
fragmentation. In late March the IMF support of US$400 million was suspended as the 
implementation of economic reforms were delayed due to this problematic situation inside 
the political leadership. However this issue was resolved as the government tried to 
implement and push forward economic development (Sharma, 2003, pp. 169-170). 
In October 1999 IBRA received extraordinary powers (the so-called PP17 powers) due to 
the problems associated with the Bank Bali scandal and to seize the assets of 
uncooperative debtors. Although IBRA was founded in February 1998 it did not begin its 
operations until one year later and in the meantime the government provided cash 
injections for the troubled banking sector (van der Eng, 2004, p. 7). In December 1999 
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IBRA used for the first time its new powers seizing two properties from a firm owned by a 
Suharto family member. A similar attempt of empowering JITF (Jakarta Initiative Task 
Force, see below) was done (Sharma, 2003, p. 170) but did not lead to the same result. 
IBRA was financed by a mix of medium- and long-term government-guaranteed bonds. In 
2004 IBRA was closed and replaced by the state-owned asset management company PT 
Perusahaan Pengelola Aset (‘PT PPA’). For the restructuring of the banking sector IBRA 
played a key role, as it took over the control of troubled banks and in this way staved off 
bank runs. The amount of assets it took over was around US$60 billion from ailing banks 
or former bank owners and it assumed control of outstanding, non-performing loans to 
more than 4,000 private firms becoming therefore the largest creditor in Indonesia (van 
der Eng, 2004, p. 7). IBRA liquidated 68, nationalised 12 and forced 14 banks to merge 
into two larger entities of the former 240 pre-crisis banks and more than US$75 billion 
were paid out of taxpayer’s pocket for the recapitalisation and restructuring of the 
Indonesian banking system (Jakarta Post, October 30th 2003). IBRA sold gradually 95 % of 
the assets, which comprised of non-performing loans, shares in the banks and fixed 
assets, to the private sector and the revenues were intended for helping to finance the 
state budget. JITF carried out the same task on a voluntary basis in cases where IBRA was 
not a major creditor (van der Eng, 2004, p. 7). IBRA could collect 28 % of nominal value 
of the assets it took over (IBRA, 2003). The assets that were not sold after closing IBRA in 
February 2004 (minority shares in banks, Rp4.5 trillion; bad loans, Rp43 trillion; many 
small properties, Rp24 trillion (Jakarta Post, December 22nd 2003 and March 4th 2004)) 
were first transferred to the Ministry of State Enterprises and thereafter to the newly 
established state-owned asset management company PT PPA under Government 
Regulation No. 10/2004. The goal of this agency is to  
‘support and participate in implementing government policies and programs for the economy and national 
development in general, with particular focus on management of state assets formerly managed as assets of IBRA, 
through the application of principles governing State Owned Companies of Limited Liability.  The scope of this 
work is as follows: 
1. Asset restructuring  
2. Cooperation with third parties for enhancing asset value 
3. Collection of receivables 
4. Asset  disposal’ (Bank Indonesia, 2005) 
 
 Domestic private corporations had borrowed US$53.6 billion form foreign banks by year-
end 1997 (leaving the corporate sector highly vulnerable to sudden depreciation) while by 
late 1998 of the estimated US$118 billion corporate debt nearly 60 % was owed to foreign 
creditors and about 40 % was denominated in foreign currency which left the corporate 
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sector vulnerable to depreciations of the rupiah. The result was that almost half of 
Indonesian corporations became insolvent and many of them had difficulties in meeting 
their debt-servicing obligations (Sharma, 2003, p. 166). Not only the lack of confidence in 
the banking system caused a stop of negotiations between institutions and debtors but as 
well the political instability caused an unwillingness to enter into negotiations (Root et al., 
2000, p. 202; Sharma, 2003, pp. 166-167). 
Under the surveillance of the IMF the Indonesian government reached in June 1998 an 
agreement (the Frankfurt agreement) with a group of private creditors on restructuring 
three categories of debt: 
a. Trade credits: Indonesian commercial banks would repay all trade credits that were 
in arrears, and in return foreign banks would maintain trade credits at the April 
1998 level. Additionally Bank Indonesia agreed to guarantee for new trade credits.  
b. Interbank debt: Foreign banks agreed to exchange new loans of maturities 
between one and four years for obligations owed by Indonesian commercial banks 
maturing by March 31st 1999. New loans were guaranteed by Bank Indonesia. 
c. Corporate debt: There were three elements: Firstly, the establishment of the 
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA, mandate run until 2006) in order 
to provide foreign-exchange cover for Indonesian corporations with foreign 
currency-denominated debt.  INDRA was a voluntarily step and its private sector 
offshore debt would be restructured in such a way that it could be repaid over an 
eight-year period.  INDRA is effectively an institution that provides protection for 
debtors against the risk of further real depreciation of the rupiah and gives 
assurance of foreign-exchange availability for debt repayments. INDRA has not 
been as successful as IBRA and corporate debt restructuring has been extremely 
slow. 
Secondly, the introduction of the Jakarta Initiative and thirdly, the introduction of 
the JITF in September 1998 were promoted in order to facilitate voluntary 
negotiations between debtors and creditors for corporate restructuring and to 
provide a regulatory complete framework for administrative procedures pertaining 
to debt resolution. While the Jakarta Initiative introduced a set of principles based 
on the London Approach to guide voluntary out-of-court corporate restructuring 
the JITF was intended to facilitate negotiations between debtors and creditors and 
to obtain necessary regulatory approvals for deals (Sharma, 2003, pp. 167-168). 
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In August 2000 a new bankruptcy law has been introduced by the Indonesian government 
(Company Bankruptcy and Debt Restructuring and/or Rehabilitation Act) similar to US 
Chapter 11.  
Decentralization efforts began in May 1999 as two laws, which came into effect on January 
1st 2000 and were designed to change intergovernmental political and fiscal relations in 
Indonesia; these two laws (Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government – UU PD – and Law 
No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions – UU 
PKPD) empowered local districts and not provincial governments. The most important 
characteristics of these two laws are (Sharma, 2003, pp. 170-171): 
- Law No. 22/1999 eliminates the hierarchical structure of the provincial and the 
district governments; kota (municipality) and kabupaten (district) became fully 
autonomous, district heads became fully responsible to the locally elected 
assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, while the provinces retained the 
hierarchical relationship with the central government. 
- Law No. 25/1999 changes the structure of transfers received by the local 
governments from the central government. Revenue sharing for provincial and 
district governments was introduced, i.e. each level of government was assigned its 
share of revenues from taxes on land and buildings, forestry, mining, fisheries, oil 
and gas. 
 
The Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia introduced after the crisis new supervisory 
regulations for the financial sector, including the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and forcing 
banks to write off some of their non-performing loans. The CAR of banks increased over 
the period 1997 to late 2003 from -16 % to approximately 23 %. But this was not a grant 
for a complete rehabilitation of the banking sector as the 2002-2003 Lippo Bank scandal or 
fraudulent actions of the state-owned banks BRI and BNI show (van der Eng, 2004, p.8). 
One remaining problem in all East Asian crisis countries is their low reliance in bonds and 
limited access to formal finance although there are some initiatives undergoing as the 
project of the ADB to develop a bond market in Asia. 
Decentralisation became an important factor in Indonesia after the crisis as well.  Law No. 
22/1999 provides the basis for political and administrative decentralisation and Law No. 
25/1999 the basis for fiscal decentralisation. One characteristic of the Indonesian 
decentralisation is the devolution of power and authority from the central government to 
the second tier of local government, the districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota).  
Although the idea is to bring the government closer to people there is lack of skilled 
officials at local level. The power of the central government has been limited by 
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introducing decentralization: defence and security, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal 
policy, judicial affairs and religious affairs are still under the control of the central level 
while all the other affairs were conferred to the provincial or local level. Regarding the 
fiscal decentralization the most significant changes occurred in the distribution of revenues 
from natural resources with regional governments (Brodjonegoro, 2004, pp. 126-127). 
Table 4.6 shows the changes in the distribution of natural resource revenues since 
decentralisation. 
 
TABLE 4.6 – Changes in the Distribution of Natural Revenue since Decentralization in 
Indonesia 
Revenue Source Old Sharing Arrangement Major Change New Sharing Arrangement 
Oil revenue (pneerimaan 
Negara dari pertambangan 
minyak bumi) 
100% center Assignment of share of 
revenue after tax deduction 
to regional governments 
85% centre; 3% province 
of origin; 6% district of 
origin; 6% other districts 
in province of origin 
Gas revenue (penerimaan 
Negara dari pertambangan 
gas) 
100% center Assignment of share of 
revenue after tax deduction 
to regional governments 
70% centre; 6% province 
of origin; 12% district of 
origin; 12% other districts 
in province of origin 
Reforestation fee (dana 
reboisasi) 
100% center Regional government 
component integrated into 
specific grants 
60% centre; 40% regional 
governments of origin 
Forestry enterprise licence 
fee (iuran hak 
penugsahaan hutam) 
55% center; 30% provinces; 
15% districts 
Continued with new sharing 
arrangement 
20% centre; 16% 
provinces; 64% districts 
Forestry production 
royalties (provinsi sumber 
daya hutan formerly iuran 
hasil hutan) 
30% center; 70% regional 
governments 
Continued, with new sharing 
arrangement favouring 
districts in province of origin 
20% centre; 16% 
provinces; 32% district of 
origin; 32% other districts 
in province of origin 
Mining and land rent (iuran 
tetap sector 
pertambangan) 
65% center; 19% provinces; 
16% districts 
Continued, with new sharing 
arrangement 
20% centre; 16% 
provinces; 64% districts 
Minang royalties (iuran 
eksplotasi) 
30% center; 56% provinces; 
14% districts 
Continued, with new sharing 
arrangement favouring 
districts in province of origin 
20% centre; 16% 
provinces;3% district of 
origin; 32% other districts 
in province of origin 
Fishery enterprise fee 
(pungutan pengusahaan 
perikanan) 
- Newly introduced 20% centre; 80% 
distributed equally among 
districts 
Fee on fishery income 
(pungutan hasil perikanan) 
- Newly introduced 20% centre; 80% 
distributed equally among 
districts 
Source: Ford and Brodjonegoro (2004). 
 
Although the new decentralisation approach is a step towards better intergovernmental 
relations there remains an unpleasant aftertaste as Brodjonegoro (2004, p. 129) states 
that ‘the current reforms were born out of crisis and were hastily conceived; the legislation 
was written without clearly established objectives and with little consultation with, or 
involvement of, the public. The new fiscal law continues the reluctance to give local 
governments any meaningful ability to raise local revenue. This omission jeopardises a key 
benefit of decentralisation: to enforce the accountability of local governments to their 
constituencies.’  Decentralisation also focuses on giving regions and provinces the 
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possibility to promote business and attract companies in their region. Which impact the 
decentralisation attempts in Indonesia will have for future growth and development as well 
as on attractiveness for investment will have is still open because the process is 
undergoing. Decentralisation has created some uncertainty of doing business at the local 
level due to the fear of companies that additional fees and charges levied distorting ways 
will raise their production costs; this can be seen from surveys on the local business 
climate (Brodjonegoro, 2004, p. 139).  
Another topic of reformasi is the privatisation of the poorly performing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which began in 1994 (Hill, 2000, pp. 105-109). Profitability of most 
SOEs was until 2001 very low some of them even incurred losses (103 out of 162, or 63 
%). 124 SOEs (77 % of the total 162) were involved in competitive industries while 12 (7 
%) enjoyed a monopoly and 26 (16 %) were engaged in sectors with a mixed competitive, 
monopolistic and public service-oriented market structure. Examples of privatisations are 
Semen Gresik listed after an initial public offering (IPO) on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSE) in July 1991, Indosat and Telkom in 1995 and Bank BNI and Timah in 1996 
(Prasetiantono, 2004, pp. 141-142). The IMF put more pressure on privatization as it was 
considered to be an important part of reducing the budget deficit and increasing efficiency 
of SOEs (see for example IMF, 1998b). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the business concentration in Indonesia was very high, where 
top ten families as of end December or end of accounting year 1996 (% of total market 
capitalization that families hold) in Indonesia and the Philippines were at the top of the list 
in Asia with 57.7 % and 52.5 % compared to other Asian countries where the share was 
smaller (in Japan 2.4 %, in Malaysia 24.8 %, in South Korea 26.8 % and in Taiwan 18.4 
%) (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999). Not only the Soeharto family was among these 
top ten families; another example is the Salim group, an Indonesian conglomerate, under 
businessman Liem Sioe Long, which controlled about 16.6 % of market capitalization by 
the onset of the financial crisis (Smith, 2001, p. 3). Most of the conglomerates were often 
webs of cross-shareholdings with a pyramidal structure and with poor minority shareholder 
protection (van der Eng, 2004, p. 16). 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis the companies refocused their business 
encouraging decentralizing of company ownership in two ways (van der Eng, 2004, p. 16):  
1. Through the persuasion of IBRA or voluntarily many companies sold their non-core 
and often loss-making branches. 
2. Some of the companies sold equity in order to pay back debt, attract funds and 
trying to stop the fall in credit ratings or acquired ventures at relatively low prices. 
 
 157 
The assumption that the opaque, relationship-based business culture in Indonesia was a 
sign of poor company performance might not be true at all in Indonesia. This point is 
highlighted by the national study of Sato (2004), which  shows that while the ownership 
was still highly concentrated and ownership and management were still entwined in 2000 
albeit less than in 1996 - this does not necessary lead to the conclusion that companies 
perform poorly. The best examples of this are, firms associated with established business 
groups such as Salim, Astra and Sinar Mas (all under ethnic Chinese control) showing 
better performance than firms associated with groups which have grown rapidly since the 
1980s (e.g. Bimantara and Humpuss, both controlled by former President Soeharto’s son) 
and firms not affiliated with groups. 
The attempts of corporate governance and its evolution in Indonesia will be discussed in 
more detail later (see Chapter 5). The official party established a national committee on 
corporate governance policy, and in the year 2000 introduced the code for good corporate 
governance. In 2002 the Minister for State Enterprises revised the Company Law and 
Capital Market Law and established a national code of corporate governance for SOEs, 
while the private party established a forum for corporate governance (business and 
professional associations) which conducts self-assessment surveys among firms in 
Indonesia. The goal that these initiatives pursue is to promote a business environment 
that is based on rules, transparency, financial health and minority shareholder protection 
and less on relationships (van der Eng, 2004, p. 17). 
 
4.2.1 Political Events in Indonesia 
During his legislature President Abdurrahman Wahid encountered different scandals and 
on July 23rd 2001 he was removed from his office by the People’s Consultative Assembly.  
Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded him and improved relations with the IMF. One problem 
during the following period was the terrorist attacks in Indonesia, in the tourism regions of 
Bali and in Jakarta, which wounded the Indonesian economy.  Another issue are the 
ongoing separatist movements on different islands. East Timor (Timor Leste) became 
independent in May 2002 after reaching an agreement with Indonesia. The 29-year lasting 
armed conflicts in Aceh calmed down after the Tsunami in late December 2004 where 
more than 100,000 people died (Economist, The Aceh peace process, October 27th 2005).  
The ongoing conflict in Papua is not resolved yet and the risk that new conflicts will arise 
is given for the future as decentralisation increases the fragmentation of administrative 
districts (Jones, 2004, p. 31-33). 
In July 2003 new election laws were introduced in order to guarantee a framework for the 
2004 elections resulting in a success of the Golkar party of former President Soeharto and 
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with Megawati Sukarnoputri’s party PDI-P coming second. In September 2004 Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono was elected president. The Yudhoyono government concentrates on 
economic growth and investment and wants to limit corruption. The political climate 
further improved as well as the macroeconomic environment. In December 2005 President 
Yudhoyono reshuffled the cabinet where respected technocrats were appointed to become 
Economic Coordination Minister and Finance Minister and which should lead to a more 
constructive policy environment (Standard and Poors, February 9th 2006). 
 
4.2.2 Economic Developments 
In July 2003 the government declared its exit from the IMF program that was due to 
expire in December 2003 following the pressures of the parliament; the government 
decided to adopt the post-program monitoring (PPM) by the IMF as exit strategy (Basri, 
2004, p. 50).  In July 2003 the rupiah strengthened to Rp 8,600 per US dollar and the 
debt/GDP ratio declined from 90 % in 2001 to 72 % in 2002 although at this stage the 
economy had not yet recovered fully from the crisis. Other problems like the outbreak of 
SARS and the threat of terrorism did have some impact on the Indonesian economy in 
2003 positive prospects remained for the future (Basri, 2004, p.39). The same holds for 
the years 2004 and 2005 with recovering GDP growth rates.  
After five years of IMF programmes the government regained the possibility to establish its 
own economic policy with the downside that the government would be responsible for the 
implementation and the outcome of their policies. This resulted in a timidity of 
implementation of economic and political reforms. Nonetheless the newly elected 
government under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono improved macroeconomics by reducing 
debt and debt-servicing burden and improving external liquidity position. Furthermore, 
unpopular measures such as cutting the fuel price subsidies were already settled or are 
expected to be settled during the term of office of President Yudhoyono. A sensible issue 
remains microeconomic policies and external vulnerability (Standard and Poors, February 
9th 2006). 
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4.3 Policies Applied by Malaysia 
Before the onset of the crisis the exchange rate fluctuated from 2.36 to 2.51 ringgit per US 
dollar. After the Thai baht was floated on July 2nd 1997 the ringgit came under strong 
pressure as well. Although Bank Negara Malaysia intervened into the market in order to 
sustain the exchange rate, the ringgit floated on July 14th 1997 (Athukorala, 2001, p. 61).  
Until the fixing of the ringgit to the US dollar became effective on September 2nd 1998 at 
3.8 RM/US$, it fluctuated widely. 
The exchange rate was strongly affected and from July 1997 to January 7th 1998, when 
the exchange rate reached its lowest level at 4.88 RM/US$, the ringgit depreciated against 
the US dollar by almost 50 % (see figure A.4.2). In contrast to experiences in Thailand 
and Korea, where the exchange rates began to stabilize in March, the exchange rate 
continued to deteriorate in the following months until it was fixed. During the period 
between the outbreak of the crisis and the introduction of controls on capital outflows the 
stream of capital reversed sharply: from inflows to outflows, as portfolio capital, which is 
highly mobile, was the main source of capital flight. This increased not only the pressure 
on exchange rates but as well on the stock market exchange which plunged around 50 % 
of its pre-crisis level to end of 1997 (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 61-62). The Malaysian stock 
market plunged from almost 1,300 in February 1997 to a low of 262 in early September 
1998 and until end of 2005 the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) did not return to its 
pre-crisis level. 
As the problems in Malaysia were mainly due to capital flows from portfolio investment, 
the economy was not exposed to large foreign debt of its banking system as it was in the 
case of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea.  Therefore Athukorala argues that Malaysia was 
‘able to ‘muddle through’ without an IMF-sponsored rescue package’ (2001, p. 63). 
 
4.3.1 The First Stage of Policy Response 
Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, Prime Minister Mahathir stated that the crisis was 
due to currency speculators and blamed especially Georg Soros (calling him a ‘moron’) for 
putting Malaysia into the crisis. Prime Minister Mahathir continued the complaints about 
currency speculators during the IMF and World Bank annual meetings in Hong Kong in late 
September 1997 at a seminar before the Joint World Bank-IMF annual meeting.  In his 
speech he stated that ‘currency trading is unnecessary, unproductive and immoral’ and 
that it should be ‘stopped’ and ‘made illegal’ and continued at the Annual Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on November 18th 1997 in Vancouver and the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Birmingham in the same month 
(Athukorala, 2001, pp. 63-64; Jomo, 2005, p. 7). During this early stage until the 
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imposition of capital controls and with it the fixing of the exchange rate, the downward 
pressure of the ringgit was external, and inappropriate political rhetoric (of Prime Minister 
Mahathir) and policy measures put even more pressure on the exchange rate. Therefore 
the foreign exchange reserves of Malaysia depleted rapidly and improved significantly only 
after the imposition of capital controls (Jomo, 2005, pp. 4-5).  
At this early stage there were incentives for sponsored share purchases by the 
government which decreased confidence into the Malaysian government and economy. 
The project of share purchases started on August 28th 1997 at which Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) banned the short selling of 100 blue-chip stocks and in order to 
discourage sale of stocks were introduced, like the requirement to deliver physical share 
certificates to their brokers before selling. This ban of short selling, which was lifted after a 
few weeks in early September 1997, adversely affected liquidity and caused the stock 
market to fall further (Jomo, 2005, p. 9). On September 3rd 1997 the prime minister 
announced that funds from the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) would be used to prop up 
share prices by buying stocks from Malaysian shareholders and not from foreigners at a 
premium above prevailing prices.  The result of these actions was that local and foreign 
investors regarded it as a possibility of getting rid of Malaysian shares (Athukorala, 2001, 
pp. 64-65). This announcement was seen as a bail-out facility designed to save ‘cronies’ 
from disaster and although the fund was never properly institutionalised as announced, 
and government officials later denied its existence, government-controlled public funds, 
mainly pension funds, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), PETRONAS and Khazanah, 
have been deployed to bail out some of the most politically well-connected and influential 
corporations. Especially the protracted UEM-Renong saga from mid-November 1997 was 
damaging as the nature of the ‘bail-out’ (around RM2.34 billion) undermined public 
confidence in the Malaysian investment environment as stock market rules were 
suspended at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests, with the KLSE losing RM70 
billion in market capitalization over the next three days (Jomo, 2005, p. 9). 
 
The Finance Minister Anwar announced on December 5th 1997 a policy package, the so-
called White Paper (NEAC, 1999, box 1, pp. 25-26), which included the following 
elements: 
• Cutting government spending by 18 %,  
• postponing indefinitely all public sector investment projects which were still in the 
pipeline, stopping new overseas investment by Malaysian firms,  
• freezing new share issues and company restructuring, and cutting salaries of 
government ministers by 10 %  
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• and Bank Negara Malaysia increased its three-month intervention rate from 7.55 % 
to 8.7 %, reduced the default period for classifying a loan as a non-performing 
loan by banking institutions from six months to three months and increased the 
inter-bank lending rate from the pre-crisis level of 7.6 % to 8.7 % in December 
1997 and to 10 % in January and 11 % in February 1998 (Athukorala, 2001, p. 65; 
Jomo, 2005, pp. 9-10).  
This repressive package was considered to please mainly foreign financial interest and did 
not recognize the gravity of the crisis and its possible causes (Jomo, 2005, p. 9). 
In the news media the new package was labelled as ‘IMF policy without IMF’ (FEER, 
1997b).  The following period was characterized by the underlying conflict between the 
Prime Minister Mahathir and the Finance Minister Anwar how to manage the crisis. 
Therefore this period was a state of policy paralysis although policies were announced. 
The austerity package in 1997 was announced by Anwar Ibrahim himself while the attacks 
against international currency speculators were announced by Dr Mahathir himself. 
Therefore international news media speculated about a split between them (Athukorala, 
2001, pp. 65-66). Until the illness of Soeharto in December 1997 and the beginning 
conflicts between Soeharto and IMF in 1998, Mahathir was considered as the ‘bad boy’ of 
the region, while the other countries had little choice in not calling in the IMF in order to 
restore confidence and secure funds to service their fast-growing non-performing loans 
although they were privately held (Jomo, 2005, pp. 8-9). 
 
On January 7th 1998 a National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was set up in order to act 
as a consultative body for the government and ‘to chart its own course of action, instead 
of following IMF’s prescription’ (Government of Malaysia, 1999, p. 9). The chair of the 
NEAC was Prime Minister Mahathir and as executive director Daim Zainuddin, a confidant 
of him and former finance minister, was called in. The exchange rate reached its historic 
intra-day low of 4.88 RM/US$ on that day and the media interpreted the step of Dr 
Mahathir and the call in of Daim Zainuddin as a ‘calculated plan to sideline Anwar Ibrahim 
form the policy scene’ (Athukorala, 2001, p. 66). 
During the following months the contractionary monetary and fiscal policies announced 
and introduced in late 1997 were reversed in an ad hoc manner. Therefore, Bank Negara 
Malaysia reduced the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) from 13.5 % to 10 % in 
February 1998 and to 8 % in July 1998 arguing that it was necessary to ‘avoid a 
recession-deflation spiral’ (BNM, 1999a, p.4). Furthermore the three-month inter-bank 
intervention rate was reduced in three steps from 11 % to 9.5 % in August and 
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government expenditure was restored and some large, halted projects were reactivated 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 66). 
On July 23rd 1998 the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) prepared by the National 
Economic Action Council was launched and the aim was to take the form of a policy 
blueprint. The NERP failed to include concrete policy measures (Athukorala, 2001, p. 66). 
In May 1998 the Malaysian authorities introduced an institutional framework for 
recapitalizing the troubled banks and resolving mounting corporate distress by setting up 
an asset management company, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad or in short 
Danaharta in order to acquire and manage NPLs from banks and in July 1998 a banking 
and corporate recapitalization company, Danamodal Nasional Berhad or in short 
Danamodal, was established in order to recapitalize the financial institutions whose capital 
adequacy ratio had fallen bellow 9 %. In August 1998, the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CDRC, a joint public and private sector steering committee) was established in 
order to facilitate the restructuring of corporate debts through out-of-court settlements 
between debtors and creditors. These three institutions were introduced in order to deal 
with the raising problem of bad debt of the financial system and corporate distress.  
Although the political framework for these three institutions was set up they had 
difficulties to get the required funds in order to act properly and therefore Bank Negara 
Malaysia had to continue to intervene in the banking and corporate sector preventing an 
increasing liquidity squeeze caused by the share market crash and capital outflow 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 67). 
 
In August 1998, the economy already had been entered into recession and in contrast to 
the other crisis affected countries there seemed not to be any signs of achieving currency 
and share price stability. Output as well as employment declined, while the inflation rate 
peaked at 6.2 % in June 1998. The impact of the collapse of output and the crash of the 
property market increased non-performing loans in the banking system which aggravated 
the situation as it resulted by a ‘flight to quality’ of deposits from smaller to large well-
managed banks from the fourth quarter of 1997 onwards (Athukorala, 2001, p. 68).  
In addition, the banks changed their strategy from issuing new loans to loan recovery 
creating a credit crunch which had an impact on domestic consumption and investment.  
Growth of net outstanding bank loans (in nominal terms) decreased from about 26 % per 
annum during the five years preceding the crisis to 9 % during the year ending July 1998 
and the annual rate of growth of money supply (M3) declined from 18.5 % at the end of 
1997 to 4.4 % by August 1998 (Athukorala, 2001, p. 68). 
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Additionally, asset prices declined even more, the recovery in the export market did not 
show up and the investor confidence weakened. External reserves of the country 
decreased to very low levels despite the massive import contraction in the depressed 
economy (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 68-69). The large capital outflows did not improve the 
foreign reserve position of the current account that was in surplus due to the recession 
and which was in contrast to the experience of the four IMF-programme countries 
(Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Korea) where widening current account surpluses 
boosted international reserves, preventing further exchange rate collapse (World Bank, 
1998b). 
One characteristic of the capital flights from Malaysia since early 1998 was that they were 
ringgits flowing to Singapore and about 25 to 35 billion ringgit flew to Singapore at the 
height of the crisis in mid-1998 (Ariff, 1999; Tripathi et al., 1998; IMF, 1999b). The cause 
of this outflow was mainly due to attractive money market rates of 20 to 40 % in 
Singapore (compared to 11 % in the domestic market) combined with a weakening 
exchange rate of the ringgit. This arbitrage position put pressure on domestic interest 
rates in Malaysia and therefore politicians became concerned about the 
‘internationalization’ of the national currency which was considered as a new threat to 
economic stability and monetary policy autonomy (Athukorala, 2001, p. 71).  The demand 
for offshore ringgits and the consequent build-up of offshore ringgit deposits increased the 
vulnerability of the Malaysian currency and undermined the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy (BNM, 1999b, ch. 14). 
Another important property of the crisis was that in early and mid 1990s massive portfolio 
capital inflows had transformed the capital market in Malaysia. Foreign investors held an 
estimated one third of the stock of the largest 100 companies of the KLCI and were 
involved into short-term transactions and speculation, while local institutions were 
generally too small in comparison and took generally more long-term stock positions. 
Malaysia was very attractive for foreign fund managers and therefore they probably played 
a key role in the phenomenon of ‘contagion’ which involves cross-border investment 
trends (Jomo, 2005, pp. 5-6). Herd behaviour was especially dangerous for Malaysia being 
exposed more on portfolio flows than to private creditors. 
 
4.3.2 Turning Around Policies – The Introduction of Capital Controls 
During the second half of 1998 the policy choices available for the Malaysian government 
were very limited. The government followed a strategy of monetary and fiscal expansion in 
order to fight recession and in the mean time let the exchange rate fluctuate.  Therefore, 
in theory, the exchange rate could have gradually stabilized as the economy recovered 
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from the recession by introducing expansionary macroeconomic policies and corporate and 
banking restructuring. But the ringgit remained under attack and market sentiments were 
not restored to confidence as the policies were not those advocated by the IMF being 
‘unorthodox’ and considered to rescue some politically connected corporations and banks 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 73).  
Furthermore, the downgrading of Malaysia’s credit rating by international credit rating 
agencies was decreasing market confidence even more and the planned sovereign bond 
issue in August 1998 in the USA and Europe which should have raised US$2 billion for the 
implementation of the banking sector restructuring programme had to be postponed 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 73). 
Malaysia’s government had at this stage two possibilities: 
1. Calling in the IMF and adopting similar policies like those applied in Thailand, 
Indonesia or Korea and trying to stabilize the exchange rate in this way; 
2. Introducing capital controls in order to increase the influence of the policies and to 
speed up recovery. 
 
Although in the region the IMF at the beginning had adopted a contractionary policy 
strategy it had changed the strategy by the second half of 1998 to a more expansionary 
macroeconomic policy. Market sentiment was not very favourable as there was less 
constraint for Malaysia to undergo structural reforms when not calling in the IMF (BNM, 
1999a, p. 5). Some authors argue that Malaysia was not eligible for IMF support even if it 
wanted to seek such support because of its relatively strong balance of payments position 
and its relatively lower foreign debt (BNM, 1999a, p. 5; NEAC, 1999, p. 1), although the 
actual practice of the IMF is to give assistance to member countries in the event of an 
economic crisis and not necessarily of a balance-of-payments crisis. 
The key point against the call in of the IMF was that the Malaysian leadership did not want 
to change the Malaysian policy practice of having distortionary policies like NEP 
(subsequently renamed into NDP) that had established intimate links between business 
and government giving the economy stabilization and therefore any new policy was 
weighted against the potential negative effect on socio-political stability of the country 
(Crouch, 1998).  The following statement of Prime Minister Mahathir at his presidential 
address to the UMNO General Assembly on June 19th 1998 shows this: 
 
‘[I]f we have to resort to the International Monetary Fund assistance […] the conditions imposed by the IMF 
will require us to open up our economy to foreigners.  There will not be any Bumiputra quota as the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) is an injustice, and unacceptable to their liberal democracy’ (Mahathir, 1998, pp. 60-
61). 
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Therefore, according to Athukorala, the Malaysian leadership opted for the second 
alternative (2001, p. 75). As seen in Chapter 3 this policy shift could be explained by the 
‘impossible trinity’ (also called ‘three-cornered dilemma’ or ‘dilemma’) of open economies.  
The social equilibrium and its stability in Malaysia played an important role of choosing 
capital controls (i.e. Malaysia is socio-politically more fragile than more socially 
homogenous countries like Thailand and Korea) although political scientists are debating 
about the relative importance of pure political motives compared to genuine economic 
policy considerations behind the policy shift (Athukorala, 2001, p. 81). 
In Malaysia capital controls were already used before September 1998, i.e. in the period of 
1993-1994 when BNM successfully used capital controls on inflow without experiencing 
adverse effects on Malaysia’s long-term prospects for attracting foreign investment. On 
July 30th 1997, just two weeks after the speculative attack on the ringgit, the prime 
minister gave a hint that the government might use capital controls as a possible policy 
alternative (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997a). 
 
The introduction of the capital controls began with the ban of offshore trading of shares of 
Malaysian companies since August 31st 1998 and therefore the over-the-counter share 
trading in the central limit order book (CLOB) market in Singapore was effectively frozen.  
On September 1st 1998, comprehensive controls over short-term capital flows were 
introduced and on September 2nd 1998 the exchange rate was fixed at 3.80 RM/US$. The 
exchange rate was fixed with a mild appreciation of the ringgit from the average level for 
the previous three months (around 4.18 RM/US$) but it represented a 35 % depreciation 
against the pre-crisis level of about 2.5 RM/US$. BNM stated that the exchange rate could 
have been changed if underlying economic fundamentals changed (Athukorala, 2001, 
p.76). 
The capital controls on outflows banned trading in ringgit instruments among offshore 
banks operating in Malaysia and stopped Malaysian financial institutions offering domestic 
credit facilities to non-resident banks and stockbrokers. The ringgit was banned as an 
invoicing currency in foreign trade and legal tender on all ringgit deposits outside the 
country with effect from September 30th 1998, too. Furthermore, a 12-month withholding 
period was introduced on repatriation proceeds (principal and profit) from foreign portfolio 
investment and restrictions on overseas investment by residents exceeding RM 10,000 and 
a limit of RM 1,000 on Malaysian overseas travellers were imposed (for more details on 
specific policies refer to Table A.4.1, Appendix). 
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The aim of the capital controls was to limit short-term capital flows; selling of shares of 
portfolio investors became more difficult and this should result in an alleviated pressure on 
the exchange rate. Long-term capital flows were not under control as well as import and 
export trade which was exempted from controls. Profit remittances and repatriation of 
capital by foreign investors continued to remain free of control.  
 
TABLE 4.7 – Overview of Key-Points of Policy Package in September 1998 in Indonesia 
Transactions subject to control Transactions not subject to control 
Ringgit-denominated transactions with non residents Current account transactions 
 trade transactions denominated in foreign 
currency 
Outflow of short-term capital 
 One-year withholding period until August 30th 
1998, 
 A three-tier tax (10%, 20%, 30%) on profit 
remittance between September 1998 and 
February 1999, 
 A 10% tax on profit remittance since February 
1999 
Repatriation of profits, interests, dividends, capital gains 
and rental income from FDI and similar forms of ringgit 
assets owned by non-residents. 
Import and export of ringgit (carriage on person)  
Export of foreign currency by citizen (carriage on person) General payments by residents including those for 
education abroad 
Outflow of Malaysian investment abroad FDI inflows and outflows 
Source: Athukorala (2001, p. 77) 
 
Additionally, policies were introduced in order to encourage FDI flows to the country, 
which included the admission of 100 % foreign ownership of new investment made before 
December 31st 2000 in domestic manufacturing, regardless of the degree of export 
orientation, pushing the foreign ownership share in the telecommunication project from 30 
% to 69 % under the condition that the ownership share would be lowered to 49 % after 
five years, and in stockbroking companies and the insurance sector the share was 
increased from previously 30 % to 49 % and 51 %, respectively, and restrictions on 
foreign investment in landed property were relaxed such that foreigners were allowed to 
purchase all types of properties above RM250,000 in new projects or projects which were 
less than 50 % completed (Abidin, 2000, p. 188). 
Summarizing, the policies were aimed to (Rajamaraman, 2003): 
- Kill the offshore ringgit market: This was done by forbidding the transfer of funds 
into the country from externally held ringgit accounts, except for investment in 
Malaysia or for the purchase of goods in Malaysia. 
- Close off access by non-residents to domestic ringgit sources: This was reached by 
banning ringgit credit facilities. 
- Shut down the offshore market in Malaysian shares: The CLOB in Singapore was 
closed. 
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- Obstruct speculative outward capital flows: Malaysian residents needed prior 
approval to invest abroad in any form and exports of foreign currency by residents 
for other than valid current account purposes, were limited. 
- Protect the ringgit’s value and raise foreign exchange reserves: The export 
proceeds had to be repatriated within six months. 
- Insulate monetary policy from the foreign exchange market: The authorities 
imposed a 12-month ban on outflow of external portfolio capital on the principal 
while interest and dividend payments could be freely repatriated. 
 
In the following period capital control policies were changed and relaxed: 
1. In early February 1999 the original 12-month holding restriction on portfolio 
investment was replaced by a system of repatriation levy. This repatriation levy 
identified two sets of repatriation levy: Funds which entered the country before 
February 15th 1999 a three-tier levy to the principal was to be applied (the capital 
value) on the retaining period of the funds in the country. Funds which entered the 
country after February 15th 1999 a two-tier levy was imposed on the repatriation of 
profits and not applicable on the principal: 30 % on profit made and repatriated 
within one year, and 10 % on profit repatriated after one year.  On September 21st 
1999 the two-tier levy on profit repatriation was replaced by a 10 % levy. On 
October 27th 2000 the authorities announced that profit earned from foreign 
portfolio investments in the country for a period of more than one year was 
exempted from this levy. The 10 % levy on capital gains repatriated after investing 
in Malaysia for more than one year was effectively removed on January 1st 2001. 
2. On February 26th 2000 the KLSE and the Singapore Stock Exchange reached an 
agreement on the transfer of the shares trapped in the CLOB market to the 
Malaysian stock exchange and allowed to resume trading (Athukorala, 2001, p.78; 
Jomo, 2005). 
 
The change of the capital controls policy by changing the one-year moratorium on 
portfolio capital with an exit tax was mainly interpreted in the financial press as a major 
backsliding from the original capital controls. The change was introduced in consultation 
with key players in the capital market (International Herald Tribune, February 9th 1999) 
and it was a pragmatic revision of the former capital control policy to only one element of 
the comprehensive controls in order to manage capital inflows in the recovery phase. The 
tax on profit repatriation from portfolio investment, together with the restrictions in place 
on foreign short-term bank borrowing, was intended to discourage excessive reliance of 
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Malaysian corporations on volatile foreign capital (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 78-79). The 
ringgit offshore market was destroyed by this policy package and the exchange rate 
controls limited access to the ringgit for non-residents preventing the re-emergence of an 
offshore ringgit market.  
The fixed peg of the ringgit to the US dollar was removed with the announcement of BNM 
on July 21st 2005. At the same time the Chinese authorities announced that it allowed 
appreciating its currency. The movements by China but as well by Malaysia imply that the 
economic environment in and outside the region changed and therefore the authorities in 
Malaysia moved to a managed float, based on a currency basket consisting of the 
currencies of their major trading partners. In the months after the move to a managed 
float, the ringgit appreciated slightly with respect to the US dollar (from 3.8RM/US$ to 
almost 3.7RM/US$).  This change in the exchange rate policy did not re-establish the 
offshore ringgit market i.e. its internationalization is still banned. 
 
The alterations of the reactions of the IMF with respect to the introduction of the capital 
controls in Malaysia can be seen from the following quotes: 
 
‘The introduction by Malaysia in early September of exchange and capital controls may also turn out to be an 
important setback not only to that country’s recovery and potentially to its future development, but also to other remerging 
market economies that have suffered from heightening investor fears of similar actions elsewhere.’  (IMF, 1998e, page 4) 
‘Despite stimulative monetary and fiscal measures introduced last year, however, domestic demand is expected to 
strengthen only gradually, and inflationary pressures are expected to remain low’.  (IMF, 1999c, page 19) 
‘In Malaysia, a strong economic recovery is also now underway in response to fiscal and monetary stimulus and 
the pegging of the exchange rate at a competitive level.’  (IMF, 1999d, page 19) 
 
The capital controls combined with the fixed exchange rates gave the authorities policy 
autonomy and this resulted into macroeconomic stimulation and the restructuring of the 
banking and corporate sector. In 1999 the budget deficit was planed to increase to 3.2 % 
of GNP (before 1.8 %) and in 2000 to 4.4 % of GNP. The government expenditures 
comprised of no new major proposals in either budgets but some moderate increase in 
funds for road and rail projects while the main source for the increased deficit were tax 
cuts and new tax incentives. A further advantage of the controls on capital outflows was 
that the Malaysian government was able to finance the deficits through issuing Malaysian 
government securities (MGS) that were absorbed largely by provident, pension and 
insurance funds while only one third of the financial needs were funded externally, mainly 
from concessionary bilateral and multilateral sources. The funds for the deficit came 
mainly from domestic borrowing (86 %, mainly from centrally controlled Employees 
Provident Fund and other saving funds) and the remainder was externally (concessionary 
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long-term credit from multilateral sources such as World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and Islamic Development Bank, from bilateral borrowing from Japan under the New 
Miyazawa Initiative, Japanese Overseas Cooperation Fund and Japan Import-Export Bank, 
and from a global bond issue made in May 1999 raising US$1 billion) and therefore 
Malaysia remained a net creditor to the IMF throughout the crisis period (Athukorala, 
2001, p. 79). 
The domestic economic policies during the period of capital controls were characterized by 
monetary expansion by the cut of the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) ratio for 
banking institutions in successive stages in order to inject liquidity into the debt-ridden 
banking system (from a pre-crisis level of 13.5 % to 4 % in late 1998). And, also the 
reformulation of the base lending rate (BLR) in order that reductions in the intervention 
rate are better reflected in the cost of bank credit and the three-month inter-bank rate, 
which was Bank Negara Malaysia’s policy rate and was cut in different stages (from 11 % 
in early 1998 to 4 % in early 1999). The default period of the classification of bank loans, 
which was changed in January 1998 from six months to three months, but reverted back 
to six months reducing the pressure on the bank to set aside capital against NPLs 
(Athukorala, 2001, pp. 79-80).  Accompanied by monetary expansion were policies that 
tried to boost credit expansion which included the announcement of an indicative annual 
loan growth target of 8 % for commercial banks, relaxation of credit limits on lending by 
commercial banks and financial companies for the purchase of property and shares, a 
scheme for providing soft loans for the purchase of cars, a special loan scheme for 
assisting smaller industries and low-income groups, and relaxing credit limits on credit 
cards (BNM, 1999a). 
The Malaysian government decided to implement a macroeconomic stimulation package 
using monetary policy and not so much fiscal policy as there was a need to avoid crowding 
out the private sector investment recovery because of the former interest rate hikes and 
the resulting credit squeeze (Athukorala, 2001, p. 80). 
 
On the banking and corporate side the new policies stressed the importance of the 
implementation of the banking and corporate restructuring programmes initiated in the 
first half of 1998. As mentioned above this programme set up Danaharta, the National 
Asset Management Company to carve out bad debt from the banking system, Danamodal, 
the Bank Recapitalization Company to inject fresh capital, and CDRC. The institutions 
remained largely inactive before the imposition of new policies due to a lack of essential 
funds. This problem was resolved by supplying a framework for raising required funds 
from domestic sources. Additionally Bank Negara Malaysia embarked on ambitious merger 
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programmes for domestic finance companies and banks in order to increase their 
competitiveness. Hence the number of financial companies was reduced from 39 to less 
than a half through merger and/or amalgamation with banks and the banks were forced to 
consolidate the 58 financial institutions into six (subsequently increased to ten) banking 
groups (Athukorala, 2001, pp. 80-81).  
 
In 1998 the Malaysian economy experienced a 7.5 % contraction in GDP after 11 years of 
uninterrupted expansion with an average of 8 % per year (only in the mid-1980s GDP 
contracted for about 1 %). In the first quarter of 1999 output contracted by approximately 
1.3 % (on an annual basis), but the trend reversed and output recovered to positive levels 
in the following quarters resulting in a 5.4 % positive growth in 1999. In 2000 the 
economy returned back to pre-crisis levels of growth.  As the output recovered, 
employment improved as well and the unemployment rate bounced back to pre-crisis 
levels (Athukorala, 2001, p. 84). During the period of implementation of the new policies 
(i.e. expansionary monetary policies) the inflation rate did not rise excessively (CPI 2.7 % 
in 1997 to 5.3 % in 1998; PPI 2.7 % in 1997 to 10.7 % in 1998 and 3.2 % in 1999). 
Business confidence increased again and trading on KLSE increased from mid-1999 again 
(Athukorala, 2001, p. 88), although the latter did not return to pre-crisis level. 
Domestic demand increased due to the reflationary policies and public expenditure.  
Therefore public consumption increased recording double-digit growth from the first 
quarter of 1999 and contributing 70 % of the total consumption growth of 6.7 % in 1999. 
Public fixed investment contracted by around 10 % in 1998 but private fixed investment 
declined by 58 % in the same year. In 1999 public fixed investment expanded by 14 % 
while private investment contracted at a lower level and total annual investment 
contracted only at 6 % in 1999 compared to 45 % in 1998. Furthermore, private 
consumption stabilized in the first half of 1999 and grew strongly in the second half of 
1999 (Athukorala, 2001, p. 89). 
The sectors in Malaysia recovered soon, where the services sectors, particularly in financial 
services, and domestic market-oriented manufacturing recovered first and by the second 
quarter of 1999 the recovery spread beyond those sectors and the export-oriented 
manufacturing played a leading role. Growth of export manufacturing bounced back faster 
than domestic manufacturing showing that the experience of Malaysia is consistent with 
the conventional wisdom that greater export orientation is an important facilitator of 
economic rebound following a crisis (Bhagwati, 1998; Sachs, 1985). 
Export of electronics and electronic parts were the main driver of manufacturing growth in 
the second half of 1999 while processed foods, plastic and rubber goods (export-oriented 
 171 
industries) and domestic market-oriented industries continued their recovery benefiting 
from an increased demand of electronics and electronic parts (semiconductors) on the 
world market and an improvement of international competitiveness due to the exchange 
rate depreciation. 
On the other side, the agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing) recorded negative 
growth in 1997 and 1998 due to the crisis and unfavourable world market conditions of 
the major export products (rubber and palm oil) rebounding to positive growth only in the 
second quarter of 1999.  The service sector grew in 1999 by 6 % (Athukorala, 2001, p. 
91). 
 
The fiscal position of Malaysia changed as the government introduced expansionary 
measures in September 1998 and therefore the government budget deficit was at 1.8 % 
of GDP in 1998 and increased in 1999 to 3.8 % of GDP as a result of the intensification of 
expansionary policies (Athukorala, 2001, p. 91). 
After the introduction of the new policies the main driver of the output changed from 
government to private sector driven. More interesting is the fact that government 
expenditure relative to GDP declined from the pre-crisis level in 1996 of 23 % to 20 % in 
1999 while at the same time the share of gross development expenditure in total 
expenditure increased from 25 % to 39 % during this period. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the government committed itself to fiscal expansion in order to get out of the crisis 
but was careful to do it by keeping current expenditure under control (current expenditure 
as a percentage of total government revenue remained almost unchanged at the pre-crisis 
level of 56 %). The deficit was funded by an increase of net total borrowing by RM12.8 
billion (after six consecutive years of debt redemption) where more than two-thirds of the 
new debt were funded domestically and the latter by foreign debt which was mainly long-
term concessionary loans obtained from multilateral financial organizations and foreign 
governments as mentioned above (Athukorala, 2001, p. 92). 
As real GDP growth turned into positive, the balance of payment strengthened as external 
trade balance became more favourable and the economy experienced significant inflows of 
long-term capital. In 1999 the trade balance recorded a surplus of RM74 billion boosted by 
a stronger export performance than import growth, 7.4 % higher than the surplus 
registered in 1998. By end of 1999 the foreign exchange reserves of Malaysia stood at 
US$31 billion and provided 300 % cover for total outstanding short-term debts and 200 % 
cover for the stock of volatile capital (i.e. outstanding short-term debt plus cumulating 
portfolio investment). Total external debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 44 % in 
1997 to 58 % in 1998 and declined to 53 % in 1999 while the short-term debt in total 
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outstanding debt declined from 25.2 % in 1997 to 19.9 % in 1998 and to 14.3 % in 1999 
(Athukorala, 2001, pp. 92-93). 
 
After a slowdown in growth for 2002 the economy maintained its positive GDP growth 
levels albeit not returning to pre-crisis levels and other economic fundamentals improved 
from 1999 onwards, too. 
 
4.3.2.1 The Banking Sector Restructuring 
The financial sector in Malaysia was weakened in the period before the crisis but as 
mentioned above it retained a better condition than in other Asian countries as the 
economy experienced a bank crisis in the late 1980s and therefore the authorities 
maintained more prudential regulations. This resulted in a lower exposure to foreign 
borrowings of the domestic economy. Therefore the external commitments during and 
after the crisis were smaller than in the other crisis-hit countries and especially with 
respect to Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, during the period of political confusion in the second half of 1997 until the 
imposition of capital controls, non-performing loans increased not only due to economic 
factors but also due to some changes in the classification system of non-performing loans 
in late 1997 with the introduction of a tighter definition of non-performing loans as can be 
seen from Table 4.8 below. 
 
TABLE 4.8 – Loan Classification and Reserve Requirements in Malaysia in 1997-1998 
 Old (since September 1997) Revised (since September 1998) 
Classification of NPLs 
General 
BA’s, trade bills 
Credit cards 
 
Overdue for 3 months 
Dormant for 6 months 
3 months in arrears 
 
Overdue for 6 months 
Dormant for 6 months 
Unpaid 1 month after maturity 
Reclassification of NPLs to Performing 
Status 
General 
 
Rescheduled/Restructured 
 
 
Full settlement of arrears on interest 
and principle 
Complies with rescheduling terms for 
12 consecutive months 
 
 
Total period in arrears less than 6 
months 
Complies for 6 consecutive months 
Provisioning 
General provisioning 
Specific provisioning 
Substandard 
Doubtful 
Bad 
 
Minimum 1.5% 
 
20% (3 to 6 months overdue) 
50% (6 to 12 months overdue) 
100% (12 months and more) 
 
Minimum 1.5% 
 
20% (3 to 6 months overdue) 
50% (6 to 12 months overdue) 
100% (12 months and more) 
Source: Chin (2004, p. 207) 
 
The restructuring plan of the Malaysian banking sector consisted of short-term stabilization 
measures and medium to longer-term strategies to develop and strengthen the banking 
sector (BNM, 1999c, p. 421). Figure 4.4 illustrates in more detail the outline of the 
restructuring plan. 
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FIGURE 4.4 – Restructuring Plan of the Banking Sector in Malaysia 
 
Source: BNM (1999c, p.145) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.4 above BNM introduced clear objectives for the 
restructuring of the financial sector: short-term objectives were to rid of NPLs and 
strengthen banks and on the long term objectives were to increase the strength and 
prudence of the banking sector. 
 
The Malaysian authorities introduced three institutions for the resolution of short-term 
problems: 
- Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (or short Danaharta), which became the 
national asset management company and had to ensure that the level of non-
performing loans in the banking system remained manageable, 
- Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) which was given the function of 
recapitalizing the banking sector, and 
- the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) provided a mechanism for 
banks and debtors to work out feasible debt workout solutions. 
 
The estimates of costs borne by the government for the purchase of the non-performing 
loans of the banking system and the recapitalization were RM15 billion and RM16 billion 
Objectives 
Short-term Long-term 
- Halt the vicious cycle of the 1997 crisis 
- Stimulate economic recovery 
- Create resilient banking system to withstand 
future shocks 
- Develop efficient and competitive banking 
sector to support economic and contribute as 
sector growth 
- Provide foundation to broaden and deepen 
financial markets and strengthen financial 
infrastructure to meet future challenges 
Encourage banks to lend 
Manage 
NPLs 
  Capital     Funding 
Danaharta 
& CDRC 
Special 
funds 
Danamodal 
- Finance companies merger programme 
- BNM to initiate mergers and use Danamodal 
to faciltate consolidation of the banking sector 
and to rationalize and revamp management 
when necessary 
- Asset-backed securitization 
- Plan to chart the direction of the banking 
sector 
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respectively, while the total costs of the restructuring was estimated to amount to 17 % of 
real GDP (Chin, 2004, p. 209). 
Danaharta was given the right to purchase and manage non-performing loans with a gross 
value of RM5 million from banking institutions in order to promote bank lending (NEAC, 
1999, p. 34). At the end of 1999 Danaharta had acquired already RM45.5 billion of non-
performing loans of which 35.7 billion were loan rights acquired from the banking system 
(BNM, 2000), i.e. 42 % of non-performing loans in the banking system. There were two 
ways how Danaharta acquired NPLs (Danaharta, 2002, p. 3): 
1. NPLs were acquired from the financial institutions at an average discount rate of 
54.4 %. The payment was made either by issuing zero-coupon Danaharta bonds to 
the selling financial institution or in cash. The total cost of this method was RM9.03 
billion. 
2. The NPLs of the now defunct Sime Bank and Bank Bumiputra Malaysia were 
assigned at no cost and Danaharta had to manage on behalf of the government. 
 
In 2000 Danaharta had already completed its loan acquisition phase and focused in 2001 
on the management and resolution of loans and assets (Chin, 2004, p. 210) engaging 
thereafter in exit options. In August 1998 the NPL ratio, just before the start of activity of 
Danaharta, was at 11.4 % (6-month classification) and declined over the years below 10 
% (Danaharta, 2005). The institution, which was closed on September 30th 2005, dealt 
with a portfolio consisting of acquired NPLs of RM19.71 billion from over 70 financial 
institutions and RM27.97 billion from the defunct Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia Group, dealing in total with RM47.68 billion (at original transfer value of the loans 
(Danaharta, 2005)). By September 30th 2005, the recovery rate, measured by adjusting 
the original transfer value of the loan plus interest accrued from the date of acquisition by 
Danaharta, amounted in overall to 58 %. Whereby the adjusted loan rights acquired 
amounted in overall to RM52.42 billion, consisting of RM47.68 billion of principal loan 
rights acquired and accrued interest of RM4.74 billion, and the recovery cost in overall 
RM30.35 billion (Danaharta, 2005). The zero-coupon bonds issued by Danaharta were all 
fully repaid and no bond remained on the market (ADB, asiabondsonline). 
 
Danamodal was given the task to recapitalize the banking sector with capital ‘injections’ in 
the form of equity or hybrid instruments. In order to identify the banks that needed to be 
recapitalized, Danamodal used objective guidelines developed by Bank Negara Malaysia,  
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where the following steps were included but not limited to (Chin, 2004, pp. 212-213): 
- In-depth analysis of the competitive position and financial standing of each banking 
institution. 
- Quantification of potential synergies to be realized through consolidation. 
- Capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity – short CAMEL – analysis. 
 
Furthermore, viable banking institutions were identified by an assessment and a review 
conducted by reputable, international financial advisors. By injecting fresh money into the 
sector, Danamodal had the possibility to better facilitate the rationalization of banking 
institutions in connection with their consolidation (Chin, 2004, p. 213). Since December 
1999 no capital injections had been made as the capital position of banking institutions 
continued to improve (BNM, 2002, p.134). The bonds issued by Danamodal were fully 
repaid and it ceased its activity in late 2003. 
 
The third institution, the CDRC, was given the aim to facilitate the restructuring of large 
corporate loans, enabling borrowers and creditors to work out feasible debt restructuring 
schemes (Chin, 2004, p. 214). Although the progress of corporate debt restructuring in 
Malaysia was better than in Indonesia or Thailand it lagged behind Korea (table 4.9) as 
CDRC had no legal or statutory powers and could only act as an advisor and mediator 
between the two parties (CDRC, 2002). 
 
TABLE 4.9 – Progress of Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Four East Asian Crisis 
Economies (1999) 
Country Per cent of Corporate Debt Cases 
Resolved 
Per cent of Corporate Debt 
Restructured, by value 
Indonesia (August 1999) 1 13 
Malaysia (December 1999) 22 35 
Republic of Korea (September 1999) 78 50 
Thailand (December 1999) 14 15 
Source: Binamira and Haworth (2000, p. 143) 
 
During the period of activity CDRC resolved 48 cases with total debts amounting to 
RM52.6 billion and representing almost 65 % of the total cases und its auspices (Chin, 
2004, p. 216).  
 
Before the outbreak of the crisis, Bank Negara Malaysia had little power for forcing 
mergers in the banking sector, and hence increasing profitability. In July 1999 the 
government announced the plan of merging financial institutions in order to get six ‘anchor 
banks’ and banks were given two months to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
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and eight months to complete the exercises. The rationale behind this was to increase 
efficiency and competitiveness of the banking sector as the banking sector prior to these 
forced mergers was split up in many small banks (the merger decreased not only the 
number of banks and finance companies from almost 90 in 1997 to 45 in 2002 but as well 
the number of branch networks) (Chin, 2004, pp. 217-218). After the announcement some 
controversies were observed as not only small inefficient banks should have merged with 
larger ones but as well mid-sized profitable banks (e.g. Hon Leong Bank).  In October 
1999, due to objections about the number and composition of the proposed banking 
groups Prime Minister Mahathir decided to allow ten banks to remain in the revised merger 
policy (Chin, 2004, p. 220). 
Although these policies attempted to enhance profitability, efficiency and competitiveness 
of financial companies and banks, the process is yet unfinished and for the future there 
still remain some tasks for the central bank (see Figure 4.5 below). 
 
FIGURE 4.5 – Implementation of Recommendations into the Financial Sector Masterplan 
(2001-2010) 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2001) 
 
4.3.2.2 Ownership and Governance in Malaysia 
As mentioned above, the riots of May 1969 led the government implement the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 in order to promote an economic development of all ethnic 
groups in Malaysia and as a result should have increased the concept of national unity. 
Phase 1 
(3 years) 
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The key point of this NEP was to increase the share of Bumiputera in the corporate sector 
and therefore this was a reversal of the laissez-faire policy in the period between 
independence and the riots in 1969. The outcome of the NEP renamed after 1990 in 
National Development Policy (NDP) was that there was an effective increase over the 
years of the ownership of Bumiputera in local corporations, but the plan of the 
government to increase the share of them to 30 % failed as can be seen from official 
records (e.g. different issues of economic five year plans). 
Most of the leading companies in Malaysia in the mid-1990s were connected to one of the 
three most powerful politicians in Malaysia: Prime Minister Mahathir, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and Economic Adviser Daim Zainuddin. After the 
onset of the crisis and the change of political landscape, businessmen connected to Anwar 
and Daim lost their influence and importance in Malaysia. Connections, corporate 
ownership and control patterns were rather complex. During the crisis, Mahathir was 
afraid of the debt crisis in the private sector which led to some political intervention in the 
corporate sector not always respecting shareholder’s rights (Gomez, 2004, pp. 161-178).  
It seems that Chinese capitalists endured the crisis better than others did. By early 2001, 
no Malay was among the ten wealthiest business people; instead almost all of them were 
Chinese (Malaysian Business, February 1st 2001).  
More details on corporate governance in Malaysia will be the topic of Chapter 6.  
 
4.3.2.3 Political Implications of the Crisis 
Contrary to Indonesia the political change in the leadership was not during the first period 
of the crisis, although the political landscape changed during 1998 as well. In late 1997 
and beginning of 1998 the tension between Anwar and Mahathir became more and more 
obvious. The step down of Soeharto in Indonesia encouraged Anwar and his supporters 
even more to challenge Mahathir over the succession of UMNO and the leadership in 
Malaysia (Haggard, 2000, p.63). It seems that until mid-1997 Anwar was supported by 
Mahathir and appointed as acting prime minister before Mahathir’s two month oversees 
travel in May 1997. During this period Anwar proposed the Anti-Corruption Bill 1997 in 
order to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Agency as well as the penalties. This topic was 
very ‘hot’ during this period and Anwar became more exposed to political adversaries and 
to uncertainty about his political future (Hwang, 2003, pp. 289-290). The following months 
were characterized by rumours about a possible homosexuality of Anwar and the political 
struggle between Mahathir and Anwar. Anwar tried to assert his claims to leadership, 
opposing bailouts of closely connected corporations to Mahathir and pausing mega 
projects. At the same time Mahathir was confronted with the criticism of foreign media 
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and the differences of the management of the economic crisis between him and Anwar 
and the insight that Anwar would not protect his family after becoming prime minister 
(Hwang, 2003, p. 292). NEAC was a response on the economic side against Anwar and his 
policy. Hence, the appointment of former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin as executive 
director of the NEAC on December 20th 1997 showed that Mahathir was going to cut the 
political influence of Anwar (Hwang, 2003, p. 296). 
Prior to the political crisis in September 1998, Mahathir had succeeded in the triennial 
party elections in March 1998 for local policy leadership positions where 165 division chiefs 
were confirmed in their office while only 24 were replaced, which means that more than 
80 % of the incumbent leaders were confirmed during the elections. In order to protect 
the presidency of Mahathir at UMNO, his supporters tried to introduce measures limiting in 
this way the challenge of Anwar and his supporters (Hwang, 2003, p. 298). Anwar raised 
the issue of ‘corruption, cronyism, and nepotism’ during the next months in several 
speeches.  But as the General Assembly supported Mahathir, the outcome of the political 
conflicts between Anwar and Mahathir was in favour of the prime minister and Anwar’s 
political authority was formally undercut by the changes of the cabinet. After the release 
of the new economic package for economic growth stimulation and the pressure of the 
government on the Bank Negara Malaysia to ease monetary policy in early July, the 
central bank governor Ahmad Mohamed Don resigned in late August 1998. After the exit 
of Anwar from the cabinet, Mahathir took over the Finance Ministry and appointed close 
associates to the central bank (Haggard, 2000, p. 64). 
Following his expulsion from political offices (from the office as deputy and finance 
minister on September 2nd 1998 and from UMNO on September 4th 1998) Anwar initiated 
demonstrations against the political leadership and was arrested in late September 1998. 
In October 1998 supporters of Anwar were expelled from UMNO and Mahathir left the 
deputy prime minister position unfilled (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 15th 1998). 
The demonstrations and the opposition movement were kept under control by the police, 
while Anwar was beaten in jail. Finally, he was sentenced to a 15-year sentence but on 
September 2nd 2004 released from prison. 
By the elections of 1999 UMNO received the worst election outcome since existence and 
lost some of its importance in the National Front, i.e. the coalition that governs the 
country and includes Chinese and Indian parties.  
Prime Minister Mahathir stepped down after 22 years in politics by age 78 as he proposed 
himself to retire as ‘everything is in place. That's the right time to leave. You don't want to 
leave after people kick you out.’ (Time, October 23rd 2003). The office as prime minister 
was overtaken by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in October 2003, which had joined the cabinet 
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of Mahathir in January 1999, and in March 2004 he was sworn by for a new, five-year 
term.  The coalition government was confirmed in parliamentary and regional elections. In 
February 2006 the cabinet was reshuffled but Abdullah maintained his position as finance 
and internal security minister. 
 
4.3.3 The Role of Capital Controls and the Controversy 
During the 1980s the so-called Washington Consensus emerged and this led to the view 
that financial liberalization would contribute to economic growth although theory leaves no 
unambiguous prediction of whether opening the capital account helps in the promotion of 
growth or not. It seems that opening the capital account influences positively economic 
growth if the domestic financial markets are well developed and regulated, and the 
operation of the international financial system is smooth and stable while it might be more 
negative if domestic and international financial markets are subject to crises (Eichengreen 
and Leblang, 2002).  
In theory there are many different types of capital controls possible and the nature of 
them changes with the circumstances in which they are imposed. According to Jomo 
(2004, pp. 188-189) the following arguments of opponents and supporters of the 
introduction of capital controls can be identified: 
- Opponents: argued that capital tends to flow from capital-rich to capital-poor 
economies or between economies with different savings rates, investment 
opportunities, risk profiles or even demographic patterns. 
o Capital flows enable national economies to trade imports in the present for 
imports in the future (inter-temporal trade). 
o Capital flows allow national economies to offset pressures to reduce imports 
by borrowing from abroad or by selling assets to foreigners. 
o Capital flows enhance economic development as foreign direct investment 
is expected to involve technology transfer and which should increase future 
industrial capabilities. 
- Supporters: argued that free capital flows have an adverse effect on national 
economic policy-making and implementation and as a worst case they might 
undermine economic stability.  As capital control can be considered any policy or 
measure that restricts or redirects capital account transactions (see below).  They 
argue that the following major reasons support the introduction of capital controls: 
o Achieve greater leeway for monetary policy, e.g. to re-inflate the economy; 
o Enhance macroeconomic stability by limiting potentially volatile capital 
inflows; 
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o Secure exchange rate stability, e.g. protect a fixed exchange rate or peg; 
o Correct international payments imbalances, both deficits and surpluses; 
o Avoid inflation due to excessive inflows; 
o Avoid real currency appreciation due to monetary expansion; 
o Reduce financial instability by changing the composition of – or limiting – 
capital inflows; 
o Restrict foreign ownership of domestic assets, which might cause 
nationalistic resentment; 
o Ensure the domestic utilization of national savings by restricting outflows; 
o Enable governments to allocate credit domestically without risking capital 
flight; 
o Enable domestic financial houses to attain scale economies in order to 
better compete internationally; 
o Facilitate revenue generation, particularly taxation of wealth and interest 
income; by allowing higher inflation, more revenue can be generated. 
 
As it was the case in East Asia, the countries by having fixed exchange rate regimes could 
raise interest rates or devalue exchange rates in the situation of the net capital outflow.  
Both options may lead in this situation to strong recessionary pressure due to higher 
interest rates or further capital flight (Jomo, 2004, p. 189). The result of a monetary 
contraction might be not only higher interest rates and therefore dampen economic 
activity but also it may put pressure on the banking system which is possibly exposed to 
foreign borrowings (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2002). 
The different types of capital controls at disposal and the major differences are the 
following (Jomo, 2004, pp. 190-191): 
1. Taxes versus quantitative controls. Taxes imposed on price or market mechanism 
try to limit certain types of flows and they may be imposed on certain types of 
transactions or returns to foreign investment or may even involve mandatory 
reserve requirements. Quantitative controls could be quotas, authorization 
requirements or even outright bans. 
2. Controls on inflows versus outflows. Controls on inflows may allow higher interest 
rates in order to check money supply and inflation. Controls on outflows may allow 
lower interest rates and greater money supply and have often been used to 
postpone hard choices between devaluation and tighter monetary policy. 
3. Controls on different types of inflows especially in terms of expected duration.  
Authorities may prefer to encourage long-term inflows such as FDI but may 
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discourage short-term inflows such as bank loans or money market instruments or 
easily reversible inflows such as portfolio investments. 
 
Important for the implementation of capital controls is to clearly state which kind of 
control will be imposed and objectives pursued as well as to state for short-term controls 
the timing of the exit strategy. 
 
The view that capital account liberalization would always boost economic growth was 
disproven even by an IMF research in 2003 (Rogoff et al., 2003); other empirical 
researches show mixed results, for example Quinn (1997) finds positive results between 
growth and liberalization; Edwards (2001) finds positive relationships especially in high 
income countries; Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2002) finds a positive relationship 
especially in emerging markets; Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) find a negative 
relationship in industrial countries; Rodrik (1998) finds no stable association between 
liberalization and growth; Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) find no impact of liberalization on 
growth; Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) finds results that question about the 
robustness of growth effects of capital account policies). Quantitative studies about the 
association of capital controls with crisis show that there exists a positive association of 
capital controls with crises (Glick and Hutchison, 2000; Leblang, 2001; Bordo, 
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martiney Peria, 2001) while qualitative studies claim that 
capital account liberalization can set the stage for crises (e.g. Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2002) argue in their work that capital controls influence 
macroeconomic performance through a direct channel i.e. the ‘cost’ as they have a strong 
impact on resource allocation and efficiency and an indirect channel, i.e. limiting the 
disruptive effects of crises at home and abroad and due to their opposite directions they 
conclude that in periods of financial instability capital controls are positive as they can 
insulate the economy, while in periods of financial stability the cost, i.e. the impact on 
resource allocation and efficiency, is more likely to dominate. 
 
Some studies have shown that financial liberalization not only does not seem to have 
contributed to economic growth but that it has succeeded more adverse consequences 
including deflationary macroeconomic policy pressures, slower growth and greater 
vulnerability to crisis. Additionally it has been shown that the promised gains from 
international financial liberalization have not materialized and there is evidence that capital 
account convertibility has increased net capital flows from the capital poor to the capital 
rich countries as well as there is little evidence that the costs of capital was declining 
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significantly and to a sustainable level. Furthermore, the frequency of currency, banking 
and other financial crisis in the past years increased. The economic liberalization and 
international financial integration have resulted in the greater likelihood of cross-border 
transmission of financial crises and increased the danger of contagion (Jomo, 2005).  
The financial liberalization proposed by the Washington Consensus was not based on the 
theoretical analysis of the outcome of financial liberalization. Ronald McKinnon, an early 
proponent of the Washington Consensus, based on the singular case of the Republic of 
Korea during the 1960s when savings rates continued to rise despite alleged financial 
repression, argues that it was not interpreted in his sense and published thereafter the 
book ‘The Order of Economic Liberalization’ suggesting that capital account liberalization 
should be the last step in financial liberalization. But the IMF was proposing to include in 
the Fund’s Articles of Agreement currency convertibility for capital transactions until the 
outbreak of the East Asian Crisis. The objective of capital account liberalization was after 
the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis was no longer included in the daily agenda (Fischer, 
1998). 
 
Looking at history, the imposition of capital controls is not as new as it seemed in 1998 as 
for example capital controls were imposed before by Chile and Malaysia. These capital 
controls were on inflows whereas the 1998 experiment of Malaysia was to impose controls 
on outflows. While there is more agreement that temporary capital controls on inflow are 
beneficial for the recovery and stabilization of an economy, there is much more 
controversy on temporary capital controls on outflows. Therefore the capital controls 
introduced in September 1998 in Malaysia are considered to be an ‘unorthodox’ step (i.e. 
‘orthodox’ policies were promoted especially by the IMF and other institutions). Although 
there is a huge literature on the effectiveness and advantages and disadvantages of 
capital controls on inflows (e.g. Williamson, 1999; Montiel, 1995, Dooley, 1995; Cooper 
1999; Saxena and Wong, 1999) and empirical studies (e.g. Johnston and Ryan, 1994; 
Dooley, 1995; Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Epstein et al., 2003; Montiel and Reinhart, 
2001; Ariyoshi et al., 2000, Edwards, 2003), the topic of capital controls on outflows has 
received more attention consequently after its imposition in Malaysia. The result of 
analyses of capital controls on inflows is rather mixed depending on sampling and 
methodology used. 
In the case of Malaysia the proponents of the success of the capital controls on outflows 
argue that the economic and stock market decline came to a stop soon after the controls 
were implemented (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001; Jomo ed., 2001; Palma, 2000; Dornbusch, 
2002). Opponents argue that the reversals have been more pronounced in the rest of the 
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region. The empirical study of Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) suggests that there is strong 
evidence that the controls had a positive effect on the economy as they provided some 
room for breath for domestic monetary and financial policies. For these reasons, they 
permitted a faster recovery than by implementing the orthodox IMF policies. Kaplan and 
Rodrik (2001) also argue that the controls averted another crisis that had to hit Malaysia 
and note that the offshore overnight ringgit market interest rates, principally in Singapore, 
remained at high levels (around 40 %) for some months. This put pressure on domestic 
interest rates in Malaysia. On the other hand, a leading Malaysian neo-liberal economist, 
R. Thillainathan, argued that the speculative offshore market was very thin although the 
huge amount of ringgit held abroad (around RM25-30 billion) but failed to provide further 
evidence (Jomo, 2004, p. 182). Epstein et al. (2003) argue that the Malaysian government 
reached their goal of eliminating the offshore ringgit market by the implementation of the 
policy package in 1998; therefore the targets of these policies were reached. On the other 
side, Jomo (Ed. 2001) argues that the imposition of capital controls might have 
contributed to cronyism and corruption. Additionally, Jomo (2005, p. 12) argues that the 
policy package is generally recognized as being comprehensive and cleverly designed to 
limit foreign exchange outflows and ringgit speculation by non-residents as well as 
residents but at the same time not affecting foreign direct investors. Furthermore, the 
Central Bank effectively enforced the measures and its success is often attributed to 
Malaysian conditions i.e. the adequacy of its foreign exchange reserves, its lower exposure 
to foreign debt and strong economic fundamentals. 
A recent paper on the effectiveness on capital controls (Magud and Reinhart, 2006) 
evaluates empirically the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows and outflows by 
standardizing the outcome with two indices (Capital Control Effectiveness Index – CEE 
Index; Weighted Capital Control Effectiveness Index – WCCE Index; for a detailed 
discussion please consult Magud and Reinhart, 2006) and gives a good overview of results 
of other studies. Magud and Reinhart (2006) argue that by comparing Malaysia to other 
cases of controls on capital outflows, in Malaysia outflows were reduced and monetary 
policy became more independent while Spain (ERM crisis in 1992) performed better in 
reducing real exchange rate pressures. The following tables gives an overview of the 
methodologies used by different authors and a summary of the results on effectiveness of 
capital outflows discussed before Malaysia was compared with Spain, ERM Crisis in 1992, 
and Thailand, East Asian Crisis 1997. 
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TABLE 4.10 – Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor of East Asian Crisis 
Country Studies 
Study Sample Methodology 
Econometric 
Rigor 
Malaysia (1997) 
Tamirisia (2004) 1991:1 – 2002:12 
Error-correction model.  Series on net foreign portfolio assets 
are by foreign portfolio assets to isolate country-specific 
effects 
High 
Dornbusch 
(2001) 
 Descriptive analysis of different variables Low 
Edison & 
Reinhart 
(2000) 
 
 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence 
between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) 
for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window 
High 
 
Kaplan & Rodrik 
(2002) 
 
1992 – 1996 
Shifted difference in differences to separate the 
counterfactual of capital controls versus IMF-based program 
recovery. This methodology enables the authors to re-
schedule the episodes in terms of the 
timing of the crises (shifted). The difference in differences 
allows them to capture the comparison 
effect of the recovery with capital controls vis á vis with a 
successful IMF program, controlling for 
exogenous and country-specific effects (static and dynamics) 
High 
 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter- 
Robe, Canales- 
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1998 – 2000 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies 
analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows 
(limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls 
(financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
 
Spain (1992) 
Jose Viñals(1992) 1992 
Descriptive analysis of economic policy measures and its 
effect on various macroeconomic variables 
Low 
Edison & 
Reinhart 
(1999) 
1991 – 1993 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence 
between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) 
for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window 
High 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter- 
Robe, Canales- 
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1992 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies 
analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows 
(limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls 
(financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
Thailand (1997) 
Edison & 
Reinhart 
(2000) 
 
1995 – 1999 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence 
between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) 
for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window 
High 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter- 
Robe, Canales- 
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1997 – 1998 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies 
analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows 
(limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls 
(financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
Source: Magud and Reinhart (2006) 
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TABLE 4.11 – Summary of Key Findings on ‘Effectiveness’ on Controls on Capital Outflows 
  
Did controls on outflows: 
 
Study 
Episode 
 
Reduce the 
volume of net 
capital 
outflows 
Alter the 
composition of 
flows 
Reduce real 
exchange rate 
pressures 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
Malaysia (1997) 
Tamirisia (2004) 1991:1 – 2002:12   No Yes 
Dornbusch (2001)    No  
Edison & Reinhart 
(2000) 
   Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Kaplan & Rodrik (2002) 1992 – 1996    
Yes 
 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1998 – 2000 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Magud and Reinhart 
(2006) 
 Yes  No Yes (strong) 
Spain (1992) 
Jose Vinals(1992) 
1992 
 
No 
 
   
Edison & Reinhart 
(2001) 
1995 – 1999   
No 
 
No 
 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1992 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes (ST) 
 
Yes 
 
Magud and Reinhart 
(2006) 
 Yes  Yes Yes (weak) 
Thailand (1997) 
Edison & Reinhart 
(2000) 
   
No 
 
No 
 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1997 – 1998 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes (ST) 
 
Magud and Reinhart 
(2006) 
 Yes  No No 
Notes: A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular relationship. An (ST) 
refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
Source: Adapted from Magud and Reinhart (2006) 
 
Paul Krugman suggested the imposition of capital controls in his Fortune magazine column 
in early September 1998 in order to create a window of opportunity to facilitate economic 
recovery just by coincidence at the same time when Malaysia was announcing its effective 
imposition of capital controls, (Krugman, 1998). Although Malaysia recovered soon 
(experiencing a so-called ‘V-shaped’ recovery), at the time of announcement of the policy 
package and the capital controls on outflows, the sentiment of the IMF and other 
institutions as well as some market observers was rather pessimistic and negative. The 
pessimism changed within a few months and the IMF in an Article IV Consultation with 
Malaysia praised the Malaysian authorities for ‘using the breathing space [by introducing 
the policy measures in September 1998 and] to push ahead with a well-designed and 
effectively implemented strategy for financial sector restructuring’ (IMF, 1999a, 2000). The 
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) even suggested in its 
1998 ‘Trade and Development Report’ to impose capital controls as means to avoid 
financial crises.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
Although prior to experiencing a crisis both Indonesia and Malaysia has a balanced 
economic growth. However, both suffered from the sudden outbreak of the East Asian 
Crisis in mid 1997 followed by fundamental changes in politics and economics. Indonesia 
experienced after a long period of political instability in 1997/1998 while Malaysia did 
experience some political uncertainty. The economic landscape changed in both countries 
from mid 1997: Indonesia called in the IMF and adopted strict policies limiting e.g. public 
spending but leaving capital movements free; Malaysia did not call in the IMF, being the 
only crisis hit country to deal the problems by themselves, and in September 1998 decided 
to introduce capital controls on short term capital outflows, which was observed by the 
international financial community sceptical. The imposition of capital controls as discussed 
just before is controversial and not yet finished. 
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5 
Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia – a Qualitative Approach 
 
This chapter will deal with some qualitative approaches such as the evolution of 
governance and corporate governance in Indonesia and Malaysia along with the 
construction and an analysis of federal government spending before and during the East 
Asian Crisis. 
The chapter will start with the governance in the two countries, analyse corporate 
governance and lastly discuss shortly federal government revenue and expenditures 
during the crisis period. 
 
5.1 Governance 
This section deals with the results of the world governance indicators by the World Bank.  
As the World Bank argues in one of its publications (World Bank, 2006), governance is 
important for not only development but there are other important impacts: 
“Good governance pays a very large development dividend. An improvement in governance of one standard 
deviation can triple a nation’s per capita income in the long run. Higher income also correlates with better 
governance, but the causal relationship is mostly from governance to income. 
Although governance quality on average changes slowly, it can in some countries decline sharply in a few short 
years, but it can also quickly improve. 
Responses to specific questions on governance from citizens, firms, and country experts are important, because 
stakeholders make decisions based on those views and perceptions. 
Direct data from citizens, firms, and experts, even if they contain a subjective element, can paint a richer picture 
of actual conditions on the ground than counting laws and regulations, which in fact may not be enforced or 
observed. 
Aggregate indicators yield more reliable information about governance than any individual indicator can 
provide.”  (World Bank, 2006) 
 
The study comprises six different indicators available for 213 countries and territories for 
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-2005 and is based on different individual variables from 31 
different data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. The six indicators were 
constructed according to the methodology presented in the paper of Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2004) and are as follows: 
1. Voice and accountability (VA): The extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media; 
2. Political stability and absence of violence (PV): Perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including political violence and terrorism; 
3. Government effectiveness (GE): The quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
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quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies; 
4. Regulatory quality (RQ): The ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development; 
5. Rule of law (RL): The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; 
6. Control of corruption (CC): The extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
Although the methodology used is the same for all countries analyzed in the study there 
are some limits in cross-country comparisons as the methodology generates margins of 
errors for the estimates of governance in each country and which should be taken into 
account (for a more detailed discussion see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006). 
The following tables and figures show the results of latest available data for Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
 
TABLE 5.1 – Governance in Indonesia 
Voice and Accountability 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) -1. -1.45 -0.54 -0.52 -0.45 -0.43 -0.21 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 14.9 10.6 30.4 32.4 35.7 36.2 40.6 
Standard Error 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 
Number of surveys/polls 5 5 7 10 10 12 10 
Political Stability/No Violence 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) -0.66 -1.57 -2.01 -1.57 -1.94 -1.60 -1.42 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 23.1 7.5 2.8 9.4 4.2 7.1 9.0 
Standard Error 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.21 
Number of surveys/polls 6 6 9 10 12 10 10 
Government Effectiveness 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.08 -0.57 -0.39 -0.55 -0.58 -0.42 -0.47 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 61.9 30.1 39.2 34.0 34.0 39.7 37.3 
Standard Error 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Number of surveys/polls 7 7 10 12 12 13 12 
Regulatory Quality 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.22 +0.04 -0.41 -0.71 -0.69 -0.44 -0.45 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 57.4 44.3 31.5 23.6 23.6 36.9 36.6 
Standard Error 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Number of surveys/polls 7 6 8 10 10 11 11 
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Rule of Law 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) -0.41 -1.06 -1.03 -0.97 -0.89 -0.82 -0.87 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 41.1 13.5 12.0 18.3 21.6 23.1 20.3 
Standard Error 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Number of surveys/polls 9 10 14 16 15 17 15 
Control of Corruption 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) -0.49 -1.03 -1.05 -1.19 -1.01 -0.96 -0.86 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 34.1 9.3 10.8 6.9 13.2 15.2 21.2 
Standard Error 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Number of surveys/polls 7 9 12 13 13 15 13 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006)  
 
FIGURE 5.1 – Governance in Indonesia (1996, 2000, 2002-2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
Note: Color Coding:0th – 10th percentile: dark red; 10th – 25th percentile: pink; 25th – 50th percentile: orange; 50th – 75th 
percentile: yellow; 75th - 90th percentile: light green; 90th – 100th percentile: dark green. 
 
TABLE 5.2 – Governance in Malaysia 
Voice and Accountability 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) -0.11 -0.22 -0.35 -0.30 -0.39 -0.35 -0.41 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 48.1 42.0 38.2 42.0 36.7 39.1 34.3 
Standard Error 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 
Number of surveys/polls 5 6 8 10 10 12 10 
Political Stability/No Violence 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.77 +0.18 +0.15 +0.24 +0.32 +0.24 +0.49 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 73.1 51.9 50.0 51.9 56.1 56.1 62.3 
Standard Error 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.21 
Number of surveys/polls 6 7 10 10 10 12 10 
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Government Effectiveness 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.75 +0.73 +0.71 +0.95 +0.85 +0.95 +1.01 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 79.5 78.0 73.2 80.9 78.9 79.4 80.4 
Standard Error 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Number of surveys/polls 7 8 10 11 11 12 11 
Regulatory Quality 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.80 +0.49 +0.28 +0.53 +0.59 +0.57 +0.50 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 80.4 65.0 59.1 67.5 69.0 69.5 66.8 
Standard Error 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Number of surveys/polls 7 7 7 9 9 10 10 
Rule of Law 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.80 +0.57 +0.39 +0.48 +0.48 +0.55 +0.58 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 78.5 67.3 65.4 64.4 64.4 65.9 66.2 
Standard Error 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 
Number of surveys/polls 9 11 14 15 14 16 14 
Control of Corruption 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Estimate (-2.5 - + 2.5) +0.57 +0.67 +0.21 +0.33 +0.36 +0.29 +0.27 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 75.6 77.0 64.2 66.7 68.1 64.7 64.5 
Standard Error 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Number of surveys/polls 7 10 11 12 12 14 12 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) 
 
FIGURE 5.2 – Governance in Malaysia (1996, 2000, 2002-2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
Note: Color Coding:0th – 10th percentile: dark red; 10th – 25th percentile: pink; 25th – 50th percentile: orange; 50th – 75th 
percentile: yellow; 75th - 90th percentile: light green; 90th – 100th percentile: dark green. 
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As can be seen from Table 5.1 and Table 5.2., the percentile ranks of Indonesia are lower 
compared to Malaysia. It can also be observed that in both countries voice and 
accountability are negative, meaning that the possibility of participation of citizens in 
choosing their government, freedom of expression and association are relatively bad. 
Overall Malaysia outperforms Indonesia from the period 1996 – 2006 this is evident not 
only from the tables but also when one studies Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Examining Figures  
5.2 – 5.7 below other comparisons which can be made it can be seen that 
- Compared to regional averages (East Asia): Indonesia performs below the regional 
average, while Malaysia performs better in four indicators (Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption), 
although in one case it is at least as good (Political Stability/No Violence) and in 
one case Indonesia is below the regional average (Voice and Accountability). 
- Regarding income category averages: Indonesia is performing as good as the 
group of lower middle-income country averages for one indicator (Voice and 
Accountability), for two indicators almost as good (Government Effectiveness and 
Regulatory Quality) and for the other indicators worse than the average (Political 
Stability/No Violence, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption).  On the contrary 
Malaysia is compared with the group of higher middle income country averages 
and performs for five indicators almost or better than the average (Political 
Stability/No Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
Control of Corruption) and in one case below average (Voice and Accountability). 
- comparing Indonesia and Malaysia: Indonesia has lower ranks for five indicators 
and is performing better for the indicator ‘Voice and Accountability’ also evident 
from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above. Looking at the bar charts above it can be seen, 
that ‘Voice and Accountability’ is the weakest indicator for Malaysia. While for 
Indonesia  this indicator is in the same percentile group since 2000. The relatively 
low performance of Malaysia for ‘Voice and Accountability’ takes into account the 
political landscape (i.e. large coalition and small opposition) and freedom of 
expression/free media. 
 
These indicators can be seen as a guideline for reviewing different countries but are not 
free of errors and should therefore be used with caution.  
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FIGURE 5.3 – Governance: Indonesia vs. Regional Average (2005) 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
 
FIGURE 5.4 – Governance: Malaysia vs. Regional Average (2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
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FIGURE 5.5 – Governance: Indonesia vs. Income Category Average (2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
 
FIGURE 5.6 – Governance: Malaysia vs. Income Category Average (2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
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FIGURE 5.7 – Governance: Indonesia vs. Malaysia (2005) 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ 
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5.2 Corporate Governance 
A comparison of economies should not be made without looking into corporate 
governance issues in the countries analyzed. Corporate governance is a highly debated 
issue discussed on both the international (e.g. OECD) and national level. East Asian 
economies became more aware of corporate governance after the East Asian Crisis but as 
can be seen from recent cases in the USA or Europe (e.g. Enron, Arthur Anderson, and 
WorldCom) the topic is important in both emerging and developed markets. 
After a short introduction, developments in Indonesia and Malaysia over the past years will 
be discussed above and with respect to other Asian emerging economies. 
 
5.2.1 Corporate Governance: Introduction 
Corporate governance could not be defined by one single word as it consists of a set of 
different actions, rules and interactions. Figure 5.1 shows a simple framework of corporate 
governance showing the sets of activities.  
 
FIGURE 5.8 – Framework of Corporate Governance 
 
Source: Keasy and Wright (1997), p. 3. 
 
Key elements of corporate governance include supervision (monitoring) of management 
performance and ensuring the accountability of management to shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Keasy and Wright, 1997, p.2). The supervision and accountability of 
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directors is needed due to the so-called divorce between ownership and control in large 
enterprises with diffuse ownership (Hart, 1995). Audit committees usually provide 
supervision from outside the companies. The focus is primarily on the review of financial 
statements and internal procedures. Internal supervision and accountability are more 
difficult but include self-regulation and internal audit committees. 
 
5.2.1.1 The OECD and the Initiatives on Corporate Governance 
The OECD plays an important role in the establishment and introduction of Corporate 
Governance rules in all countries around the world. The OECD published in 1999 its 
‘Principles on Corporate Governance’, the first international code of good corporate 
governance approved by member countries. The principles are neither prescriptive nor 
binding but are rather recommendations and are applied as a benchmark for good practice 
in corporate governance. In 2002 the Principles were reviewed and in April 2004 
governments approved a revised version of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
These principles should provide assistance both in developed and emerging markets. The 
revised version of the Principles reinforces the role of shareholders and stresses the role 
that institutional investors can play in monitoring company performance and conveying to 
the board of a company. Additionally, the principles stress a minimum level of 
transparency and disclosure of companies as well as the requirement of measures for 
independence and transparency in order to limit possible conflicts of interest. 
Implementation of good corporate governance rules should lead to lower costs of capital 
for companies. The OECD stresses in the Preamble of the Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004 that there does not exist one single model of good corporate 
governance as jurisdictions, ethics and macroeconomic environment differ across the 
countries. Nevertheless, OECD encourages regional round table discussion in order to 
harmonize corporate governance regulations across the countries but with focus to the 
local environment. The OECD Principles were identified by the Financial Stability Forum as 
one of 12 core standards for sound financial systems and they were endorsed by the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) as well as by private-sector 
bodies (e.g. International Corporate Governance Network). 
 
There can be identified six key areas in the OECD Principles (OECD, 2004): 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the 
rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
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II. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
III. The equitable treatment of shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority 
and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of 
their rights. 
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through 
mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
V. Disclosure and transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of 
the company. 
VI. The responsibilities of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
 
Other activities by the OECD for improvement of corporate governance include the 
creation of the Steering Group on Corporate Governance and the Regional Corporate 
Governance Roundtables in co-operation with the World Bank (Asia, Latin America, 
Eurasia, Southeast Europe and Russia). The latter one used the Principles as a framework 
for policy dialogue for the promotion of corporate governance and reforms. The results of 
these dialogues are regional White Papers in which common policy objectives and 
recommendations for policy actions are put down. The White Paper on Corporate 
Governance in Asia was first issued in 2003 after the meeting of the roundtable from 1999 
to 2003 and in co-operation with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the 
Government of Japan and the Global Corporate Governance Forum. The White Paper on 
Corporate Governance in Asia was designed to deal with the shortcomings leading to the 
East Asian financial crisis but it is like the OECD Principles not binding. The priorities of 
reform are the following (OECD, 2003): 
 
Priority 1: Public and private sector institutions should continue to raise awareness among companies, directors, 
shareholders and other interested parties of the value of good corporate governance. 
Priority 2: All jurisdictions should strive for effective implementation and enforcement of corporate-governance 
laws and regulations. 
Priority 3: Asian Roundtable Countries should work towards full convergence with international standards and 
practices for accounting, audit and non-financial disclosure. Where, for the time being, full convergence is not 
possible, divergences from international standards and practices (and the reasons for these divergences) should 
be disclosed by standards setters; company financial statements should repeat or reference these disclosures 
where relevant to specific items. 
Priority 4: Boards of directors must improve their participation in strategic planning, monitoring of internal control 
systems and independent review of transactions involving managers, controlling shareholders and other insiders. 
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Priority 5: The legal and regulatory framework should ensure that non-controlling shareholders are protected from 
exploitation by insiders and controlling shareholders. 
Priority 6: Governments should intensify their efforts to improve the regulation and corporate governance of 
banks. 
 
The following meetings of the Roundtable will focus on implementation and enforcement 
issues. The Roundtable set itself a two-year time period for a study of stocktaking 
developments in Asia. Two key points are stressed in Asia: the protection of minority 
shareholder rights as in Asia a high share of corporations is dominated by the government 
or families, and the strengthening of banks. 
 
The next paragraphs will show the main results of a survey conducted in 2005 in East Asia 
(Cheung and Jang, 2005) which evaluated Corporate Governance in the following 
countries: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. The survey was split in two parts: one part on rules and regulations 
and the second part on investor perception. As a main result the authors point out, that 
there are significant differences in the evaluation of results of the two surveys: the 
rankings given by the evaluation of rules and regulations are not consistent with rankings 
that investors gave for the quality of corporate governance practices.  
Furthermore, the ranking of the two surveys are not significantly correlated, but the 
correlation between them could even become negative with statistical significance by 
using a different evaluation measurement system of rules and regulations. Therefore the 
authors conclude that this implies significant differences between what the rules and 
regulations intend and how corporate governance is practiced by corporations. The 
authors conclude that corporate governance rules and regulations are not enforced in 
some economies as they should and that economies which practice poor corporate 
governance have introduced new rules and regulations in order to improve corporate 
governance. 
Most rules and regulations were only introduced after the East Asian crisis in 1997 and 
therefore it can be stated that the East Asian economies made a significant effort to 
improve their corporate governance practices. 
The following differences and commonalities in the economies, focusing on Malaysia and 
Indonesia, can be identified (Cheung and Jang, 2005): 
1. Rights of shareholders 
The following elements can be found in both economies: 
- Audited annual reports, and un-audited semi-annual reports and quarterly 
financial statements have to be disclosed; 
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- There is a minimum period of notice for shareholder meetings; 
- Proxy voting is allowed in all economies; 
- Multiple voting shares are not allowed; 
- Shareholders have the right to vote on the following matters: 
appointment/removal of directors, authorizing share capital changes, 
amendments to the company’s articles or statute, major corporate 
transactions (acquisitions, disposals, mergers, takeovers); 
- Shareholders can nominate candidates for the position of director; 
- Shareholders can propose an agenda item at shareholder meetings; 
- Existence of non-voting shares; 
- Transactions with related parties exceeding a certain amount should be 
approved by shareholders in both countries; 
- Derivative lawsuits are allowed; 
- Shareholders can vote on the appointment/removal of auditors. 
Differences arise in the following areas: 
- The number of days constituted by law in order to notice for a shareholder 
meeting; 
- Mail voting is allowed in Indonesia only; 
- Class action lawsuits are only allowed in Malaysia. 
2. Equitable treatment of shareholders 
Common features are: 
- Law defines who insiders are; 
- Insiders are required to disclose their transactions; 
- Law explicitly defines penalties attached to the offence of insider trading 
regulations; 
- Fines and imprisonment are part of the penalty for insider trading; 
- The legal and regulatory framework requires disclosure of related party 
transactions; 
- Cumulative voting in the election of directors. 
Difference:  
- Indonesia does not attach any civil liability to the offence of insider trading. 
3. Role of stakeholder 
Although there are four main factors that are to be considered in this topic the 
economies have sometimes similar and sometimes different regulations: 
- An ESOP or another long-term employee incentive plan is not required in 
Indonesia and Malaysia; 
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- Details of the safety and welfare of employees do not have to be disclosed 
in both countries; 
- The wage and benefits of employees take the first priority in the event of 
insolvency in Indonesia while it is not clear whether this has first priority in 
Malaysia; 
- Indonesia requires that companies disclose any event that is related to 
environmental issues while this is not true in Malaysia. 
4. Disclosure and transparency 
Commonalities are: 
- The following information has to be included in the annual report of a 
company: general information on the company, main business, audited 
annual accounts, basis of board remuneration, consolidated financial 
reports, information on corporate governance (CG code, CG structure and 
practice); 
- The shareholdings of directors have to be disclosed; 
- Directors are required to report their transactions in the stock of the 
company; 
- Financial statements of companies have to be audited externally; 
- Management shareholdings do not have to be disclosed. 
Differences are: 
- In Malaysia shareholders cannot obtain minutes of board meetings; 
- In Malaysia the top 10 shareholders must be disclosed in addition to any 
shareholders with 5 per cent or more of share on the company; 
- Rotation of audit firms is mandatory in Indonesia; 
- Attendance records of board members are not disclosed in Indonesia. 
5. Board responsibilities 
Commonalities: 
- The remuneration of directors has to be disclosed in both countries; 
- Requirement of an audit committee; 
- The presence of outside directors (or independent directors) on the board is 
required; 
- There are no regulations on a minimum number of board meetings in both 
countries. 
Differences: 
- Only in Malaysia a code of ethics or business conduct is required; 
- Malaysia requires continuing training or education for board directors; 
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- The disclosure of remuneration of outside directors (independent directors) 
is only required in Malaysia; 
- Malaysia has guidelines on the number of corporate boards on which an 
individual executive director may serve. 
 
Tables 5.3 to 5.5 show the results of this first survey of corporate governance rules and 
regulations (for more details of methodology and weights used please consult the paper of 
Cheung and Jang, 2005).  Details of the questionnaire and answers can be found in the 
appendix (Table A5.1). 
 
TABLE 5.3 – Scores of Five Areas of Corporate Governance for East Asian Countries 
Rank  A – Rights of 
Shareholders 
B – 
Equitable 
Treatment of 
Shareholders 
C – Role of 
Shareholders 
D – 
Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
E – Board 
Responsibilities 
Sum 
1 China 0.766 1.0 0.5 0.778 0.722 3.766 
2 Philippines 0.865 0.667 0.5 0.833 0.722 3.587 
3 Korea 0.611 0.917 0.5 0.778 0.519 3.325 
4 Thailand 0.639 1.0 0.5 0.528 0.426 3.093 
5 Indonesia 0.782 0.938 0.5 0.5 0.315 3.035 
6 Taiwan 0.865 0.917 0 0.722 0.250 2.754 
7 Malaysia 0.698 0.75 0 0.528 0.648 2.624 
8 Hong Kong 0.778 0.75 0 0.389 0.648 2.565 
9 Singapore 0.833 1.0 0 0.528 0.204 2.565 
Source: Cheung and Jang, 2005 
From Table 5.3 it can be seen that Indonesia ranks higher in the following areas: rights, 
equitable treatment and role of shareholders. While Malaysia ranks higher in the areas of 
disclosure and transparency and board responsibilities. Overall, Indonesia has a higher 
ranking, in fifth position, in comparison to Malaysia in seventh. Looking at the results of 
the investor perception i.e. the results of the answers of fund managers and analysts, a 
different ranking may be observed. Now Malaysia ranks ahead of Indonesia. 
 
TABLE 5.4 – Total Score for all 10 Questions Asked on Investor Perception in East Asia 
Ranking Economy Total Fund manager Analysts 
1 Singapore 40.18 40.88 38.66 
2 Hong Kong 39.24 39.59 38.46 
3 Taiwan 26.26 27.35 23.77 
4 Korea 26.11 25.12 28.25 
5 Thailand 25.64 25.88 25.09 
6 Malaysia 25.25 26.71 22.04 
7 Philippines 19.75 21.06 16.34 
8 Indonesia 17.60 17.99 16.58 
9 China 17.03 16.94 17.21 
 Number of people 
questioned 
25 17 8 
Source: Cheung and Jang, 2005 
 
Another survey is conducted annually by the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA), an independent, non-profit membership organisation funded by various sponsors 
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and corporate members (e.g. Citigroup Asset Management, Asia; CLSA Asia-Pacific 
Markets; ING Asia-Pacific; Standard and Poor’s; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; Fidelity 
Investments Management).  The goal of the organization is to provide better insight into 
the interested parties on corporate governance in Asia and it has initiated a confidential 
‘Investor Discussion Group’ on corporate governance for institutional investors in Asia.  
The secretariat is located in Hong Kong. 
ACGA supervises ten markets in Asia (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) and includes more than 400 
companies; from each market the top 30-50 companies are selected. The ACGA has been 
working together with CLSA since 2003, the Asian investment-banking arm of Crédit 
Agricole, on the country rankings, i.e. the development of the scoring methodology and 
the templates of questions of which CLSA comments on. In close cooperation with the 
CLSA, research heads in each market are required to answer the questions and to ensure 
the consistency of the approach across the ten markets. The methodology consists of 
questions which can be put into five categories:  
• corporate governance rules and regulations,  
• enforcement (public and private),  
• political and regulatory environment,  
• adoption of international accounting standards (IGAAP), and  
• corporate governance culture.   
During the past three years the methodology was changed, i.e. the questionnaire was 
tightened and specified. Results of previous surveys can be seen from Table 5.5. 
 
TABLE 5.5 – Rankings of East Asian Countries on Corporate Governance (2000-2004) 
Country1 2000 2001 2002 2003² 2004³ 
Singapore 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.5 
Hong Kong 7.1 6.8 7.2 7.3 6.7 
India 5.6 5.4 5.9 6.6 6.2 
Malaysia 3.2 3.7 4.7 5.5 6.0 
Korea 5.2 3.8 4.7 5.5 5.8 
Taiwan 5.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 
Thailand 2.8 3.7 3.8 4.6 5.3 
Philippines 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 5.0 
China 3.6 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 
Indonesia 2.9 3.2 2.9 3.2 4.0 
Notes: 1  Ranked in descending order according to 2004 score; scores out of 10.  ² First year in which ACGA collaborated 
with CLSA.  ³ Introduced more rigorous scoring methodology in 2004. 
Source: ACGA, 2005. 
 
From Table 5.5 above the scores in 2004 are in general lower than previous years, as a 
consequence of different factors such as: switching to a stricter methodology, certain 
weaknesses in the detail of laws and regulations became more apparent; there is a gap 
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between national accounting policies and practices; some major corporate governance 
best practices are not yet fully implemented among listed companies. 
Table 5.5 shows that, with the exception in the year 2000, Indonesia has always ranked 
on the last position while Malaysia improved and maintained a middle ranking position. 
In general ACGA (2005) shows the following strengths of corporate governance issues in 
Asian markets: 
- there has been improvement in financial reporting standards in most 
markets, 
- the rules on disclosure of ‘material transactions’ and substantial ownership 
are generally good, 
- voting by poll is an issue in some markets, while a rule in most markets, 
- there are some plans of legislative improvements in some countries (e.g. 
China), 
- regulators are making larger efforts in the enforcement of regulations, 
- supervision of intermediaries (e.g. brokers, advisors) and initial public 
offerings (e.g. quality of prospectus disclosure) has increased, 
- stock exchanges have become a good source of information on listed 
companies although information available is not necessarily in English, 
- there seems that the degree of media freedom to report on corporate 
governance issues does appear to rise, 
- looking at corporate governance culture there is a tendency that in addition 
to the large caps a small group of mid-caps is gaining reputation for good 
governance, 
- the remuneration of independent directors is on the rise, 
- there is an improvement in internal controls and the practice of risk 
management, 
- some brave companies begin to appoint independent chairmen. 
 
The ACGA highlights as well some weak points and gives some recommendations (ACGA, 
2005): 
- problematic rules and procedures (e.g. pre-emption rights, voting systems, 
shareholder meetings) should be reviewed with market participants, 
- if mandatory rules are sound (e.g. audit committees) it should be ensured 
that they are implemented properly, 
- there should be an improvement of the enforcement track record in order 
to get a higher trust in the stock market, 
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- all major laws and regulations should be translated and easily accessible. 
 
5.2.2 Corporate Governance in Indonesia and Malaysia 
The following section is concerned with Corporate Governance in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
From Tables 5.3 – 5.5 above and the tables which will follow in this section it can be seen 
that both countries are not leaders in corporate governance issues in Asia, with Malaysia in 
the middle-field and Indonesia ranking on the last position in the regional comparison. 
This absence is not due to the inadequate regulations in neither Indonesia nor Malaysia 
but rather due to enforcement. in Indonesia enforcement of existing rules and regulations 
seems to be very low compared to other Asian economies. 
 
TABLE 5.6 – Corporate Governance Ratings in Southeast Asia (2001) 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Accountability Responsibility Fairness Social 
Awareness 
Indonesia 36 57 22 21 34 53 37 
Malaysia 49 63 67 38 52 70 60 
Philippines 41 44 46 34 36 41 78 
Singapore 56 67 81 45 70 76 54 
Thailand 36 65 43 63 47 70 65 
Notes:  
Discipline – management’s commitment to emphasize shareholder value and financial discipline 
Transparency – the ability of outsiders to access the true position of a company 
Independence – the board of directors’ independence of controlling shareholders and senior management 
Accountability – the accountability of the management to the board of directors 
Responsibility – the effectiveness of the board to take necessary measures in case of mismanagement 
Fairness – the treatment of minority shareholders received from majority shareholders and management 
Social awareness – the company’s emphasis on ethical and socially responsible behaviour 
Source: CLSA (2001). 
 
5.2.2.1 Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
As is evident from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 above the level of corporate governance in 
Indonesia is very low compared to other countries in the region. Although Indonesia was 
very fast in passing new laws, amending existing ones and to setting up new institutions 
(regulatory institutions and constitutional court) enforcement is lagging behind 
(Simanjuntak, 2005, p.162). Indonesia has adopted over the past two decades many 
regulations that should promote corporate governance like the adoption of accounting and 
auditing standards based on international standards, the enactment of a new bankruptcy 
law, and the establishment of a new commercial court and the publication of a national 
Code for Good Corporate Governance (CGCG). Nevertheless, Indonesia lags behind other 
countries in the region as the enforcement is very low (Rosser, 2005, p. 180).  
 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia is split in three levels (Figure 5.9 below; Daniri, 2005): 
1. National Policy: Through the Coordination of the Ministry on Economy the 
government has issued the Ministry Decree in 1999 which sets up the National 
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Committee on Corporate Governance (renamed in 2004 into National Committee 
on Governance (NCG)). During the period of 1999-2004 the NCG published a Code 
for Good Corporate Governance followed by the publication of Code for Corporate 
Governance in Banking Sectors, Code for Audit Committee, and Code for 
Independent Commissioners in 2004. The 2009 destination statement of NCG is: 
‘Indonesia placed in top quartile of international rating of good governance’.  
2. Regulatory framework: Projects were conducted by Bapepam (Indonesia Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency) together with self regulatory organizations of the 
capital market like the Jakarta Stock Exchange, Surabaya Stock Exchange, 
Kustodian Sentral Eefek Indonesia (KSEI; the central securities depository 
institution in Indonesia capital market) and Kliring Penjaminan Eefek Indonesia 
(KPEI) (a clearing and guarantee body in the Indonesian capital market) with the 
support of the World Bank and ADB (projects include: JSX Pilot project, ACORN, 
ASEM, ROSC). In parallel the SOEs ministry has developed a framework for good 
corporate governance implementation and there were some reviews related to 
corporation law and regulation. 
3. Private initiatives: There are some voluntary organizations focusing on corporate 
governance issues, which provide education, training, rating, research and 
advocacy (Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI), Indonesian 
Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD), Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance (IICG), Ikatan Komite Audit Indonesia/Indonesian Institute of 
Committee Audit (IKAI), Lembaga Advokasi Proxy Proteksi Investor/Indonesian 
Institution for Shareholder Activism (LAPPI), Indonesian Society for Independent 
Commissioners (ISICOM) and Lembaga Komisaris dan Direktur 
Indonesia/Indonesian Institute for Commissioners and Directors (LKDI)). 
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FIGURE 5.9 – The Indonesian Agenda on Corporate Governance Implementation 
 
Source: Daniri, 2005 
 
In addition to these initiatives the government has introduced in collaboration with the 
business community good corporate governance regulations: for the sector of SOEs based 
on Ministerial Decree No. 117/M-MBU/2002 and for the capital markets based on 
regulations and guidelines issued by the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Furthermore, BAPEPAM 
plays an active role in the implementation of good corporate governance principles in 
Indonesia through the issue of rules and policies that are related to good corporate 
governance (regarding transparency, implementation of fairness principle and 
responsibility and accountability principles). Other laws that promote good corporate 
governance in Indonesia are the enactment of the new Central Bank Law in 1998, 
Anticorruption Law in 1999, the Antimonopoly Law in 1999, the Oil and Gas Law in 2001 
and SOEs Law and SOEs privatization in 2003 as well as amendments of the Corporate 
Law, Company Registry Law, Capital Market Law and its implementing rules. The Judicial 
Reform Programs include the establishment of a Commercial Court in 1997 and the 
establishment of Capital Market Arbitration agency in 2001 (Daniri, 2005). 
As it was recognized in Indonesia that the implementation of good corporate governance 
was still lagging behind other countries in the region the NCG was revitalized in 2004 to 
socialize, educate, and advocate good corporate governance not only in the private sector 
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but also in the public sector. NCG is positioned in such a way to implement corporate 
governance holistically in collaboration with all stakeholders. In order to do this Indonesia 
wants to adopt the recommendations of the World Bank Policy Recommendation of ROSC 
(based on OECD Principles of Corporate Governance) with the following the major points 
(Daniri, 2005): 
1. Minority shareholders must be given voting rights to nominate members of board 
of commissioners and directors; 
2. Public companies are recommended to have Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee; 
3. It is recommended to adopt the international standard on financial reporting; 
4. Steps to promote the interest of minority shareholders should be done; 
5. The market surveillance of BAPEPAM and JSX should be strengthened; 
6. Legal liability of accountants should be confirmed; 
7. The limit date of annual reports submission should be shortened; 
8. The rights and accountability of independent commissioners should be clarified; 
9. The code on independence should be defined further; 
10. There must be clear definitions of transactions that may have conflict of interest 
with the directors. 
 
As mentioned above, in 2000 a Code of Corporate Governance was introduced which was 
then revised in 2001 (the full report can be found in the Appendix). 
 
As can be seen from the short list above, corporate governance in Indonesia is regulated 
but there is a lack of enforcement in the country. By studying the Table 5.7 shows the 
rating history of CLSA over the past four years, while Table 5.8 shows the changes from 
2003 to 2004 rating. 
 
TABLE 5.7 - Indonesian Ratings for Macro-Determinants of Corporate Governance (2001-
2004) 
 2001 (Rating 1-10) 2002 (Rating 1-10) 2003 (Rating 1-10) 2004 (Rating 1-10) 
Rules and 
regulations 
4 4 4.5 5.3 
Enforcement 2 1 1.5 2.7 
Political and 
regulatory 
environment 
5 5 3.8 4.0 
Adoption of IGAAP 4 4 6.0 5.0 
Institutional 
mechanisms and CG 
Culture 
2 2 2.7 2.5 
Source: CLSA – ACGA. 
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TABLE 5.8 – Indonesian Ratings for Macro-Determinants of Corporate Governance (2003 
and 2004 with Comments) 
 2004 (Rating 1-10) 2003 (Rating 1-10) Comment 
Rules and regulations 5.3 4.5 Rules continue to improve 
gradually.  Reporting 
deadlines shorter than in 
some more advanced 
markets, but in general, 
disclosure rules and board 
accountability are weak. 
Enforcement 2.7 1.5 Higher score largely due to 
our new methodology, 
which takes into account 
private enforcement by the 
market. 
Political and regulatory 
environment 
3.8 4.0 No improvement in 2004.  
Implementation, 
government commitment 
to CG, and the legal 
system remain weak. 
Adoption of IGAAP 6.0 5.0 Accounting rules are 
improving.  Some efforts 
to strengthen 
independence of external 
auditors and regulation of 
the accounting profession. 
Institutional mechanisms 
and CG Culture 
2.7 2.5 CG culture is being 
implemented, but with 
many loopholes. 
Source: CLSA – ACGA (2004). 
 
5.2.2.2 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Corporate Governance played a role in Malaysia even before the East Asian Crisis in 
1997/1998. In 1993 a watchdog for Malaysia’s stock market introduced listing 
requirements that mandated all publicly listed companies to set up audit committees 
within the board of directors and in April 1996 the Registrar of Companies introduced 
guidelines to regulate the behaviour of company directors and secretaries, known as 
‘Guidelines on Voluntary Codes of Company Directors and Company Secretaries’ and only a 
few weeks before the outbreak of the crisis the Financial Reporting Act (FRA) was 
introduced under which the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) and the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) were established (Cheah, 2005, p. 86).  
In Malaysia many government agencies are involved in regulating corporate governance.  
The principal regulator for companies in Malaysia, the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
(CCM), is responsible for the administration of the Companies Act 1965 while the 
Securities Commission (SC) is the central regulatory authority for the capital market and 
administers the Securities Industry Act (SIA) 1983 (which deals with the provisions of the 
stock exchanges and persons dealing in securities, and for certain offences relating to 
trading securities) and regulates capital market activities and enacts regulations for 
securities and futures intermediaries and issuers in Malaysia (in primary and secondary 
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market). The KLSE is a self-regulatory agency which is in charge of the regulation of its 
members and public listed companies and for the surveillance of the marketplace; the 
Listing Requirements (LRs) is the most important and comprehensive non-legislative 
regulation which is administered by the KLSE (Cheah, 2005, p.86-87). 
In the past years corporate governance in Malaysia has been changed. Most changes have 
been in the regulatory framework which can be divided into statutory reforms and non-
statutory reforms. Other reforms include corporate governance initiatives which establish 
institutions and elaborate new policies and plans. Some other initiatives involve the efforts 
to upgrade corporate governance education and training and the enhancement of public 
and investor awareness of corporate governance in general and upgrading the knowledge 
and competency of company directors in particular. The following classification is allocated 
by Cheah (2005, p. 87-92) and will give an overview of the major reforms in corporate 
governance in Malaysia: 
1. Statutory reforms 
Corporations, and in particular public listed companies, are subject to the following 
legislative acts: the Companies Act 1965, Securities Industry Act 1983, and the 
Securities Commission Act 1993.  There were amendments over the past years and 
improvements of corporate governance practices. 
The amendment of the Securities Industry Act (SIA) 1983 in April 1998 was a 
direct result of the East Asian Crisis; the goal was to enhance the Securities 
Commissions powers and to institute civil remedies against offences for insider 
trading.  The power of the Securities Commission and the KLSE have been 
increased and reinforced in order to ensure more transparency and disclosure of 
the companies and to prosecute directors personally. Other regulatory changes 
include amendments of the Securities Commission Act 1993 and the introduction of 
the Securities Commission (Amendment) Act 2000 as well as amendments of the 
Companies Act (CA) 1965 in 1999 and 2000 in order to incorporate proposals made 
in the Finance Committee Report (1999). The amendments since 1997 have 
strengthened the corporate governance regulatory framework by empowering 
authorities. 
2. Development of Codes of Conduct and Industry Best Practices 
The Securities Commission introduced not only statutory legislations but also non-
legislative rules. Examples of such rules issued include the Policies and Guidelines 
on Issue/Offer of Securities and the Code on Takeover and Mergers 1987, while 
one of the most important non-legislative regulations is the KLSE Listing 
Requirements which applies to all public listed companies and is administered by 
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the KLSE. From 1997 to 2000 the LRs underwent significant changes but the most 
important change was in January 2001 when the LRs underwent a major and 
comprehensive revamp which is known as the KLSE Revamped Listing 
Requirements that not only includes earlier amendments but incorporated a 
significant component of the recommendations contained in the Finance Committee 
Report, particularly the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). In March 
2000 the MCCG was introduced and it represents a milestone in government-
industry collaboration as the code is a product of an industry-led working group 
which was set up under the supervision and guidance of the High Level Finance 
Committee of the government. The MCCG consists of 13 principles of conduct and 
33 best governance practices (please consult the Appendix for the MCCG). 
Progress in Malaysia experienced more support and cooperation by professional 
bodies which are preparing the respective codes of conduct and promoting 
awareness and standards of corporate governance (e.g. the publications of the 
Malaysian Association of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators – 
MAICSA – entitled ‘A Guide to Annual General Meetings’ and ‘The Company 
Secretary: A Reference Kit’). 
3. Institutional Reforms 
The most important events were the introduction of the High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) and the release of the Finance 
Committee Report (1999). The goal of the High Level Finance Committee is to 
review the framework for corporate governance in Malaysia. The Committee (the 
Securities Commission is working as a Secretariat) adopted a severe process of 
consultation which involved the whole financial community including regulatory 
agencies, corporates, banks, industry associations, standard setting bodies, and 
members of academia. The report which was published on March 26th 1999 is 
known as ‘The Finance Committee Report on Corporate Governance’ and covers 
three areas: the development of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
which sets out a set of principles and best practices for good governance; reform 
of laws, regulations and rules to strengthen the regulatory framework for corporate 
governance; and training and education to ensure that the framework for corporate 
governance is supported by the necessary human and institutional capital. The 
KLSE LRs revamp introduced 22 of the 25 recommendations proposed by the 
report. 
Two other important institutions were established shortly after the outbreak of the 
East Asian crisis: the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and the 
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Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) which help to increase the 
awareness of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
4. Education and Training 
To increase the use of Corporate Governance at the firm’s level different 
institutions introduced different educational and training programmes. The KLSE 
introduced a mandatory training for company directors with PN5/2001 which is 
divided into Mandatory Accreditation Programme (MAP) and Continuing Education 
Programme (CEP).  The goals of these programmes are to enhance the 
effectiveness of directors in discharging their duties and to ensure that they are 
continuously updated on developments in the securities industry.  
On the other hand there is the Securities Industry Development Centre of the 
Securities Commission which was set up in 1994 and tries to promote corporate 
governance by organizing training, education and research.  
The role of capital markets in Malaysia for the implementation of Corporate Governance is 
very limited as the source of financing corporation’s activities is mainly provided by banks 
which do not play a major role in governance in Malaysia with respect to the appointment 
of managers or director or the choice of investments (Cheah, 2005, p. 92).  
Most of the initiatives in Malaysia are government-led and the reforms are largely 
compliance-based. Only recently the authorities seem to have adopted the incentives 
approach and also some professional bodies have started to introduce codes of best 
practice and codes of conduct. Nevertheless there seems to remain two problems, i.e. the 
protection of minority shareholders which is not appropriately dealt with and the lack of 
takeovers that would punish poor management and encourage a higher degree of 
corporate governance.  The last point to note is the enforcement of the rules and 
regulations which is still not very strict as for example KLSE is a self-regulatory body with 
rules and regulations but has virtually a very low degree of law-enforcement (Cheah, 
2005, p. 97-99). 
 
Looking at the CLSA-ACGA Corporate Governance Watch of 2004, 2003 and the CLSA 
Survey of 2002 and 2001 the change in the following ratings in Malaysia can be seen in 
Table 5.9. 
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TABLE 5.9 – Malaysian Ratings for Macro-Determinants of Corporate Governance (2001-
2004) 
 2001 (Rating 1-10) 2002 (Rating 1-10) 2003 (Rating 1-10) 2004 (Rating 1-10) 
Rules and regulations 9 9 9.0 7.1 
Enforcement 2 4 3.5 5.0 
Political and regulatory 
environment 
2 3 4.0 5.0 
Adoption of IGAAP 5 6 7.0 9.0 
Institutional mechanisms 
and CG Culture 
5 6 6.5 4.6 
Source: CLSA – ACGA. 
 
In recent years Malaysia has experienced an improvement of the corporate governance 
environment, as illustrated in Table 5.9 above; Malaysia improved in regional ranking and 
is maintaining its position in the upper half.  The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
can be found in the Appendix. 
 
5.2.3 Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector 
With respect to corporate governance of banks the countries affected by the East Asian 
Crisis have tried to improve their standard. Corporate governance of the financial sector is 
considered to be different from corporate governance of non-financial corporations. And, 
in Asia, as can be seen in Table 5.10 below banking institutions play a more important role 
than the capital market for efficiently allocating and monitoring the use of funds. Hence, 
compliance to good corporate governance is important, since problems in the banking 
sector can be transmitted throughout the economy resulting in liquidity constraints, loss of 
confidence or capital flight. Table 5.11, illustrates costs of banking crises. 
 
TABLE 5.10 – Composition of External Finance for East Asian Economies (in percentage 
Shares of Total) 
 Domestic credit provided by banking sector Stock market capitalization Outstanding debt issues 
China 62.89 25.49 11.63 
Hong Kong 26.29 71.25 2.46 
Malaysia 41.81 36.58 21.61 
Singapore 31.22 57.72 11.07 
South 
Korea 
57.52 20.76 21.72 
Thailand 71.15 14.11 14.74 
Source: Eichengreen (2004), p. 5. 
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TABLE 5.11 – The Costs of Banking Crises 
  Peak non-performing loans as % of total loans Cost of restructuring as % of GDP 
Chile 1978-83 19 41 
United 
States 
1984-91 4 5-7 
Norway 1988-92 9 4 
Finland 1991-93 9 8-10 
Sweden 1991-93 11 4-5 
Mexico 1995-97 13 14 
Argentina 1995 - 2 
Brazil 1995- 15 5-10 
Thailand 1997- 47 24 
South Korea 1997- 25 17 
Indonesia 1997- 55 58 
Malaysia 1997- 25 10 
Philippines 1998- 12 7 
Source: Randhawa (2005), p. 55. 
 
From the tables above the importance of banks in Asia can be seen along with the 
excessive burden of bailing out banks in trouble in some crisis countries in East Asia. In 
Table 5.12 the status-quo of the banking system and NPLs by end-2002 is shown. From 
this table the difficulties in the banking sector can be observed along with the extent of 
how large the bailouts of the government were. Thailand and Indonesia both had to deal 
with a high share of NPLs with respect to GDP respectively total loans. 
 
TABLE 5.12 – Overview of the Banking System and NPLs, End-2002 (in percentage) 
 Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Banking system 
assets as % of 
GDP 
74 154 158 84 136 
Assets of state-
owned banks as  
% of total 
assets 
49 NA NA 11.5 27.71 
NPLs/GDP      
Peak 26.8 8.4 25.5 7.9 54.1 
End-2002 2.1² 8.4 18.5 6.2³ 8.4 
NPLs/Total loans      
Peak 48.6 9.7 30.1 18.1 51.6 
End-2002 8.1² 9.7 8 15³ 10.11 
Notes: 1 As of November 2002.  ² Excludes NPLs transferred to Asset Management Companies.  ³ NPLs in commercial banks 
under the central bank’s new NPL definition. 
Source: Fung et al. (2004), p. 53. 
 
Looking at these tables some differences between the governance of non-financial 
companies and banking institutions can be observed (Levine, 2004): 
1. Banks are usually opaque. The informational asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders of the corporate sector make it difficult to estimate the risk of bank 
balance sheets and its portfolio. 
2. The financial sector is one of the most regulated sectors in the economy. The goal 
of regulating the financial sector is to ensure its fair and efficient functioning and to 
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create conditions for financial stability. The banking sector is usually highly 
concentrated sometimes with monopolistic market structures and leverage of 
banks is sometimes very high which increases the vulnerability not only of the 
banking sector but as well of the whole economy. 
 
Table 5.13 will give an overview of the challenges in governance of financial institutions 
and the main differences. 
 
TABLE 5.13 – Challenges in Governance of Financial Institutions 
 Assumptions underlying traditional 
model 
Banks 
Market structure Competitive Banking structures tend towards 
monopolistic competition 
Information asymmetry Forms crux of agency problem Agency problem far more complex; 
banks are opaque 
Capital structure Low leverage ratios Highly leveraged 
Regulation Common for all sectors Intensive and extensive regulation in 
the financial sector, with intervention 
of third party regulatory agency 
Ownership Dispersed, or a few controlling owners Family ownership and government 
ownership/control common in 
Southeast Asia 
Source: Randhawa (2005), p. 57. 
 
Reforms of the banking sector with respect to regulations and legal environment was 
carried out at different rate across the region. While Singapore is the most effective, 
Indonesia lags behind; Malaysia’s reform is considered to be effective (Randhawa, 2005, 
p. 63).  
The implementation of the Basel II Accord on capital adequacy for developed economies is 
due in 2008 and the major ASEAN economies have committed themselves to adhering to 
the guidelines but with varying deadlines. The three pillars of the accord are minimum 
capital requirements, supervisory oversight, and market discipline based on risk-based 
disclosure.  Table 5.14 shows that Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Singapore 
and Hong Kong meet the minimum capital adequacy requirement. What is still problematic 
is the introduction of risk-based supervision, with the exception of Singapore and Hong 
Kong, and the internal ratings based approach will not be introduced in the region before 
2008. But still far ahead lies market discipline based on risk-based disclosure in the region 
since it requires good data collection and dissemination; the prevailing disclosure method 
in the developing economies of East-Asia is not adequate enough (Randhawa, 2005, p. 65-
66). 
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TABLE 5.14 – Percentage of Bank Capital to Assets in East Asian Economies (in 
percentage) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
Hong Kong 18.5 18.7 17.8 16.5 15.7 15.6 
Indonesia -13.0 -2.4 -18.2 19.2 19.7 21.4 
Korea 8.2 10.8 10.5 10.8 10.5 10.4 
Malaysia 11.8 12.5 12.5 13.0 13.2 13.4 
Philippines 17.7 17.5 16.2 15.8 16.7 16.1 
Singapore 18.1 20.6 8.3 7.8 8.1 7.6 
Thailand 10.9 12.4 12.0 13.9 13.7 13.6 
       
Bank Capital to Assets 
Hong Kong 7.7 8.1 9.0 9.8 10.7 11.5 
Indonesia -12.9 -4.1 5.2 5.4 7.3 8.3 
Korea 2.8 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.0 
Malaysia 8.9 8.9 8.5 8.5 8.7 … 
Philippines 14.8 16.0 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.9 
Singapore 7.5 7.8 7.1 9.6 8.3 8.5 
Thailand 4.8 5.5 4.5 5.5 5.8 6.2 
Source: Randhawa (2005), p. 61. 
 
Looking at the development of the institutional framework before and after the crisis it can 
be observed that all the economies hit by the crisis improved although progress is uneven 
across the region. In Indonesia state owned banks have taken the step to become publicly 
listed corporations while private sector banks have been sold to foreign investors; this 
produced a considerable fall in connected lending. In Malaysia on the other hand direct 
ownership of banks by the government is negligible. The loan classification criteria are 
agreed to harmonize in the region but implementation is uneven throughout. Accounting 
standards still do not meet global best practice norms (Randhawa, 2005, p. 73).  
With respect to the development of Asian capital markets the Asian countries agreed to 
develop the bond market in Asia; this is done under the Chiang Mai initiative for 
integration of regional financial markets. This initiative should help to diversify fund 
sourcing in East Asia. 
Comparing the performance of the corporate and the financial sector (1998 and 2003) in 
Indonesia and Malaysia it can be said that these sectors improved over time with the 
exception that in Malaysia the commercial bank return on assets remained almost stable 
(see table 5.15). 
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TABLE 5.15 – Corporate and Financial Sector Comparison for Asian Crisis Countries (1998 
and 2003) 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
Corporate Sector 1998 2003 1998 2003 
Ordinary income to 
sales 
-12.0 8.0 3.0 7.0 
Interest expense to 
sales 
13.0 3.0 4.5 1.7 
Financial Sector     
Commercial bank 
return on assets 
0.6 2.7 1.8 1.6 
Capital adequacy 
ratio 
2.3 22.0 11.0 13.0 
Source: World Bank (2005), p. 71. 
 
Another interesting statistic is the number of banks and the bank concentration in the 
crisis affected countries in East Asia which compares the status-quo in 1994 and 2000.  
This data shows that every country has attempted in concentrating its banking sector, 
which was carried out successfully. The concentration of the banks with respect to the 
share of total deposits has decreased as well. A similar picture should be true for 
Indonesia from 1994 to 2005, too, although no figures are available. 
 
TABLE 5.16 – Share of Total Deposits (in percentage) 
 1994 2000 
  Share in total deposits 
(in %) 
  Share in total deposits 
(in %) 
 
 Number of 
banks 
Largest 3 
banks 
Largest 10 
banks 
HH Index 
(1994) 
Number of 
banks 
Largest 3 
banks 
Largest 10 
banks 
HH 
Index 
(2000) 
Korea 30 52.8 86.9 1263.6 13 43.5 77.7 899.7 
Malaysia 25 44.7 78.3 918.9 10 43.4 82.2 1005.1 
Philippines 41 39.0 80.3 819.7 27 39.6 73.3 789.9 
Thailand 15 47.5 83.5 1031.7 13 41.7 79.4 854.4 
Notes: HH Index is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index which is a standard measure of consolidation in any industry and is 
defined as the sum of squared deposit market shares of all the banks in the market. The upper-value of 10,000 will be 
reached in the case of a monopolist firm with 100 per cent share of the market; the index tends to zero in the case of a 
large number of firms with very small market shares.  
Source: Gelos and Roldós (2002). 
 
5.2.3.1 Corporate Governance in Banking Sector in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Corporate Governance principles for banks in Indonesia and Malaysia are enacted by the 
central banks, Bank Indonesia respectively Bank Negara Malaysia.  In Indonesia Corporate 
Governance rules were only introduced by the Bank Indonesia Regulation No.  
8/4/PBI/2006 on January 30th 2006.  Bank Indonesia based this regulation on five main 
principles (Bank Indonesia, 2006): 
1. Transparency – openness in disclosure of material and relevant information and 
openness of the decision making process. 
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2. Accountability – clarity of functions and implementation of accountability of the 
bank’s organs in order to ensure effective management. 
3. Responsibility – consistency between bank management and prevailing laws and 
regulations and prudential bank management principles, too. 
4. Independency – bank management in professional manner without undue 
influence/pressure from any parties. 
5. Fairness – justice and equality in fulfilling stakeholders’ rights arising from 
agreements and prevailing laws and regulations. 
 
This regulation is a minimum requirement, regulating the essentials of good corporate 
governance such as composition, function and responsibilities of the board of 
commissioners, the board of directors, the committees, compliance, internal audit and 
external audit functions, essentials of risk management implementation, provisions of 
funds to related parties and provision of funds in large amount (large exposures), bank’s 
strategic plans, transparency aspect in bank condition, internal reporting and conflict of 
interests, report and assessment of good corporate governance implementation, good 
corporate governance implementation at branch offices at a foreign bank and sanctions. 
Some of the provisions are transitional for specific determined banks. 
In Malaysia corporate governance is directly regulated by the Development Financial 
Institutional Act 2002 (Act 618) (DFIA) which came into force on February 15th 2002 
(BNM, 2002a). The DFIA focuses on the promotion of the  
 
“[…] development of effective and efficient development financial institutions (DFIs) to ensure that the roles, 
objectives of the DFIs are consistent with the Government policies and that the mandated roles are effectively 
and efficiently implemented. DFIA also emphasises on efficient management and effective corporate 
governance, provides a comprehensive supervision mechanism and mechanism to strengthen the financial 
position of DFIs through the specification of prudential requirements.” (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=66) 
 
The main points of the DFIA are that the regulation is applicable very flexible (i.e. Malaysia 
is a common law country) according to the kind of DFIs, the establishment of a centralized 
supervisory body of DFIs, the introduction of monitoring mechanisms to enable Bank 
Negara Malaysia efficient and effective implementation of the regulation, emphasising on 
efficient management and effective corporate governance, introducing a comprehensive 
supervision mechanism and therefore strengthening the financial sector (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=14&pg=464&ac=361). 
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Following the conclusions of a survey conducted by Sang-Woo Nam and Chee Soon Lum in 
2005, where 26 banks in Indonesia and 10 banks in Malaysia (and 14 banks in Korea and 
13 in Thailand, too) were surveyed, the following lists the main results (detailed results of 
the survey can be seen from table A6.2 appendix): 
A. Supervision and Financial Safety Net: Supervision and financial safety nets are 
important not only for the normal course of the business but also for the protection of the 
rights of shareholders and stakeholders. 
1. Bank Supervisory Agency: In Indonesia and Malaysia the bank supervisory agency 
is located at the central banks (Bank Indonesia respectively Bank Negara 
Malaysia).  The head of the bank supervisory agency is appointed by the President 
in Indonesia and by the Minister of Finance in Malaysia. In both countries the bank 
supervisory agency has legal power to make changes in the internal organizational 
structures of problem banks and they favour prevention, hence both supervisory 
agencies increased on-site inspections of banks by professional bank supervisors 
over the past years. Important to mention is, that there seems not to be any 
conflict of interests among bank supervisors in discharging their responsibilities in 
both countries.  
2. Deposit Protection: Before the East Asian Crisis in 1997 neither of the two 
countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, had an explicit deposit insurance. Both 
countries have only an implicit deposit insurance system and are planning to 
introduce an explicit deposit insurance system in the future. Nevertheless, both 
countries introduced after the crisis a blanket deposit guarantee system in which 
both deposits and liabilities of creditors were fully covered. 
3. Competitive Environment: Looking at official statistics in 2004 there were 135 
commercial banks in Indonesia and 23 in Malaysia with the market share for the 5 
largest commercial banks in terms of deposits at 57.3 % in Indonesia and 54.8 % 
in Malaysia. In Indonesia government-controlled banks have the highest market 
shares with 41.5 % and foreign-controlled banks have the lowest market shares 
with 10.6 %. A similar picture is true for Malaysia where government-controlled 
banks and foreign-controlled banks each constitutes about one-third of the market 
shares (37.0 per cent respectively 31.4 per cent). 
4. Business Segments and Restrictions: Indonesia has restrictions on the banking 
institutions with respect to offering various fee income businesses (e.g. credit 
cards, insurances) while Malaysia does not have any restriction. 
5. Specific Regulations on Banking Operations: The banking institutions in Indonesia 
and Malaysia have to follow government-directed credit guidelines in their loan 
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portfolios and they have to maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 %.  
While in Malaysia banks subject for minimum investment in government securities 
and subject to restrictions on taking equity investment or ownership in non-
financial firms, this is not the case in Indonesia. In both countries there is no limit 
on fees for bank services in the banks. In Indonesia and Malaysia banks have to 
maintain minimum liquidity requirements. Looking at interest rates there is no limit 
in Malaysia while in Indonesia there is a limit set indirectly by the blanket 
guarantee scheme.  The requirements and restrictions for opening up branches by 
the banking institutions are different in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
6. Ownership of Banks: In both countries there are restrictions on the maximum 
allowable ownership of a bank by an individual or corporation although the specific 
regulations vary. Non-financial firms or groups can be a controlling owner of a 
bank in Indonesia and Malaysia, too. 
B. Board of Directors: The organizational structure and characteristics of the internal 
corporate governance mechanism of a bank are influenced by the Board of Directors. 
1. Board Accountability: The board is accountable to shareholders, depositors and 
creditors in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
2. Responsibilities of the Board: In both countries the banking laws and regulations 
define the role and responsibilities of the Board of Directors clearly; the degree of 
the involvement of the Board in overseeing and implementing major corporate 
policies vary across the countries. 
3. Board Composition: In Indonesia and Malaysia government officials and foreigners 
can be appointed as Board members with the exception of politicians. The 
restrictions on the minimum size of a Board vary: in Indonesia it has to consist of 
two people while in Malaysia it has to consist of five. Additionally, there exist 
restrictions on the maximum number of Boards on which a bank director can serve 
and which vary across the countries. 
4. Independent Directors: The appointment and definition of the role of the 
independent directors in the Board were introduced by the Central Banks, where 
these independent directors have to fulfil specific requirements. Large shareholders 
of a bank are allowed to become an independent director in both countries 
respecting some restrictions on the number of shares while their families cannot. 
5. Bank’s CEO (President): In Indonesia and Malaysia the appointment of the CEO is 
subject to a fit and proper test. 
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6. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Board: While the survey showed that an 
effective board is believed to be important in both countries but it showed as well 
that there are some problems that may cause Board ineffectiveness. 
7. Related-Party Transactions: In Indonesia and Malaysia the rules governing the 
conduct of ‘interested’ directors are similar: board members are prohibited from 
participating or voting in any decision making that involves conflicts of interest 
affecting the bank adversely and there is an obligation for the bank to disclose 
conflicts of interests; the disclosure requirements for related-party transactions also 
apply to senior management and the directors (including their close family 
members).  Regarding the conflict of interest with respect to favourable bank loans 
to senior management staff and Board members it is allowed with some 
restrictions in Indonesia but prohibited in Malaysia. 
8. Board Committees: In both countries the establishment of an audit committee is 
mandatory while the rules governing the composition of the members of the audit 
committee are varying. Only in Malaysia the establishment of remuneration and 
nomination committees are mandatory, while the establishment of risk 
management committees is mandatory in both countries. 
C. Disclosure rules and other regulations: Since the crisis the Central Banks of both 
Indonesia and Malaysia have given a high priority to regulatory changes that encourage 
disclosures of relevant information in the banking industry. This is a step closer to full 
disclosure and more transparency.  
 
 
  222 
5.3 Comparing Government Revenues and Expenditures 
The following paragraphs deal with federal government revenues and expenditures and 
will compare actual and projected figures for the crisis period. Intuitively one could expect 
that in 1997 and/or 1998 both countries experienced a slump in revenues (i.e. revenues 
include tax revenues) and regained slowly in the following years. 
The data used in this section are data published by national authorities: 
- for Indonesia: Central Government Financial Statistics (Statistik Keuangan 
Pemerintah Pusat), vaious issues, Badan Pusat Statistik, Indonesia: 
Jakarata; 
- for Malaysia: Economic Report, various issues, Ministry of Finance, 
Malaysia. 
 
The data has been issued on a yearly basis and therefore updates of projected data were 
possible for the time shortly after the crisis. This is important for reading and interpreting 
the results as the period after the crisis includes adjustments which reflect changes in the 
situation. Nevertheless, the most interesting data is that of the crisis period and are 
‘authentic’ forecasts of the respective government agencies. The highlighted data in Tables 
5.17 and 5.18 show the crisis period.  
 
Table 5.17 – Indonesia: Actual and Projected Central Government Revenues and 
Expenditures (Deflated, in Billions of 2003 Rupiah – Year-Over-Year Percentage Change in 
Brackets) 
 1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 
Revenue  
Actual 
318.597 
(NA) 
312.365 
(-1.956%) 
348.220 
(11.479%) 
79.830 
(-77.075%) 
Revenue  
Projected 
291.411 
(NA) 
297.136 
(1.965%) 
317.033 
(6.696%) 
314.466 
(-0.810%) 
Difference 27.186 
(NA) 
15.229 
(-43.982%) 
31.187 
(104.783%) 
-234.635 
(-852.352%) 
Expenditure  
Actual 
312.351 
(NA) 
301.675 
(-3.418%) 
344.662 
(14.249%) 
398.092 
(15.502%) 
Expenditure  
Projected 
291.411 
(NA) 
297.136 
(1.965%) 
317.033 
(6.696%) 
314.466 
(-0.810%) 
Difference 20.940 
(NA) 
4.539 
(-78.322%) 
27.629 
(508.638%) 
83.626 
(202.676%) 
Rev.-Exp.  
Actual 
6.246 
(NA) 
10.690 
(71.143%) 
3.558 
(-66.715%) 
-318.261 
(-9044.636%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Projected 
0 
(NA) 
0 
(NA) 
0 
(NA) 
0 
(NA) 
Difference 6.246 
(NA) 
10.690 
(71.143%) 
3.558 
(-66.715%) 
-318.261 
(-9044.636%) 
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 1998/1999 1999/2000* 2001 2002 2003 
Revenue  
Actual 
382.026 
(378.547%) 
381.584 
(-0.116%) 
227.114 
(-40.481%) 
311.635 
(37.215%) 
341.400 
(9.551%) 
Revenue 
Projected 
468.610 
(49.018%) 
341.577 
(-27.108%) 
333.950 
(-2.233%) 
350.830 
(5.055%) 
349.934 
(-0.255%) 
Difference -86.584 
(63.098%) 
40.007 
(146.206) 
-106.836 
(-367.042%) 
-39.194 
(63.313%) 
-8.534 
(78.226%) 
Expenditure 
Actual 
382.836 
(-3.832%) 
381.377 
(-0.381%) 
377.897 
(-0.913%) 
336.265 
(-11.017%) 
376.500 
(11.965%) 
Expenditure 
Projected 
468.610 
(49.018%) 
341.577 
(-27.108%) 
349.307 
(2.263%) 
359.026 
(2.783%) 
370.592 
(3.221%) 
Difference -85.774 
(-202.569%) 
39.800 
(146.401%) 
28.590 
(-28.166%) 
-22.761 
(-179.612%) 
5.908 
(125.957%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Actual 
-0.810 
(99.746%) 
0.207 
(125.547%) 
-150.783 
(-72987.231%) 
-24.630 
(83.665%) 
-35.100 
(-42.508%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Projected 
0 
(NA) 
0 
(NA) 
-15.357 
(NA) 
-8.197 
(46.625%) 
-20.658 
(-152.023%) 
Difference -0.810 
(99.746%) 
0.207 
(125.547%) 
-135.426 
(-65563.749%) 
-16.433 
(87.865%) 
-14.442 
(12.118%) 
Source: Central Government Financial Statistics, various issues; author’s own calculations. 
Note: *Change of Fiscal Year. 
 
Table 5.18 – Malaysia: Actual and Projected Central Government Revenues and 
Expenditures (Deflated, in Millions of 2003 Ringgit – Year-Over-Year percentage Change in 
Brackets) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Revenue 
Actual 
100.163 
(NA) 
99.574 
(-0.59%) 
112.006 
(12.49%) 
127.391 
(13.74%) 
112.368 
(-11.79%) 
Revenue 
Projected 
85.259 
(NA) 
85.837 
(0.68%) 
94.608 
(10.22%) 
108.340 
(14.51%) 
114.108 
(5.32%) 
Difference 14.903 
(NA) 
13.737 
(-7.83%) 
17.397 
(26.65%) 
19.051 
(9.51%) 
-1.740 
(-109.13%) 
Expenditure 
Actual 
91.399 
(NA) 
90.956 
(-0.49%) 
99.758 
(9.68%) 
106.845 
(7.10%) 
103.283 
(-3.33%) 
Expenditure 
Projected 
86.627 
(NA) 
90.331 
(4.28%) 
102.316 
(13.27%) 
102.738 
(0.41%) 
102.327 
(-0.40%) 
Difference 4.772 
(NA) 
0.625 
(-86.91%) 
-2.558 
(-509.44%) 
4.106 
(260.55%) 
0.956 
(-76.73%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Actual 
8.763 
(NA) 
8.618 
(-1.65%) 
12.247 
(42.11%) 
20.546 
(67.76%) 
9.085 
(-55.78%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Projected 
-1.368 
(NA) 
-4.494 
(-228.54%) 
-7.708 
(-71.52%) 
5.601 
(172.67%) 
11.781 
(110.33%) 
Difference 10.131 
(NA) 
13.112 
(29.42%) 
19.955 
(52.19%) 
-14.945 
(-174.89%) 
-2.696 
(81.96%) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Revenue 
Actual 
128.017 
(13.93%) 
122.129 
(-4.60%) 
140.704 
(15.21%) 
146.880 
(4.39%) 
162.706 
(10.78%) 
Revenue 
Projected 
97.313 
(-14.72%) 
98.177 
(0.89%) 
132.586 
(35.05%) 
124.894 
(-5.80%) 
146.265 
(17.11%) 
Difference 30.704 
(1864.66%) 
23.951 
(-21.99%) 
8.118 
(-66.11%) 
21.985 
(170.82%) 
16.441 
(-25.22%) 
Expenditure 
Actual 
111.757 
(8.21%) 
119.709 
(7.12%) 
141.677 
(18.35%) 
149.452 
(5.49%) 
167.478 
(12.06%) 
Expenditure 
Projected 
104.460 
(2.08%) 
113.585 
(8.74%) 
138.117 
(21.60%) 
137.635 
(-0.35%) 
144.828 
(5.23%) 
Difference 7.297 
(663.54%) 
6.124 
(-16.08%) 
3.560 
(-41.87%) 
11.817 
(231.97%) 
22.650 
(91.68%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Actual 
16.260 
(78.97%) 
2.420 
(-85.12%) 
-0.972 
(-140.18%) 
-2.572 
(-164.53%) 
-4.772 
(-85.54%) 
Rev.-Exp. 
Projected 
-7.147 
(-160.66%) 
-15.408 
(-115.60%) 
-5.531 
(64.10%) 
-12.741 
(-130.36%) 
1.437 
(111.28%) 
Difference 23.407 
(968.31%) 
17.828 
(-23.84%) 
4.559 
(-74.43%) 
10.169 
(123.07%) 
-6.209 
(-161.06%) 
Source: Economic Report, Malaysia, Various issues; author’s own calculations. 
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Table 5.17 and 5.18 show the deflated figures for Indonesia and Malaysia and the year-
over-year changes in percentages in brackets.  
Looking at Table 5.17 for the fiscal year 1997/1998 the actual revenue differed 
significantly from the precedent year (being approximately one quarter) and the expected 
figure. On the other hand actual expenditures increased by approximately 15 percentage 
from 1996/1997 to 1997/1998. From these figures it is clear how unexpected and 
unheralded the East Asian Crisis befell Indonesia. Nevertheless, in 1998/1999 actual 
revenues bounced back again to pre-crisis levels; actual expenditures stayed almost stable 
over the whole period. 
 
Table 5.18 shows revenues and expenditures for the central government of Malaysia. 
While Indonesia has been hit very hard in 1997/1998 by the East Asian Crisis it seems 
from the data below that Malaysia did not experience a crisis at all, as actual revenues and 
expenditures do not show any slump in 1997 or 1998. 
 
Although, the result for Indonesia is as expected (a slump in 1997/1998) the result for 
Malaysia is unexpected and might be due some different accounting method of the central 
government budget. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
Governance and Corporate Governance are fields that are growing in importance; this can 
be seen by the developments and the improvements of Indonesia and Malaysia from 
before the outbreak of the crisis to nowadays. However, there is still a long way to go, not 
only in Emerging Markets such as Indonesia and Malaysia but as well in developed 
economies (e.g. Enron in the USA or the bribe scandal of Siemens in Germany). 
Furthermore, corporate governance rules for the financial industry are important and need 
to be adapted to the fast changing environment. Good corporate governance should 
prevent and buffer some smaller and bigger disturbances (e.g. the so-called ‘subprime 
squeeze’ in the US markets in 2007) of local and due to integration efforts international 
financial markets. Macroeconomic and political stability are contributing to the health and 
to a prospering economy as corporate governance rules (and rules for the financial sector) 
that are transparent, constantly adapted to the fast changing environment and enforced 
by independent authorities. 
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6 
Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia – a Quantitative Approach 
 
The following chapters, Chapter 6 and 7 will analyze the events by using a quantitative 
approach allowing the answers to the following questions to be elucidated:  
Which country recovered faster? Which of the countries experienced a lower impact of 
economic growth respectively on the performance of companies? And finally: Is the policy 
adopted by Malaysia a possible option for countries in a similar situation as Malaysia was 
in 1997/1998? 
Giving answers to the above questions is difficult as there are many influencing factors 
which contribute to the functioning of an economy. Nevertheless the following two 
chapters will try to answer these questions and at the same time give an overview of the 
economic situation before, during and after the crisis by using different types of data. The 
focus lies on a comparison of data on a macroeconomic and a corporate sector level. The 
difficulties of doing the analyses are due to limited data availability. 
Sources of data used will be specified followed by a delineation of the theoretical models 
used. The analysis can be roughly divided in two parts: analysis of macroeconomic data, 
i.e. indicator analysis and difference-in-difference methodology, and of microeconomic 
data, i.e. annual data of stock listed companies analysed by an ordered logistic and a 
quantile regression. 
This chapter will give the overview of the theoretical models used while the results will be 
discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 7).  
 
6.1 Data 
The data used in this analysis derive from various sources: 
The source of macroeconomic data is Thomson DataStream (i.e. a recognized database 
including data from national statistical offices, central banks, international organizations 
e.g. IMF, WB, OECD and other research institutions such as Economist Intelligence Unit) 
while corporate data derives mainly from stock market guides of local entities (for 
Indonesia: Institute for Economic and Financial Research (various issues) ‘Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory’, and for Malaysia: Thomson Information (S. E. Asia), ‘Corporate 
Handbook Malaysia: The definitive guide to listed companies’, (various issues) and 
Dynaquest Sdn. Bhd., ‘Stock Performance Guide’ (various issues)). 
As different data requires aligned techniques, different methods will be discussed: Firstly, 
the indicator analysis which uses data of annual frequency (1990 to 2005); secondly, the 
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difference-in-difference analysis, which uses data on monthly and quarterly frequency; 
thirdly, a logistic regression and lastly, a quantile regression which will be computed based 
on annual audited corporate balance sheet data. 
The period chosen is from 1990 to 2005 (macroeconomic data/indicators) respectively 
from 1991 to 2004 (microeconomic/corporate data) in order to look for impacts on 
economic growth of the East Asian Crisis  but discussion of the results will concentrate on 
a five year period (1996 to 2000) which will illustrate more clearly the impacts of the East 
Asian crisis; following Kaplan and Rodrik (2001), who used in their difference-in-difference 
analysis data from 1992 to 1996 as the period ‘before treatment’ and the one year data 
described below as the ‘treatment’ period, the same observation period has been selected 
for this method.  
For the difference-in-difference (conventional and time-shifted) analyses the breakpoints 
of the two economies have been defined by using the definition given by Kaplan and 
Rodrik (2001): 
Indonesia: 
• Date of first official announcement that country will seek IMF assistance: October 
8th, 1997 
• Date of IMF executive board approval of program: December 4th, 1997 
• Treatment window (difference-in-difference analysis): 
o Monthly Data: October 1997 to September 1998 
o Quarterly Data: Q4 1997 to Q3 1998 
• ‘Before’ treatment period: 1990 (1991) to 1997 
• ‘Treatment’ and after treatment period: 1998 to 2004 (2005) 
Malaysia: 
• No date of IMF announcement of assistance/approval 
• Introduction of capital controls: September, 2nd 1998 
• Treatment window (difference-in-difference analysis):  
o Monthly Data: September 1998 to August 1999 
o Quarterly Data: Q4 1998 to Q3 1999 
• ‘Before’ treatment period: 1990 (1991) to 1998 
• ‘Treatment’ and after treatment period: 1999 to 2004 (2005) 
 
The break points as defined by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and explained above will be used 
as break points in all subsequent analyses. This means that for the indicator analysis the 
break point will be 1997 for Indonesia, 1998 for Malaysia, i.e. the ‘before’ period will be 
from 1990 to 1997 for Indonesia and from 1990 to 1998 for Malaysia while the ‘treatment’ 
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and after treatment period will be from 1998 to 2005 for Indonesia and 1999 to 2005 for 
Malaysia. 
For the other two analysis based on annual corporate balance sheet data the ‘before’ 
treatment period will be from 1991 to 1997 for Indonesia and 1991 to 1998 for Malaysia, 
while the ‘treatment’ and after treatment period will be from 1998 to 2004 for Indonesia 
and from 1999 to 2004 for Malaysia. 
 
Difficulties 
One major problem is dealing with corporate data. The data is usually released in line with 
national accounting standards and annual financial statements are audited by approved 
national auditors if corporations are listed on the stock market. However, accounting and 
auditing standards differ across countries. Since harmonization of International Accounting 
Standards has not been completed there are some differences for the calculation of items 
in annual financial statements. Therefore, calculations based on annual reports should be 
treated carefully especially by making comparisons between different markets. Corporate 
data from Indonesia consists of companies listed on ‘Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite 
Index’ and from Malaysia listed on the ‘Main Board of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange’. The 
limitation of companies on the ‘top’-national stock market should guarantee coherent data, 
stricter supervision of local supervisory bodies and higher quality of financial reports.  
Additionally, not all companies listed on the composite index were selected for the analysis 
as data was not available on a continuous basis for all companies (e.g. due to mergers, 
acquisitions) for the period 1991 to 2004. Therefore only companies with continuous data 
sets over the period were selected. Interpretation of data has to be done cautiously as the 
quality of data is not the same for the two countries; this could lead to some 
misinterpretations. 
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6.2 Hypothesis 
The hypotheses which will be used this chapter and discussed in the Chapter 7 is 
described below. 
The null hypothesis for all calculations is that there has been no significant change in the 
period before, during and after the crisis in the macroeconomy and on the corporate level 
meaning that the East Asian Crisis did not have any significant impact on the Indonesian 
and Malaysian economy.  
The alternative hypothesis is that firstly, a significant change at the macroeconomic and 
corporate level are observed and secondly the recovery experienced by the two economies 
had a different outcome and speed. 
 
The economic rationale for the hypotheses is to show how the two policy approaches 
affected the economies which experienced a similar economic growth before the outbreak 
of the East Asian crisis. Furthermore, the results of the analyses, both on a qualitative and 
quantitative approach, should give the insight how the two different policies applied to 
Indonesia and Malaysia affected the recovery and what lessons can be drawn from their 
experience for the future. 
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6.3 Methodology 
This part of the chapter will concentrate on the methodology used. Firstly, indicators will 
be described, followed by a description of a difference-in-difference analysis and the 
ordered logistic regression. The chapter concludes with the quantile regression. The 
overviews of the methodology used will be summarized and the results will be discussed. 
 
6.3.1 Indicator Analysis 
For a good overview of the macroeconomic development of the economies and a rough 
picture of the impact of the East Asian Crisis an analysis based on macroeconomic 
indicators will be used. The selected ratios show possible threats in the two economies 
before the outbreak of the crisis and the impacts of the remedies for the two economies. 
The following indicators, accompanied by a short description and expected results, will be 
used: 
• Current Account (as % of GDP) 
This indicator shows the share of exports, imports, and unilateral transfers in the 
economy as a percentage of overall economic performance. An inversion of the 
sign of the current account balance shows a reversal of economic events (e.g. 
sharp decrease in imports, sharp increase in exports). 
Expected results: Considering the large share of exports of both economies the 
ratio should be positive, as exports should exceed imports. Due to the real currency 
depreciations during the crisis the current account should become even more 
positive as imports should become more costly for the two economies. 
 
• Short Term Debt (as % of Reserves) 
The ratio ‘short term debt as % of reserves’ shows the amount of volatile financial 
means that are covered by reserves of the central bank. The indicator shows for an 
economy with an open capital account the exposure to so-called ‘hot money’ i.e. to 
volatile funds that can reverse sharply the direction of flow. Furthermore, it shows 
how much of these volatile funds are backed by central bank reserves and 
therefore are an indicator for resistance to financial market turmoil or speculative 
attacks of an economy. A ratio higher than 100 percent indicates a lack of liquidity 
in the system and a high exposure of the economy to exogenous shocks and 
investor confidence. 
Expected results: Both countries should have positive and large ratios in the period 
before the outbreak of the crisis, although the ratio of Malaysia should be lower 
due to some problems in the banking sector in 1994/95. During the crisis the ratio 
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is expected to fall dramatically and recover thereafter in both countries. The 
indicator for Malaysia should show the consequences of the policy measures (i.e. 
capital controls), too, and therefore the ratio for Malaysia should not bounce back 
to pre-crisis level. 
 
• International Reserves to Total Debt 
The ratio ‘international reserves to total debt’ shows a country’s possibility to cope 
with debt. As the ratio decreases a situation of default becomes more realistic. 
Expected results: Both countries should not experience any huge increment of total 
debt. Instead it is expected that international reserves should decrease in the pre-
crisis period as both countries are expected to defend their currencies due to the 
openness of the capital account. Therefore, the ratio should increase for a short 
period during the crisis and improve only thereafter. 
 
• Net Foreign Debt (as % of GDP), Net Foreign Debt to Exports of Goods and 
Services 
These are measures of indebtness and show how much of the gross domestic 
product/exports of goods and services is due to foreign investors. 
Expected results: As net foreign debt should increase during the crisis period due 
to the financial distress, the ratios should increase, too. For Indonesia the return to 
pre-crisis levels is expected to last longer than for Malaysia due to policy measures 
adopted. 
 
• Debt Service Paid (as % of GDP), Debt to Service Due, Debt to Service Paid, Total 
Public Debt (as % of GDP) 
These ratios show the amount of debt repaid. Furthermore they can be interpreted 
as an indicator of distress of a sovereign economy. 
Expected results: All three ratios should be stable for both economies over time as 
both countries did not expose themselves during and after the crisis to additional 
debt. The repayments are expected to be stable, too, as the sovereign 
governments did not expect problems with the debt exposure. Lastly, there should 
only be some variations for the first ratio (debt service paid as % of GDP) because 
of the expected economic downturn during the crisis which should be smaller for 
Malaysia than for Indonesia. 
 
  232 
• Interest Paid (as % of GDP) 
A high ratio means that the economy is running close to bankruptcy, as a large 
share of economic output is needed to cover interest payments that do not include 
principal repayments. 
Expected results: This ratio should be low for both economies as they did not 
experience high outstanding debt owed to international organizations over the 
whole period. 
 
• Interest Paid to Debt Service Paid 
The relative size of this ratio shows the debt position of a country and measures 
the exposure to its debt position. 
Expected result: As both countries did not experience any huge increase of debt 
service from international organizations or similar before the crisis the ratios should 
be relatively low and stable over the period even during the crisis. Both, Indonesia 
and Malaysia did not have any significant increase of debt owed to international 
organizations before, during and after the crisis. 
 
• Interest Due to Exports of Goods and Services (in %) 
The ratio ‘interest due to exports of goods and services’ shows the amount of 
interests due which is covered by the value of exports of goods and services. It 
shows the relative amount of debt service of a country and the possibility to 
generate funds to cover interest and debt owed to international organizations. 
Expected results: This ratio should be relatively low as both countries experienced 
a very low share of debt owed to international organizations before the outbreak of 
the crisis. Furthermore, the ratio should be stable during and after the crisis as 
both countries are expected not to increase their debt position owed to 
international organizations. 
 
• Fiscal Balance (as % of GDP), Government Budget Expenditure (as % of GDP) and 
Government Budget Revenue (as % of GDP) 
These ratios demonstrate the degree of fiscal reflation of a government i.e. the 
intervention in an economy. The ratio ‘fiscal balance as % of GDP’ shows how 
much the government could ‘save’ for future investments (i.e. a positive ratio), 
while a negative ratio shows that the government is spending more than it could 
earn from fiscal income.  The other two ratios regarding the government budget 
expenditure/revenue illustrate in more detail the composition of the fiscal balance. 
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Expected results: The ratio regarding fiscal balance should be positive before the 
outbreak of the East Asian crisis in both economies as Indonesia and Malaysia were 
experiencing economic growth and therefore fiscal income (e.g. tax revenues) 
should be large enough to cover fiscal expenditure. In the period during and after 
the crisis the ratio should become negative; due to the sudden slowdown of 
economic growth fiscal income should also decrease. Lastly, the ratio should 
become rapidly positive for Malaysia compared with Indonesia, as economic growth 
in Malaysia recovered faster. 
The ratio of government expenditure (as % of GDP) is expected to be stable for 
Indonesia, while increasing during and after the crisis for Malaysia. The ratio 
government budget revenue (as % of GDP) is expected to decrease in both 
economies during the crisis but increasing faster in Malaysia then in Indonesia. 
 
• Gross Fixed Investment (as % of GDP) 
This ratio shows the investment climate of an economy. An increase of the share 
over time shows that no fundamental changes regarding investment were 
occurring in the economy.  
Expected results: As gross fixed investment is a volatile component of aggregate 
demand the ratio should show the impacts of the short-term financial shock i.e. the 
East Asian crisis and become relative volatile in the crisis period, too. 
 
• M2 (year-over-year change, in %) 
This indicator shows the growth of money M2 (i.e. this definition includes total 
amount of currency and checking deposits as well as time deposits). The growth of 
M2 in open economies is related to both interest rates and exchange rates. 
Therefore changes of interest rates could cause not only alter M2 but also the 
exchange rate changes (see the introductory chapters in order to see problems 
with monetary policies in open economies as explained by the impossible trinity) 
Expected results: As the economies were growing during the period before the 
outbreak of the crisis M2 should be positive. The year-over-year change should be 
lower in the crisis period compared to pre-crisis levels in both countries. 
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• Different economic indicators: Exports of Goods and Services (as % of GDP), 
Exports of Goods and Service to Imports of Goods and Services, GDP per capita (in 
USD), GDP Growth (real; year-over-year change, in %), Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) (year-over-year change, in %, average over period), Exchange Rate (average 
over period), Real Effective Exchange Rate (average over period) 
These are ratios giving some signals in the degree of economic growth, openness 
to trade and international financial integration. 
Expected results:  The ratios are expected to be positive during the pre-crisis 
period. During the crisis the economic indicators are expected to reflect the 
spreading problems of the financial markets to the real economy, i.e. a higher 
inflation rate, a depreciated exchange rate, negative GDP growth etc. Due to the 
policies adopted it is expected that Indonesia experienced problems in the real 
economy for a longer period than Malaysia. 
 
6.3.1.2 Expected Results 
Summing up, Indonesia should show similar patterns as Malaysia before the crisis 
although absolute values might differ significantly. The pattern during the crisis should be 
similar, too, but shortly after the crisis the pattern for Indonesia should not show any 
major improvement while Malaysia should show a sharp improvement. Lastly, Indonesia 
should not show the so-called V-recovery which was observed with Malaysia. 
Therefore this indicator analysis should show in a brief overview two similar developments 
of the economies before the outbreak of the East Asian crisis but differences after the 
crisis giving a hint to the effectiveness of the policies used during and after the crisis. 
 
 
6.3.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis  
This section will deal with a difference-in-difference analysis as proposed by Kaplan and 
Rodrik (2001). The model used here is slightly different to what was proposed by the two 
authors: here two countries will be compared, i.e. Indonesia and Malaysia, (for an 
introduction to the difference-in-difference methodology please refer to Meyer (1995)) 
instead of a set of countries as in Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). 
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6.3.2.1 The Model 
Let  denote some economic performance of interest (e.g. interest rates), where t 
stands for time and i for the countries examined (i.e. i = Indonesia and Malaysia). The 
representation is then the following: 
 
 
 
where  
  is the country specific, time-invariant intercept; 
  is the time-varying coefficient, that captures the common effect when Malaysia 
was under ‘treatment’ (i.e. when Malaysia applied the ‘unorthodox’ policies); 
  is the coefficient that captures the differential effect of the capital controls in 
Malaysia; 
 is a country specific (  when i = Malaysia and 0 otherwise, and so on);  
 is a time-varying dummy variable that takes the value 1 during the 12 months 
(respectively four quarters) that follow  = September 1st, 1998 (i.e. during the 
one-year period subsequent to the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia), and 
is 0 otherwise; 
 is the time-varying error term.  
 
This model is the conventional difference-in-difference approach and has the advantage 
that it controls for (‘differences out’) the effects of both country specific and time-varying 
influences that might be attributed otherwise to the use of capital controls. In particular 
the term  washes out common improvements across countries in fundamentals that 
coincide with the use of capital controls in Malaysia. The problem with this conventional 
difference-in-difference method is that for  to be an unbiased estimator of the effect of 
the capital controls, the condition that Malaysia would have experienced the same 
economic recovery as the other crisis country in the months following September 1998 
had capital controls not been imposed, must hold. The problem arises as Indonesia 
already had agreed to IMF programs in October 1997 and undergone some ‘treatment’ 
while Malaysia had only begun to stick to strict policies in September 1998. To account for 
these time differences in the analysis a slightly changed model will be used and presented 
below. 
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Looking more carefully at the model, one has to look at the treatment and its 
counterfactual: the treatment in the case of Malaysia had been the introduction of capital 
controls and the counterfactual is calling in the IMF, which Indonesia did. Reformulating, 
the following assumption can be constructed (Kaplan and Rodrik (2001)): In absence of 
capital controls, Malaysia would have called in the IMF and the post-September 1998 
economic performance would have exhibited the same change that Indonesia experienced 
after its calling in of the IMF. This allows reformulating the above equation, too, into a 
time-shifted difference-in-difference method of the following form 
 
 
 
where 
  is the country specific, time-invariant intercept; 
  is the country specific, time-varying coefficient, that captures the effect 
undergoing the IMF ‘treatment’ during an economic crisis relative to outcomes in 
more normal times, i.e. it picks up a mix of IMF and crisis effects; 
  is the coefficient that captures the differential effect of the capital controls in 
Malaysia compared to an IMF program, i.e. is a unbiased estimate of the effect of 
the Malaysian controls relative to the counterfactual of an IMF program under the 
assumption that Malaysia implemented its capital controls at a stage in the 
financial crisis that is comparable to that at which the other countries called in the 
IMF; furthermore this coefficient picks up the effects of all policies applied in 
Malaysia which include fixed exchange rates, reflation via interest cuts etc. but in 
particular it includes the impact of not receiving billions of dollars of loans from the 
IMF; 
 is a country specific dummy (  when i = Malaysia and 0 otherwise, and 
so on);  
 is a country specific, time-varying dummy variable that takes the value 1 
during the 12 months (respectively four quarters) that follow the country specific 
treatment period (i.e. during the one-year period subsequent (a) in Indonesia of 
approval of the IMF of loan – October 1997 or fourth quarter 1997 – and (b) to the 
imposition of capital controls in Malaysia – September 1998 or fourth quarter 
1998), and is 0 otherwise; 
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The main difference from the equation above is that the time-varying dummy that 
specifies treatment is in this equation country-specific and accounts for the different 
treatment periods of the countries. The problem that might arise applying the time-shifted 
difference-in-difference method is that there might be a correlation between the external 
economic environment and , i.e. Malaysia may have imposed the capital controls in a 
much more favourable environment than prevailed at the time Indonesia had implemented 
its IMF package which then might have accounted for a substantial part of the faster 
recovery of Malaysia. This cannot be ruled out entirely but according to Kaplan and Rodrik 
(2001), firstly, it is not very obvious that the external environment was improving during 
the second half of 1998 when Malaysia introduced the capital controls; secondly, Malaysia 
cut itself off from the external financial markets and therefore it is not obvious that any 
improvement of the external environment would have produced many benefits to this 
country; lastly, in the empirical analysis some variables that account for the external 
environment are included (e.g. US inflation rate, US interest rate, S&P500). 
 
6.3.2.2 The Methodology 
As proposed by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) the following equation, which is an augmented 
version of the equation just discussed before, will be estimated: 
 
 
 
where 
 is a measure of economic performance (e.g. interest rate); 
 is a set of country dummies; 
 is the ‘treatment’ period dummy which is 1 during the 12 month or four 
quarter period following ’s first appeal for IMF assistance or in the case of 
Malaysia, during the 12 month or four quarter period following the introduction of 
capital controls, and is 0 otherwise; 
 is the interaction term of the Malaysia dummy with ; 
 is the baseline post-treatment response; 
 is the estimate of the difference that is attributable to capital controls in 
Malaysia; 
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 is a set of country specific time-varying variables (country-specific monthly or 
quarterly dummies); 
 is a set of time-varying variables capturing the external economic environment 
(e.g. US interest rates, US inflation rate, S&P 500) 
 is the error term. 
 
This specification includes not only a time trend but also country specific monthly 
respectively quarterly dummies and the external economic environment is controlled for by 
the inclusion of .  Data used for the regression are from 1990 to 1996 (the ‘before’ 
period) and the one-year ‘treatment’ or ‘after’ period (as described in the introduction to 
this chapter is the treatment window for Indonesia from October 1997 to September 1998 
respectively Q4 1997 to Q3 1998 and for Malaysia from September 1998 to August 1999 
respectively Q4 1998 to Q3 1999). 
 
6.3.2.3 Expected Results 
This analysis should show that Malaysia recovered faster, especially when used the time-
shifted difference-in-difference analysis. Hence, the coefficients should show that Malaysia 
experienced less of a downturn as Indonesia did. Lastly, this analysis should show that the 
policies applied by Malaysia lead to a faster recovery then the policies applied during the 
crisis in Indonesia. 
 
 
6.3.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
In contrast with the methodologies presented above the last two methodologies will deal 
with corporate data. The methodology used here is an ordered logistic regression model 
(Greene, 2003) and computed with the aid of Stata which reports different from Greene 
no constants (i.e. the first constant is set to zero and for finding the appropriate constants 
the ‘cut’ has to be transformed but which will not be done here – for further information 
please consider http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/ologit_con.html). This model has 
been chosen as it adheres to code financial strength easily in categories (see below) and 
compare the corporate sector of Malaysia and Indonesia. Using a simple regression would 
have distorted the interpretation as absolute values are different. Furthermore this model 
allows one to see how.  
The set of corporate data is divided into the following five categories where one is bad and 
five is very good. 
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- for P/E a high ratio is interpreted as being bad (1) and a low ratio is very good (5) as a 
high ratio implies that it will take longer to pay back the investment in the stock 
- for ROE, ROA, Current Ratio and Operating Margin a low ratio is interpreted as being bad 
(1) while a high ratio is very good (5) as an increase in these ratios are usually interpreted 
by investors that the corporations are stronger and healthier 
 
6.3.3.1 The Model 
The general model can be described by the following equations (Greene, 2003, pp. 736-
740). The model is based on a latent regression like a binominal probit model and there 
can be started with 
 
 is unobserved but there can be observed 
 if , 
 if , 
 if , 
 
 if  
and where s are unknown parameters to be estimated with  and  is assumed to be 
normally distributed across observations. Normalizing the mean and the variance  to zero 
and one which will lead to the following probabilities 
Prob , 
Prob , 
Prob , 
 
Prob . 
For the probabilities to be positive there has to be . 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients is similar to a logistic regression but has to be done 
carefully, too. 
 
6.3.3.2 The Methodology 
The sources of data used are, as discussed in the previous chapter, local stock market 
guides that publish different ratios and a very short balance sheet of companies listed at 
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the local stock markets. Due to availability and comparability the following ratios have 
been selected: 
 
Price-Earnings Ratio (PER): Profit after tax divided by the number of issued and fully 
paid-up ordinary shares. This ratio reflects the consensus of future earnings growth 
prospects. The advantage of the PER is that it provides a relative simple and reliable 
‘rule of thumb’ while the disadvantages are that it is based on accounting figures 
(and therefore accounting principles matter) and for comparison a reference 
indicator (e.g. the industry average) has to be selected which is rather tricky. 
The PER can be interpreted in the following way: A PER of five means that it will 
take five years for the company’s earnings to add up to the original investment, i.e. 
five years before the original investment in shares will be paid back. Or in other 
words: an investor is willing to pay five currency units for one unit of current 
earnings and therefore the PER is sometimes referred to as a ‘multiple’, too. 
 
Return on Equity (ROE): Profit attributable to shareholders, but before extraordinary 
items minus preference dividend divided by shareholder’s equity. ROE is based on 
accounting figures and should be compared with ROE of the same industry. 
Furthermore ROE is a profitability indicator (in percentage). 
 
Return on Asset (ROA): Profit before tax divided by total assets. ROA is an indicator 
for profitability and shows how assets are used to generate earnings (in percentage) 
i.e. how debt and equity funds are used to invest and generate income. 
This measure, as ROE, is widely used and can be easily compared across industry. 
Nevertheless, it is based on accounting figures and therefore has to be interpreted 
carefully. 
 
Current Ratio (CR): Current assets divided by current liabilities. CR is a liquidity 
measure and shows the ability of a company to pay back its short-term liabilities 
(debt and payables) with its short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables). A ratio 
above one suggests good financial health while a ratio under one suggests some 
liquidity problems but does not necessarily show that the company will go bankrupt; 
the higher the ratio the more capable the company to pay its obligations. 
Furthermore, CR can show how efficient the operating cycle or the company’s ability 
to turn its products into cash is. For comparison an industry average should be used. 
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Operating Margin (OM): Profit/Loss before tax divided by turnover/total 
income/operating revenue. OM is an indicator of the company’s pricing strategy and 
operating efficiency and shows how much is left after paying for variable costs of 
production (e.g. wages, raw materials) for covering fixed costs such as interest on 
debt. Or in other words: OM shows how much income (before taxes) is generated on 
each monetary unit of sales. A change over time of OM shows excellently how the 
quality of a company evolves i.e., the higher the margin, the better. 
 
The following empirical ordered logistic regression model will be estimated 
 
 
 
where 
  is the dependent variable (i.e. the price-earnings ratio); 
 are the unknown regression parameter associated with  (with its estimate 
); 
ROE, ROA, Current Ratio and Operating Margin are a set of independent variables; 
 is an unknown error term with normal distribution. 
 
This empirical model has been chosen in order to explain best with data available the 
events in Indonesia and Malaysia. Although there might be some positive correlation 
between the independent and the dependent variables this model should give the best 
explanation if and how the underlying structures changed. As ROE usually gives a good 
overview about the health of a company this ratio is identified as being the independent 
variable while the other are expected to explain how fundamentals like profit (i.e. P/E), 
liquidity (i.e. current ratio) and sales (i.e. operating margin) change the profitability of a 
company. 
 
6.3.3.3 Expected Results 
The results expected from this analysis are that the correlation of the corporate data will 
worsen (i.e. the correlation will increase) during the crisis period: The behaviour of market 
participants (i.e. ‘herding behaviour’) should heavily influence without a ‘rationale’ the 
price of stocks in the market (see also the previous chapters and the different 
explanations to the causes of the crisis). Due to the turmoil in the markets the goodness 
of the model is expected to worsen as irrational behaviour in the market will increase 
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which means that the above described fundamentals influencing the profit of a company 
will only play a minor role in explaining the movements of the ratios (like P/E and current 
ratio). During the crisis due to the behaviour of investors it is expected that prices will not 
reflect all fundamentals of the companies. The current ratio is expected to worsen during 
the crisis, due to the spill-over effects of the financial markets problems to the real 
economy (see previous Chapter 2 for theoretical explanation and foundation). 
 
To summarize, the data analysis should show that not only the macroeconomy was 
affected by the financial market turmoil but also the corporate sector changed. Therefore 
the ordered logistic regression should show changes in both countries, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, especially during the crisis (i.e. data ranging from 1997 to 1998). Furthermore, 
as it is expected that the East Asian crisis had an impact on the profitability of the 
corporations hence the prediction of the model will decrease (e.g. due to an increase of 
noise and irrational behaviour of market participants). And finally, it is expected that 
Malaysia will return faster to the pre-crisis levels and therefore the prediction of the model 
should improve faster then for Indonesia. 
 
 
6.3.4 Quantile Regression Analysis 
The methodology used here is a quantile regression model, as first introduced by Koenker 
and Bassett (1978). The quantile regression is an extension of classical least square 
regression of the conditional mean for a collection of models for different conditional 
quantile functions; the difference is that the median (quantile) regression estimator does 
minimize the symmetrically weighted sum of absolute errors (where the weight is equal to 
0.5) in order to estimate the conditional median (quantile) function while other conditional 
quantile functions are estimated using minimized asymmetrically weighted sum of absolute 
errors (weights are functions of the quantile of interest; for a good introduction please 
refer to Koenker and Hallock (2001)). Quantile regression is robust to the presence of 
outliers and it can be seen from some simple descriptive statistics in Chapter 7 that the 
value of mean and median of the corporate data used here differs significantly. 
Furthermore, quantile regression can show how some specific selected quantile (e.g. 
lowest fifth percentile and top fifth percentile of the sample) evolve over a specific period 
of time.  
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6.3.4.1 The Model 
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978) the general quantile regression equation can be 
expressed as 
 
   
where   
  is a continuous response variable depending on , 
  is the dependent variable, 
 data pairs  are denoted by the subscription , 
  is the error term and has zero expectation, 
 indicates the proportion of the population having scores below  
the quantile  
 
As can be observed from this very simple construction, the error term does not need to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Therefore this methodology allows 
analysis of a population of different, heterogeneous companies using different levels of , 
which need not to be equidistant. 
 
The th quantile regression estimators  and  , , are chosen to minimize  
 
 
 
in words, minimizing a weighted sum of absolute errors, where the weights are symmetric 
in the case  (median) and asymmetric otherwise.  
According to Buchinsky (1998) this minimization can be formulated as a linear 
programming (which implies that the method is computationally straightforward) or as a 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) problem which leads to 
 
 
 
implying that tests can be constructed using critical values of the normal distribution with 
asymptotic justification. 
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In order to estimate  several estimators are available and the most commonly used in 
practice is the bootstrap estimator described below and suggested by Buchinsky (1995), 
being more efficient in small samples and robust between the regressors and regression 
errors. This method computes  
 
 
 
where 
 is the quantile regression estimator based on the  bootstrap sample, 
. 
 
The bootstrap samples  are obtained by sampling with replacement from the 
original sample, ; the procedure just described can be implemented using Stata© 
software. The advantage of the bootstrap method is that it does not necessarily require 
the i.i.d. assumption and results may therefore be more robust than other asymptotic 
procedures requiring stronger assumptions. 
The bootstrap method is used to compute standard errors in the calculation of the next 
chapter and limited to 500 bootstraps replications. 
For a good introduction to quantile regression analysis refer to Hao and Naimann (2007). 
 
6.3.4.2 The Methodology 
The following empirical quantile model will be estimated 
 
 
 
where 
  is the dependent variable (i.e. the price-earnings ratio); 
  is the intercept; 
 are the unknown regression parameter associated with the  percentile 
(with its estimate ); 
ROE, ROA, Current Ratio and Operating Margin are a set of independent variables; 
 is an unknown error term with properties as described above. 
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The chosen bootstrap sample is 500 bootstrap replications as suggested by literature (e.g. 
Hao and Naiman, 2007). The levels of  have been selected at, ,  and 
.  
As Hao and Naiman (2007) suggest the variables are used on a raw scale and not 
transformed by a log-operation as a log-transformation would influence the estimation 
result. 
The calculations were done on a basis of ‘event study’ i.e. focusing on a period of five 
years including the pre- and after-crisis period which comprises the period of 1996 to 
2000. 
The model described above has been chosen due to data availability (only annual data has 
been available for the firms analyzed over this period). The Price/Earnings Ratio is a ratio 
that incorporates both stock performance (and therefore movements on the market) as 
well as firm specific performance (i.e. earnings). The four explanatory variables reflect the 
performance of the operative business (i.e. ROE, ROA and Operating Margin) as well as 
the liquidity position (i.e. Current Ratio). Due to the data structure (annual data) the 
model has to be interpreted with caution. For the explanation of the empirical model as 
well as for the interpretation of the independent and dependent variables please refer to 
the previous section. 
 
6.3.4.3 Expected Results 
Although the data set is limited and on an annual basis there should be significant 
differences looking at the quantiles of Malaysia and Indonesia during and after the crisis. 
Furthermore, as the analysis is very rough and simple it should show that differences in 
quantiles over the whole period and especially during the crisis occurred, i.e. that changes 
in the structure of the data set over the period of 1997 to 1999 can be found which could 
be interpreted that the East Asian Crisis influenced the real economy and especially the 
corporate sector, too. A rough comparison between pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis 
outcomes should show that in these bigger time periods fundamental changes on 
corporate level were occurring. This would imply that the East Asian Crisis did not only 
affect the macroeconomy but as well the corporate sector which is typical for a third-
generation crisis. 
Nevertheless, the result have to be interpreted cautiously due to reliability of data, 
sampling and possible misspecification of the model used here.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has given the overview to the methodologies that will be used (the results 
are interpreted in Chapter 7). A top-down approach will be used, i.e. moving from 
macroeconomic to corporate data and looking for changes in the economy of Indonesia 
and Malaysia. While the two analyses with macroeconomic data should give good 
predictions, the results of the two analyses with corporate data have to be interpreted 
with caution due to limited data quality. Additional noise in model and model prediction 
could be caused by the data quality could lead to misinterpretations of results. 
To summarize, the analysis should show that Malaysia has recovered faster (experiencing 
a so-called V-shaped recovery) while Indonesia struggled with the East Asian Crisis for a 
longer time. Furthermore, the analysis should give a hint how the policies used by the two 
countries during the crisis helped to boost their recovery. While the difference-in-
difference analysis gives good insights to the effectiveness of the influence of the policies 
used the ratio analysis and the ordered logistic regression analysis have to be interpreted 
much more careful and the quantile regression should not be interpreted without looking 
at the other analysis. The latter should only be used as integration for the interpretation of 
the other methods used. 
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7 
Discussion of Results 
 
This chapter will deal with the empirical results of the methodologies discussed in Chapter 
6. The first part will consider the result of the indicators, followed by the results of the 
difference-in-difference analysis, quantile regression and paneldata analysis.  
 
7.1 Indicator Analysis 
The analysis by means of indicators can give only a general overview of the situation in 
the two countries. Table 7.1 shows selected indicators, as discussed previously, which 
cover economic performance measures, liquidity and indebtness. The dark shaded cells 
cover the immediate pre- and after-crisis period with the darkest cell covering the most 
affected year. 
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TABLE 7.1 – Results: Indicators of Indonesia and Malaysia 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Current Account (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
-3.5 
-2 
 
 
-4.1 
-8.5 
 
 
-2 
-3.7 
 
 
-1.1 
-4.7 
 
 
-1.3 
-6.1 
 
 
-3.7 
-9.7 
 
 
-2.7 
-4.4 
 
 
-1.3 
-5.9 
 
 
6.8 
13.2 
 
 
6.3 
15.8 
 
 
7 
9.3 
 
 
6 
8.3 
 
 
4 
7.6 
 
 
3.6 
12.9 
 
 
0.6 
12.6 
 
 
0.3 
12.2 
Short Term Debt (as % of 
Reserves) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
258.7 
16.7 
 
 
172 
24.3 
 
 
149.6 
29.3 
 
 
161.6 
23.5 
 
 
181.4 
21.8 
 
 
231.8 
26.8 
 
 
234.2 
36.9 
 
 
218.4 
53.5 
 
 
118.3 
33.2 
 
 
81 
19.3 
 
 
82.2 
16.3 
 
 
94.2 
21.3 
 
 
81.3 
25.3 
 
 
63.5 
20.1 
 
 
55.5 
16.8 
 
 
58 
12.5 
International Reserves  to Total 
Debt 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
12.2 
64.4 
 
 
12.9 
64.4 
 
 
12.9 
86.6 
 
 
13.9 
104.6 
 
 
12.2 
84.2 
 
 
11.9 
69.6 
 
 
15 
68.4 
 
 
12.8 
44.3 
 
 
15.5 
60.5 
 
 
18 
73.1 
 
 
20.3 
67.8 
 
 
20.9 
65.6 
 
 
24.2 
69.2 
 
 
26.5 
90.4 
 
 
25.8 
126.5 
 
 
24.9 
134 
Net Foreign Debt (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
48.5 
12.4 
 
 
49 
12.4 
 
 
49.8 
4.5 
 
 
44 
-1.8 
 
 
48.4 
6.4 
 
 
49.1 
11.8 
 
 
43.6 
12.4 
 
 
49.8 
26.3 
 
 
121.1 
23.2 
 
 
80.1 
14.2 
 
 
69.8 
14.9 
 
 
64.6 
17.6 
 
 
50.1 
15.6 
 
 
42.9 
4.5 
 
 
41 
-11.7 
 
 
37 
-13.6 
Net Foreign Debt to Exports of 
Goods and Services 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
205.4 
15.7 
 
 
 
206.8 
15.3 
 
 
 
200.4 
5.7 
 
 
 
183.2 
-2.2 
 
 
 
203.4 
6.9 
 
 
 
199.7 
12 
 
 
 
186.5 
13.1 
 
 
 
180.4 
27.2 
 
 
 
221.3 
19.5 
 
 
 
210.7 
11.4 
 
 
 
155.1 
11.7 
 
 
 
160.9 
14.8 
 
 
 
146.4 
13.3 
 
 
 
139.5 
3.8 
 
 
 
120.4 
-9.3 
 
 
 
98.4 
-10.7 
Debt Service Paid (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
7.9 
9.8 
 
 
8.1 
5.9 
 
 
8.1 
7.1 
 
 
8.1 
7.1 
 
 
7.3 
8.2 
 
 
7.3 
6.8 
 
 
8.6 
8.4 
 
 
8.3 
7.1 
 
 
17.4 
8.4 
 
 
11.4 
6 
 
 
10.1 
7.1 
 
 
9.5 
7.1 
 
 
8.5 
8.3 
 
 
7.9 
9.2 
 
 
8 
7.8 
 
 
5.8 
7.2 
Debt to Service Due 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
33.3 
12.4 
 
34.2 
7.3 
 
32.6 
9 
 
33.6 
8.7 
 
30.7 
8.9 
 
29.9 
7 
 
36.6 
8.8 
 
30 
7.3 
 
36.4 
7.1 
 
36.5 
4.8 
 
24 
5.6 
 
25.1 
5.9 
 
25.9 
7.1 
 
35.8 
7.8 
 
24.7 
6.2 
 
15.4 
5.6 
Debt to Service Paid 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
33.3 
12.4 
 
34.2 
7.3 
 
32.6 
9 
 
33.6 
8.7 
 
30.7 
8.9 
 
29.9 
7 
 
36.6 
8.8 
 
30 
7.3 
 
31.7 
7.1 
 
30 
4.8 
 
22.5 
5.6 
 
23.6 
5.9 
 
24.7 
7.1 
 
25.6 
7.8 
 
23.6 
6.2 
 
15.4 
5.6 
Total Public Debt (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
N/A 
89.5 
 
 
N/A 
82.1 
 
 
N/A 
71.8 
 
 
N/A 
65.1 
 
 
N/A 
58.3 
 
 
N/A 
53.2 
 
 
N/A 
46.8 
 
 
22.6 
45.4 
 
 
65.7 
55.8 
 
 
89.8 
56.2 
 
 
92.9 
54.1 
 
 
84.7 
63.7 
 
 
76.3 
63.6 
 
 
69.1 
63 
 
 
69.4 
62.3 
 
 
63.6 
61 
Interest Paid (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
3.1 
2.6 
 
 
3.3 
2.2 
 
 
2.9 
1.9 
 
 
2.8 
2 
 
 
2.7 
1.9 
 
 
2.8 
1.8 
 
 
2.6 
2.1 
 
 
2.8 
2.8 
 
 
6.7 
3.1 
 
 
3.8 
2.4 
 
 
4.5 
2.5 
 
 
3.6 
2.4 
 
 
2 
2.1 
 
 
1.8 
2.1 
 
 
1.9 
1.8 
 
 
1.2 
1.7 
Interest Paid to Debt Service Paid 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
40 
26.9 
 
 
40.2 
37 
 
 
36.2 
26.3 
 
 
35.1 
28.3 
 
 
37.3 
23.4 
 
 
37.9 
26.3 
 
 
30.9 
24.7 
 
 
34.1 
39.8 
 
 
38.8 
37.3 
 
 
33.7 
40.2 
 
 
44.3 
35.7 
 
 
38 
34.3 
 
 
23.7 
24.8 
 
 
22.7 
22.8 
 
 
23.8 
22.7 
 
 
20.8 
24.1 
Interest Due to Exports of Goods 
and Services 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
13.3 
3.3 
 
 
13.8 
2.7 
 
 
11.8 
2.4 
 
 
11.8 
2.5 
 
 
11.4 
2.1 
 
 
11.3 
1.8 
 
 
11.3 
2.2 
 
 
10.2 
2.9 
 
 
12.3 
2.6 
 
 
16.1 
1.9 
 
 
11.5 
2 
 
 
10.5 
2 
 
 
7 
1.8 
 
 
7.2 
1.8 
 
 
5.6 
1.4 
 
 
3.2 
1.4 
Fiscal Balance (as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
N/A 
-2.9 
 
 
N/A 
-1 
 
 
N/A 
0 
 
 
N/A 
0.8 
 
 
N/A 
2.9 
 
 
N/A 
1.5 
 
 
N/A 
1.5 
 
 
N/A 
2.8 
 
 
N/A 
-1.4 
 
 
N/A 
-2.8 
 
 
N/A 
-5.8 
 
 
-1.4 
-5.5 
 
 
-1.9 
-5.6 
 
 
-1.6 
-5.3 
 
 
-3.2 
-4.2 
 
 
-0.8 
-3.8 
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Government Budget Expenditure 
(as % of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
16.6 
27.7 
 
 
 
15 
27.2 
 
 
 
16.6 
26.9 
 
 
 
14.9 
24 
 
 
 
15.6 
23 
 
 
 
14 
22.1 
 
 
 
14.3 
22.3 
 
 
 
17 
21 
 
 
 
17.6 
21.8 
 
 
 
17.4 
22.7 
 
 
 
17.2 
23.8 
 
 
 
19.3 
29.3 
 
 
 
20.1 
28.7 
 
 
 
20.6 
28.7 
 
 
 
21.9 
26.4 
 
 
 
21.2 
25.3 
Government Budget Revenues (as 
% of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
17 
24.8 
 
 
15.4 
25.2 
 
 
16.2 
26 
 
 
15.5 
24.2 
 
 
16.4 
25.3 
 
 
16 
22.9 
 
 
15.3 
23 
 
 
16.4 
23.3 
 
 
14.9 
20 
 
 
16.3 
19.5 
 
 
14.7 
18 
 
 
18.3 
23.8 
 
 
19.2 
23.1 
 
 
19.2 
23.4 
 
 
20.2 
22.1 
 
 
20.8 
21.5 
Gross Fixed Investment (as % of 
GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
25.6 
33 
 
 
25.5 
36.4 
 
 
24.6 
36.6 
 
 
23.8 
38.9 
 
 
24.9 
40.2 
 
 
25.7 
43.6 
 
 
26.8 
42.5 
 
 
25.6 
43.1 
 
 
23 
26.8 
 
 
18.6 
21.9 
 
 
19.9 
25.6 
 
 
19.2 
24.9 
 
 
19 
23.1 
 
 
19.5 
22 
 
 
21.7 
20.4 
 
 
22 
20 
M2 (year-over-year change, in %) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
46.8 
-43.7 
 
 
25.9 
16.9 
 
 
20.9 
71.9 
 
 
19.5 
26.4 
 
 
21.5 
11.5 
 
 
24.8 
18.5 
 
 
28.2 
18.5 
 
 
25.8 
16 
 
 
62.2 
0.2 
 
 
23.4 
12.1 
 
 
8.4 
10 
 
 
14.7 
9.1 
 
 
8 
3.9 
 
 
6.4 
8.1 
 
 
6.9 
11.7 
 
 
14.6 
6.3 
Exports of Goods and Services (as 
% of GDP) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
25.1 
74.5 
 
 
 
26 
77.8 
 
 
 
27.9 
76 
 
 
 
25.4 
78..9 
 
 
 
25.2 
89.2 
 
 
 
25 
94.1 
 
 
 
24.5 
91.6 
 
 
 
26.4 
93.3 
 
 
 
50.3 
115.7 
 
 
 
33.7 
121.3 
 
 
 
41 
124.4 
 
 
 
38.2 
116.4 
 
 
 
32 
114.6 
 
 
 
30.5 
113.4 
 
 
 
32.1 
121.2 
 
 
 
33.5 
123.2 
Exports of Goods and Services to 
Imports of Goods and Services 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
106.5 
102.8 
 
 
 
103.4 
95.5 
 
 
 
106.6 
101.8 
 
 
 
106.1 
99.9 
 
 
 
102.9 
98.3 
 
 
 
97.2 
96 
 
 
 
95.6 
101.6 
 
 
 
100.7 
101 
 
 
 
124.6 
123.5 
 
 
 
129.9 
126 
 
 
 
126.1 
119.1 
 
 
 
124.4 
118.8 
 
 
 
124.9 
118.1 
 
 
 
122.3 
122.5 
 
 
 
115.9 
121.3 
 
 
 
111.8 
123.5 
Effective Maturity on Foreign Debt 
(Years) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
8.7 
4.4 
 
 
8.9 
7.3 
 
 
8.4 
4.8 
 
 
7.7 
4.8 
 
 
8 
4.1 
 
 
8.7 
5.4 
 
 
6.6 
4.3 
 
 
7.4 
6.7 
 
 
9 
8.5 
 
 
10.4 
11.9 
 
 
13 
8.7 
 
 
14.1 
9.1 
 
 
9.8 
6.4 
 
 
7.8 
5.4 
 
 
7.1 
5.6 
 
 
9.1 
5.7 
GDP per Capita (in USD) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
660 
2,400 
 
730 
2,600 
 
780 
3,100 
 
880 
3,400 
 
960 
3,700 
 
1080 
4,300 
 
1200 
4,800 
 
1110 
4,600 
 
480 
3,300 
 
700 
3,484 
 
730 
3,876 
 
700 
3,668 
 
840 
3,858 
 
990 
4,133 
 
1060 
4,601 
 
1160 
4,918 
GDP Growth (real, year-over-year 
change, in %) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
0 
9 
 
 
 
7 
9.5 
 
 
 
6.5 
8.9 
 
 
 
6.8 
9.9 
 
 
 
7.5 
9.2 
 
 
 
8.2 
9.7 
 
 
 
7.8 
10.2 
 
 
 
4.7 
7.3 
 
 
 
-13.1 
-7.4 
 
 
 
0.8 
6.1 
 
 
 
5.4 
8.9 
 
 
 
3.6 
0.4 
 
 
 
4.5 
4.1 
 
 
 
4.8 
5.3 
 
 
 
5.1 
7 
 
 
 
5.6 
5.5 
CPI (year-over-year change, in %, 
average over period) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
7.8 
2.6 
 
 
 
9.4 
4.4 
 
 
 
7.6 
4.8 
 
 
 
9.7 
3.5 
 
 
 
8.5 
3.7 
 
 
 
9.4 
3.5 
 
 
 
8 
3.5 
 
 
 
6.2 
2.7 
 
 
 
57.9 
5.3 
 
 
 
24.1 
2.7 
 
 
 
3.8 
1.5 
 
 
 
11.5 
1.4 
 
 
 
11.9 
1.8 
 
 
 
6.6 
1.1 
 
 
 
6.2 
1.5 
 
 
 
10.4 
3.1 
Exchange Rate (average over 
period) 
Indonesia (Rupiah/USD) 
Malaysia (Ringgit/USD) 
 
 
1843 
2.7 
 
 
1950 
2.75 
 
 
2030 
2.55 
 
 
2087 
2.57 
 
 
2161 
2.62 
 
 
2249 
2.5 
 
 
2342 
2.52 
 
 
2909 
2.81 
 
 
10014 
3.92 
 
 
7855 
3.8 
 
 
8422 
3.8 
 
 
10261 
3.8 
 
 
9311 
3.8 
 
 
8577 
3.8 
 
 
8939 
3.8 
 
 
9705 
3.79 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(average over period) 
Indonesia (Jan 2000=100) 
Malaysia (1989=100) 
 
 
 
163 
106.6 
 
 
 
157.9 
101.9 
 
 
 
154 
108.1 
 
 
 
153.5 
102.4 
 
 
 
152.6 
98.9 
 
 
 
151 
98.8 
 
 
 
159.8 
108.3 
 
 
 
146.2 
105.6 
 
 
 
67.8 
82.6 
 
 
 
95.8 
81.8 
 
 
 
89.3 
82.8 
 
 
 
83.2 
89 
 
 
 
100.6 
90.1 
 
 
 
108.9 
83.5 
 
 
 
112.3 
79.4 
 
 
 
112.2 
82.1 
Source: DataStream, EIU, DBResearch and authors own calculations.
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Looking at the above ratios it can be seen that before the outbreak of the crisis short term 
debt (as percentage of reserves), net foreign debt (as percentage of GDP), net foreign 
debt to exports of goods and services, debt to service due and debt to service paid, were 
larger while gross fixed investment (as percentage of GDP) and international reserves to 
total debt were lower in Indonesia than in Malaysia. Hence, suggesting that the 
Indonesian economy was exposed to a larger degree of foreign debt especially short term 
debt. Therefore indebtness of Indonesia was marginally worse compared to Malaysia 
before the crisis.  
Looking at indebtness of both economies after the crisis there can be seen, that Indonesia 
experienced a larger degree of socialization of debt (total public debt as percentage of 
GDP increased by 40 % (!) from 1997 to 1998, just within one year) and exposure to 
foreign debt (as percentage of GDP) almost tripled within one year (from 49.8 to 121.1 %) 
which can be also be attributed to a slump of GDP.  
Both economies experienced an outflow of international reserves which can be seen by the 
decrease of short term debt as percentage of reserves and the increase of international 
reserves to total debt discussed previously. 
One interesting point to note is that Malaysia relied more on exports of goods and services 
than Indonesia before the outbreak of the crisis that guarantees to some extent that the 
economy generates funds for the coverage of foreign debt. The indicator exports of goods 
and services to imports of goods and services increased in both countries from 1997 to 
1998 by almost 20 %; this can be explained by a reduction of imports due to the sharp 
decline of the exchange rate (versus the US Dollar) affecting imports which became 
relatively expensive. 
Furthermore, both economies experienced a slump in GDP growth (nominal and real) and 
an increase of inflation rate. The inflation rate increased in Indonesia by almost ten times 
while in Malaysia the inflation rate ‘only’ doubled. Not only a decline of exchange rate 
(versus US Dollar) hit the economies but the real effective exchange rate (which reflects 
terms of trades, too) declined sharply in both countries, too. The observation that M2 
(year-over-year change, in percentage) increased sharply in Indonesia reflects that the 
floating exchange rate system has been secured with free capital movements. As 
explained in the previous chapters this means that under these circumstances monetary 
policy is very effective. However, the combination of a declining exchange rate and the 
sharp increase of the inflation rate with the mix of an unfavourable investor sentiment in 
the region limited the effectiveness of monetary policy in the economy. This is evident 
from economic performance indicators which bounced back only after a couple of years 
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and not immediately after the crisis. On the other hand, the capital controls introduced by 
Malaysia and reflected by the indicator regarding the fiscal balance (as percentage of GDP) 
shows that under capital controls fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy. 
Therefore M2 growth and fiscal expenditure in Malaysia has not been changed to the same 
degree as in Indonesia during and after the crisis. 
 
Comparing the expected results of indicators discussed in the previous chapter and the 
results presented in the Table above there can be seen that the ratios ‘Short Term Debt 
(as % of Reserves)’, ‘Debt Service Paid (as % of GDP), Debt to Service Due, Debt to 
Service Paid, Total Public Debt (as % of GDP)’, ‘Interest Paid to Debt Service Paid’, 
‘Interest Due to Exports of Goods and Services (in %)’, ‘Gross Fixed Investment (as % of 
GDP)’, ‘M2 (year-over-year change, in %)’ and the different economic indicators (including 
Exports of Goods and Services (as % of GDP), Exports of Goods and Services to Imports 
of Goods and Services, GDP per capita (in USD), GDP Growth (real; year-over-year 
change, in %), Consumer Price Index (CPI) (year-over-year change, in %, average over 
period), Exchange Rate (average over period), Real Effective Exchange Rate (average over 
period)) are behaving as expected (see Chapter 6.3.1).  
The ratio ‘Current Account (as % of GDP)’ is due to large inflows in the capital market 
negative (i.e. in the private sector; This differs from the Mexican experience when before 
the outbreak of the ‘Tequila Crisis’ inflows financed the government debt) before the 
outbreak of the crisis and in 1998 both economies experienced a sharp reversal of this 
ratio which becomes positive. The empirical result of ‘International Reserves to Total Debt’ 
is as expected for 1997 but Malaysia recovers rapidly and in 1998 reaches again pre-crisis 
levels (Indonesia only in 1999). The ratios ‘Net foreign Debt (as % of GDP)’ and ‘Net 
Foreign Debt to Exports of Goods and Services’ are as expected for Indonesia but stay 
relatively stable for Malaysia; this could be interpreted as a sign that Malaysia did 
experience a lower degree of exposure to foreign debt. ‘Interest Paid (as % of GDP)’ 
doubles for Indonesia in 1998 but returns to the pre-crisis levels in 1999. The ratios ‘Fiscal 
Balance (as % of GDP)’, ‘Government Budget Expenditure (as % of GDP)’ and 
‘Government Budget Revenue (as % of GDP)’ are in general as expected. For these results 
it can be seen that the ratio ‘Government Budget Expenditure (as % of GDP)’ increased 
only in 2001 as it was allowed to pursue a reflationary macroeconomic policy. 
 
In general, the Malaysian economy reached the pre-crisis levels faster than Indonesia. By 
2005 both economies regained momentum and reached or even surpassed pre-crisis levels 
as shown by economic performance indicators.  
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This indicates that for the macroeconomic indicator analysis the null hypothesis should be 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis should be accepted (see chapter 6.2), i.e. the East 
Asian Crisis did affect the macroeconomy and the economies did recover at a different 
speed. 
 
For completeness some additional economic indicators are shown graphically in the 
Appendix and discussed here. 
A. Exchange Rates 
Here it can be seen (Appendix Figure A7.1 and A7.2) that both (Indonesian Rupiah 
and Malaysian Ringgit) exchange rates were strongly affected by the East Asian 
Crisis, i.e. there can be seen that in 1997 the Indonesian Rupiah versus other 
major currencies depreciated significantly. However, while Indonesia let the 
currency float Malaysia changed its strategy and by September 1998 the Malaysian 
Ringgit was fixed against the US Dollar. 
Even more interesting is that the daily change of the Rupiah and Ringgit versus the 
US Dollar (Appendix Figure A7.3) also changed dramatically in 1997. The 
implications for companies which were exposed to unhedged foreign exchange 
debt were immense as the volatility of exchange rate increased drastically implying 
a lower degree of prediction of exchange rates. 
Looking at the real effective exchange rate (Appendix Figure A7.4) it can be seen, 
that once again the Malaysian economy did not experience such a dramatic slump 
as the Indonesian economy. 
 
B. Interest Rates 
The interest rates (Appendix Figure A7.5 and A7.6) show that the Indonesian 
economy has been hit by a sharp increase in interest rates, while Malaysia 
experienced a lower increment of interest rates. This is important if companies 
have a relatively large exposure to bank finance i.e. if their prime source of 
financing is not from capital markets but from the banking sector as was the case 
in both countries. The combination of high volatility of exchange rates and the 
huge increase in interest rates hit local companies very hard as they were exposed 
to unhedged foreign debt and their primary source of capital has been the banking 
system. Therefore problems in the financial sector were passed-through to 
companies and affected the real economy in both countries, as could be seen by 
the indicators and its discussion above. 
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C. Stock market and related indices 
Looking at JSX and KLSE Composite Index respectively their monthly change 
(Appendix Figure A7.7, A7.8 and A7.9) shows the following: The Indonesian stock 
exchange index experienced a slump in 1997 and 1998 but recovered in 1999 and 
2000, falling back again thereafter and growing since spring 2003 surpassing even 
the pre-crisis level. This contrasts with the experience of the Malaysian stock 
exchange index, which experienced a slump in 1997/1998, too, but did not reach 
pre-crisis levels thereafter. This difference can be explained by new regulations on 
the Malaysian stock market (refer to chapter five for a discussion of corporate 
governance) as well as stricter regulations during and after the imposition of capital 
controls while the Indonesian stock market remained not only during but even after 
the East Asian Crisis relatively open. 
Comparing monthly changes of the ‘JP Morgan Trade Weighted Index’ i.e. this 
index calculates the changes of the local currency to a basket of foreign currencies 
weighted by each country’s bilateral manufactured trade pattern (Appendix Figure 
A7.10) here it can be seen that the volatility of the Indonesian Index was larger 
during and after the East Asian Crisis which can be explained by a larger degree of 
economic and political instability in Indonesia (as discussed before) and by more 
difficulties in the local production and subsequently trade. 
 
D. Capital flow 
Net capital flight (Appendix Figure A7.11) which is capital outflow minus capital 
inflow (a positive sign means capital flight) can be interpreted in the following way: 
Due to free capital account convertibility Indonesia experienced a large capital 
outflow in 1998 while Malaysia experienced a sharp increase in capital outflow, but 
to a lesser extent when compared with Indonesia. The reason for this difference is 
due to capital controls, i.e. free movement of capital was limited by Malaysia. 
Problems for an economy might arise if there are mismatches in the time structure 
of balance sheets which was the case in both economies. Furthermore it can be 
seen from these figures that investor confidence returned soon after the crisis to 
pre-crisis levels in Malaysia but not in Indonesia. As previously mentioned this can 
be attributed to the economic and political instability after the crisis in Indonesia as 
discussed before. 
A greater insight can be gained by looking at the financing sources of both 
economies (Appendix Figure A7.12 and A7.13); where it can be seen that 
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Malaysia’s sources of financing were more stable with constant direct investment 
and portfolio flows compared to Indonesia. 
 
E. Other economic indicators 
As can be seen from the Appendix Figure A7.14 - A7.25 the economic situation in 
Indonesia shows some differences compared to Malaysia which is obvious when  
looking at trade indicators, labour market (i.e. unemployment rate) and money 
supply (including money supply growth rate and inflation rate). As before, in 
general Indonesia has been hit much harder than Malaysia shown by a sharper 
decrease of unemployment rates and lower inflation rates in the latter economy.  
The ranking of export markets is different but it can be seen that both countries 
have the same major export markets (i.e. Japan, Singapore and USA). The four 
major export products are different with Malaysia concentrating on processed 
goods (i.e. electronics and electrical machinery) while Indonesia concentrates on 
processed and raw products such as textiles and garments, petroleum and its 
products, liquefied natural gas and wood and its products. 
Figure A7.24 shows the fund position at IMF of Indonesia and Figure A7.25 shows 
a comparison of CPI vs. CPI Food Index. The latter one is very interesting as it 
shows that the inflation rate for a basket of food has been higher from 1998 to 
2000 than for the CPI basket. This is important as rice has been subsidized in 
Indonesia until the East Asian Crisis as discussed in the chapters before; thereafter 
this subsidy has been abolished and these changes in prices for food had major 
impacts for the poorer class of population which bear a higher burden on 
increasing food prices. Since 2001 Index CPI has been higher than Index CPI Food. 
 
In conclusion these indicators demonstrate that Malaysia was not hit as hard as Indonesia 
by the East Asian Crisis and that the Malaysian economy recovered rapidly following a so-
called V-shape recovery. The various indicators which reflect the health of an economy 
and discussed here indicate that Malaysia and Indonesia were both hit by the East Asian 
Crisis but dealt with it in a different way with the sudden problems arising especially in the 
capital markets and experienced a different speed of recovery, as discussed previously. 
Furthermore it can be observed that Indonesia did not only suffer for a longer period from 
the outcomes of the crisis but costs of the crisis were split on the whole population (i.e. 
socialization of costs of the crisis was much higher in Indonesia compared to Malaysia also 
resulting in problems in the cohabitation of the heterogeneous population of the peninsula 
of Indonesia). 
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While from this single event and the comparison of only these two country experiences it 
can not be deducted that the Malaysian policies - the imposition of specific, tailored capital 
controls on short term capital outflows - during and shortly after the crisis were better 
than the IMF policies pursued by Indonesia. Nevertheless, the result shows that so-called 
‘unorthodox’ policies might however work in specific situations. 
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7.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
The following tables, Table 7.2 - show the results of the difference-in-difference analysis 
for both monthly and quarterly data. For a better legibility and clarity of understanding 
only the baseline effect (i.e. ) and the difference effect (i.e. ) are presented; standard 
errors are in parentheses. Furthermore, conventional and time-shifted estimation results 
are presented in the same table in order to compare directly the results.  
 
TABLE 7.2 – Results: Difference-in-Difference Analysis: Monthly Data 
 
  Conventional Time-Shifted 
Variable Comparator Baseline 
effect 
Difference 
in Malaysia 
R-Squared Baseline 
effect 
Difference 
in Malaysia 
R-Squared 
Stock Market 
Index (log) 
Indonesia 0.6882* 
(0.3109) 
-1.6234* 
(0.2434) 
0.7925 -0.1193 
(0.1897) 
-1.0721* 
(0.1610) 
0.7682 
JP Morgan Trade 
Weighted Index, 
Real (log) 
Indonesia 0.4075* 
(0.2987) 
-0.4639* 
(0.0234) 
0.9836 -0.0041 
(0.0207) 
-0.0208 
(0.0176) 
0.9895 
Interest Rate 
(money market, 
%) 
Indonesia 0.0352 
(0.0451) 
-0.0310 
(0.0353) 
0.9061 0.1050* 
(0.0222) 
-0.0952* 
(0.0187) 
0.9448 
Exchange Rate 
(HC/US$, log) 
Indonesia 1.1518* 
(0.0429) 
-0.8724* 
(0.0376) 
0.9997 0.8552* 
(0.0473) 
-0.6139* 
(0.0492) 
0.9994 
Total Reserves 
minus Gold (log) 
Indonesia 0.2755 
(0.3234) 
-0.9316* 
(0.2532) 
0.8504 -0.1654 
(0.1888) 
-0.530* 
(0.160) 
0.8399 
Inflation Rate 
(CPI, annual, %) 
Indonesia -0.0216 
(0.0627) 
0.0037 
(0.0491) 
0.9133 -0.1294* 
(0.0199) 
0.0943* 
(0.0174) 
0.9559 
Source: Authors own calculations. Data Source: DataStream, IMF 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * 5% level, **10% level. 
 
 
TABLE 7.3 – Results: Difference-in-Difference Analysis: Quarterly Data 
 
  Conventional Time-Shifted 
Variable Comparator Baseline 
effect 
Difference 
in Malaysia 
R-Squared Baseline 
effect 
Difference 
in Malaysia 
R-Squared 
Stock Market 
Index (log) 
Indonesia 0.4480 
(0.5110) 
-1.6721* 
(0.4335) 
0.8984 -0.0071 
(0.2895) 
-1.3127* 
(0.2564) 
0.8967 
GDP (log) Indonesia 0.0151 
(0.2093) 
-0.7029* 
(0.1776) 
0.9892 -0.0064 
(0.1186) 
-0.6751* 
(0.1050) 
0.9873 
Claims on Private 
Sector (log) 
Indonesia -1.1119* 
(0.3873) 
0.3684 
(0.3285) 
0.9461 -
0.3555** 
(0.2076) 
-0.4268* 
(0.1838) 
0.9594 
Government 
Consumption 
Expend. (log) 
Indonesia 1.2802* 
(0.6221) 
-1.5691* 
(0.5277) 
0.8062 0.4641 
(0.3469) 
-0.8365* 
(0.3073) 
0.7411 
Household 
Consumption 
(log) 
Indonesia -0.2543 
(0.3531) 
-0.6952 
(0.2995) 
0.9798 0.1496 
(0.2105) 
-0.9992* 
(0.1865) 
0.9718 
Imports of 
Goods and 
Services (log) 
Indonesia 0.6330** 
(0.3408) 
-1.2802* 
(0.2891) 
0.9638 0.1633 
(0.2054) 
-0.9350* 
(0.1820) 
0.9626 
 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 
(log) 
Indonesia 0.9171* 
(0.3196) 
-1.2503* 
(0.2712) 
0.9727 0.1920 
(0.2028) 
-0.6703* 
(0.1796) 
0.9687 
Source: Authors own calculations. Data Source: DataStream, IMF 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * 5% level, **10% level. 
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The tables should be read in the following way: 
Consider the variable ‘Stock Market Index (log)’ for the time-shifted method of Table 7.2. 
Then the baseline effect is  = -0.1193, i.e. that the stock market during the 12-month 
period after calling in the IMF in Indonesia witnessed 0.1193 percentage points relative to 
trend. In Malaysia the difference in stock market growth in the 12-month period 
subsequent to the introduction of capital controls with respect to Indonesia is  = -
1.0721, i.e. that in Malaysia stock market growth has been 0.9528. The recovery in the 
12-month period after the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia has in fact boosted the 
KLSE and therefore this result is in line with observations. 
Repeating this exercise for all the other variables (including quarterly data) it can be seen 
that Malaysia outperforms for all variables in this analysis, i.e. that Malaysia’s ‘treatment’ 
(capital controls) was more effective than the treatment applied by Indonesia (calling in 
the IMF). This result holds for both, the conventional and time-shifted analysis. The results 
suggest therefore that the goal of Malaysia of stabilizing the economy i.e. stabilizing the 
exchange and interest rate, reflating the economy and restore investor confidence has 
worked. The capital controls allowed Malaysia (as discussed earlier) to use expansionary 
policies as well as restoring investor confidence by eliminating uncertainty on the 
economic and political level. 
Nevertheless the result has to be interpreted carefully as it does not lead to the conclusion 
that capital controls are always better than calling in the IMF but it shows that for two 
economies with a similar starting position and experiencing such an unexpected financial 
turmoil there exist not only the ‘conventional’ or ‘orthodox’ policy but as well other 
possibilities. The results are in line with those found by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). 
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7.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
The ordered logistic regression tries to answer the question how the East Asian Crisis 
influenced the growth and development of the corporate sector and therefore on a 
microeconomic level. Using the ordered logistic regression is on the one hand problematic 
as it codes and categorizes ‘original’ data i.e. categorization might be wrong and on the 
other hand the ordering makes dataset sizes relative. 
 
The issue of structural breaks is not addressed here as the hypotheses are based on the 
assumption that Indonesia and Malaysia experienced the East Asian Crisis and clearly 
imposed their policies at specific points in time (this also was assumed in the previous 
calculation). As described in detail in Chapter 6 the period before the crisis broke out in 
Indonesia is 1991-1997, in Malaysia 1991-1998, while the treatment/after-crisis period is 
1998-2004 for Indonesia and 1999-2004 for Malaysia. Therefore the year of policy change 
is considered being 1997 for Indonesia (remember Indonesia called in the IMF in 1997) 
while Malaysia introduced in 1998 the controls on short term capital outflow as described 
in the previous chapters. 
 
Regarding the data set it can be seen that the size is not the same for the two countries 
(approximately 115 observations for Indonesia and 50 observations for Malaysia). The 
cause of the different sizes of the sets is that the size of the stock market indices differs. 
Only companies were selected which were listed in the stock market index of the relative 
prime market. The following Table 7.4 and 7.5 show some descriptive statistics of the 
variables just described. 
 
TABLE 7.4 – Indonesia: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Data Used  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
PER 29.478 111.585 8.399 32.049 3.890 20.902 19.942 351.381 18.24 109.909 
ROE 8.064 28.725 -46.711 232.348 -284.026 2065.428 -26.805 260.578 -95.674 478.513 
ROA 7.117 11.897 0.055 13.005 -3.909 32.379 7.248 12.599 -2.903 21.603 
CR 1.889 1.584 1.662 2.273 1.578 1.753 2.019 3.057 1.843 2.498 
OM 16.443 24.115 41.313 254.928 32.070 181.757 40.635 298.270 10.833 21.493 
Source: Authors own calculations. NB: 115 Observations per variable; STD = standard deviation; PER = Price-Earnings 
Ratio; ROE = Return on Equity; ROA = Return on Asset; CR = Current Ratio; OM = Operating Margin. 
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TABLE 7.5 – Malaysia: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Data Used  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
PER 20.568 11.194 166.759 1113.59 3.322 63.245 21.684 18.452 24.866 23.898 
ROE 16.554 8.024 15.427 12.347 -8.891 94.994 -0.964 74.787 -0.414 68.685 
ROA 12.300 9.213 10.554 9.502 4.444 12.406 5.317 14.186 6.243 7.473 
CR 1.678 1.164 1.614 0.980 1.471 0.842 1.757 1.315 1.808 1.182 
OM 22.802 25.436 18.114 15.043 10.638 15.598 32.679 15.887 30.503 15.413 
Source: Authors own calculations. NB: 50 Observations per variable; STD = standard deviation; PER = Price-Earnings Ratio; 
ROE = Return on Equity; ROA = Return on Asset; CR = Current Ratio; OM = Operating Margin. 
 
Table 7.4 shows descriptive statistics of company’s data from Indonesian stock market, 
while Table 7.5 shows descriptive statistics for the Malaysian stock market. The PER in 
Indonesia is higher in 1996 then in Malaysia with a much higher standard deviation 
meaning that the distribution is much more widespread for the Indonesian data. This 
higher PER shows that investments in Indonesia took a longer time to repay that is 
reflected by the profitability indicators, ROE and ROA, too. Both indicators, ROE and ROA, 
are much lower and approximately half as much as the Malaysian figures for 1996. A 
similar picture arises from OM which is lower for Indonesia, too, implying that Indonesian 
companies seem to be less efficient in doing business. The liquidity measure CR shows a 
stronger position for Indonesian companies and the standard deviation is lower for 
Malaysia reflecting a more homogenous liquidity position in 1996. 
Looking at data from 1997 it can be seen that the PER for Indonesia decreases while for 
Malaysia it shoots up dramatically. ROE and ROA do not differ significantly for Malaysia 
while becoming negative respectively zero for Indonesia. The more interesting ratio, CR, 
remains relative stable for both countries showing only a slight deterioration in the liquidity 
position. The change of OM in Indonesia is very high which could indicate a sudden fall in 
operating income while the same ratio stayed relative stable in Malaysia. 
The figures for 1998 show further troubles for companies in Indonesia and Malaysia: Both 
markets experience a sudden drop in PER, ROE and ROA as well as a slight worsening of 
the liquidity position. OM falls in both markets, too. 
Moving to 1999 it can be seen that both markets gained momentum moving again towards 
pre-crisis levels. Profitability and liquidity as well as operating efficiency increase; still 
some indicators reflect problems in the market e.g. the ROE is negative for both countries. 
The year 2000 shows a calming in Malaysia as not only most ratios reach again pre-crisis 
levels but there is also a decrease in the standard deviation. On the other hand Indonesian 
indicators are showing a mixed outcome some problems supposedly caused by domestic 
affairs (e.g. independence movements in Aceh). 
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7.3.1 Discussion of Results 
The ordered logistic regression has been computed for all corporations as well as for the 
set of corporations ex-finance (i.e. excluding finance industry). Each single regression was 
advanced by an analysis of correlation of the different variables used in the regression. All 
results can be found in Tables A.7.1, A.7.2, A.7.3 and A.7.4. Firstly, the results for all 
companies will be interpreted followed by the interpretation of the ex-finance regression 
results. The coefficients presented in the tables give only an indication how likely it would 
be to move to a different category (i.e. in the category 1 = bad to 5 = good).  
 
Looking at Tables A.7.1 and A.7.3 it can be seen that the correlation in Indonesia 
increased constantly from the period 1991 to 1997 (‘before’ crisis) and started to decrease 
very slowly in the period 1998 to 2004 (‘treatment’ period). In same period the data shows 
for Malaysia that in the period 1991 to 1998 (‘before’ crisis) the variables were increasing 
slightly but in 1998 there can be seen that correlation jumped up suddenly, subsequently 
decreasing sharply again over the period analyzed. This could indicate that the Indonesian 
market experienced more noise after the imposition of their policies while it seems that 
Malaysia reduced with the imposition of controls on capital outflows some noise in the 
market. 
 
Looking at the results of the ordered logistic regression for Indonesia (Table A.7.1) it can 
be seen that prior to 1997 the model worked relatively well showing an average R2 of 25 
% and at least good significance levels (at the 1% respectively 5% significance level) for 
at least three independent variables. The PER showed a positive relationship over the 
whole period before the outbreak of the crisis however being smaller than one; ROA 
showed a positive but decreasing relationship over this period. The relationship of CR is 
negative but increasing over the period until 1997 suggesting that a higher CR decreases 
ROE which can be explained by the following: the size of ROE is dependent on the 
leverage effect, i.e. the higher the external financing the more ROE will grow as the 
external financing will contribute to an increment of earnings but equity will stay stable 
and in sum ROE will increase. Therefore a high CR is imposing a limit on this just 
described leverage effect and companies usually try to increase the leverage effect by 
decreasing for example the CR as appears to happen in Indonesia in the period before the 
crisis. The OM, during this same period, however demonstrates no significance at all (in 
1991, 1992 and 1993) and ranges from -0.03 to 0.50; suggesting that there is no pattern 
underlying the behaviour of OM.  
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Looking at 1997 there can be seen that only PER and ROA are significant showing a 
positive relationship, while PER is increasing sharply to 1.18 ROA is staying stable at 1.07 
suggesting that the influence of PER in defining the category of ROE increases strongly in 
1997 (i.e. a low category means that the ratio is considered as being bad while a high 
category means that the ratio is good). The other two variables are not significant. The 
period 1998 to 2004 is characterized in general by a lower degree of significance level of 
the variables, i.e. only PER and ROA show good significance levels on average while the 
other two, CR and OM, are almost in every year not significant. R2 ranges from 34% in 
2002 to 24% in 2003, showing a tendency to decrease over the period. The fact that 
correlation was relatively high in the after-crisis period influences the interpretation of R2, 
i.e. actual R2 might be lower as some R2 seems to be due to the high correlation of 
variables. The results for the ordered logistic regression show that the period after the 
crisis was characterized by much more noise than the pre-crisis period in the markets and 
that prediction on the profitability of a company was not anymore based on fundamental 
corporate data (i.e. significance levels which are for CR and OM worse in the after-crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period and the higher correlation of the variables). 
 
Looking at the results of the regression for Malaysia (Table A.7.3) there can be seen that 
in the period until 1998 R2 is ranging from 18% to 46% and OM is never significant at any 
level. Furthermore, CR is only significant at 1% respectively 5% level in 1991, 1995 and 
1997. This might be due to the minor banking crisis in 1994/95 in Malaysia (discussed in 
the previous chapters) where the balance sheets of banks were cleaned up to some 
degree and profitability influenced by other measures (e.g. write downs), too. Looking at 
PER this ratio ranges from -0.41 to 1.08 while ROA is ranging from 1.2 to 2.3. In 1998, the 
year when the policy approach changed in Malaysia (i.e. introduction of capital controls), 
again only PER and ROA are significant while CR and OM are not significant. There can be 
seen that the two coefficients increased sharply in this year for PER and ROA as well as R2 
which reaches almost 50%, but as before, correlation increases and gets very closed to 
one which decreases the goodness of fit of the model. The period after 1998 until 2004 is 
characterized not only by a decreasing correlation but  also by an improvement in the 
significance levels of the independent variables. The single variables return fast to pre-
crisis levels, too, as well as R2. Therefore, it seems that Malaysia limited the noise in the 
market. Furthermore, fundamentals were not neglected in predicting profitability of 
corporations. 
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Comparing now the results of Indonesia and Malaysia there can be seen that both 
economies experienced some change in 1997 respectively 1998. Both economies seem to 
have suffered under more noise in the markets and therefore prediction of profitability by 
the use of fundamental data was limited. While Malaysia returned relatively soon back to 
pre-crisis levels Indonesia only started at the end of the observed period (i.e. 2004) 
coming back to pre-crisis levels. 
 
Looking at the results of the ordered logistic regression – EX-FINANCE (Table A.7.2) it can 
be seen that the correlation for the data of Indonesia increases as before until 1997 and 
reaches its peak in 1997 not improving in the after crisis-period significantly. R2 increases 
until 1997 to 47% and decreases thereafter again to pre-crisis levels. But the relatively 
high level of R2 and correlation in the after-crisis period indicates that there might exist a 
better model and with a better fit. In general, the coefficients are lower than in the overall 
set but the significance level is lower, too. An important observation is that no significant 
change can be observed in 1997 for the size of the variables. Therefore it appears that 
much noise was added by the finance industry of the Indonesian market. Furthermore, 
Indonesia does not reach pre-crisis levels and sizes of the variables in the after-crisis 
period. This could indicate that the real sector experienced some major changes during 
and after the crisis which is in line with the results discussed above. 
The picture for Malaysia (Table A.7.4) shows that correlation increases sharply in 1998 but 
decreases again sharply and returns almost to pre-crisis levels by 2004. R2 stays relatively 
stable over the whole period, although decreasing in the pre-crisis period. Again the high 
R2 in 1998 has to be interpreted carefully as correlation also increased. Significance levels 
of the independent variables are much lower leading to a high insignificance over the 
whole period. It seems that the financial industry explained in the case of Malaysia a 
significant part of the model but also the relative small size of the dataset could have 
affected strongly the model. Overall, it seems that Malaysia returned to pre-crisis levels by 
2004. 
 
Comparing the results of the Indonesian and the Malaysian ordered logistic regression EX-
FINANCE it can be seen that the results differ: While the model is relatively stable for 
Indonesia, it does not work so well for Malaysia. Therefore, it seems that in Indonesia the 
finance industry seemed to add noise in the market and the real sector seems to be 
changed more then in Malaysia, although the results of the Malaysian regression might 
have been influenced by the relative small sample size. 
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To conclude it can be seen that the corporate sector experienced some troubles after the 
East Asian Crisis respectively after imposing the policies: While Indonesia seems only of 
being returned to pre-crisis levels in Indonesia and experiencing much noise, the results 
for Malaysia suggest that even the recovery in the corporate sector was relatively fast 
returning to pre-crisis levels soon after the imposition of capital controls in 1998, although 
a drawback of the Malaysian regressions is that the size of the sample is relatively small 
compared to Indonesia. Both countries show in the years of the policy introduction (i.e. 
1997 for Indonesia and 1998 for Malaysia) some changes in the size of coefficients in the 
model as well as correlation. The results of the ordered logistic regression indicate that the 
null hypothesis i.e. for all calculations there has been no significant change in the period 
before, during and after the crisis in the macro-economy and on the corporate level 
meaning that the East Asian Crisis did not have any significant impact on the Indonesian 
and Malaysian economy, should be rejected and that the alternative hypotheses, i.e. 
firstly, there can be observed a significant change in the macro-economy and on the 
corporate level and secondly, the recovery experienced by the two economies had a 
different outcome and speed, appear true. 
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7.4 Quantile Regression Analysis 
The quantile regression analysis used should answer the question how different quantiles 
(here the 10th, 50th and 90th quantile) evolved during the crisis, i.e. if there had been a 
change over the period observed. As discussed in the Chapter 6 no analysis of break 
points will be conducted but assumed that the pre-crisis period is for Indonesia from 1991 
to 1997 and for Malaysia from 1991 to 1998, while the after-crisis period is for Indonesia 
1998 to 2004 and for Malaysia 1999 to 2004. The period of policy change is 1997 for 
Indonesia and 1998 for Malaysia (for detailed descriptions refer to Chapter 6). 
 
Interpretation of the results of the quantile regression should be made carefully and 
incorporated above with the results. The quantiles are selected to give an overview of the 
movements in the lower, the middle and the higher quantiles of the data set. In contrast 
to the previous calculations (i.e. ordered logistic regression) the quantile regression as 
suggested by literature with raw data and not as done before with categorized data. 
 
7.4.1 Discussion of Results 
The results of the quantile regression model, which were described in Chapter 6, are 
shown in the appendix, Tables A.7.5 and A.7.6. The results show in detail the estimation 
output for every year from 1991 to 2004 for both, Indonesia and Malaysia. As the quality 
of the data is not very good, the estimation of the model used here should be read 
carefully. Furthermore, the results presented here should be read as an integration note to 
the results of the analyses done before and not exclusively on its own.  
 
Looking at Table A.7.5 it can be seen that the correlation are relatively stable over the 
period 1991 to 1996 but changes in 1997 and returns thereafter to pre-crisis levels. 
Looking at the different quantiles there will not be discussed the single year-over-year 
development but the trend between the different stages (before crisis, policy change, after 
crisis).  
Although R2 is relatively high at the beginning (around 50%) it is decreasing from 1991 to 
1996 reaching in 1997 only on average over the quantiles 18% but staying relatively 
stable over the period 1998 to 2004 at an average over quantiles of 10%. Significance 
levels of the different coefficients are relatively low or show even insignificance over the 
whole period but especially in the period 1997 to 2004. Looking at the PER there can be 
seen that the coefficient is in some periods negative which can be interpreted as a 
discount in the case of a high PER; until 1997 PER ranged below or around 0 but in 1997 
PER shoots up dramatically for the 10th quantile while staying relatively stable for the 50th 
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and the 90th quantile. In 1998 the 10th quantile of PER increases even more (almost 
tripling) and decreases over the period 1999 to 2004 reaching again almost pre-crisis 
levels. ROA stays relatively stable until 1996 when the 10th quantile decreases sharply; in 
1997 ROA shoots up drastically especially for the 10th quantile. The period 1998 to 2004 is 
characterized by the return to pre-crisis levels for the 10th and the 50th quantile while the 
90th quantile seems to follow a different pattern moving up and down over the period and 
reaching in 2003 pre-crisis levels. In general CR is negative over the whole pre-crisis 
period although the 90th quantile increases in 1996 sharply and becoming positive; a 
negative CR implies that the leverage effect is not considered being good while a positive 
implies that the leverage effect could increase profitability. In 1997 CR decreases sharply 
for the 10th and the 50th quantile while decreases moderately for the 90th quantile. Over 
the period from 1998 to 2004 the CR returns almost to pre-crisis levels although showing a 
different pattern for 1998 when CR almost triples for the 10th quantile. The pattern of the 
CR for 1998 suggests that the top 10th quantiles of corporations in the market is 
demanding a premium of having more leverage which could suggest that the market 
seems to know the companies being in financial distress. OM is staying around zero over 
the period with the exception of 2001 and 2002 when it differs significantly from zero for 
the 90th quantile. 
Summing up, the model worked relatively well for Indonesia for the pre-crisis period but 
coefficients changed dramatically in 1997 and 1998 subsequently returning to pre-crisis 
levels. Furthermore, it seems that the market knows which corporations are healthy and 
which have in the period from 1991 to 1996 and 1999 to 2004 but not for the period 1997 
to 1998 when there seems being a lot of noise in the market as all coefficients change 
drastically for all quantiles. The results point out that the causes of the crisis identified by 
literature and discussed in the chapters before are reflected by the corporate data used 
here, too, e.g. noise as a signal for irrational behaviour. 
 
Looking at Table A.7.6 it can be seen that the correlation remain relatively stable over the 
entire period changing only drastically in 1998 when all variables are positively correlated. 
R2 is relatively high and stable and slightly decreasing over the period 1991 to 1996 and 
averaging over quantiles and the period at 40% but decreasing sharply for the 10th 
quantile in 1998 reaching an absolute low over the whole period of 17%, while the other 
quantiles stay relatively stable. The period 1999 to 2004 is characterized by almost the 
same level of R2 as in the pre-crisis period. The coefficients are in general not significant 
over the whole period with exception of 1998 where significance levels are very low and 
the p-value reaches almost one indicating a very low goodness of fit of the model in 1998. 
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PER is ranging around zero over the whole period with no exceptional identified 
movements. The same is true for other variables, ROA, CR and OM which move within a 
relative small band over the whole period and show no significant outlier.  
To conclude, Malaysia did not experience huge movements within the whole group of 
corporations analyzed here – the model is relatively stable with the exception of 1998 
when the p-value of almost all coefficients reaches one. This suggests that there has been 
some noise in the Malaysian financial market in 1998 which seems to disappear in 1999 
when pre-crisis levels are almost reached for all quantiles. 
 
Comparing the results of the quantile regression analysis for Indonesia and Malaysia it can 
be seen that the model fits much better for the Malaysian data set while the results for the 
Indonesian data set are not so good. Furthermore, it can be seen that the period of policy 
change and the period after the crisis were characterized by much more noise in Indonesia 
than in Malaysia suggesting that the causes of the crisis identified and discussed in 
literature and presented in the previous chapters are applying (e.g. irrational behaviour). 
Lastly, the results of the analysis made in this section suggest that the null hypothesis 
discussed in Chapter 6 should be rejected and suggesting that the alternative hypotheses 
could be accepted, i.e. that firstly, there can be observed a significant change in the 
macroeconomy and on the corporate level and secondly, the recovery experienced by the 
two economies had a different outcome and speed. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The different analyses used in this chapter try to show an integrated picture of the effects 
of the policy instruments imposed during the crisis by Indonesia and Malaysia. For a 
generalization of results a comparison of more countries experiencing similar situations 
would be required which seems to be rather difficult in this kind of empirical studies as not 
many countries used a similar policy approach of Malaysia and therefore data available is 
rather limited. 
To conclude from the results seen above it can be said that Malaysia, when compared to 
Indonesia, experienced a faster recovery starting in 1998 while Indonesia needed more 
years to recover. This result has been expected and suggests that the alternative 
hypothesis might be true and rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e. there has been no 
significant change in the period before, during and after the crisis in the macro-economy 
and on the corporate level meaning that the East Asian Crisis did not have any significant 
impact on the Indonesian and Malaysian economy) but it is interesting that it is reflected 
by the results of macroeconomic indicators (e.g. difference-in-difference analysis) as well 
as by corporate data analyses (i.e. ordered logistic regression and quantile regression). 
The analyses of macroeconomic data show that Indonesia socialized much more of private 
debts while Malaysia circumvented socializing debt which was one of the causes in 
Indonesia for social unrest during and after the crisis. Furthermore, it seems that 
Indonesia had to deal with much more noise in the financial markets as shown by the 
results of corporate data which could be interpreted as a signal of irrational behaviour. 
Nevertheless, limiting the relative good performance of the Malaysian economy exclusively 
to the imposition of capital controls is not trivial and correct. The outcome of the analyses 
of data suggests that the capital controls were beneficial but could neither define the 
degree of being beneficial nor the direct effectiveness. This would need further 
investigation and further analyses showing the degree of direct influence of the capital 
controls especially on the corporate level. 
 
Due to the data analysis it can be shown that capital controls on short-term capital 
outflows with a specified exit strategy are an option for economies in a similar position as 
Malaysia in 1997/1998; but as mentioned above, any general recommendation for a 
country in a situation of crisis could not be drawn from the data analysis presented in this 
chapter. The results discussed in this chapter are in line with the expectations and findings 
discussed in literature as discussed above and in the previous chapters. 
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8 
Conclusion 
 
 
The goal of this study is aimed at giving an overview of two different policy approaches 
i.e. the ‘orthodox’ and ‘unorthodox’ policies during the East Asian Crisis and the 
implications for Indonesia and Malaysia. The comparison has been limited to these two 
countries, which were selected due to some affinities (e.g. both were colonies until mid of 
19th century, both are Islamic countries) and their experiences during the East Asian Crisis 
(e.g. both countries were considered as economies with high growth potential before the 
outbreak of the crisis but hit by the crisis suddenly). However, the outcome of this study 
cannot be generalized although some results are very interesting (e.g. that Malaysia 
recovered faster not only on a macroeconomic level but as well as shown by the quantile 
regression on the corporate sector level) due to the limited focus on Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Generalizations could only be done if a larger set of countries could be compared 
experiencing a similar situation which is rather difficult as similar crisis experiences are 
very limited due to a small number of crisis of the same crisis generation and the use of 
policy instruments which tended to be influenced mainly by the IMF in the past (with an 
exception of Chile in the 1990s and Malaysia as discussed in Chapters 2 – 3).  
This study analyses and compares the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia during and 
after the East Asian Crisis not only on a macroeconomic level but as well on the corporate 
level analysing the causes of the crisis on a qualitative and quantitative level and showing 
how the ‘orthodox’ and ‘unorthodox’ policies applied during the crisis influenced the 
economies and their growth. 
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8.1 Conclusion and Future Discussion 
This study started with a general overview of the so-called ‘The East Asian Miracle’ and 
introduced in more detail the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia, i.e. the economic 
and political situation, before the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis (Chapter 1). A longer 
discussion about the timing and the causes of the East Asian Crisis followed and different 
views and models (e.g. the three generations of crises) describing the crisis were 
introduced and discussed (Chapter 2). In addition remedies at the disposal for the two 
economies were presented showing the different possibilities for the crisis countries 
available (e.g. assistance from IFIs or from neighbouring countries) (Chapter 3). 
Consequently a detailed discussion of the remedies applied by Indonesia and Malaysia 
during the crisis followed; the policies introduced and applied were aimed at limiting the 
troubles in the financial market and the real economy (Chapter 4). Successively, the 
change of governance and corporate governance (including the change in banking in 
Indonesia and Malaysia) has been analysed (Chapter 5). Chapters 6 and 7 concluded with 
data analysis of macroeconomic and corporate data was discussed and analyzed by using 
different techniques. While a few similar studies have been done over the past ten years 
since the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis there such a comprehensive analysis of the 
experience of Malaysia and Indonesia and using both macroeconomic and corporate data 
does not exist in literature. 
 
The analysis of the two major policy options have been of major interest and show that 
not only the so-called ‘orthodox’ policies could be used in a situation of crisis but other 
policies as well the so-called ‘unorthodox’ policies. The application of unorthodox policies 
and their outcome have been subject of some studies (as discussed in the chapters 
before). These policies are nowadays accepted in literature as a policy option in a situation 
of economic turmoil. Therefore, the experience of Malaysia is an example that shows other 
countries the possibilities and strategies which are available based on economic theory 
and could be imposed without violating membership at IMF or other IFI’s. 
 
The experiences of the two examined economies were similar before the crisis but 
developed differently after the crisis and show how different policy actions can influence 
economic and political stability pushing prospering economies into a slump (i.e. Indonesia) 
or leading to a sharp recovery (i.e. Malaysia). Summing up the results of the previous 
chapters it seems that Indonesia recovered only after approx. ten years after the outbreak 
of the crisis while Malaysia recovered sooner and has not been expected during the crisis 
(i.e. IMF – see Chapter 4). Furthermore, Indonesia experienced political rumours and 
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turmoil while Malaysia seems after a short period of political instability in 1997/98 being 
returned to political stability in 1999. 
 
Concluding, countries have at disposal various policies in periods of economic instability 
such as the East Asian Crisis. The ‘one medicine helps all’ approach seems not to work in 
every situation and although ‘unorthodox’ policies are controversial for some policymakers 
and actors of the international financial markets, they seem to work properly if adopted 
with caution. Theory does not suggest in advance one single policy as a specific remedy – 
as discussed in Chapter 3 there are different possibilities and choices and each choice 
comes with benefits and costs which have to be weighed up which can be seen clearly by 
the impossible trinity. 
 
Additionally, the East Asian Crisis has shown that fundamental problems in the private and 
corporate sector can be transmitted to the real economy causing not only stock markets to 
tumble but also other sectors and branches of the economy. Therefore a healthy banking 
sector following prudent rules of matching assets and liabilities which is supervised by 
strong and independent authorities seems to play one but important part answering crisis 
prevention and being a lesson drawn from the East Asian Crisis. Additionally, corporations 
have to become aware of possible risks of currency mismatches and how to deal with 
potential risks (e.g. currency risks) i.e. giving incentives to hedge. The introduction of new 
governance and corporate governance rules is just one step towards the strengthening of 
the corporate and banking sector. 
 
One major issue before the outbreak of the East Asian Crisis has been the liberalization of 
goods and services followed by the progress of liberalization of capital flows. While the 
former ones seem to increase economic growth the liberalization of capital flows seems to 
be much more controversial in economic theory and as discussed in the previous chapters. 
The outbreak of the East Asian Crisis has stopped the initiatives of the IMF to push full 
capital mobility in all member countries. Nowadays, the approach of a stepwise opening to 
capital mobility i.e. starting with FDIs and ending by short term capital flows is adopted by 
most countries. The pressure on some high performing emerging economies of major 
international financial market players might be still huge but there is an increased 
awareness of full capital account convertibility (not only openness for FDIs but as well 
short term capital flows), too, as can be seen by the example of some Asian economies 
like People’s Republic of China and India.  
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Doubtless, it seems is almost impossible predicting any new kind of crisis or how the crisis 
generation models will develop in future. Nevertheless, the awareness and crisis 
prevention seems to be better than cure. Therefore, sound macroeconomic policies, 
whatever they are, and observing the interconnections of financial markets have to be 
regarded as one task of crisis prevention.  
 
As mentioned before, the results of the analyses presented and discussed in the Chapters 
6 and 7 could not be generalized meaning that there could not be concluded due to the 
limited data sets and comparison of only two countries that the imposition of capital 
controls on short term capital outflows in Malaysia is better than the use of the ‘orthodox’ 
policies in Indonesia. It can be concluded that Malaysia’s economy recovered faster 
following a V-shaped recovery while Indonesia needed more time for recovery.  
Furthermore, this seems to be true as well for corporations in Malaysia that have 
recovered faster and did not experience such a huge slump in performance as Indonesian 
companies did.  This is an interesting finding as it shows the interconnections of the 
performance of corporations in one country and the macroeconomy and could be seen as 
empirical evidence for the Bernanke-Gertler effect which has been introduced and 
discussed in chapter two. 
 
Future research could continue to investigate about the interconnections of the 
performance of the corporations and the macroeconomic situation. Furthermore, future 
research might use different techniques which are technically not yet feasible such as a 
quantile-panel data analysis of corporate data which how different companies moved over 
different quantiles but as well how the company’s performance would change in different 
years and groups.  
Lastly, the research could be extended to a larger set of countries which is tricky as there 
are not many experiences observed using ‘unorthodox’ policies and there is a lack of 
reliable and comprehensive datasets for most financial markets outside the developed 
economies and major financial markets. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.3.1 – Interest Rates in Indonesia, Malaysia and the USA 
Time 
Ind. Discount 
Rate 
Ind. 3-Months 
Deposits 
Mal. Interbank 
Overnight Rate 
Mal. Treasury 
Bill 3 Months 
US Discount 
Rate 
US Treasury Bill 
Rate 
1990/1 13,2 16,78 4,7 4,83 7 7,64 
1990/2 13,13 16,55 4,57 4,84 7 7,76 
1990/3 13,13 16,23 4,99 5,09 7 7,87 
1990/4 13,13 15,85 5,52 5,38 7 7,78 
1990/5 13,2 15,99 6,09 5,99 7 7,78 
1990/6 16,94 16,08 5,96 6,2 7 7,74 
1990/7 17,74 16,5 5,03 6,22 7 7,66 
1990/8 17,4 17,24 6,16 6,31 7 7,44 
1990/9 17,63 18,36 6,56 6,76 7 7,38 
1990/10 18,25 19,47 6,7 7,12 7 7,19 
1990/11 18,36 20,32 6,86 7,4 7 7,07 
1990/12 18,83 21 6,7 7,23 6,5 6,81 
1991/1 19,25 21,35 6,79 7,14 6,5 6,3 
1991/2 19,25 22,09 6,49 6,8 6 5,95 
1991/3 23,55 24,21 6,48 6,53 6 5,91 
1991/4 20,5 25,28 6,73 6,99 5,5 5,67 
1991/5 19,01 25,66 6,96 7,1 5,5 5,51 
1991/6 18,99 25,01 6,96 7,08 5,5 5,6 
1991/7 18,73 24,44 7,01 7,07 5,5 5,58 
1991/8 18,5 23,54 7,44 7,5 5,5 5,39 
1991/9 18,5 22,61 7,77 7,93 5 5,25 
1991/10 18,5 21,89 7,75 7,72 5 5,03 
1991/11 18,5 21,84 7,7 7,71 4,5 4,6 
1991/12 18,47 21,88 7,68 7,7 3,5 4,12 
1992/1 18 21,57 7,94 7,74 3,5 3,84 
1992/2 18 21,46 7,98 7,69 3,5 3,84 
1992/3 17,99 21,29 7,87 7,63 3,5 4,05 
1992/4 17 21,13 7,82 7,88 3,5 3,81 
1992/5 17 20,83 8,06 8,02 3,5 3,66 
1992/6 16 20,09 7,99 7,98 3,5 3,7 
1992/7 16 19,42 7,73 7,81 3 3,28 
1992/8 15,21 18,88 7,84 7,69 3 3,14 
1992/9 14,66 18,48 7,96 7,64 3 2,97 
1992/10 14,49 17,97 7,94 7,64 3 2,84 
1992/11 14 17,39 7,91 7,09 3 3,14 
1992/12 13,5 16,72 7,96 7,1 3 3,25 
1993/1 13,5 16,35 7,88 7,16 3 3,06 
1993/2 13 16,14 7,56 7,18 3 2,95 
1993/3 12,5 15,71 7,5 7,15 3 2,97 
1993/4 12,5 15,52 7,45 7,04 3 2,89 
1993/5 11,83 15,26 7,3 6,76 3 2,96 
1993/6 10,74 15,19 7,17 6,86 3 3,1 
1993/7 8,75 14,9 7,26 6,76 3 3,05 
1993/8 7,45 14,47 6,93 6,64 3 3,05 
1993/9 9,11 13,75 6,63 5,75 3 2,96 
1993/10 9,69 13,06 6,84 5,64 3 3,04 
1993/11 9,52 12,42 6,48 5,58 3 3,12 
1993/12 8,82 11,79 6,25 5,24 3 3,08 
1994/1 8,83 11,65 3,6 3,47 3 3,02 
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1994/2 8,21 11,66 4,21 2,97 3 3,21 
1994/3 8,45 11,53 4,33 2,77 3 3,52 
1994/4 8,72 11,43 4,17 3,26 3 3,74 
1994/5 9,66 11,58 3,89 3,88 3,5 4,19 
1994/6 9,94 12,07 4,14 3,38 3,5 4,18 
1994/7 10,7 12,51 4,13 3,95 3,5 4,39 
1994/8 10,87 12,94 4,08 3,95 4 4,5 
1994/9 11,55 13,35 3,95 4,03 4 4,64 
1994/10 11,99 13,67 4,34 3,9 4 4,96 
1994/11 12,17 13,74 4,65 4,11 4,4 5,25 
1994/12 12,44 14,27 4,91 4,51 4,75 5,64 
1995/1 13,05 14,69 4,8 4,57 4,75 5,81 
1995/2 13,66 15,35 5,08 5,29 5,25 5,8 
1995/3 14,13 15,92 5,17 5,23 5,25 5,73 
1995/4 14,34 16,39 5,35 5,41 5,25 5,67 
1995/5 14,74 16,73 5,47 5,61 5,25 5,7 
1995/6 14,74 17,09 5,6 5,2 5,25 5,5 
1995/7 14,67 17,42 5,5 5,33 5,25 5,47 
1995/8 14,06 17,61 5,73 5,61 5,25 5,41 
1995/9 14,02 17,6 5,66 5,73 5,25 5,26 
1995/10 13,95 17,41 6,01 6,16 5,25 5,3 
1995/11 13,99 17,25 6,34 6,04 5,25 5,35 
1995/12 13,99 17,15 6,48 5,85 5,25 5,16 
1996/1 13,99 17,2 6,52 6,03 5,24 5,02 
1996/2 13,92 17,22 7,15 6,39 5 4,87 
1996/3 13,99 17,29 6,98 6,4 5 4,96 
1996/4 13,98 17,38 6,86 6,32 5 4,99 
1996/5 13,99 17,38 6,72 6,28 5 5,02 
1996/6 13,99 17,35 6,87 6,37 5 5,11 
1996/7 13,92 17,35 7,21 6,52 5 5,17 
1996/8 13,96 17,26 6,54 6,55 5 5,09 
1996/9 13,96 17,25 6,97 6,53 5 5,15 
1996/10 13,93 17,18 6,55 6,5 5 5,01 
1996/11 13,4 17,18 7,5 6,56 5 5,03 
1996/12 12,12 17,03 7,15 6,48 5 4,87 
1997/1 12,06 16,85 7,19 6,3 5 5,05 
1997/2 11,75 16,66 7,49 6,27 5 5 
1997/3 11,07 16,47 6,42 6,31 5 5,14 
1997/4 10,72 16,25 7,26 6,41 5 5,17 
1997/5 10,63 16,06 10,12 6,41 5 5,13 
1997/6 10,5 15,93 7,18 6,48 5 4,92 
1997/7 10,87 15,84 11,44 6,29 5 5,07 
1997/8 13,67 21,73 6,26 6,31 5 5,13 
1997/9 22 26,22 5,71 6 5 4,97 
1997/10 20,7 27,73 6,68 6,24 5 4,95 
1997/11 20 26,51 7,26 7,1 5 5,15 
1997/12 20 23,92 8,29 6,76 5 5,16 
1998/1 20 22,86 8,99 5,92 5 5,09 
1998/2 22 24 10,1 5,85 5 5,11 
1998/3 27,75 27,26 9,62 6,08 5 5,03 
1998/4 46,43 29,4 10,59 7,71 5 5 
1998/5 58 32,95 9,13 8,95 5 5,03 
1998/6 58 40,63 10,19 9,98 5 4,99 
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1998/7 70,81 43,01 9,21 8,06 5 4,96 
1998/8 70,73 44,35 9,18 6,48 5 4,94 
1998/9 68,76 47,38 6,64 6,26 5 4,74 
1998/10 59,72 54,67 6,24 5,91 4,75 4,08 
1998/11 51,25 53,06 6,11 5,8 4,5 4,44 
1998/12 38,44 49,23 5,41 5,38 4,5 4,42 
1999/1 36,43 45,5 5,31 5,57 4,5 4,34 
1999/2 37,5 38,2 5,23 5,31 4,5 4,45 
1999/3 37,84 34,85 5,23 5,4 4,5 4,48 
1999/4 35,19 34,09 3,53 3,94 4,5 4,28 
1999/5 28,73 31,2 3,08 2,65 4,5 4,51 
1999/6 22,05 27,39 2,81 2,73 4,5 4,59 
1999/7 15,01 23,45 2,6 2,72 4,5 4,6 
1999/8 13,2 19,06 2,54 2,97 4,75 4,76 
1999/9 13,02 15,88 2,53 2,82 4,75 4,73 
1999/10 13,13 13,37 2,54 2,72 4,75 4,88 
1999/11 13,1 12,91 2,66 2,77 5 5,07 
1999/12 12,51 12,95 2,52 2,71 5 5,23 
2000/1 11,48 12,85 2,55 2,61 5 5,34 
2000/2 11,13 12,64 2,55 2,74 5,25 5,57 
2000/3 11,03 12,4 2,57 2,89 5,5 5,72 
2000/4 11 12,16 2,51 2,81 5,5 5,67 
2000/5 11,08 11,81 2,55 2,75 6 5,92 
2000/6 11,74 11,69 2,53 2,71 6 5,74 
2000/7 13,53 11,79 2,63 2,76 6 5,93 
2000/8 13,53 12,36 2,8 3,09 6 6,11 
2000/9 13,62 12,84 2,79 3,12 6 5,99 
2000/10 13,74 13,09 2,78 2,95 6 6,1 
2000/11 14,15 13,17 2,82 2,92 6 6,18 
2000/12 14,53 13,24 2,82 2,98 6 5,83 
2001/1 14,74 13,83 2,8 2,92 5 5,26 
2001/2 14,79 14,35 2,78 2,82 5 4,93 
2001/3 15,82 14,86 2,87 2,81 4,5 4,5 
2001/4 16,09 14,93 2,79 2,79 4 3,91 
2001/5 16,3 14,92 2,85 2,79 3,5 3,66 
2001/6 16,55 15 2,77 2,84 3,25 3,48 
2001/7 17,17 15,14 2,77 2,81 3,25 3,54 
2001/8 17,67 15,62 2,78 2,78 3 3,39 
2001/9 17,57 16,16 2,78 2,78 2,5 2,87 
2001/10 17,58 16,67 2,8 2,73 2 2,22 
2001/11 17,6 17,06 2,76 2,71 1,5 1,93 
2001/12 17,62 17,24 2,76 2,73 1,25 1,72 
2002/1 17,21 17,39 2,76 2,75 1,25 1,66 
2002/2 16,86 17,24 2,7 2,73 1,25 1,73 
2002/3 16,76 17,02 2,71 2,71 1,25 1,81 
2002/4 16,61 16,57 2,72 2,72 1,25 1,72 
2002/5 15,51 16,24 2,72 2,72 1,25 1,74 
2002/6 15,11 15,85 2,72 2,72 1,25 1,7 
2002/7 14,93 15,26 2,74 2,73 1,25 1,68 
2002/8 14,35 14,77 2,73 2,72 1,25 1,63 
2002/9 13,22 14,36 2,72 2,72 1,25 1,63 
2002/10 13,1 13,94 2,74 2,72 1,25 1,59 
2002/11 13,06 13,76 2,75 2,71 0,83 1,25 
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2002/12 12,93 13,63 2,79 2,82 0,75 1,2 
2003/1 12,69 13,49 2,77 2,8 2,25 1,17 
2003/2 12,24 13,15 2,75 2,8 2,25 1,16 
2003/3 11,4 12,9 2,81 2,79 2,25 1,12 
2003/4 11,06 12,48 2,74 2,79 2,25 1,14 
2003/5 10,44 12,02 2,76 2,78 2,25 1,08 
2003/6 9,53 11,55 2,77 2,77 2,2 0,94 
2003/7 9,1 10,65 2,75 2,77 2 0,9 
2003/8 8,91 9,58 2,73 2,82 2 0,95 
2003/9 8,66 8,58 2,71 2,82 2 0,94 
2003/10 8,48 7,96 2,71 2,77 2 0,92 
2003/11 8,49 7,58 2,71 2,78 2 0,94 
2003/12 8,31 7,14 2,71 2,77 2 0,89 
2004/1 7,86 6,68 2,7 2,68 2 0,89 
2004/2 7,48 6,38 2,71 2,38 2 0,92 
2004/3 7,42 6,11 2,71 2,54 2 0,94 
2004/4 7,33 6,01 2,72 2,49 2 0,94 
2004/5 7,32 6,17 2,7 2,58 2 1,03 
2004/6 7,34 6,31 2,7 2,57 2,01 1,28 
2004/7 7,34 6,49 2,7 2,34 2,25 1,35 
2004/8 7,37 6,54 2,7 2,51 2,43 1,5 
2004/9 7,39 6,61 2,69 2,52 2,58 1,67 
2004/10 7,41 6,65 2,69 2,35 2,75 1,75 
2004/11 7,41 6,66 2,69 1,84 2,93 2,08 
2004/12 7,43 6,71 2,69 1,96 3,15 2,2 
2005/1 7,42 6,71 2,7 2,25 3,25 2,35 
2005/2 7,43 6,74 2,69 2,22 3,49 2,59 
2005/3 7,44 6,93 2,7 2,56 3,58 2,76 
2005/4 7,7 6,87 2,7 2,56 3,75 2,78 
2005/5 7,95 7,03 2,7 1,74 3,98 2,87 
2005/6 8,25 7,19 2,7 2,66 4,01 3 
2005/7 8,49 7,41 2,7 2,3 4,25 3,21 
2005/8 9,51 7,71 2,7 2,27 4,44 3,46 
2005/9 10 8,51 2,7 2,69 4,59 3,46 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
 
TABLE A.4.1 – Overview of Capital and Exchange Control Measures Before and After 
September 1st 1998 
Transaction Prior to September 1st 1998 New 
Transfers based on external accounts Transfer between external account holders freely allowed. Transfer of any amount between external 
accounts requires prior approval 
 
Sources of funding external accounts are limited 
to: 
 Proceeds from sale of ringgit 
instruments, securities registered in 
Malaysia or other assets in Malaysia, 
 Salaries, wages, commissions, 
interest or dividends, and 
 Sales of foreign currency. 
 
Use of funds in accounts is limited to purchase of 
ringgit assets in Malaysia. 
General payments Residents were freely allowed to make payments to non-
residents for any purpose. Amounts of RM100000 and above 
were permitted provided the resident did not have any 
domestic borrowing (if the payment was for investment 
abroad) or the payment was made in foreign currency (for non-
trade purposes). 
Residents are freely allowed to make payments to 
non-residents for any purpose up to RM10000 in 
ringgit or foreign currency, except for imports of 
goods and services. 
Amounts exceeding RM10000 require approval 
and are allowed in foreign currency only. 
Export of goods Payments to be received in foreign currency or ringgit from an 
external account. 
Payments are to be received from an external 
account in foreign currency only. 
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Credit facilities to non-residents Non-resident correspondent banks and stock-broking 
companies were permitted to obtain credit facilities up to RM5 
million from domestic banks to fund mismatch of receipts and 
payments in their external accounts. 
Domestic credit facilities to non-resident 
corresponding banks and non-resident stock-
broking companies are no longer allowed. 
Investment abroad Corporate residents with domestic borrowing were allowed to 
invest abroad up to the equivalent of RM10 million per calendar 
year on a corporate group basis. 
Residents with no domestic borrowing are 
allowed to make payment to non-residents for 
investment abroad up to an amount or RM10000 
or its equivalent in foreign currency per 
transaction. 
Credit facilities from non-residents Residents were allowed to obtain ringgit credit facilities of less 
than RM100000 in the aggregate from non-resident individuals. 
All residents require prior approval to make 
payments to non-residents for investing abroad 
an amount exceeding RM100 equivalent in foreign 
currency. Residents are not allowed to obtain 
ringgit credit facilities from any non-resident 
individual. 
Trading in securities There were no restrictions on secondary trading of securities 
registered in Malaysia between residents and non-residents and 
among non-residents. 
For transfer of Securities registered outside Malaysia from a 
non-resident to a resident, the resident was subject to the rules 
on investment abroad. 
Ringgit securities held by non-residents must be 
transacted through an authorized depositor. 
All payments by non-residents for any security 
registered in Malaysia must be made from an 
external account (in foreign currency or in 
ringgit). 
All proceeds in ringgit received by a non-resident 
from the sale of any Malaysian security must be 
retained in an external account for at least one 
year before converting to foreign currency. 
All payments to residents for any security 
registered outside Malaysia from non-residents 
must be made in foreign currency. 
Import and export of currency notes, 
bills of exchange, insurance policies 
etc. 
A resident or non-resident traveller was free to import or export 
any amount of ringgit notes or foreign currency notes in 
person. 
Export of foreign currencies required approval. 
Authorized currency dealers were allowed to import any 
amount of ringgit notes, subject to reporting to Bank Negara 
Malaysia on a monthly basis. 
A resident traveller is permitted to bring in ringgit 
notes up to RM1000 only and any amount of 
foreign currencies. 
A resident traveller is permitted to export ringgit 
notes only up to RM1000 and foreign currencies 
up to the equivalent of RM10000. 
A non-resident traveller is permitted to import 
ringgit notes up to RM1000 only and any amount 
of foreign currencies. 
A non-resident traveller is permitted to export 
ringgit notes up to RM1000 only and foreign 
currencies up to the amount brought into the 
country. 
Transaction in the Labuan Offshore 
Financial Centre 
Licensed offshore banks were allowed to trade in ringgit 
instruments up to permitted limits. 
Licensed offshore banks are no longer allowed to 
trade in ringgit instruments. 
Source: Athukorala (2001, pp. 128-129) 
 
FIGURE A.4.1 – Monthly Exchange Rate Movement of Indonesian Rupiah 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
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FIGURE A.4.2 – Monthly Exchange Rate Movement of Malaysian Ringgit 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
 
TABLE A.5.1 – Summary of Questionnaires and Answers 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
A. The Rights of Shareholders 
1. What periodic information are listed companies required to disclose? 
1.1 Annual Reports Yes Yes 
1.2 Unaudited semi-annual reports Yes  
1.3 Quarterly financial statements Yes Yes 
1.4 AGM minutes No Yes 
1.5 AGM attendance records No Yes 
1.6 Audit Committee Report (if have Audit Committee) Yes Yes 
2. Convening of shareholder meetings 
2.1 Time of notice (days before meeting) 28 days 14-21 days 
2.2 Thresholds for requesting or convening an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting, including number 
of shares, number of shareholders and minimum 
holding period required. 
10% share 2 or more members holding 
more than 10% of the issued 
share 
2.3 Legal minimum quorum requirements for None 
EGM (Quorum means the minimum number of 
shareholders attending EGM) 
½ of independent 
shareholders 
Up to company, usually 2 
members 
2.4 Is non-voting shares allowed? Yes No 
2.5 Is multiple voting shares allowed? No No 
3. Can shareholders vote by  
3.1. proxy Yes Yes 
3.1.a Any document required Yes Yes 
3.1.b Any notarization required Yes Yes 
3.2 mail Yes No 
3.3 other means (such as electronic voting, please 
specify) 
No No 
4. Do shareholders have the right to vote on: 
4.1 Appointment/Removal of directors Yes Yes 
4.2 Appointment/Removal of auditors Yes Yes 
4.3 Authorizing share capital Yes Yes 
4.4. Issuing share capital Yes Yes 
4.5 Disapplication of pre-emption rights Yes Not prescribed 
4.6 Amendments to company articles or statute Yes Yes 
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4.7 Remuneration of board members Yes Yes 
4.8 Major corporate transactions (acquisitions, 
disposals, mergers, takeovers) 
Yes Yes 
4.9 Transaction with related parties Yes Yes 
Size of related party transaction subject to 
shareholder voting 
None ≥5% of net tangible assets 
4.10 Can shareholders nominate a candidate of 
director? 
Yes Yes 
If yes, what is the requirement to do so? (i.e. number 
of shares or number of shareholders required to make 
such nomination) 
10% of legal voting rights ≥5% of voting rights, or not 
less than 100 members 
holding shares 
4.11 Can shareholder propose an agenda at 
shareholder meeting? 
Yes Yes 
If yes, what is the requirement to do so? (i.e. number 
of shares or number of shareholders required to make 
such proposal) 
10% of legal voting rights ≥5% of voting rights, or not 
less than 100 members 
5. What are the minimum number of shares required to approve the solution? 
5.1 Appointment of directors ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
Removal of directors ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
5.2 Appointment of auditors ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority; An election of 
directors shall take place 
each year 
Removal of auditors ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
5.3 Authorizing share capital ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
5.4 Issuing share capital ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
5.5 Dissapplicatoin of pre-emption rights ½ of the total shares with 
legal voting rights 
None 
5.6 Amendments to company articles or statute Attendance of 2/3 of the total 
shares with legal voting rights 
and approved by at least 2/3 
of such votes 
Special resolution, not less 
than 75% 
5.7 Remuneration of board members  Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
5.8 Major corporate transactions (acquisitions, 
disposals, mergers, takeovers) 
Attended by ¾ of the total 
shares with legal voting rights 
and approved by more than 
¾ of such votes 
Special resolution, not less 
than 75% majority 
5.9 Transaction with related parties Attended by at least ½ of 
independent shareholders 
and approved by more than 
½ of such votes 
Ordinary resolution, simple 
majority 
6. How can shareholders seek redress if their rights are violated? 
6.1 Derivative action/derivative lawsuit Yes Yes 
If yes, what is the requirement to do so? (i.e. number 
of shares or number of shareholders required to make 
such proposal) 
  
6.2 Class action lawsuit No Yes 
If yes, what is the requirement to do so? (i.e. number 
of shares or number of shareholders required to make 
such proposal) 
 Procedural limitations 
7. Does staggered election term allowed?  Yes 
B. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
1. Is one-share-one-vote required? (Different 
from convening EGM) 
Yes Yes 
2. Is cumulative voting allowed for minority 
shareholders when they vote for election of 
directors or outside directors? 
Yes No 
3. Insider trading 
3.1 Does the law define who insiders are? Yes Yes 
3.2 Are insiders required disclosing their transactions? Yes Yes 
3.3. How many days required to disclose the 
transaction after insider trading occurs? 
2 days  
3.4 Penalties attached to the offence of insider trading   
Civil liability (Please specify the liable amount) No Yes 
Fines (please specify the fine amount) Yes (maximum Rp 
15,000,000,000) 
Yes (Not less than one million 
ringgit) 
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Imprisonment Yes Yes 
4. Related party-transactions 
4.1 Does the legal and regulatory framework require 
disclosure of the transaction? 
Yes Yes 
4.2 What is the minimum amount of transaction that 
is subject to approved by shareholders? 
Every related party 
transaction regardless the 
amount of transaction 
Yes (≥5% of net tangible 
assets) 
4.3 How many days should the transaction be 
disclosed after it takes place? 
Within 2 days Immediately 
4.4. Are related persons required to abstain from 
voting on the transactions? 
Yes Yes 
C. Role of Stakeholders   
1. Employees’ rights 
1.1 Is it required to disclose employees’ safety and 
welfare? 
No No 
1.2 What priority do employee wages and benefits 
have in the event of insolvency? 
The employee wages is 
priority 
Second, after costs and 
expenses of winding up, 
including the taxed costs of 
petitioner, remuneration of 
liquidator and costs of audit 
1.3 Is ESOP (Employee Share Option Program), or 
other long-term employee incentive plan required? 
No No 
2. Is it required to disclose if any 
environmental issue occurs? 
Yes No 
D. Disclosure and Transparency 
1. What information must be contained in the company’s annual report? 
1.1 General information on the company/main 
business 
Yes Yes 
1.2 Audited annual accounts Yes Yes 
1.3 Personal details of company’s directors Yes Yes 
1.4 Basis of the board remuneration No Yes 
1.5 Operating risks Yes No 
1.6 Business operation and competitive position Yes Yes 
1.7 Consolidated financial reports Yes Yes 
1.8 Management discussion and analysis (MD&A) Yes Yes 
1.9 Information on Corporate Governance (CG code, 
CG structure & practice) 
No Yes 
1.10 Does minutes of board meeting can be obtained 
by shareholders? 
Yes No 
If so, what are requirements for shareholder to obtain 
it? 
 Not prescribe 
2. Ownership Structure 
2.1 Is it required to disclose Top 10 shareholders? No Yes 
2.2 Is it required to disclose shareholders with 5% of 
shares or above? 
Yes Yes 
2.3 Is director shareholding required to disclose? Yes Yes 
2.4 Is management shareholding required to disclose? No No 
3. Are directors required to report their 
transactions of the company stocks? 
Yes Yes 
4 Auditing/Accounting 
4.1 Are companies required to have their financial 
statements externally audited? 
Yes Yes 
If so, how often? (annually/semi-annually/quarterly) Annually/semi-
annually/quarterly 
Annually 
4.2 Is internal audit (separate unit) required? No Yes 
4.3 Is a rotation of audit firms mandatory? Yes No 
If so, how should it be rotated? 5 years  
5 Is it required to have company website, with 
up-to-date information? 
No No 
5.1 Business operation   
5.2 Financial statement   
5.3 Press release   
5.4 Shareholding structure   
5.5 Organization structure   
5.6 Corporate group structure   
5.7 Annual report downloadable   
5.8 Be provided in both local language and English   
6. Is attendance records of board member 
disclosed 
No Yes 
E. Board Responsibilities   
1. Are the following documents required? 
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1.1 Corporate Governance related rules No Yes 
1.2 Code of ethics or business conduct No Yes 
1.3 Corporate mission Yes Yes 
2. Are the following committees required to be carried out by independent members? 
2.1 Audit Committee Yes Yes 
2.2 Compensation Committee No No 
2.3 Nomination Committee No No 
3. Quality of the Audit Committee Report 
3.1 Attendance No Yes 
3.2 Internal control No Yes 
3.3 Management control No No 
3.4 Proposed auditors No No 
3.5 Financial report review No No 
3.6 Legal compliance No No 
3.7 Conclusion or opinion No No 
4. Board composition 
4.1 Any minimum/maximum limitation of number of 
directors? 
Min. 2, no maximum Min. 2, no maximum 
4.2 What is the minimum number/proportion of INED? 30% of directors 2 directors or 1/3 of the 
board of directors, whichever 
is the higher 
4.3 Is the separation of Chairman and CEO required? No No 
5. What is the minimum number of board 
meetings to be held per year? 
No limitation No limitation 
6. Directors’ qualification 
6.1 Minimum professional experience No No 
6.2 Does law or regulations require continuing training 
for board directors? 
No Yes 
6.3 Minimum professional experience for INED No No 
6.5 Any continuing education requirement for INED? No Yes 
7. Is specific investor relation person required? Yes No 
8. Remuneration of board members 
8.1 Is remuneration of directors required to disclose? Yes Yes 
8.2 Is remuneration of INEDs required to disclose? No Yes 
8.3 Is there a regulation that governs director’s stock 
option? If so, specify it 
No No 
9. Limitation on serving as director 
9.1 Is there a limit to the number of boards on which 
an individual executive director may serve? 
No Yes (10 for listed firms) 
9.2 Is there a limit to the number of boards on which 
an individual outside director may serve? 
No Yes 
10 What is the maximum election term for 
board member? 
No 3 years 
Source: Cheung and Jang (2005) 
 
TABLE A.5.2 – Legal and Regulatory Environment 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
Supervision and Financial Safety Nets: Bank Supervisory Agency 
1. What agency/organization 
supervises banks? 
Bank Indonesia (central bank) Bank Negara Malaysia (central 
bank) 
2. How is the head of the supervisory 
agency appointed? 
By President prior to parliament’s 
approval (the same for Senior Deputy 
Governor and Deputy Governor) 
By the Minister of Finance 
3. Can it force a bank to change its 
internal organizational structure? 
Yes. If a bank faces a difficulty 
endangering the continuity of its 
business, Bank Indonesia can let the 
shareholders replace the board of 
commissioners and/or board of 
directors of the bank. 
Yes, by way of imposing conditions 
on the license, threat of revocation 
or prosecution, and approval of 
appointment or threat of removal 
of directors. 
4. Can it take legal action against 
external auditors for their negligence? 
It can advice Ministry of Finance and 
the Association of Public Accountant to 
revoke their business license. 
BNM can blacklist auditors for 
auditing banks. BNM may institute 
negligence suit against bank 
auditors, but this has not been 
done. 
5. Can it legally declare insolvency of a 
bank and supersedes the rights of bank 
shareholders? 
Yes. Yes. 
6. How many professional bank 
supervisors? 
About 100 persons: members of 
Directorate of Bank Supervision. 
345 persons in charge on on-site 
inspection, bank regulation and IT 
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audit. 
7. How frequent are onsite inspections 
conducted per bank on average? 
Once a year (by regulation), but more 
than once if needed. 
Average 4 times: total of 93 on-
site inspections covering 23 banks 
in 2003. 
8. Roughly what % of bank supervisors 
get employed by a bank after quitting 
their job? 
Most of them work for BI until they 
retire. 
Approximately 50%. But no 
evidence of their interfering in the 
supervisory process. 
9. How are bank supervisors’ salary 
level compared with that of bankers 
(with similar qualifications)? 
The salary and other income of 
Governor are to be maximum twice of 
the highest-ranked employee in BI. 
Salary of working-level supervisors is 
competitive with that of private bank, 
though their fringe benefit is slightly 
better. 
Competitive with the banking 
sector. 
10. Are bank supervisors legally liable 
for their actions? May they be sued for 
their act conducted in good faith? 
No, they are not as long as the 
decisions and policies are taken in 
accordance with the task and authority 
as stated in the Act and conducted in 
good faith. 
No, there is statutory immunity for 
actions provided that such actions 
or omissions are done in good 
faith. 
Supervision and Financial Safety Nets: Depositor Protection 
1. What was the depositor protection 
system before the Asian crisis in 1997? 
Implicit guarantee: liquidity guarantee: 
liquidity support to problem banks on a 
ad-hoc basis in non-transport manner. 
Implicit guarantee. 
2. What was the nature and experience of the blanket deposit guarantee system introduced right after the crisis? 
2.1. Coverage: Both deposits and other 
liabilities fully covered? Was the 
coverage reduced later? 
Yes, both deposits and other liabilities 
on or off the balance sheets. 
Yes, fully covered until now. 
2.2. On average, how long did it take 
for depositors at closed banks to be 
fully paid? When did it happen? 
Within one month. 
In April 2004, the operating licenses of 
Bank Dagang Bali & Bank Asiatic were 
revoked. 
No bank failure. 
3. Is there a system of explicit deposit 
insurance system now? If not, is there 
any plan (from when)? 
No. But, the Banking Law 1998 
amendment mandates a partial deposit 
insurance system. 
Not yet. But, the government is 
considering introducing it issuing a 
consultation document. 
4. If there is an explicit insurance system now, 
4.1 How is it funded: government, 
banks or both? 
 Central bank is considering both. 
4.2. What is the limit (per person or 
account) in absolute amount and % of 
per capita GDP? 
 Central bank is still working on the 
details. 
4.3 Any uncovered categories of 
deposits (such as inter-bank or foreign 
currency deposits)? 
 (No) 
4.4 Is there variable insurance 
premium or differential capital 
requirement for high-risk banks? 
 (Yes) 
4.5 Have there been cases of bank 
failure under this system? 
  
5. Can the deposit insurance (or bank 
supervisory) agency take a legal action 
against bank directors or other officers? 
Have there been such cases? 
Yes, they can take legal actions, and 
there have been some cases (involving 
Bank Bali, Bank BNI, Bank Dagang Bali 
and Bank Asiatic). 
Administrative sanctions can be taken 
against banks or their business licenses 
may be evoked. 
Legally, yes. There have been a 
few isolated cases of prosecution 
for contravention of the Banking 
Act. 
Regulations on Banking Activities, Operation, and Ownership: Competitive environment 
1. How many commercial banks are 
there in the country? 
135 banks (as of May 2004): 5 state 
banks, 26 regional government banks, 
74 private national banks, and 30 
foreign or joint venture banks 
23 banks including foreign banks 
(as of October 2004) 
2. What is the market share for the five 
largest commercial banks in terms of 
deposits? (%) 
57.3% (March 2004) 54.8% (end of 2003) 
3. What is the market share for all the 
government-controlled commercial 
banks in terms of deposits? (%) 
41.5% (March 2004) 37.0% (end of 2003) 
4. What is the market share for all 
foreign-controlled commercial banks in 
terms of deposits? (%) 
10.6% (foreign banks and joint 
venture banks; March 2004) 
31.4% (end of 2003) 
Regulations on Banking Activities, Operation, and Ownership: Can banks provide the following businesses 
either directly or by their subsidiaries? Are there any restrictions? 
1. Credit cards Yes Yes 
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2. Insurance Not directly (though they may have 
capital participation in other banks or 
companies that engaged in insurance 
business) 
Yes 
3. Underwriting corporate 
equities/bonds, public debentures, etc. 
Not directly Yes 
4. Securities brokerage Not directly Yes 
5. Fund management Not directly Yes 
6. Investment advice Yes Yes 
7. Real estate No Yes 
Regulations on Banking Activities, Operation, and Ownership: Are there regulations on the following 
banking operation? 
1. Any requirement for minimum 
investment in government securities? 
No Yes 
2. Any government-directed credit 
guideline? 
Yes Yes 
3. Any restrictions on taking ownership 
(equity investment) in (non-financial) 
firms? 
Yes. Not allowed except for the 
businesses stipulated in the Banking 
Act (leasing, venture capital, securities 
business, insurance, deposit and 
settlement clearing). 
No 
4. Any requirement for minimum 
capital-asset ratio? 
Yes, the minimum requirement for CAR 
is 8%. 
Yes, there is a requirement to 
maintain a minimum CAR of 8%. 
5. Any liquidity requirement? Yes, the Minimum Obligatory Demand 
Deposit at Bank Indonesia (reserve 
requirement): 5% for third party funds 
in Rupiah and 3% for third party funds 
in foreign currencies. 
Yes. Since 1999, there is a 
compliance requirement. For 
example, banks must be able to 
withstand, by holding liquid assets, 
the withdrawal of up to 5% of 
their deposit base over a one-week 
period or 7% of their deposit base 
over a one-month period. 
6. Any limits on interest rates? Under the blanket guarantee scheme, 
guarantees are given only to deposits 
accepted at interest rates not 
exceeding the stipulated ceilings: 
weighted average SBI discount rate (3 
month maturity) in the latest auction 
plus/minus a specified margin for 
Rupiah deposits; and average US$ time 
deposits rate at JIBOR member banks 
(by maturity) plus/minus a specified 
margin. 
No. 
7. Any limits on fees for bank services? No. No. 
8. Any branching 
restriction/requirement? 
No restriction. Only for foreign banks. 
Regulations on Banking Activities, Operation, and Ownership: Ownership of banks 
1. What is the maximum allowable 
ownership of a bank by an individual or 
corporation/institution? 
The ownership of a commercial bank 
by an Indonesian legal entity shall not 
exceed the net worth of the legal 
entity concerned. 
10% for individuals and 20% for 
others unless MOF approves. 
2. May non-financial firms (or groups) 
be a controlling owner of a bank? 
Yes. Yes. 
3. What is the maximum allowable 
ownership of a bank by a foreigner 
(foreign firm/institution)? 
99% of the bank’s paid-up capital. None for existing approved foreign 
entities. 10-15% for new entrants 
(though the Central Bank is willing 
to consider up to 30% in certain 
cases). 
4. Do large shareholders need the 
approval of the banking supervisory 
agency before having beyond certain 
levels of ownership within the allowed 
limit? 
No, they don’t need the approval from 
Bank Indonesia. But any change in the 
ownership of banks should be reported 
to Bank Indonesia.  
Acquisition or disposal for shares 
of 5% or more also requires a 
BNM consent. However, fund 
managers unwittingly buying 
shares of a listed bank beyond the 
5% threshold would not be 
penalized if there is no intention to 
gain control over the bank. 
5. Are there separate ownership rules 
for banks owned by financial holding 
companies, financial groups, or non-
bank financial firms? What are they? 
No. No. 
Board of Directors: Board accountability 
1. To whom is the board mainly 
accountable? (bank, shareholders, 
Depositors. Shareholders. The BNM also 
exercises a strong supervisor 
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depositors, other creditors, 
government) 
presence directly impacting 
governance process exercised by 
the BOD. 
2. To whom is the board also 
accountable? (bank, shareholders, 
depositors, other creditors, 
government) 
Shareholders. Depositors and creditors. 
3. Are directors liable for false or 
misleading information disclosed? 
Yes (as stated in the Law on Capital 
Market). 
Yes. 
Board of Directors: Are the followings specified by law as the responsibilities of the board? 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate 
strategy and major plans of actions 
Yes Yes (not by law but recommended 
as Best Practices under the 
Corporate Governance Code – 
same for items below). 
2. Reviewing and approving risk policy Yes Yes 
3. Reviewing and approving annual 
budget 
Yes Yes 
4. Setting performance objectives Yes Yes 
5. Overseeing major capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and 
divestitures 
Yes Yes 
6. Selecting executives, monitoring and 
replacing key executives 
Yes Yes ( in consideration of 
recommendations by Nomination 
Committee) 
7. Setting key executive compensation 
and board remuneration 
Yes Yes (in consideration of 
recommendations by 
Remuneration Committee) 
8. Oversee the process of disclosure Yes Yes (aided by company secretary 
and legal manager) 
9. Monitor and manage potential 
conflicts of interests of the controlling 
shareholders and other stakeholders 
Yes Yes 
10. Are there other responsibilities laid 
out in the law? Please specify. 
Overseeing the board of directors’ 
implementing corporate policies and 
giving advice to the board of directors. 
Duties of care and skill and 
prohibiting insider trading. 
Board of Directors: Board composition 
1. Can the following persons be appointed as board members? 
1.1 Current government officials Yes Yes (but rare now) 
1.2 Ex government officials Yes Yes (common) 
1.3 Politicians (including cabinet 
members) 
No (restriction particularly applied to 
members of the house of 
representatives) 
No (members of Parliament, State 
Assembly or Supreme Council of 
political parties) 
1.4 Foreigners (or non-residents) Yes Yes 
1.5 Are there any other restrictions? 
Please specify. 
Members of the board should be those 
deemed by Bank Indonesia to possess 
competence and high integrity: 
1. those possessing good 
character and strong moral 
values 
2. those complying with the 
prevailing regulation 
3. those strongly committed to 
the development of sound 
bank operations 
4. those having the capacities 
to execute their duties 
There is a fit and proper test for 
the appointment of directors. The 
test excludes: 
1. those bankrupt 
2. those charged for 
offence relating to 
dishonesty 
3. those charged and 
proven offence under 
the Banking Act 
4. those subject to order of 
detention, supervision, 
etc. 
5. director of a company 
that has been wound up 
within or without 
Malaysia 
2. How many foreigners are allowed to 
serve on the board? 
No restriction. No restriction. 
3. what is the minimum required 
number of independent directors? 
Independent commissioners should be 
at least 30% of the total. 
For listed banks, at least tow 
directors or 1/3 of the total 
(whichever higher). 
4. Are there any other restrictions on 
board size or composition? Please 
specify. 
The minimum size of the board of 
commissioners is 2 persons. 
Minimum 5 directors (average 
board size is about 9). 
5. What is the maximum number of 
boards (banks or other corporations), 
on which a bank director can serve? 
Member of the board of commissioners 
may only hold concurrent positions as 
follow: 
1. as member of commissioners 
An executive director (ED) cannot 
serve as ED of another company. 
For listed banks, a non-executive 
director cannot hold directorship at 
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of one bank 
2. as commissioner, director, or 
executive officer at not more 
than tow non-bank firms or 
institutions 
more than 25 firms (10 listed 
companies and 15 unlisted firms). 
Board of Directors: Independent directors 
1. Can the following persons be appointed as independent directors? 
1.1 Family members of the major 
shareholders 
No No 
1.2 Bank’s employees Yes, as long as he/she has no 
affiliation with the controlling 
shareholder, directors, or other 
commissioner. 
No 
1.3 Bank’s major borrowers Yes No 
1.4 Bank’s (large) shareholders Yes, but independent commissioners 
are not allowed to hold controlling 
shares, i.e., 20% 
Yes, but independent directors 
may hold the listed bank’s hares 
only up to 5%. 
1.5 Foreigners (or non-residents) Yes Yes 
2. Are there any restrictions that 
disqualify some categories of persons 
from serving as independent directors? 
Please specify. 
Yes, disqualified for: 
1. those with affiliated 
relationship with the 
controlling shareholder, 
directors or other 
commissioners of the bank 
2. those with a position as 
director in other companies 
affiliated to the bank 
Yes, those with family relationship 
or otherwise closely associated 
with, or de facto controlled by, 
major shareholders. 
3. Are there any minimum qualification 
requirements for independent 
directors? Please specify. 
No No 
4. What is the maximum term 
permitted for independent directors 
(number of years)? 
No restriction  No restriction 
Board of Directors: Bank’s CEO (President) 
1. Can the Chairperson and CEO be the 
same person? 
No, since Indonesian firms have a dual 
board system. 
Yes (but most Malaysian banks 
have them separately). 
2. Are there any separate regulations 
on the qualifications of bank CEOs? 
Yes, President Director of a bank 
should be independent from the 
controlling shareholder. 
No, (other than the BNM approval 
on the basis of a fit and proper 
test). 
3. Are bank CEOs subject to a Fit and 
Proper Test of the bank supervisory 
agency? 
Yes Yes 
4. Are CEOs required to certify the 
bank’s financial statement? 
Yes Yes 
Board of Directors: Board meeting 
1. Is there requirement for the board 
to meet regularly, or the minimum 
number of meetings a year? Please 
specify. 
No Yes, minimum of 6 board 
meetings. 
2. Are banks required to disclose the 
directors’ attendance at board 
meetings? Please specify. 
No Yes 
Board of Directors: Related-party transactions 
1. Are banks permitted to make loans 
to the board members or top 
management? If yes, what are relevant 
rules? 
Yes, according to the internal 
regulation of each bank. 
No, prohibited unless exempted. 
They include loans to its officers 
and employees 
- personally 
- any firm they serve (or 
have interest in serving) 
as partner, director, 
manager, agent or 
guarantor 
- any firm in which they 
have a material interest 
- any individuals for whom 
they stand as guarantor. 
2. Are there any rules governing the 
conduct of “interested” directors (who 
are connected to controlling/major 
shareholders or others with vested 
interests in the outcome of board 
decisions)? If yes, please specify. 
Yes. Members of BoD or BoC are 
prohibited from joining any decision-
making involving conflicts of interest 
that may incur losses to the bank; and 
such conflicts of interest should be 
disclosed. 
No related-party transactions 
allowed that may involve 
connected persons. 
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3. Are the following entities included in the disclosure requirement for related party transactions? 
3.1 Top management, other directors, 
and their close family members 
Yes Yes (not permitted unless 
exempted) 
3.2 Individuals who are major 
shareholders and their close family 
members 
Yes for major shareholders, but not for 
their close family members. 
Yes (not permitted unless 
exempted) 
Board of Directors: Board committees 
1. Audit committee 
1.1 Is the committee mandatory? Yes, mandatory (all listed companies 
by the end of 2004) 
Yes, mandatory. 
1.2 If mandatory, are there rules 
concerning the composition of the 
committee (minimum number of 
independent directors, etc.)? 
Yes, the committee should consist of at 
least one independent commissioner 
and minimum two outsiders. 
Yes, independent directors 
required to constitute a majority 
for all banks. At least three non-
executive members required. 
2. Nomination committee 
2.1 Is the committee mandatory? Not mandatory Yes mandatory 
2.2 If mandatory, are there rules 
concerning the composition of the 
committee (minimum number of 
independent directors, etc.)? 
 Yes, the committee should be 
composed of 5 members of which 
4 are non-executive members, and 
chaired by an independent 
director. 
3. Remuneration/compensation committee 
3.1 Is the committee mandatory? Not mandatory  Yes, mandatory 
3.2. If mandatory, are there any rules 
concerning the composition of the 
committee (minimum number of 
independent directors, etc.) 
 Yes, the committee should be 
composed of only non-executive 
members (and majority 
independent directors) and chaired 
by an independent director. 
4. Risk management committee 
4.1 Is the committee mandatory? Yes, mandatory Yes, mandatory 
4.2 If mandatory, are there rules 
concerning the composition of the 
committee (minimum number of 
independent directors, etc.)? 
Yes, the committee should consist of 
majority of directors and related 
executive officers (BI regulation). 
According to the national and banking 
sector corporate governance codes, 
however, the committee should have 
at least one independent director. 
Yes, the committee should be 
composed of a minimum 3 non-
executive members and chaired by 
an independent director. 
Disclosure and Others: Disclosure rules: Is the following information required to be disclosed in the 
annual report? 
1. Policies on risk management No, not mandatory Yes 
2. Policies on risk factors No, not mandatory Yes 
3. Consolidated accounts covering all 
bank and non-bank subsidiaries 
Yes Yes 
4. Major off-balance sheet items Yes Yes 
5. Identity of major shareholders Yes Yes 
6. Relationship between major 
shareholders 
Yes Yes 
7. Relationship between board 
members 
Yes Yes 
8. Professional background of board 
members 
Yes Yes 
9. Top executive compensation 
individually 
No Yes for CEO, but only aggregate 
total for other executive directors. 
10. Non-executive/independent 
directors compensation individually 
No, only aggregate total No, only aggregate total 
Disclosure and Others: Others 
1. Is there a regulatory requirement 
that banks’ audit standards should 
materially conform to the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA)? 
Yes Yes 
2. Is external audit a compulsory 
obligation for banks? 
Yes Yes 
3. Are specific requirements for the 
extent of nature of the audit spelled 
out? 
Yes Yes 
4.1 Is there a corporate governance 
code targeted for banks/financial 
institutions? 
Yes Yes 
4.2 If yes, who issued the code? National Committee on Corporate 
Governance (NCGG) 
The Central Bank 
Number of surveyed banks 26 10 
Source: Sang-Woo Nam and Chee Soon Lum (2005). 
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A.5.3 – Indonesian Code for Good Corporate Governance, April 2001 (National Committee 
on Corporate Governance) 
 
PREAMBLE 
This Code for Good Corporate Governance ("Code") has been drafted by the National Committee for Corporate Governance 
Policies with the objective that it shall become the reference point as a Model of Good Corporate Governance for the 
Indonesian Business Community. 
 
Consistent with such objective, the principles of Good Corporate Governance herein set forth are intended to apply to all 
Indonesian companies. In the initial stage, however, public companies, state-owned enterprises and companies utilizing 
public funds or engaged in the business of managing public funds shall be the first to commence proper adherence to the 
principles of the Code. It is hoped that all other legal entities established under the regulations having the force of law of the 
Republic of Indonesia will subsequently realize and implement these principles as soon as practicable. 
 
Considering the diversity of companies, however, the pace of implementation hereof should take into account the different 
characteristics of each company, for instance, the size of share capital, the impact of its activities on the public, and the 
degree of internationalization. Recognizing that a company or a group of companies belonging to a specific industrial sector 
may share specific characteristics, it is also intended to eventually formulate sectoral codes containing more specific 
principles of Good Corporate Governance, for which this Code should serve as a model. 
 
The formulation of principles of Good Corporate Governance contained in this Code is intended to allow for more 
constructive and flexible methods of raising standards of corporate governance in Indonesian companies, as opposed to 
adopting the more prescriptive approach of imposing mandatory regulations having the force of law. 
 
The National Committee for Corporate Governance Policies recognizes that there are aspects of Good Corporate Governance 
where regulations having the force of law would be necessary, but that there are also other aspects where self-regulation in 
accordance with market developments is more appropriate. Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the principles 
contained in this Code are intended to be dynamic, which should evolve in correspondence with dynamic markets and 
structures. As the external context changes, the requirements of relevant sound corporate governance follow. Hence the 
Code is evolutionary in nature and should be seen and reviewed in light of anticipated changes in circumstances nationally 
and internationally. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
The purpose of the principles set forth in this Code are: 
1. to maximize corporate and shareholder value by enhancing transparency, accountability, 
reliability, responsibility, and fairness in order to strengthen the company’s competitive 
position both domestically and internationally, and to create a sound environment to support 
investment; 
2. to encourage the management of the company to behave in a professional, transparent, and 
efficient manner, as well as optimizing the use of and enhancing the independence of the 
Dewan Komisaris, the Direksi, and the GMOS; 
3. to encourage shareholders, members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi to make 
decisions and to act with a strict sense of morality, in compliance with the prevailing 
regulations having the force of law, and in accordance with their social responsibility towards 
the various stakeholders and the environmental protection. 
 
I. SHAREHOLDERS 
 
1.1. Shareholders Rights 
Principle: 
The rights of the shareholders shall be protected and, accordingly, shareholders shall be able to exercise their rights through 
reliance upon appropriate procedures that have been adopted by the Company concerned, which procedures shall be 
required under applicable regulations having the force of law. 
The rights of shareholders are basically: 
(a) the right to attend and vote at any GMOS on a one share/one vote basis; 
(b) the right to obtain relevant corporate information, in a timely and regular manner, to enable a shareholder to make 
informed investment decisions concerning their shares in the Company; and 
(c) the right to receive part of the Company's distributable profit in proportion to their respective shareholding in the 
Company, through dividends or other distributions. 
 
1.2. General Meetings of Shareholders ("GMOS") 
Principle: 
All shareholders shall be entitled to obtain a full explanation and accurate information concerning the procedures to be 
followed prior to and at the GMOS concerned in order to enable the shareholders to participate in the decision making 
regarding matters which may affect the existence of the company and the rights of the shareholders. 
This may include: 
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(a) notices for a GMOS including information about each item of the agenda of the GMOS, including any proposals which the 
Direksi may contemplate to submit at the GMOS, to enable a shareholder to participate in the discussions at the GMOS and 
to vote responsibly. If such information and/or proposals are not available at the time the notices were sent, such 
information and/or proposals shall be made available for the shareholders at the offices of the Company prior to the GMOS; 
(b) explanations of other relevant matters which are provided, prior to and/or at the GMOS; 
(c) resolutions of a GMOS be adopted through transparent and fair proceedings. It is desirable that the shareholders are 
allowed to join in the making of decisions on issues which may affect the Company's existence and the rights of 
shareholders; 
(d) minutes of a GMOS provided to each shareholder upon request and should include opinions as well as dissenting 
comments and be properly maintained; 
(e) the system for determining the remuneration and facilities of each member of the Dewan Komisaris and Direksi, and the 
specific remuneration and facilities received by the incumbent members of the Dewan Komisaris and Direksi, shall be 
disclosed to the shareholders; and 
(f) in order to monitor compliance with this Code, the Direksi disclosing financial as well as non-financial matters in the 
Annual Reports of the Direksi to the shareholders, and identify therein any discrepancies from and/or non-compliance with 
the principles of Good Corporate Governance contained in this Code, and provide the reasons for such discrepancies and 
non-compliance. 
 
1.3. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Principle: 
Shareholders of the same kind of shares shall be treated equitably based on the principle that shareholders of the same kind 
of shares have equitable position in the company. 
 
1.3.1 Shareholders shall hold voting rights according to the type and number of shares they are holding. 
 
1.3.2. Each and every shareholder shall be provided with full and accurate information about the Company, unless there is a 
justifiable reason not to do so. The Company shall not show partiality to certain shareholders by providing information not 
disclosed to the other shareholders. Such information shall be provided to each and every shareholder, irrespective 
of the class of shares held by such shareholders. 
 
1.3.3. No shareholder, member of the Dewan Komisaris, or member of the Direksi may engage in insider trading or self-
dealing with the intent of personal gain. The Company, therefore, must have an effective internal control mechanism to 
monitor and address these types of practices. If discovered, such insider transactions shall be disclosed to the 
shareholders through fair means. 
 
1.4. Shareholder Responsibilities 
Principle: 
Shareholders owning a controlling interest in a Company shall be mindful of their responsibilities as shareholders when they 
exercise any influence over corporate management, whether by the exercise of their voting rights or otherwise. Any unlawful 
intervention in the management of the Company should be addressed through greater transparency, accountability of 
management and, ultimately, resolved by prevailing law. Minority shareholders also have corresponding responsibilities to 
the effect that they do not misuse their rights under the prevailing regulations having the force of law. 
 
1.5. Appointment of the members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi and their 
Remuneration Systems 
Principle: 
At a GMOS, the shareholders shall adopt a system for 
(a) the appointment of members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi of the Company; 
(b) the determination of the remuneration of the members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi of the Company; and 
(c) the evaluation of their performance. 
 
Procedures regarding such nomination and remuneration can be formulated by the Dewan Komisaris or by retaining 
independent professional advisors appointed by the Dewan Komisaris subject to approval of the GMOS. 
The Dewan Komisaris should recommend to the GMOS the establishment of a Nomination and Remuneration Committee as 
dealt with in section 2.9, to implement such system, including proposing the candidates for the Dewan Komisaris and the 
Direksi and their remuneration. Such Committee shall consist of at least 1 (one) member of the Dewan Komisaris and 1 
(one) member of the Direksi who both fall under the category of “outside members” as stated in section 2.2 and 3.2. 
Such Committee shall endeavour to attract members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi of high quality, and should 
keep in mind that the amount of their remuneration should be appreciable and reflect their responsibility and commitment.  
The remuneration of the members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi as determined by any GMOS shall not be 
dependent upon the results of the Company, without prejudice to the right of the GMOS to decide payment of bonuses to 
members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi dependent upon the results of the Company. A member of the Dewan 
Komisaris or the Direksi shall not be remunerated separately for his/her advice to any organ of the Company. 
 
II. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (DEWAN KOMISARIS) 
 
2.1. Function of the Dewan Komisaris 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall be responsible and shall have the authority to supervise the actions of the Direksi, and shall give 
advice to the Direksi when required. To assist it in doing so, the Dewan Komisaris may, pursuant to the procedures it has 
adopted, retain independent professional advisors and/or establish special committees. Each member of the Dewan 
Komisaris shall be a person of good character and shall have relevant experience. 
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Each member of the Dewan Komisaris and the Dewan Komisaris as an organ shall perform their duties honorably in the best 
interests of the Company, and shall also ensure that the Company perform its social responsibilities and consider the 
interests of the various stakeholders in the Company. 
The Dewan Komisaris should monitor the effectiveness of the Good Corporate Governance practices under which it operates 
and make changes as needed. 
The Dewan Komisaris may delegate part of its authority to a special committee or to two or more members of the Dewan 
Komisaris by virtue of a special power of attorney. In such special power of attorney the authority so delegated must be 
clearly specified, and the period of delegation may not exceed 6 (six) months. The members of the Dewan Komisaris or such 
special committee shall report to the Dewan Komisaris all actions and transactions effected by them by virtue of such special 
power of attorney no later than 30 (thirty) days after the expiration thereof. 
 
2.2. Composition of the Dewan Komisaris 
Principle: 
The composition of the Dewan Komisaris shall be such as to allow effective, appropriate and swift decision making. The 
Dewan Komisaris should be composed in such a way that its members act independently and that they shall hold no 
interests that might impair their ability to perform their duties independently and critically in relation to each other and the 
Direksi, in order to increase the effectiveness and transparency of its deliberations. Depending on the specific characteristics 
of a Company, at least 20% of the members of the Dewan Komisaris should fall under the category of outside members as 
stated in Section 3.2. 
Such members of the Dewan Komisaris shall be independent from the Direksi and controlling shareholders. 
It shall be afforded that during the process of nomination and appointment of the “outside members” of the Dewan 
Komisaris, the opinion of the minority shareholders considered in order to provide real protection for the interest of the 
minority shareholders and stakeholders. 
The Annual Reports of the Company shall include not only the names of the members of the Dewan Komisaris, but also their 
occupation, and their principal external jobs, to the extent that such jobs are relevant to the performance of their tasks as 
members of the Dewan Komisaris. 
 
2.3. Compliance with Articles of Association and prevailing regulations having the 
force of law 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall observe the Articles of Association of the Company and all applicable regulations having the force 
of law when performing its duties, and shall ensure that the Direksi also complies with the Articles of Association of the 
Company and all applicable regulations having the force of law. 
For this purpose, it is equally important that the members of the Dewan Komisaris familiarize themselves with the Articles of 
Association and all regulations having the force of law in effect from time to time that are relevant to their duties and 
authorities. 
 
2.4. Meetings of the Dewan Komisaris 
Principle: 
The Meetings of the Dewan Komisaris shall be held regularly, i.e., at least once every month in principle, depending on the 
specific characteristics of the Company. 
The Dewan Komisaris shall adopt procedures for Meetings of the Dewan Komisaris and shall clearly set out such procedures 
in the Minutes of the Meetings of the Dewan Komisaris and when such procedures were determined and decided. A member 
of the Dewan Komisaris can only be represented by another member of the Dewan Komisaris at a meeting of the Dewan 
Komisaris. 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris shall be drawn-up for each Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris. Any dissent 
from decisions taken in the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris shall be noted in the Minutes of any Meeting of the Dewan 
Komisaris. Each member of the Dewan Komisaris shall be entitled to receive a copy of the Minutes of the Meeting of the 
Dewan Komisaris, irrespective whether such member has been present or not at a Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris. 
Within 14 (fourteen) days from the date of the delivery thereof, each member of the Dewan Komisaris shall advise the 
Chairman of the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris concerned of his/her objections and/or corrections to any matter referred 
to therein.  
If no such objections and/or corrections are received, the other members of the Dewan Komisaris shall be entitled to 
assume that there are no objections and/or corrections to the Minutes of the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris concerned. 
Any dissent from decisions taken in the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris shall be noted in the Minutes of any Meeting of the 
Dewan Komisaris. 
The originals of the Minutes of each Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris shall be bound annually and kept at the Company's 
offices; and each member of the Dewan Komisaris, and each member of the Direksi shall be entitled to read each Minutes of 
the Meeting of the Dewan Komisaris. 
 
2.5. Information for the Dewan Komisaris 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall be entitled to have access to information of the Company in a timely and comprehensive manner. 
Since the Dewan Komisaris have no executive authority within the Company, the Direksi responsible for ensuring that the 
information regarding the Company is furnished to the Dewan Komisaris timely and comprehensively. 
 
2.6. Other Business Relations between a member of the Dewan Komisaris and/or the 
Direksi and the Company 
Principle: 
In the Annual Reports, the Direksi shall clearly specify if there exists any other business relationship between any member of 
the Dewan Komisaris and/or the Direksi and the Company, and what kind of business relationship that is. 
 
2.7. No Personal Gain 
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Principle: 
Members of the Dewan Komisaris should derive no form of personal gain from the Company's activities other than through 
their remuneration as members of the Dewan Komisaris. 
 
2.8. A system for the appointment of Executives who are not members of the Direksi, determination of their remuneration 
and the evaluation of their performance 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall establish a transparent system for (a) the appointment of the executives who are not members 
of the Direksi; (b) the determination of their remuneration; and (c) the evaluation of their performance. 
 
2.9. Committees which may be established by the Dewan Komisaris 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall consider to establish from among their members certain committees to support the 
implementation of the tasks of the Dewan Komisaris. 
Such committees shall report their findings and make recommendations with respect to their relevant mandates to the 
Dewan Komisaris. 
The establishment of such Committees shall be reported in the Annual Reports. 
The following are a number of the Dewan Komisaris duties in respect of which decision-making can be prepared by the 
various Committees. 
1. Nomination Committee 
Preparation of the selection criteria and nomination procedures for the executives who are not members of the Direksi and 
for other executive positions in the Company, and to formulate a system of assessments and provide recommendations in 
respect of the number of members of the Dewan Komisaris and Direksi in the Company. 
2. Remuneration Committee 
To prepare a remuneration system and provide recommendations in respect of (i) the assessment of such system, (ii) the 
granting of options, such as a stock option, (iii) pension rights, and (iv) redundancy and other compensation schemes. 
3. Insurance Committee 
To conduct periodical assessments and provide recommendations in respect of the type and coverage of the insurance of 
the Company. 
4. Audit Committee 
(will be dealt with in Article IV paragraph 4.2 of this Code) 
 
III. THE BOARD OF MANAGING DIRECTORS (DIREKSI) 
 
3.1. Function of the Direksi 
Principle: 
The Direksi are charged with the overall management of the Company. The Direksi shall be responsible for the 
implementation of their duties to the shareholders at the GMOS. To assist it in doing so, the Direksi may, pursuant to 
procedures it has adopted, retain independent professional advisors and/or establish special committees. 
Each member of the Direksi shall be a person of good character and relevant experience. 
The Direksi shall perform their duties faithfully in the best interests of the Company and the Direksi shall also cause the 
Company to perform its social responsibilities and consider the interests of various stakeholders. 
The Direksi should consistently promote compliance with the principles of Good Corporate Governance contained in this 
Code. 
 
3.2. Composition of the Direksi 
Principle: 
The composition of the Direksi shall be such as to allow effective, appropriate and swift decision making. The Direksi should 
be composed in such a way that its members act independently by means that they shall hold no interests that might impair 
their ability to perform their duties independently and critically. 
Depending on the specific character of the Company, at least 20% of the members of the Direksi should be "outside 
directors" as mentioned in section 2.2 in order to increase the effectiveness of its management role, and the transparency of 
its deliberations. 
Such members of the Direksi shall be independent from the Dewan Komisaris and controlling shareholders. 
It shall be afforded that during the process of nomination and appointment of the “outside directors”, the opinion of the 
minority shareholders shall be considered in order to provide actual protection for the interest of the minority shareholders 
and stakeholders. 
 
3.3. Compliance with Articles of Association and prevailing regulations having the force of law 
Principle: 
The Direksi shall observe the Articles of Association of the Company and all applicable regulations having the force of law 
when performing its duties. It is equally important that each member of the Direksi familiarize themselves with the Articles 
of Association and prevailing regulations having the force of law prevailing from time to time, that are relevant to their 
duties and authorities. 
 
3.4. No Personal Gain 
Principle: 
Members of the Direksi should derive no forms of personal gain from the Company's activities other than through their 
remuneration as members of the Direksi. 
3.5. Meetings of the Direksi 
Principle: 
The Meetings of the Direksi shall be held periodically, namely in principle at least once every month, depending on the 
specific characteristics of the Company. 
 309 
The Direksi shall adopt procedures for Meetings of the Direksi and shall clearly set out such procedures in the Minutes of the 
Meetings of the Direksi during which such procedures were determined and decided. 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Direksi shall be drawn-up for each Meeting of the Direksi. Any dissent from decisions taken in 
the Meeting of the Direksi shall be noted in the Minutes of any Meeting of the Direksi. Each member of the Direksi shall be 
entitled to receive a copy of the Minutes of the Meeting of the Direksi irrespective whether such member has been present 
or not at a Meeting of the Direksi. 
Within 14 (fourteen) days since the date of the delivery thereof, each member of the Direksi shall advise the Chairman of 
the Meeting of the Direksi concerned of his/her objections and/or corrections to any matter referred to therein. 
If no such objections and/or corrections are received, the other members of the Direksi shall be entitled to assume that 
there are no objections and/or corrections to the Minutes of the Meeting of the Direksi concerned 
The originals of the Minutes of each Meeting of the Direksi shall be bound annually and kept at the Company's offices; and 
each member of the Dewan Komisaris, and each member of the Direksi shall be entitled to read each Minutes of the Meeting 
of the Direksi. 
 
3.6. Internal Controls 
Principle: 
The Direksi should establish an effective system of internal controls in order to safeguard the investment and assets of the 
Company. 
The Direksi should also establish an appropriate internal information control system, in order (a) to safeguard important 
information of the Company, and (b) that such information can be quickly transmitted to the corporate secretary (if any). 
Internal controls are the process aimed at achieving reasonable certainty about the realization of objectives in regard to (a) 
the reliability of the financial information, (b) the effectiveness and efficiency of the corporate processes, and (c) compliance 
with all relevant regulations having the force of law. 
 
3.7. Role of Direksi in Accounting Matters 
Principle: 
The Direksi should advise the Audit Committee when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue. 
 
3.8. Maintenance of Registers by the Direksi 
Principle: 
The Direksi shall organize and maintain a Register of Shareholders and a Special Register in accordance with the provisions 
of prevailing regulations having the force of law. Such Register of Shareholders and Special Register shall be held in the 
office of the Company, and the shareholders, the members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi of the Company shall be 
entitled to read such Registers. Each of these Registers shall be signed in accordance with the Articles of Association. 
 
IV. AUDIT SYSTEMS 
 
4.1. External Auditors 
Principle: 
The external auditors shall be appointed by the GMOS from candidates nominated by the Audit Committee. The Audit 
Committee through the Dewan Komisaris will provide to the GMOS the reasons for such nominations and the proposed 
remuneration for such external auditors. 
Such external auditors shall be independent from the Company's Dewan Komisaris, Direksi and stakeholders of the 
Company. 
The Company must make available to the external auditors all accounting records and supporting data necessary to enable 
such auditors to render their opinion as to the fairness, consistency and conformity of the Company's financial statements 
with Indonesian accounting standards. The external auditors shall notify the Company through its Audit Committee, (if any), 
of any event related to the Company that is contrary to prevailing regulations having the force of law (if any). 
 
4.2. Audit Committee 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris shall establish an Audit Committee comprised of certain members of the Dewan Komisaris. The Dewan 
Komisaris may invite outsiders as member(s) of the Audit Committee with the requisite mixture of relevant skills, experience 
and other qualities to achieve all of the Audit Committee's objectives. 
The Audit Committee shall be independent of the Direksi and external auditors and thus should report solely to the Dewan 
Komisaris. The removal of a member of the Audit Committee should require the approval of more than 50% of the number 
of the members of the Dewan Komisaris. The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee shall be specified in a 
Charter. Such duties and responsibilities should inter alia include: 
(a) promoting an adequate structure of internal control; 
(b) improving the quality of financial disclosure and reporting; 
(c) reviewing the scope, accuracy and cost effectiveness of the external audit and the independence and objectivity of the 
external auditors; 
(d) preparing a letter (signed by the Chairman of the Audit Committee) describing the Audit Committee's duties and 
responsibilities during the year under review, which letter shall be included in the Annual Reports to be submitted to 
shareholders. 
The Audit Committee should have adequate resources and authority to discharge their duties and responsibilities. 
 
4.3. Information 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris and Direksi shall ensure that both external and internal auditors and the Audit Committee shall have 
full access to information necessary to perform their audits. 
 
4.4. Confidentiality 
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Principle: 
Both external and internal auditors, and the Audit Committee shall not reveal, unless required by regulations having the 
force of law, any confidential information obtained while performing such audits. 
 
4.5. Audit regulations 
Principle: 
The GMOS shall approve/adopt mandatory internal regulations to govern all aspects of audits including the qualifications, 
rights, duties, responsibilities and operations of external and internal auditors. 
 
V. CORPORATE SECRETARY 
 
5.1. Function 
Principle: 
Depending on the specific characteristics of the Company, it is recommended that the Direksi recommend a person as 
corporate secretary who should act as a liason officer and can be assigned to administer and maintain of corporate 
documents, including but not limited to the Register of Shareholders, the Special Register and the Minutes of all meeting of 
the Direksi and GMOS. 
 
5.2. Qualifications 
Principle: 
The corporate secretary shall have such academic qualifications adequate to perform his/her duties and responsibilities. The 
function of the corporate secretary can be carried out by a member of the Direksi. 
 
5.3. Accountability 
Principle: 
The Corporate Secretary is accountable to the Direksi. 
 
5.4. Role of Corporate Secretary in Disclosure Matters 
Principle: 
The corporate secretary shall ensure that the Company complies with prevailing regulations having the force of law in 
respect of disclosure requirements. The corporate secretary shall periodically provide to the Direksi any information relevant 
to their duties. Such information shall also be provided to the Dewan Komisaris when required. 
 
VI. STAKEHOLDERS 
 
6.1. Rights of Stakeholders 
Principle: 
The rights of stakeholders under prevailing regulations having the force of law and/or pursuant to any contracts entered into 
with the Company, customers, suppliers, creditors and surrounding community, shall be respected. Furthermore, 
stakeholders shall be afforded appropriate means of redress if there is an evidence of infringements of their rights. 
 
6.2. Stakeholder Participation in Monitoring the Compliance with prevailing regulations having the force of law by the Direksi 
Principle: 
Stakeholders shall be provided with an opportunity to monitor and offer input to the Company's Direksi. Whereas, the 
Company shall provide stakeholders with relevant information necessary for protecting their rights. The Company will 
cooperate with stakeholders for their mutual benefit. 
 
VII. DISCLOSURE 
 
7.1. Timely and Accurate Disclosure 
Principle: 
The Company shall disclose material information through its Annual Reports and financial statements to shareholders, and 
the relevant government authorities in accordance with the prevailing regulations having the force of law in a timely, 
accurate, understandable and objective manner. 
7.2. Matters of material importance to Decision-Making 
Principle: 
In addition to the contents of the Annual Reports required by prevailing regulations having the force of law, companies shall 
take the initiative to disclose not only matters required under the regulations having the force of law, but also those of 
material importance to the decision-making of institutional investors, shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders with 
respect to such matters, such as, but not limited to: 
(a) the Company's objectives, business goals and strategies; 
(b) the status of major shareholders and all other shareholders and pertinent information on the exercise of shareholders' 
rights; 
(c) cross-shareholdings and cross-debt guarantees, if any; 
(d) evaluations of the Company by external auditors, credit rating agencies and others; 
(e) curriculum vitae on members of the Dewan Komisaris, the Direksi, key executives, and their remuneration; 
(f) honorarium system for external auditors 
(g) remuneration systems for internal auditors, members of the Dewan Komisaris, Direksi and key executives; 
(h) material foreseeable risk factors, including management assessment of the business climate and risk factors; 
(i) material issues regarding the Company's employees and other stakeholders; 
(j) material claims submitted by and/or against the Company and court cases involving the Company; 
(k) potential and ongoing conflict of interests; and 
(l) Good Corporate Governance implementations. 
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7.3. Disclosure of Adherence to this Code 
Principle: 
The Company shall actively disclose how they have applied the principles of Good Corporate Governance set out in this Code 
and any discrepancies from and/or non-compliance with such principles, including reasons therefore. 
This should include a statement of the corporate governance issues specific to the Company so that investors understand 
how a particular company deals with those issues. 
 
7.4. Disclosure of Price Sensitive Information 
Principle: 
The Company shall ensure that all price sensitive information is kept confidential until a public announcement is made. 
However, if there is a concern that confidentiality cannot be maintained until the particular transaction or matter has been 
concluded, a warning announcement may be necessary to avoid the creation of a misleading information, according to the 
prevailing regulations having the force of law. 
 
VIII. CONFIDENTIALITY 
Principle: 
The Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi are under an obligation of confidentiality to the Company. 
Confidential information, which their members have obtained while acting as a member of the Dewan Komisaris or as a 
member of the Direksi, or key executives, must remain confidential according to the prevailing regulations having the force 
of law. 
 
IX. INSIDER INFORMATION 
Principle: 
Members of the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi holding shares in the Company and, for public companies, any other 
"insiders" as meant in prevailing regulations having the force of law, shall not misuse such material information in relation to 
the Company. 
Information concerning take-overs, mergers, and share repurchase programs is in general considered as insider information 
and the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi and key executives of the Companies concerned with the planning and 
implementations of these programs should afford fair treatment to all affected shareholders. 
 
X. BUSINESS ETHICS AND CORRUPTION 
Principle: 
Members of the Dewan Komisaris, the Direksi, and all employees of the Company shall never make or offer, directly or 
indirectly, anything of value to a customer or government official to influence or reward an action, in accordance with the 
prevailing regulations having the force of law. 
A business courtesy, such as gift, contribution or entertainment, should never be offered under circumstances that might 
create the appearance of an impropriety. 
The Company should adopt a codification of ethical conduct, which essentially is a statement of values, such Code should be 
expressed briefly and clearly but sufficiently detailed to give a clear direction to the behavior of those to whom it is directed. 
 
XI. DONATIONS 
Principle: 
It is inappropriate that any of the corporate funds or assets or profits that rightfully accrue to the shareholders be diverted 
to political donations. 
Political contributions by the Company, or the use of any Company's assets, to any political party or any legislative 
candidate, shall be carried out under the prevailing public election regulations having the force of law. 
Donations to charities are acceptable within reason. 
 
XII. COMPLIANCE WITH HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS HAVING THE 
FORCE OF LAW 
Principle: 
The Direksi shall ensure that the Company, its production and manufacturing facilities, plans, shops, and other Company 
facilities, comply with applicable environmental and health regulations having the force of law. The Direksi shall take 
appropriate measures to prevent workplace injuries and illness. Employees shall be provided with a safe and healthy working 
environment. In carrying out this task, the Direksi shall consider evolving industry practices, regulatory requirements and 
societal standards of care. 
 
XIII. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
Principle: 
The Direksi shall use merit, qualifications and other job-related criteria as the sole basis for all employment-related decisions. 
The Direksi shall recruit, hire, train, compensate, promote and provide other conditions of employment without regard to a 
person's race, religion, sex, age, disability, or other characteristic protected by regulations having the force of law. 
The Direksi shall provide a work environment free of harassment of any kind based on diverse human characteristics and 
cultural backgrounds.  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A.5.4 – Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, March 2000 (Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance) 
 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
A Directors 
I The Board 
Every listed company should be headed by an effective board which should lead and control the company. 
 
II Board Balance 
The board should include a balance of executive directors and non-executive directors (including independent non-
executives) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision making. 
 
III Supply of Information 
The board should be supplied in a timely fashion with information in a form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to 
discharge its duties. 
 
IV Appointments to the Board 
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. 
 
V Re-election 
All directors should be required to submit themselves for re-election at regular intervals and at least every three years. 
 
B Directors’ Remuneration 
I The Level and Make-up of Remuneration 
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain the directors needed to run the company successfully. The 
component parts of remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance, in the 
case of executive directors. In the case of non-executive 
directors, the level of remuneration should reflect the experience and level of responsibilities undertaken by the particular 
non-executive concerned. 
 
II Procedure 
Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for 
fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors. 
 
III Disclosure 
The company’s annual report should contain details of the remuneration of each director. 
 
C Shareholders 
I Dialogue between Companies and Investors 
Companies and institutional shareholders should each be ready, where practicable, to enter into a dialogue based on the 
mutual understanding of objectives. 
 
II The AGM 
Companies should use the AGM to communicate with private investors and encourage their participation. 
 
D Accountability and Audit 
I Financial Reporting 
The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects. 
 
II Internal Control 
The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s 
assets. 
 
III Relationship with the Auditors 
The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the 
company’s auditors. 
 
BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
AA The Board of Directors 
I Principal Responsibilities of the Board 
The board should explicitly assume the following six specific responsibilities, which facilitate the discharge of the board’s 
stewardship responsibilities - 
• Reviewing and adopting a strategic plan for the company; 
• Overseeing the conduct of the company’s business to evaluate whether the business is being properly managed; 
• Identifying principal risks and ensure the implementation of appropriate systems to manage these risks; 
• Succession planning, including appointing, training, fixing the compensation of and where appropriate, replacing senior 
management; 
• Developing and implementing an investor relations programme or shareholder communications policy for the company; 
and 
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• Reviewing the adequacy and the integrity of the company’s internal control systems and management information 
systems, including systems for compliance with applicable laws, regulations, rules, directives andguidelines. 
 
Constituting an effective board 
 
II Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of the company, which will ensure a balance of 
power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision. Where the roles are combined there 
should be a strong independent element on the board. A decision to 
combine the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive should be publicly explained. 
 
III Board Balance 
Non-executive directors should be persons of calibre, credibility and have the necessary skill and experience to bring an 
independent judgement to bear on the issues of strategy, performance and resources including key appointments and 
standards of conduct. To be effective, independent non-executive directors need to make up at least one third of the 
membership of the board. 
 
Size of non-executive participation 
 
IV In circumstances where a company has a significant shareholder, in addition to the requirement that one third of the 
board should comprise independent directors, the board should include a number of directors which fairly reflects the 
investment in the company by shareholders other than the significant 
shareholder. For this purpose, a “significant shareholder” is defined as a shareholder with the ability to exercise a majority of 
votes for the election of directors. 
 
V In circumstances, where the shareholder holds less than the majority but is still the largest shareholder, the board will 
have to exercise judgment in determining what is the appropriate number of directors which fairly reflects the investment in 
the company by the remaining holders of the shares. 
 
VI The board should disclose on an annual basis whether one third of the board is independent and in circumstances where 
the company has a significant shareholder, whether it satisfies the requirement to fairly reflect through board 
representation, the investment of the minority shareholders in a company. The 
board should disclose its analysis of the application of the best practices set out above, to the circumstances of the board. 
 
VII Whether or not the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive are combined, the board should identify a senior independent 
non-executive director of a board in the annual report to whom concerns may be conveyed. 
 
VIII Appointments to the Board 
The board of every company should appoint a committee of directors composed exclusively of non-executive directors, a 
majority of whom are independent, with the responsibility for proposing new nominees for the board and for assessing 
directors on an on-going basis. The actual decision as to who shall be nominated should be the responsibility of the full 
board after considering the recommendations of such a committee. The nominating committee should - 
• Recommend to the board, candidates for all directorships to be filled by the shareholders or the board. 
• Consider, in making its recommendations, candidates for directorships proposed by the Chief Executive Officer and, within 
the bounds of practicability, by any other senior executive or any director or shareholder. 
• Recommend to the board, directors to fill the seats on board committees.  
 
IX The board, through the nominating committee, should annually review its required mix of skills and experience and other 
qualities, including core competencies which non-executive directors should bring to the board. This should be disclosed in 
the annual report. 
 
X The board should implement a process, to be carried out by the nominating committee annually for assessing the 
effectiveness of the board as a whole, the committees of the board and for assessing the contribution of each individual 
director. 
 
XI Boards should be entitled to the services of a company secretary who must ensure that all appointments are properly 
made, that all necessary information is obtained from directors, both for the company’s own records and for the purposes of 
meeting statutory obligations, as well as obligations arising from the Listing requirements of Exchanges or other regulatory 
requirements. 
 
XII Size of Boards 
Every board should examine its size, with a view to determining the impact of the number upon its effectiveness. 
 
XIII Directors’ Training 
As an integral element of the process of appointing new directors, each company should provide an orientation and 
education program for new recruits to the board. 
 
Board structures and procedures 
 
XIV The board should meet regularly, with due notice of issues to be discussed and should record its conclusions in 
discharging its duties and responsibilities. The board should disclose the number of board meetings held in a year and the 
details of attendance of each individual director in respect of meetings held. 
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XV The board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it for decision to ensure that the direction 
and control of the company is firmly in its hands. 
 
Relationship of the board to management 
 
XVI The board, together with the Chief Executive Officer, should develop position descriptions for the board and for the 
Chief Executive Officer, involving definition of the limits to management’s responsibilities. In addition, the board should 
approve, or develop with the Chief Executive Officer, the corporate objectives, which the Chief Executive Officer is 
responsible for meeting. 
 
XVII Quality of Information 
The board should receive information that is not just historical or bottom line and financial-oriented but information that 
goes beyond assessing the quantitative performance of the enterprise and looks at other performance factors such as 
customer satisfaction, product and service quality, market share, market reaction, environmental performance and so on, 
when dealing with any item on the agenda. 
 
XVIII The chair of the board shall undertake primary responsibility for organising information necessary for the board to deal 
with the agenda and for providing this information to directors on a timely basis. If the chair is also the Chief Executive 
Officer, the board should also have in place a procedure to ensure 
that its agenda items are placed on the agenda and for providing this information to directors. 
 
XIX Access to Information 
Directors should have access to all information within a company whether as a full board or in their individual capacity, in 
furtherance of their duties. 
 
XX Access to Advice 
There should be an agreed procedure for directors, whether as a full board or in their individual capacity, in furtherance of 
their duties to take independent professional advice at the company’s expense, if necessary. 
 
XXI All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company secretary. 
 
XXII Directors should appoint as secretary someone who is capable of carrying out the duties to which the post entails and 
their removal should be a matter for the board as a whole. The board should recognise that the Chairman is entitled to the 
strong and positive support of the company secretary in ensuring the effective functioning of the board. 
 
XXIII Use of Board Committees 
Where the board appoints a committee, it should spell out the authority of the committee, and in particular, whether the 
committee has the authority to act on behalf of the board or simply has the authority to examine a particular issue and 
report back to the board with a recommendation. 
 
XXIV Remuneration Committees 
Boards should appoint remuneration committees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors, to recommend to 
the board the remuneration of the executive directors in all its forms, drawing from outside advice as necessary. Executive 
directors should play no part in decisions on their own remuneration. Membership of the remuneration committee should 
appear in the directors’ 
report. 
The determination of remuneration packages of non-executive directors, including non-executive chairmen should be a 
matter for the board as a whole. 
The individuals concerned should abstain from discussion of their own remuneration. 
 
BB Accountability and Audit 
 
The audit committee 
I The board should establish an audit committee of at least three directors, a majority of whom are independent, with 
written terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties. The Chairman of the audit committee should be 
an independent non-executive director. 
 
II The duties of the audit committee should include the following - 
(i) To consider the appointment of the external auditor, the audit fee and any questions of resignation or dismissal; 
(ii) To discuss with the external auditor before the audit commences, the nature and scope of the audit, and ensure co-
ordination where more than one audit firm is involved; 
(iii) To review the quarterly and year-end financial statements of the company, focusing particularly on:- 
• Any changes in accounting policies and practices; 
• Significant adjustments arising from the audit; 
• The going concern assumption; 
• Compliance with accounting standards and other legal requirements; 
(iv) To discuss problems and reservations arising from the interim and final audits, and any matter the auditor may wish to 
discuss (in the absence of management where necessary); 
(v) To review the external auditor’s management letter and management’s response; 
(vi) To do the following where an internal audit function exists: 
• review the adequacy of the scope, functions and resources of the internal audit function, and that it has the necessary 
authority to carry out its work; 
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• review the internal audit programme and results of the internal audit process and where necessary ensure that appropriate 
actionis taken on the recommendations of the internal audit function; 
• review any appraisal or assessment of the performance of members of the internal audit function; 
• approve any appointment or termination of senior staff members of the internal audit function; 
• inform itself of resignations of internal audit staff members and provide the resigning staff member an opportunity to 
submit his reasons for resigning. 
(vii) To consider any related party transactions that may arise within the company or group; 
(viii) To consider the major findings of internal investigations and management’s response; 
(ix) To consider other topics as defined by the board. 
 
III The Finance director, the Head of Internal Audit (where such a function exists) and a representative of the external 
auditors shall normally attend meetings. Other board members may attend meetings upon the invitation of the audit 
committee. However, at least once a year the committee shall meet with the external auditors without executive board 
members present. 
 
IV The audit committee must have explicit authority to investigate any matter within its terms of reference, the resources 
which it needs to do so and full access to information. The committee should be able to obtain external professional advice 
and to invite outsiders with relevant experience to attend, 
if necessary. 
 
V The audit committee should meet regularly, with due notice of issues to be discussed and should record its conclusions in 
discharging its duties and responsibilities. 
 
VI The board should disclose in an informative way, details of the activities of audit committees, the number of audit 
meetings held in a year and details of attendance of each individual director in respect of meetings. 
 
VII The Board should establish an internal audit function. Where an internal audit function does not exist, the Board should 
assess whether there are other means of obtaining sufficient assurance of regular review and/or appraisal of the 
effectiveness of the system of internal controls within the company. The board 
should explain, in summary, the means that exist for obtaining such assurance of regular review and/or appraisal. 
 
VIII The internal audit function should be independent of the activities they audit and should be performed with impartiality, 
proficiency and due professional care. The board or the audit committee should determine the remit of the internal audit 
function. 
 
CC Shareholders 
 
The relationship between the board and shareholders 
I Boards must maintain an effective communications policy that enables both the board and management to communicate 
effectively with its shareholders, stakeholders and the public generally. This policy must effectively interpret the operations 
of the company to the shareholders and must accommodate feedback 
from shareholders, which should be factored into the company’s business decisions. 
 
PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR OTHER CORPORATE 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
I Shareholder Voting 
Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes. 
 
II Dialogue between Companies and Investors 
Institutional investors should encourage direct contact with companies including constructive communication with both 
senior management and board members about performance, corporate governance and other matters affecting 
shareholders’ interest. 
 
III Evaluation of Governance Disclosures 
When evaluating companies’ governance arrangements, particularly those relating to board structure and composition, 
institutional investors and their advisers should give due weight to all relevant factors drawn to their attention. 
 
IV External Auditors 
The external auditors should independently report to shareholders in accordance with statutory and professional 
requirements and independently assure the board on the discharge of its responsibilities under D.I and D.II above in 
accordance with professional guidance. 
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FIGURE A.7.1 –  Indonesia: Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.2 – Malaysia: Exchange Rate 
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FIGURE A.7.3 – Exchange Rates: Daily Change (percentage, 1990-2005) 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.4 – Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.5 – Indonesia: Interest Rate 
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FIGURE A.7.6 – Malaysia: Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.7 – Indonesia: JSX Composite Index 
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FIGURE A.7.8 – Malaysia: KLSE Composite Index 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.9 – Stock Market Indices, Monthly Change (percentage) 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.10 – JP Morgan Trade Weighted Index Indonesia vs. Malaysia (1990-2005) 
 
 320 
 
FIGURE A.7.11 – Capital Flight (net): Indonesia vs. Malaysia 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.12 – Indonesia: Financing 
 
 
FIGURE A 7.13 – Malaysia: Financing 
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FIGURE A.7.14 – Indonesia: Trade Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.15 – Malaysia: Trade Indicators 
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FIGURE A.7.16 – Indonesia: Labour Market 
 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.17 – Malaysia: Labour Market 
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FIGURE A.7.18 – Indonesia: Money Supply 
 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.19 – Malaysia: Money Supply 
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FIGURE A.7.20 – Indonesia: Export Markets 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.21 – Malaysia: Export Markets 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.22 – Indonesia: Share of Export Products 
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FIGURE A.7.23 – Malaysia: Share of Export Products 
 
 
FIGURE A.7.24 – Indonesia: Fund Position 
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FIGURE A.7.25 – Indonesia: CPI vs. CPI Food 
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TABLE A.7.1 – Indonesia: Ordered Logistic Regression – ALL (1991-2004) 
************** 
*1991. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.2237 1.0000    
ROA 0.6377 0.2496 1.0000   
CR -0.0178 0.2064 0.4954 1.0000  
OM 0.1461 0.1202 0.2625 0.1331 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -143.63353 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -140.94913 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -140.85815 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -140.85794 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 97.97 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -140.85794 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2580 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.2759171 0.1326936 2.08 0.038 0.0158424 0.5359919 
ROA 1.718037 0.2182224 7.87 0.000 1.290329 2.145745 
CR -1.020646 0.1819598 -5.61 0.000 -1.377281 -0.6640118 
OM -0.0327685 0.1325209 -0.25 0.805 -0.2925047 0.2269678 
       
/cut1 0.4620041 0.6235678   -0.7601664 1.684175 
/cut2 2.116952 0.6563171   0.830594 3.40331 
/cut3 3.57298 0.7113561   2.178748 4.967213 
/cut4 5.404937 0.8051312   3.826909 6.982965 
 
************** 
*1992. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5170 1.0000    
ROA 0.6808 0.3531 1.0000   
CR 0.0080 0.0684 0.4868 1.0000  
OM 0.2151 0.2452 0.1978 0.0770 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -129.24801 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -124.36652 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -124.0102 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -124.00695 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 131.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -124.00695 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3468 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.6801349 0.1569086 4.33 0.000 0.3725997 0.9876701 
ROA 1.933328 0.2462763 7.85 0.000 1.450635 2.416021 
CR -1.151877 0.2022934 -5.69 0.000 -1.548365 -0.7553891 
OM 0.0780065 0.1360506 0.57 0.566 -0.1886477 0.3446608 
       
/cut1 1.804046 0.6707942   0.4893135 3.118778 
/cut2 3.813337 0.7329501   2.376781 5.249893 
/cut3 5.457167 0.80062   3.88798 7.026353 
/cut4 7.666561 0.9660598   5.773119 9.560003 
 
 
************** 
*1993. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6205 1.0000    
ROA 0.6248 0.4609 1.0000   
CR 0.1072 0.1762 0.5385 1.0000  
OM 0.0857 -0.0265 0.1461 -0.0825 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -142.66053 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -139.55838 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -139.44676 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -139.44651 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 100.80 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -139.44651 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2655 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.7602282 0.1511062 5.03 0.000 0.4640654 1.056391 
ROA 1.256494 0.2049384 6.13 0.000 0.8548223 1.658166 
CR -0.5874147 0.1721057 -3.41 0.001 -0.9247356 -0.2500938 
OM -0.0308978 0.1330605 -0.23 0.816 -0.2916916 0.229896 
       
/cut1 1.726825 0.697164   0.3604081 3.093241 
/cut2 3.517602 0.7660068   2.016257 5.018948 
/cut3 5.091996 0.8382901   3.448978 6.735015 
/cut4 6.808585 0.9167943   5.011701 8.605469 
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************** 
*1994. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5385 1.0000    
ROA 0.6075 0.4005 1.0000   
CR 0.0857 0.1159 0.4307 1.0000  
OM 0.2970 0.2064 0.1849 0.1676 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -146.41783 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -144.15211 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -144.08686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -144.08676 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 91.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -144.08676 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2410 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.6182116 0.149375 4.14 0.000 0.325442 0.9109812 
ROA 1.110177 0.1852015 5.99 0.000 0.7471884 1.473165 
CR -0.4257477 0.1541668 -2.76 0.006 -0.7279092 -0.1235863 
OM 0.3360643 0.1319661 2.55 0.011 0.0774156 0.5947131 
       
/cut1 2.646779 0.6861203   1.302008 3.99155 
/cut2 4.309064 0.7569514   2.825467 5.792662 
/cut3 5.604906 0.8041149   4.02887 7.180942 
/cut4 7.270859 0.8990997   5.508656 9.033062 
 
 
************** 
*1995. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 117 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4533 1.0000    
ROA 0.5496 0.3194 1.0000   
CR 0.1897 0.1633 0.5743 1.0000  
OM 0.4269 0.3259 0.3267 0.2563 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -188.23517 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -152.12224 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -150.51173 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -150.48341 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -150.48339 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 117 
LR chi2(4) = 75.50 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -150.48339 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2006 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.4410928 0.1387231 3.18 0.001 0.1692006 0.7129851 
ROA 1.001108 0.1825231 5.48 0.000 0.6433691 1.358846 
CR -0.4013886 0.158502 -2.53 0.011 -0.7120468 -0.0907305 
OM 0.4525265 0.1399348 3.23 0.001 0.1782592 0.7267937 
       
/cut1 2.46456 0.6381893   1.213732 3.715388 
/cut2 3.99256 0.7027377   2.61522 5.369901 
/cut3 5.181596 0.7473776   3.716763 6.646429 
/cut4 6.674376 0.8269753   5.053534 8.295218 
 
 
************** 
*1996. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5946 1.0000    
ROA 0.6205 0.3789 1.0000   
CR 0.1762 0.1719 0.5170 1.0000  
OM 0.5515 0.4609 0.4566 0.2754 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -139.28363 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -136.01317 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -135.86777 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -135.86712 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 107.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -135.86712 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2843 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.7233426 0.1596827 4.53 0.000 0.4103703 1.036315 
ROA 1.059218 0.1879931 5.63 0.000 0.6907584 1.427678 
CR -0.4380295 0.1595997 -2.74 0.006 -0.7508392 -0.1252197 
OM 0.5017932 0.1512898 3.32 0.001 0.2052706 0.7983158 
       
/cut1 3.01858 0.6326332   1.778642 4.258518 
/cut2 5.01324 0.7504267   3.542431 6.484049 
/cut3 6.404228 0.814616   4.80761 8.00846 
/cut4 8.08366 0.915087   6.290122 9.877198 
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************** 
*1997. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7369 1.0000    
ROA 0.6722 0.4609 1.0000   
CR 0.2496 0.1461 0.5213 1.0000  
OM 0.2107 0.1806 0.2668 0.2237 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.06147 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -128.51122 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -128.01256 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -128.00518 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -128.00517 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 123.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -128.00517 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3257 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.183275 0.1912811 6.19 0.000 0.8083708 1.558179 
ROA 1.075586 0.1954408 5.50 0.000 0.6925294 1.458643 
CR -0.143343 0.1493137 -0.96 0.337 -0.4359924 0.1493065 
OM 0.0032987 0.1348339 0.02 0.980 -0.2609709 0.2675683 
       
/cut1 3.318204 0.6719083   2.001288 4.63512 
/cut2 5.137122 0.7543075   3.658707 6.615538 
/cut3 7.218705 0.9301784   5.395589 9.041822 
/cut4 9.381176 1.098799   7.227569 11.53478 
 
************** 
*1998. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6463 1.0000    
ROA 0.8404 0.5773 1.0000   
CR 0.5946 0.3401 0.6636 1.0000  
OM 0.4350 0.3315 0.5385 0.3401 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -123.11904 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -113.0572 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -111.26788 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -111.17668 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -111.17636 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 157.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -111.17636 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4144 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.7069133 0.1994928 3.54 0.000 0.3159145 1.097912 
ROA 1.903577 0.2916676 6.53 0.000 1.331919 2.475235 
CR 0.2675004 0.1784308 1.50 0.134 -0.0822175 0.6172183 
OM -0.0723874 0.1559069 -0.46 0.642 -0.3779594 0.2331845 
       
/cut1 4.890342 0.7776595   3.366157 6.414526 
/cut2 6.859306 0.8659663   5.162044 8.556569 
/cut3 9.352503 1.132886   7.132087 11.57292 
/cut4 12.5267 1.477435   9.630982 15.42242 
 
 
************** 
*1999. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6679 1.0000    
ROA 0.7887 0.7369 1.0000   
CR 0.4911 0.3703 0.5903 1.0000  
OM 0.4523 0.4307 0.4695 0.2841 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.24222 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -130.55417 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -130.0504 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -130.04377 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -130.04377 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 119.60 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -130.04377 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3150 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.532758 0.2010734 2.65 0.008 0.1386614 0.9268546 
ROA 1.388878 0.2549618 5.45 0.000 0.8891616 1.888593 
CR -0.0247116 0.16357 -0.15 0.880 -0.345303 0.2958797 
OM 0.1389099 0.144587 0.96 0.337 -0.1444754 0.4222951 
       
/cut1 2.998291 0.5852514   1.851219 4.145362 
/cut2 4.964531 0.7079645   3.756946 6.352116 
/cut3 7.046234 0.8863314   5.309057 8.783412 
/cut4 9.078911 1.022047   7.075736 11.08209 
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************** 
*2000. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7585 1.0000    
ROA 0.6636 0.5040 1.0000   
CR 0.4393 0.2323 0.6550 1.0000  
OM 0.3358 0.2582 0.4005 0.3789 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.92021 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -129.0107 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -128.40382 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -128.39176 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -128.39175 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 122.91 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -128.39175 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3237 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.212402 0.1923207 6.30 0.000 0.8354607 1.589344 
ROA 0.8601083 0.2220403 3.87 0.000 0.4349172 1.295299 
CR 0.1194567 0.1695778 0.70 0.481 -0.2129096 0.451823 
OM 0.0781269 0.1366178 0.57 0.567 -0.1896391 0.3458929 
       
/cut1 3.71962 0.6480568   2.449452 4.989788 
/cut2 5.552624 0.7454235   4.09162 7.013627 
/cut3 7.795413 0.9701084   5.894036 9.696791 
/cut4 9.955473 1.138304   7.724437 12.18651 
 
************** 
*2001. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6824 1.0000    
ROA 0.4480 0.4343 1.0000   
CR 0.2970 0.2298 0.5256 1.0000  
OM 0.4307 0.3038 0.3617 0.2798 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -147.20228 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -144.03332 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -143.89276 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -143.89225 
 
 334 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 91.90 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -143.89225 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2421 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.144118 0.1780489 6.43 0.000 0.7951485 1.493087 
ROA 0.2142614 0.1792366 1.20 0.232 -0.137036 0.5655588 
CR 0.1037222 0.1534094 0.68 0.499 -0.1969546 0.4043991 
OM 0.4451955 0.1435573 3.10 0.002 0.1638284 0.7265626 
       
/cut1 3.225374 0.6313576   1.987936 4.462813 
/cut2 5.143506 0.7662632   3.641658 6.645354 
/cut3 6.657173 0.8611539   4.969342 8.345003 
/cut4 8.192232 0.9438108   6.342397 10.04207 
 
************** 
*2002. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6998 1.0000    
ROA 0.7024 0.5214 1.0000   
CR 0.2452 0.1210 0.4997 1.0000  
OM 0.3358 0.1297 0.4048 0.2366 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -132.56459 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -126.25487 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -125.62971 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -125.61943 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -125.61942 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 128.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -125.61942 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3383 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.201889 0.1966187 6.11 0.000 0.8165233 1.587254 
ROA 1.062745 0.2165838 4.91 0.000 0.6382483 1.487241 
CR -0.1172955 0.1502319 -0.78 0.435 -0.4117446 0.1771536 
OM 0.2062951 0.1421698 1.45 0.147 -0.0723526 0.4849428 
       
/cut1 3.807324 0.7053112   2.424939 5.189708 
/cut2 6.220799 0.8915855   4.473324 7.968274 
/cut3 8.272529 1.046359   6.221703 10.32336 
/cut4 10.07792 1.132289   7.858673 12.29717 
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************** 
*2003. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6650 1.0000    
ROA 0.5428 0.4822 1.0000   
CR 0.0080 -0.0139 0.4393 1.0000  
OM 0.4048 0.3299 0.3574 -0.0178 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -147.54798 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -145.04024 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -144.95521 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   -144.955 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 89.78 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -144.955 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2365 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.9215654 0.1806767 5.10 0.000 0.5674456 1.275685 
ROA 0.5880025 0.186812 3.15 0.002 0.2218578 0.9541472 
CR -0.2081486 0.152759 -1.36 0.173 -0.5075507 0.0912535 
OM 0.3048631 0.1395551 2.18 0.029 0.0313401 0.578386 
       
/cut1 2.451447 0.6656694   1.146759 3.756135 
/cut2 4.313669 0.7677218   2.808962 5.818376 
/cut3 5.762207 0.8416185   4.112665 7.411749 
/cut4 7.221079 0.8997753   5.457552 8.984606 
 
************** 
*2004. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 118 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7477 1.0000    
ROA 0.4911 0.4561 1.0000   
CR 0.1892 0.1645 0.5213 1.0000  
OM 0.4048 0.3734 0.2452 -0.0351 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -189.84468 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -140.71012 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -136.48795 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -136.18891 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -136.18667 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -136.18667 
 336 
 
Ordered logistic regression  
Number of obs = 118 
LR chi2(4) = 107.32 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -136.18667 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2826 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.314705 0.19321 6.80 0.000 0.9360205 1.69339 
ROA 0.4629137 0.1737407 2.66 0.008 0.1223882 0.8034391 
CR 0.0042165 0.148293 0.03 0.977 -0.2864324 0.2948654 
OM 0.2984955 0.1414786 2.11 0.035 0.0212026 0.5757884 
       
/cut1 3.49664 0.6903805   2.143523 4.849765 
/cut2 5.578741 0.8321891   3.94768 7.209801 
/cut3 7.41309 0.9700069   5.511911 9.314268 
/cut4 9.047543 1.0526   6.984484 11.1106 
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TABLE A.7.2 – Indonesia: Ordered Logistic Regression – EX-FiNANCE (1991-2004) 
************** 
*1991. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.1274 1.0000    
ROA 0.6071 0.2345 1.0000   
CR -0.1788 0.1733 0.3876 1.0000  
OM 0.1376 0.1172 0.1988 0.1886 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -117.34694 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -114.72595 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -114.60963 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -114.60928 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 89.41 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -114.60928 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2806 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.1626106 0.1455989 1.12 0.264 -0.1227579 0.4479791 
ROA 1.740063 0.2422009 7.18 0.000 1.265358 2.214768 
CR -1.219662 0.2091773 -5.83 0.000 -1.629642 -0.8096822 
OM 0.2353915 0.1441877 1.63 0.103 -0.0472111 0.5179941 
       
/cut1 0.2723022 0.7092919   -1.117884 1.662489 
/cut2 2.037232 0.7510722   0.5651579 3.509307 
/cut3 3.558848 0.8094374   1.97238 5.145316 
/cut4 5.423605 0.9081526   3.643659 7.203552 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1992. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5050 1.0000    
ROA 0.7499 0.4336 1.0000   
CR -0.0461 0.0763 0.3264 1.0000  
OM 0.0968 0.2294 0.0661 0.0202 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -108.12223 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -103.62601 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -103.30491 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -103.3021 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 112.02 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -103.3021 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3516 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5265673 0.1725837 3.05 0.002 0.1883095 0.8648252 
ROA 1.817118 0.2430186 7.48 0.000 1.340811 2.293426 
CR -0.8399912 0.1790626 -4.69 0.000 -1.190947 -0.4890349 
OM 0.0159817 0.1459088 0.11 0.913 -0.2699943 0.3019578 
       
/cut1 1.67842 0.7653526   0.1783567 3.178484 
/cut2 3.811515 0.8343247   2.176269 5.446762 
/cut3 5.571837 0.9172292   3.7741 7.369573 
/cut4 7.665361 1.075461   5.557495 9.773227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1993. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6377 1.0000    
ROA 0.7346 0.5764 1.0000   
CR 0.0865 0.1580 0.3825 1.0000  
OM 0.2549 0.2141 0.2907 0.2345 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -114.35625 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -110.83015 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.65142 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.65055 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 97.33 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.65055 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3055 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.6339759 0.1770579 3.58 0.000 0.2869487 0.981003 
ROA 1.322152 0.2218676 5.96 0.000 0.8872998 1.757005 
CR -0.4261503 0.162577 -2.62 0.009 -0.7447955 -0.1075052 
OM 0.17798 0.1499169 1.19 0.235 -0.1158517 0.4718117 
       
/cut1 2.380057 0.678035   1.051132 3.708981 
/cut2 4.39168 0.7863115   2.850538 5.932822 
/cut3 6.041936 0.8794961   4.318156 7.765717 
/cut4 7.812436 0.9922761   5.867611 9.757262 
 
************** 
*1994. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4999 1.0000    
ROA 0.7806 0.4897 1.0000   
CR 0.0968 0.1121 0.3213 1.0000  
OM 0.2549 0.1682 0.2243 0.2754 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -112.21767 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -108.30217 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -108.06304 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -108.0615 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 102.50 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -108.0615 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3217 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.3375171 0.1628247 2.07 0.038 0.0183866 0.6566477 
ROA 1.631427 0.2285929 7.14 0.000 1.183393 2.079461 
CR -0.4890778 0.175694 -2.78 0.005 -0.8334316 -0.144724 
OM 0.347477 0.1554994 2.23 0.025 0.0427038 0.6522502 
       
/cut1 2.724543 0.7269267   1.299793 4.149293 
/cut2 4.661658 0.8328934   3.029217 6.294099 
/cut3 6.321305 0.9249833   4.508372 8.134239 
/cut4 8.339757 1.069823   6.242942 10.43657 
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************** 
*1995. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4693 1.0000    
ROA 0.6734 0.4080 1.0000   
CR 0.1376 0.1223 0.3876 1.0000  
OM 0.4080 0.3111 0.3978 0.2856 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -122.67037 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -120.60241 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -120.54163 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -120.54152 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 77.54 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -120.54152 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2434 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.4003075 0.1571586 2.55 0.011 0.0922822 0.7083328 
ROA 1.183149 0.1989499 5.95 0.000 0.793214 1.573083 
CR -0.3238316 0.1576009 -2.05 0.040 -0.6327237 -0.0149394 
OM 0.3109474 0.1517702 2.05 0.040 0.0134833 0.6084115 
       
/cut1 2.454668 0.6873335   1.107519 3.801817 
/cut2 4.188249 0.7814451   2.656644 5.719853 
/cut3 5.485241 0.8352421   3.848197 7.122286 
/cut4 7.087784 0.9255563   5.273727 8.901841 
 
************** 
*1996. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5918 1.0000    
ROA 0.7346 0.4642 1.0000   
CR 0.1784 0.1886 0.3672 1.0000  
OM 0.5254 0.4234 0.4999 0.2703 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -113.97218 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -110.55057 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.35995 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.35866 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 97.91 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.35866 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3073 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.620327 0.1783941 3.48 0.001 0.270681 0.9699731 
ROA 1.217013 0.2111033 5.77 0.000 0.8032581 1.630768 
CR -0.2930734 0.1545423 -1.90 0.058 -0.5959708 0.009824 
OM 0.3729374 0.1680339 2.22 0.026 0.043597 0.7022778 
       
/cut1 3.038546 0.6805889   1.704616 4.372476 
/cut2 5.094753 0.8227294   3.482233 6.707273 
/cut3 6.592643 0.9052708   4.818345 8.366941 
/cut4 8.425692 1.034481   6.398147 10.45324 
 
************** 
*1997. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7091 1.0000    
ROA 0.8673 0.6326 1.0000   
CR 0.4489 0.3264 0.4795 1.0000  
OM 0.1988 0.1376 0.2754 0.1988 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   -96.8644 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -86.742604 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -84.812479 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -84.706019 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -84.70555 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 149.22 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -84.70555 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4683 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5933208 0.225615 2.63 0.009 0.1511235 1.035518 
ROA 2.325782 0.3246138 7.16 0.000 1.689551 2.962013 
CR 0.1600226 0.1672425 0.96 0.339 -0.1677667 0.4878119 
OM -0.114626 0.1612002 -0.71 0.477 -0.4305725 0.2013206 
       
/cut1 4.874688 0.8593966   3.190302 6.559074 
/cut2 7.291965 1.024721   5.283549 9.30038 
/cut3 10.06403 1.32719   7.462786 12.66527 
/cut4 13.27677 1.64494   10.05275 16.50079 
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************** 
*1998. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6428 1.0000    
ROA 0.9184 0.6326 1.0000   
CR 0.6479 0.3315 0.6428 1.0000  
OM 0.3570 0.3315 0.4336 0.2396 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -88.592694 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -74.823077 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -71.185291 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -70.797781 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -70.791331 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -70.791329 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 177.05 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -70.791329 
Pseudo R2 = 0.5556 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5511384 0.2374897 2.32 0.020 0.0856672 1.01661 
ROA 2.931933 0.4063152 7.22 0.000 2.13557 3.728296 
CR 0.4067313 0.2154252 1.89 0.059 -0.0154943 0.8289569 
OM -0.225819 0.1795954 -1.26 0.209 -0.5778196 0.1261816 
       
/cut1 5.896683 0.9771329   3.981537 7.811828 
/cut2 8.987427 1.203052   6.629487 11.34537 
/cut3 12.54862 1.634247   9.345555 15.75168 
/cut4 16.39905 2.090774   12.30121 20.49689 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1999. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6683 1.0000    
ROA 0.8010 0.7806 1.0000   
CR 0.4029 0.3213 0.4999 1.0000  
OM 0.3978 0.4080 0.4387 0.2447 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -113.21492 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -107.86113 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -107.34269 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -107.33457 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -107.33456 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 103.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -107.33456 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3263 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.4362121 0.2346346 1.86 0.063 -0.0236634 0.8960875 
ROA 1.626148 0.2917618 5.57 0.000 1.054305 2.19799 
CR -0.1024438 0.1660823 -0.62 0.537 -0.4279591 0.2230716 
OM 0.0207617 0.1535876 0.14 0.892 -0.2802644 0.3217877 
       
/cut1 2.699077 0.634693   1.455102 3.943052 
/cut2 4.777427 0.7766376   3.255246 6.299609 
/cut3 6.934515 0.975679   5.02222 8.846811 
/cut4 8.966789 1.116509   6.778472 11.15511 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2000. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7040 1.0000    
ROA 0.7704 0.6122 1.0000   
CR 0.5254 0.2958 0.6275 1.0000  
OM 0.2549 0.2447 0.3876 0.3264 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.24084 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -105.36515 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -104.62932 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -104.60882 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -104.6088 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 109.41 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -104.6088 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3434 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.7266356 0.1933059 3.76 0.000 0.347763 1.105508 
ROA 1.450243 0.2853489 5.08 0.000 0.8909691 2.009516 
CR 0.2006715 0.188313 1.07 0.287 -0.1684152 0.5697582 
OM -0.1543192 0.1492392 -1.03 0.301 -0.4468226 0.1381843 
       
/cut1 3.383963 0.6935146   2.024699 4.743227 
/cut2 5.331282 0.8073875   3.748832 6.913733 
/cut3 7.789965 1.090091   5.653425 9.926504 
/cut4 10.0109 1.269706   7.522319 12.49947 
 
 
************** 
*2001. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7193 1.0000    
ROA 0.5254 0.4795 1.0000   
CR 0.3009 0.2805 0.4999 1.0000  
OM 0.4693 0.2958 0.3570 0.3009 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -117.15762 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -113.54434 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -113.32954 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -113.32832 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -113.32832 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 91.97 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -113.32832 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2886 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.244711 0.2073866 6.00 0.000 0.8382413 1.651182 
ROA 0.3437566 0.1958646 1.76 0.079 -0.0401309 0.7276442 
CR -0.0071613 0.1648343 -0.04 0.965 -0.3302306 0.3159081 
OM 0.5616675 0.1611054 3.49 0.000 0.2459068 0.8774282 
       
/cut1 3.678551 0.7232388   2.26103 5.096073 
/cut2 5.679324 0.8752149   3.963935 7.394714 
/cut3 7.38815 0.9978563   5.432387 9.343912 
/cut4 9.18192 1.128833   6.969447 11.39439 
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************** 
*2002. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7040 1.0000    
ROA 0.7091 0.5509 1.0000   
CR 0.1529 0.0100 0.4182 1.0000  
OM 0.2907 0.0406 0.4029 0.2601 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -110.04755 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.28801 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -103.6102 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -103.59448 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -103.59447 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 111.44 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -103.59447 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3497 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.205287 0.2231062 5.40 0.000 0.7680072 1.642567 
ROA 1.131111 0.2431032 4.65 0.000 0.6546371 1.607584 
CR -0.091398 0.1663683 -0.55 0.583 -0.4174739 0.2346779 
OM 0.198396 0.1580858 1.25 0.209 -0.1114465 0.5082385 
       
/cut1 3.919606 0.8196261   2.313169 5.526044 
/cut2 6.582393 1.043262   4.537638 8.627149 
/cut3 8.655937 1.205455   6.293288 11.01859 
/cut4 10.38834 1.291819   7.856417 12.92025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2003. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.6989 1.0000    
ROA 0.6989 0.6020 1.0000   
CR 0.0763 0.0610 0.3213 1.0000  
OM 0.3672 0.2805 0.5458 0.1529 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -115.88316 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -111.94525 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -111.68449 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -111.68247 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -111.68247 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 95.26 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -111.68247 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2990 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.8485244 0.2004675 4.23 0.000 0.4556154 1.241433 
ROA 1.116614 0.2463787 4.53 0.000 0.6337208 1.599508 
CR -0.1865535 0.1611051 -1.16 0.247 -0.5023137 0.1292066 
OM 0.046307 0.1659569 0.28 0.780 -0.2789625 0.3715766 
       
/cut1 2.701776 0.7275014   1.2759 4.127653 
/cut2 4.876436 0.8829082   3.145967 6.606904 
/cut3 6.692677 1.01331   4.706627 8.678728 
/cut4 8.354366 1.095515   6.207196 10.50154 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2004. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7551 1.0000    
ROA 0.7295 0.6632 1.0000   
CR 0.3366 0.3162 0.4489 1.0000  
OM 0.4285 0.3876 0.3927 0.1325 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -159.31394 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -109.90815 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -103.70547 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.94026 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.92197 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.92195 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 99 
LR chi2(4) = 112.78 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.92195 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3540 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.007329 0.2357984 4.27 0.000 0.5451722 1.469485 
ROA 1.144286 0.2579115 4.44 0.000 0.6387891 1.649784 
CR 0.0681367 0.1535151 0.44 0.657 -0.2327473 0.3690208 
OM 0.3057958 0.1572009 1.59 0.052 -0.0023123 0.6139039 
       
/cut1 4.29445 0.780098   2.765486 5.823414 
/cut2 6.792918 1.002186   4.82867 8.757167 
/cut3 9.101119 1.231231   6.687951 11.51429 
/cut4 10.97633 1.238288   8.333731 13.61892 
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TABLE A.7.3 – Malaysia: Ordered Logistic Regression – ALL (1991-2004) 
************** 
*1991. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7214 1.0000    
ROA 0.8143 0.6286 1.0000   
CR 0.3779 0.4986 0.6379 1.0000  
OM 0.4057 0.3871 0.4800 0.4707 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -50.454741 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -45.754682 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -44.922857 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -44.87906 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -44.878886 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of observations  = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 77.33 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -44.878886 
Pseudo R2       =     0.4628 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.087247 0.2927437 3.71 0.000 0.5134793 1.661014 
ROA 2.286608 0.4670599 4.90 0.000 1.371187 3.202028 
CR -0.8773881 0.3035825 -2.89 0.004 -1.472399 -0.2823773 
OM 0.1437284 0.2381253 0.60 0.546 -0.3229885 0.6104454 
       
/cut1 3.962656 1.021671   1.960217 5.965094 
/cut2 6.89751 1.402637   4.148391 9.646628 
/cut3 9.416371 1.720362   6.044524 12.78822 
/cut4 11.82896 1.992214   7.924288 15.73362 
  
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1992. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3463 1.0000    
ROA 0.6193 -0.0864 1.0000   
CR 0.2664 -0.0121 0.5264 1.0000  
OM 0.2107 -0.1421 0.2200 0.0529 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -68.870142 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -68.315055 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -68.305205 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -68.305201 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 30.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -68.305201 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1824 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER -0.4126447 0.1905457 -2.17 0.030 -0.7861074 -0.0391821 
ROA 1.068087 0.2643428 4.04 0.000 0.5499846 1.586189 
CR -0.1278196 0.2176347 -0.59 0.557 -0.5543757 0.2987365 
OM 0.0408244 0.1829185 0.22 0.823 -0.3176893 0.3993382 
       
/cut1 -0.368461 1.11248   -2.548881 1.811959 
/cut2 1.112251 1.128825   -1.100206 3.324708 
/cut3 2.340788 1.158673   0.0698301 4.611746 
/cut4 3.605153 1.227321   1.199648 6.010658 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1993. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4336 1.0000    
ROA 0.6471 0.1643 1.0000   
CR 0.1829 -0.0121 0.5543 1.0000  
OM 0.2293 0.2571 0.0621 -0.1793 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -63.270883 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -62.068022 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -62.027812 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -62.027722 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 43.03 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -62.027722 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2575 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5902564 0.2060741 2.86 0.004 0.1863587 0.9941541 
ROA 1.372342 0.2894268 4.74 0.000 0.8050758 1.939608 
CR -0.3538622 0.2399155 -1.47 0.140 -.824088 0.1163636 
OM 0.1406452 0.202806 0.69 0.488 -.2568472 0.5381377 
       
/cut1 2.959888 1.11746   0.7697059 5.15007 
/cut2 4.721097 1.231497   2.307407 7.134787 
/cut3 6.024729 1.317151   3.443162 8.606297 
/cut4 7.510243 1.4524   4.663591 10.3569 
 
 
 
**************  
*1994. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5821 1.0000    
ROA 0.6379 0.2014 1.0000   
CR 0.0807 -0.0307 0.4243 1.0000  
OM 0.4243 0.2943 0.1829 -0.1886 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -57.984961 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -55.898128 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -55.766574 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -55.765756 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 55.55 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -55.765756 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3325 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.9009135 0.2284811 3.94 0.000 0.4530987 1.348728 
ROA 1.318362 0.2856418 4.62 0.000 0.7585138 1.878209 
CR -0.2896421 0.2347628 -1.23 0.217 -0.7497687 0.1704844 
OM 0.4339304 0.2137795 2.03 0.042 0.0149303 0.8529304 
       
/cut1 4.326901 1.238924   1.898655 6.755147 
/cut2 6.271838 1.366125   3.594282 8.949394 
/cut3 7.966036 1.533601   4.960232 10.97184 
/cut4 9.802547 1.725604   6.420425 13.18467 
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**************  
*1995. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4243 1.0000    
ROA 0.5821 0.1086 1.0000   
CR -0.0214 0.0250 0.4243 1.0000  
OM 0.4150 0.3964 0.1550 -0.3371 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -63.545108 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -62.388656 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -62.347822 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -62.347732 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 42.39 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -62.347732 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2537 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5948216 0.2240163 2.66 0.008 0.1557578 1.033885 
ROA 1.320695 0.2816714 4.69 0.000 0.7686296 1.872761 
CR -0.6757171 0.2713768 -2.49 0.013 -1.207606 -0.1438284 
OM 0.1942809 0.2202536 0.88 0.378 -0.2374083 0.6259701 
       
/cut1 1.895597 1.085514   -0.2319718 4.023167 
/cut2 3.631862 1.173245   1.332345 5.931379 
/cut3 5.023522 1.278534   2.517641 7.529402 
/cut4 6.505571 1.385841   3.789372 9.221769 
 
 
 
**************  
*1996. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.1457 1.0000    
ROA 0.6379 0.0529 1.0000   
CR 0.2107 0.1179 0.5264 1.0000  
OM -0.0029 0.3036 -0.0307 -0.0679 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -68.849344 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -68.232067 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -68.223477 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -68.223474 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 30.64 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -68.223474 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1834 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.345317 0.2087456 1.65 0.098 -0.0638168 0.7544508 
ROA 1.239985 0.2645746 4.69 0.000 0.7214286 1.758542 
CR -0.3397578 0.2326995 -1.46 0.144 -0.7958404 0.1163248 
OM -0.1374773 0.1981826 -0.69 0.488 -0.525908 0.2509535 
       
/cut1 1.372107 0.9804884   -0.5496145 3.29383 
/cut2 2.738138 1.009001   0.7605327 4.715744 
/cut3 3.922805 1.08898   1.788445 6.057166 
/cut4 5.284019 1.203258   2.925677 7.64236 
 
 
**************  
*1997. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0529 1.0000    
ROA 0.7029 0.0343 1.0000   
CR 0.1829 0.1550 0.5821 1.0000  
OM 0.3221 -0.1143 0.1643 -0.0400 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -61.908728 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -60.241778 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -60.138033 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -60.137392 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 46.81 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -60.137392 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2802 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.2031933 0.1905931 1.07 0.286 -0.1703622 0.5767489 
ROA 1.854769 0.3596396 5.16 0.000 1.149888 2.559649 
CR -0.6920189 0.2650761 -2.61 0.009 -1.211559 -0.1724792 
OM 0.2332499 0.2056856 1.13 0.257 -0.1698865 0.6363863 
       
/cut1 2.20606 1.096302   0.0573482 4.354772 
/cut2 4.131293 1.222918   1.734418 6.528168 
/cut3 5.776676 1.373851   3.083977 8.469374 
/cut4 7.268049 1.47766   4.371889 10.16421 
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**************  
*1998. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.8050 1.0000    
ROA 0.8979 0.7771 1.0000   
CR 0.1829 0.1179 0.2293 1.0000  
OM 0.6471 0.6379 0.7400 0.0343 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -48.96686 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -43.473012 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -42.291219 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -42.209211 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -42.208668 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 82.67 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -42.208668 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4948 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.9929323 0.3652946 2.72 0.007 0.2769679 1.708897 
ROA 2.396607 0.5249045 4.57 0.000 1.367813 3.425401 
CR -0.1706732 0.2350314 -0.73 0.468 -0.6313264 0.28998 
OM -0.3854317 0.340827 -1.13 0.258 -1.05344 0.2825769 
       
/cut1 3.97167 1.101651   1.812473 6.130867 
/cut2 7.284938 1.496157   4.352525 10.21735 
/cut3 10.02844 1.91905   6.267166 13.7897 
/cut4 12.67398 2.256978   8.250388 17.09758 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
************** 
*1999. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7864 1.0000    
ROA 0.7864 0.6657 1.0000   
CR 0.3221 0.3500 0.3314 1.0000  
OM 0.2757 0.3500 0.3871 0.2014 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -53.636052 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -49.989205 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -49.513957 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -49.500069 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -49.500051 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 68.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -49.500051 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4075 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.277968 0.3244964 3.94 0.000 0.641967 1.91397 
ROA 1.326657 0.3422171 3.88 0.000 0.6559233 1.99739 
CR 0.0352515 0.2194414 0.16 0.872 -0.3948457 0.4653486 
OM -0.2974031 0.2413441 -1.23 0.218 -0.7704289 0.1756227 
       
/cut1 3.539909 1.008507   1.563271 5.516547 
/cut2 6.386636 1.350581   3.739547 9.033725 
/cut3 8.285347 1.521944   5.302391 11.2683 
/cut4 10.25785 1.710905   6.904533 13.61116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**************  
*2000. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4336 1.0000    
ROA 0.5636 0.3871 1.0000   
CR -0.0493 0.1364 0.2850 1.0000  
OM -0.0679 0.1921 0.2664 0.0900 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -67.685242 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -66.981528 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -66.965949 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -66.965934 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 33.15 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -66.965934    
Pseudo R2 = 0.1984 
 355 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5181632 0.2091554 2.48 0.013 0.1082261 0.9281002 
ROA 1.031799 0.2516538 4.10 0.000 0.5385663 1.525031 
CR -0.310303 0.1948655 -1.59 0.111 -0.6922324 0.0716264 
OM -0.3855855 0.1972347 -1.95 0.051 -0.7721584 0.0009874 
       
/cut1 0.4538337 1.01119   -1.528061 2.435729 
/cut2 2.056991 1.109439   -0.1174694 4.231452 
/cut3 3.269848 1.146331   1.023081 5.516615 
/cut4 4.54356 1.195417   2.200585 6.886534 
 
 
 
 
**************  
*2001. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5079 1.0000    
ROA 0.8421 0.5171 1.0000   
CR 0.0714 0.2293 0.2107 1.0000  
OM 0.2107 0.2943 0.2757 0.2107 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -54.762557 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -51.278563 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -50.84916 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -50.839035 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -50.839028 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 65.41 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -50.839028 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3915 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.1755474 0.2582694 0.68 0.497 -0.3306513 0.6817461 
ROA 2.186216 0.3919779 5.58 0.000 1.417954 2.954479 
CR -0.392275 0.2092027 -1.88 0.061 -0.8023048 0.0177548 
OM -0.0488245 0.2140925 -0.23 0.820 -0.4684382 0.3707891 
       
/cut1 2.416083 0.9632662   0.5281159 4.30405 
/cut2 4.821442 1.184406   2.500049 7.142835 
/cut3 7.010185 1.431947   4.20362 9.81675 
/cut4 9.057836 1.622658   5.877485 12.23819 
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************** 
*2002. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5357 1.0000    
ROA 0.7214 0.4150 1.0000   
CR 0.1829 0.2571 0.2757 1.0000  
OM 0.0343 0.1364 0.2479 0.2293 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -61.264074 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -59.645649 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -59.557165 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -59.556763 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 47.97 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -59.556763 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2871 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.6022111 0.2321277 2.59 0.009 0.1472492 1.057173 
ROA 1.413471 0.3032105 4.66 0.000 0.8191891 2.007753 
CR -0.2050001 0.2069697 -0.99 0.322 -0.6106532 0.2006529 
OM -0.3358938 0.2030421 -1.65 0.098 -0.7338491 0.0620615 
       
/cut1 1.935035    0.0795365 3.790534 
/cut2 3.830352    1.711689 5.949016 
/cut3 5.405567    3.031612 7.779523 
/cut4 6.955322    4.358374 9.552271 
 
 
************** 
*2003. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.3407 1.0000    
ROA 0.6193 0.3036 1.0000   
CR 0.1364 0.1457 0.3407 1.0000  
OM -0.0493 0.0900 0.1550 0.3593 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -69.16155 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -68.637128 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -68.629974 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -68.629972 
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Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 29.82 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -68.629972 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1785 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.2529327 0.1968906 1.28 0.199 -0.1329659 0.6388313 
ROA 1.119064 0.2631532 4.25 0.000 0.6032934 1.634835 
CR -0.2989693 0.2286401 -1.31 0.191 -0.7470956 0.149157 
OM -0.180663 0.1909358 -0.95 0.344 -0.5548903 0.1935643 
       
/cut1 0.7252028 0.8698128   -0.9795989 2.430004 
/cut2 2.095679 0.911855   0.3084756 3.882882 
/cut3 3.271558 0.97629   1.358065 5.185052 
/cut4 4.602227 1.06482   2.515218 6.689236 
 
 
************** 
*2004. 
************** 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.1364 1.0000    
ROA 0.6286 0.0529 1.0000   
CR 0.0714 -0.0586 0.4057 1.0000  
OM 0.2943 0.0714 0.2571 0.2479 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -83.54239 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -67.336407 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -66.793573 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -66.784949 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -66.784945 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 52 
LR chi2(4) = 33.51 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -66.784945 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2006 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.1065755 0.1866463 0.57 0.568 -0.2592446 0.4723955 
ROA 1.226751 0.2715285 4.52 0.000 0.6945653 1.758937 
CR -0.5027154 0.2415021 -2.08 0.037 -0.9760508 -0.0293799 
OM 0.354103 0.1959602 1.81 0.071 -0.0299719 0.738178 
       
/cut1 1.56375 1.027488   -0.4500886 3.577589 
/cut2 2.941873 1.112407   0.7615962 5.12215 
/cut3 4.09059 1.168267   1.800829 6.380352 
/cut4 5.492322 1.244204   3.053726 7.930917 
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TABLE A.7.4 – Malaysia: Ordered Logistic Regression – EX-FINANCE (1991-2004) 
 
************** 
*1991. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7222 1.0000    
ROA 0.9000 0.6556 1.0000   
CR 0.3778 0.5333 0.4667 1.0000  
OM 0.2889 0.2889 0.5000 0.3778 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -37.773112 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -30.625568 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -28.177769 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -27.690509 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -27.660875 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -27.660717 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 89.53 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -27.660717 
Pseudo R2 = 0.6181 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 1.439262    0.4761325 3.02 0.003 0.5060595 2.372465 
ROA 4.248244    0.9461818      4.49    0.000      2.393762     6.102726 
CR -0.8408452 0.4270332 -1.97 0.049 -1.677815 -0.0038755 
OM -1.105301 0.408165 -2.71 0.007 -1.90529 -0.3053128 
       
/cut1 4.907107 1.270636   2.416707 7.397507 
/cut2 8.875912 2.044778   4.868222 12.8836 
/cut3 13.12572 2.770854   7.694946 18.55649 
/cut4 17.80482 3.649647   10.65164 24.958 
 
 ************** 
*1992. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3000 1.0000    
ROA 0.8000 -0.1000 1.0000   
CR 0.2556 -0.0111 0.4333 1.0000  
OM 0.0889 -0.0667 0.1222 0.0222 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -49.504088 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -47.304816 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -47.113224 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -47.111108 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -47.111108 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 50.63 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -47.111108  
Pseudo R2 = 0.3495 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER -0.5348325 0.2398727 -2.23 0.026 1.004974 -0.0646906 
ROA 2.028634 0.3890559 5.21 0.000 1.266098 2.791169 
CR -0.3326685 0.249 -1.34 0.182 -0.8206995 0.1553625 
OM -0.1218041 0.2199702 -0.55 0.580 -0.5529378 0.3093295 
       
/cut1 .2460708 1.326231   -2.353294 2.845435 
/cut2 2.250962 1.357773   -0.4102248 4.912148 
/cut3 4.038026 1.456531   1.183277 6.892775 
/cut4 6.23119 1.656884   2.983758 9.478622 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1993. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4222 1.0000    
ROA 0.7889 0.3333 1.0000   
CR 0.1889 0.1222 0.3889 1.0000  
OM 0.1889 0.2111 0.1667 -0.1444 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -48.520564 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -46.02249 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -45.792913 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -45.789879 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -45.789879 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 53.27 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -45.789879 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3678 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.523246 0.2418555 2.16 0.031 0.0492179 0.9972741 
ROA 2.068845 0.4001639 5.17 0.000 1.284538 2.853152 
CR -0.3612123 0.2627536 -1.37 0.169 -0.8761999 0.1537754 
OM -0.1091413 0.2293356 -0.48 0.634 -0.5586307 0.3403481 
       
/cut1 3.350269 1.2612   0.8783617 5.822176 
/cut2 5.712835 1.473176   2.825464 8.600207 
/cut3 7.623708 1.656156   4.377701 10.86971 
/cut4 9.618957 1.877173   5.939766 12.29815 
 
 
 
************** 
*1994. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.5333 1.0000    
ROA 0.8333 0.4333 1.0000   
CR 0.1556 0.0222 0.1889 1.0000  
OM 0.3556 0.1889 0.3333 -0.1333 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -47.622023 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -44.611698 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -44.274443 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -44.267502 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -44.267498 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 56.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -44.267498 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3888 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5311722 0.2433024 2.18 0.029 0.0543083 1.008036 
ROA 1.844891 0.3756513 4.91 0.000 1.108628 2.581154 
CR 0.0197852 0.2198777 0.09 0.928 -0.4111672 0.4507376 
OM 0.1962356 0.2334406 0.84 0.401 -0.2622995 0.6537707 
       
/cut1 4.461228 1.312012   1.889732 7.032724 
/cut2 6.657366 1.472698   3.770931 9.5438 
/cut3 8.823197 1.768058   5.3357867 12.28853 
/cut4 11.214 2.10892   7.080592 15.3474 
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************** 
*1995. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.2667 1.0000    
ROA 0.8111 0.2667 1.0000   
CR 0.0444 0.0556 0.2111 1.0000  
OM 0.3333 0.2778 0.2667 -0.2889 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -50.265301 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -47.765471 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -47.536338 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -47.533241 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -47.53324 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
 Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 49.78 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -47.53324 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3437 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.0144682 0.22422 0.06 0.949 -0.4249949 0.4539313 
ROA 1.947102 0.376611 5.17 0.000 1.208958 2.685246 
CR -0.2841876 0.2411837 -1.18 0.239 -0.756899 0.1885238 
OM 0.2155341 0.2287421 0.94 0.346 -0.2327923 0.6638605 
       
/cut1 2.652117 1.188921   0.3218746 4.982359 
/cut2 4.63568 1.314526   2.059256 7.212104 
/cut3 6.603814 1.573126   3.520545 9.687084 
/cut4 8.817526 1.812039   5.265995 12.36906 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1996. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0333 1.0000    
ROA 0.8333 0.1667 1.0000   
CR 0.3111 0.2889 0.4889 1.0000  
OM -0.0333 0.2000 0.1111 0.0889 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -48.155605 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -45.318426 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -44.982346 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -44.975592 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -44.975589 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 54.90 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -44.975589 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3790 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER -0.1695568 0.2364174 -0.72 0.473 -0.6329263 0.2938128 
ROA 2.353257 0.4403728 5.34 0.000 1.490143 3.216372 
CR -0.2568757 0.2622206 -0.98 0.327 -0.7708186 0.2570671 
OM -0.2653741 0.215604 -1.23 0.218 -0.6879503 0.157202 
       
/cut1 1.778984 1.05401   -0.2868381 3.844806 
/cut2 3.930579 1.181569   1.614747 6.246411 
/cut3 6.113086 1.433746   3.302995 8.923177 
/cut4 8.491126 1.708399   5.142725 11.83953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*1997. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.1556 1.0000    
ROA 0.8333 0.0889 1.0000   
CR 0.2000 0.2667 0.3778 1.0000  
OM 0.1667 -0.1000 0.2111 -0.0778 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -47.539087 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -44.929864 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -44.67862 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -44.674899 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -44.674898 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 55.50 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -44.674898 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3832 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.3062134 0.2250007 1.36 0.174 -0.1347798 0.7472066 
ROA 2.357101 0.4410334 5.34 0.000 1.492691 3.221511 
CR -0.5686194 0.2596698 -2.19 0.029 -1.077563 -0.0596759 
OM -0.2276562 0.2482554 -0.92 0.359 -0.7142279 0.2589155 
       
/cut1 2.600008 1.21947   0.2098912 4.990124 
/cut2 4.836121 1.348108   2.193878 7.478363 
/cut3 6.781562 1.569592   3.705218 9.857905 
/cut4 8.981753 1.784656   5.483892 12.47961 
 
 
 
************** 
* 1998. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7667 1.0000    
ROA 0.9000 0.8000 1.0000   
CR 0.0667 0.0222 0.1222 1.0000  
OM 0.5889 0.6778 0.6667 -0.0889 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -43.554535 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -38.949719 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -38.109831 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -38.071914 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -38.071812 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 68.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -38.071812 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4743 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.4263413 0.4163749 1.02 0.306 -0.3897385 1.242421 
ROA 2.683251 0.579689 4.63 0.000 1.547081 3.81942 
CR -0.1805392 0.2367851 -0.76 0.446 -0.6446295 0.2835512 
OM -0.3406553 0.346275 -0.98 0.325 -1.019342 0.3380312 
       
/cut1 3.485248 1.126066   1.278198 5.692297 
/cut2 6.36448 1.510993   3.402988 9.325972 
/cut3 9.218724 1.901077   5.492682 12.94477 
/cut4 11.8937 2.188983   7.603374 16.18403 
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************** 
*1999. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.7556 1.0000    
ROA 0.7778 0.6222 1.0000   
CR 0.3111 0.2778 0.2667 1.0000  
OM 0.2556 0.2778 0.3333 0.0333 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -47.913987 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -44.822644 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -44.455067 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -44.446204 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -44.446197 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 55.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -44.446197 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3863 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.9715909 0.3210134 3.03 0.002 0.3424162 1.600766 
ROA 1.447209 0.3991775 3.63 0.000 0.6648357 2.229583 
CR 0.1372572 0.2186073 0.63 0.530 -0.2912053 0.567197 
OM -0.0497512 0.2256354 -0.22 0.825 -0.4919884 0.39224861 
       
/cut1 4.059888 1.152848   1.800348 6.319428 
/cut2 6.809279 1.496783   3.875637 9.74292 
/cut3 8.984946 1.764693   5.526212 12.44368 
/cut4 10.95642 1.974084   7.087286 14.82555 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2000. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4556 1.0000    
ROA 0.6333 0.3889 1.0000   
CR -0.0111 0.0556 0.2222 1.0000  
OM 0.0111 0.0222 0.2333 -0.0111 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -58.090823 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -57.230269 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -57.198234 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -57.198161 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 30.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -57.198161 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2102 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.3636115 0.2247357 1.62 0.106 -0.0768624 0.8050854 
ROA 1.203659 0.2905227 4.14 0.000 0.6342451 1.773073 
CR -0.2303226 0.2068687 -1.11 0.266 -0.6357778 0.1751327 
OM -0.1532782 0.2014362 -0.76 0.447 -0.5480858 0.2415295 
       
/cut1 1.357076 1.18039   -0.9564452 3.670598 
/cut2 3.086034 1.319594   0.4996778 5.672391 
/cut3 4.415832 1.37748   1.716021 7.115644 
/cut4 5.825771 1.456093   2.971882 8.67966 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2001. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4333 1.0000    
ROA 0.7778 0.4444 1.0000   
CR 0.0222 0.1778 0.1000 1.0000  
OM 0.2111 0.2111 0.2111 -0.0333 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   -51.4333 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -49.324918 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -49.165291 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -49.163748 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 46.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -49.163748 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3212 
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ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER -0.0118194 0.2578498 -0.05 0.963 -0.5171958 0.493557 
ROA 1.86215 0.366409 5.08 0.000 1.144001 2.580298 
CR -0.1761213 0.2155805 -0.82 0.414 -0.5986513 0.2464087 
OM 0.1943574 0.2113851 0.92 0.358 -0.2199498 0.6086646 
       
/cut1 2.873054 1.157334   0.6047207 5.141387 
/cut2 5.006648 1.360128   2.340847 7.672449 
/cut3 6.841374 1.534864   3.833095 9.849653 
/cut4 8.669463 1.703123   5.331403 12.00752 
 
 
 
************** 
*2002. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.4889 1.0000    
ROA 0.7444 0.3111 1.0000   
CR 0.1667 0.3444 0.1778 1.0000  
OM -0.0111 0.0222 0.1778 0.1222 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -52.230749 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -50.178863 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -49.99735 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -49.99488 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -49.994879 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 44.86 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -49.994879 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3097 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.6591613 0.2458089 2.68 0.007 0.1773847 1.140938 
ROA 1.587385 0.3405761 4.66 0.000 0.9198677 2.254901 
CR -0.2087255 0.220549 -0.95 0.344 -0.6409937 0.2235426 
OM -0.2445762 0.2161882 -1.13 0.258 -0.6682972 0.1791448 
       
/cut1 2.577313 1.102819   0.4158274 4.738799 
/cut2 4.610172 1.3285   2.006359 7.213985 
/cut3 6.610345 1.559006   3.55475 9.66594 
/cut4 8.404402 1.685365   5.101147 11.70766 
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************** 
*2003. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.3556 1.0000    
ROA 0.6556 0.2111 1.0000   
CR 0.2222 0.2889 0.3667 1.0000  
OM -0.1222 0.0667 0.0667 0.1667 1.0000 
 
OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -56.68935 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -55.799747 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -55.774815 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -55.774782 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 33.30 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -55.774782 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2299 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.5234614 0.2361649 2.22 0.027 0.0605868 0.986336 
ROA 1.362948 0.3215234 4.24 0.000 0.732774 1.993122 
CR -0.4016976 0.2817104 -1.43 0.154 -0.9538399 0.1504447 
OM -0.2241981 0.2013195 -1.11 0.265 -0.6187771 0.1703808 
       
/cut1 1.599992 1.043894   -0.4460029 3.645988 
/cut2 3.200367 1.145758   0.9547231 5.44601 
/cut3 4.58198 1.256095   2.120078 7.043882 
/cut4 6.17362 1.382536   3.469642 8.889083 
 
 
 
 
 
 
************** 
*2004. 
************** 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 45 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.2444 1.0000    
ROA 0.6778 0.1667 1.0000   
CR 0.1111 0.0222 0.3222 1.0000  
OM 0.4222 0.0444 0.2667 0.2889 1.0000 
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OLOGIT 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -72.424706 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -54.754828 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -53.782198 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -53.746972 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -53.746902 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
Number of obs = 45 
LR chi2(4) = 37.36 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -53.746902 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2579 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
PER 0.2470338 0.2153816 1.15 0.251 -0.1751063 0.6691739 
ROA 1.2861 0.2953228 4.35 0.000 0.7072777 1.864922 
CR -0.3887255 0.2457407 -1.58 0.114 -0.8703685 0.0929175 
OM 0.6333515 0.2252061 2.81 0.005 0.1919558 1.074747 
       
/cut1 3.078209 1.180319   0.7648256 5.391593 
/cut2 4.677201 1.319237   2.091544 7.262859 
/cut3 5.993169 1.423385   3.203386 8.782952 
/cut4 7.724913 1.569221   4.649296 10.80053 
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TABLE A.7.5 – Indonesia: Quantile Regression (1991-2004) 
******************* 
*1991. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 87 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.2617 1.0000    
ROA 0.4420 -0.1012 1.0000   
CR -0.0452 0.0442 0.8202 1.0000  
OM 0.1651 -0.1360 0.0527 -0.0387 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 87 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4496 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4239 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5270 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0158697 0.0887281 -0.18 0.858 -0.1923782 0.1606387 
ROA 0.7979164 0.0866234 9.21 0.000 0.6255948 0.970238 
CR -0.5009016 0.2066595 -2.42 0.018 -0.9120131 -0.0897901 
OM 0.0125288 0.0557427 0.22 0.823 -0.0983611 0.1234187 
Constant 3.234343 1.987799 1.63 0.108 -0.7200223 7.188707 
q50 
PER -0.027283 0.0585136 -0.47 0.642 -0.1436851 0.0891192 
ROA 0.8280947 0.161549 5.13 0.000 0.5067223 1.149467 
CR -0.5388056 0.2344943 -2.30 0.024 -1.005289 -0.0723218 
OM 0.0641853 0.0650699 0.99 0.327 -0.0652593 0.19363 
Constant 5.586569 2.153652 2.59 0.011 1.30227 9.870868 
Q90 
PER -0.1247171 0.1571146 -0.79 0.430 -0.4372681 0.1878339 
ROA 1.34094 0.2424545 5.53 0.000 0.8586204 1.823259 
CR -0.4741779 0.3117489 -1.52 0.132 -1.094346 0.14599 
OM -0.0323708 0.1274928 -0.25 0.800 -0.2859946 0.221253 
Constant 10.16028 2.962611 3.43 0.001 4.266704 16.05386 
 
 370 
 
******************* 
*1992. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 98 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3115 1.0000    
ROA 0.8430 -0.2649 1.0000   
CR -0.0918 0.0511 0.1654 1.0000  
OM 0.1127 -0.1533 0.1242 0.0822 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 98 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5193 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.5115 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5519 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0137523 0.0311403 -0.44 0.660 -0.0755907 0.0480862 
ROA 0.777631 0.0777751 10.00 0.000 0.623185 0.932077 
CR -0.7224531 0.2759215 -2.62 0.010 -1.270379 -0.1745277 
OM 0.0070892 0.0350876 0.20 0.840 -0.0625878 0.0767662 
Constant 3.05022 0.9511519 3.21 0.002 1.161421 4.939019 
q50 
PER -0.0146564 0.026437 -0.55 0.581 -0.0671552 0.0378423 
ROA 0.8792258 0.1264535 6.95 0.000 0.6281142 1.130337 
CR -1.126217 0.3954427 -2.85 0.005 -1.911487 -0.3409458 
OM 0.020482 0.0530639 0.39 0.700 -0.0848924 0.1258563 
Constant 5.886144 1.548554 3.80 0.000 2.811023 8.961266 
Q90 
PER -0.0255845 0.0468696 -0.55 0.586 -0.1186582 0.0674892 
ROA 1.56058 0.347032 4.50 0.000 0.8714433 2.249717 
CR -1.08715 0.6593119 -1.65 0.103 -2.396413 0.2221128 
OM 0.0620999 0.1164704 0.53 0.595 -0.1691873 0.293387 
Constant 5.380959 3.482006 1.55 0.126 -1.533616 12.29553 
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******************* 
*1993. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 98 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.0935 1.0000    
ROA 0.7742 -0.1561 1.0000   
CR -0.0065 -0.0231 0.1370 1.0000  
OM 0.1063 -0.0109 0.0472 -0.2366 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 98 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4732 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4822 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4427 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0068024 0.0897749 0.08 0.940 -0.1714728 0.1850775 
ROA 1.142675 0.254837 4.48 0.000 0.6366193 1.648731 
CR -0.9294809 0.7869066 -1.18 0.241 -2.492121 0.6331597 
OM 0.1477042 0.1364316 1.08 0.282 -0.123222 0.4186304 
Constant -4.929771 7.853315 -0.63 0.532 -20.5249 10.66536 
q50 
PER -0.0037447 0.0306288 -0.12 0.903 -0.0645676 0.0570781 
ROA 1.103647 0.1004988 10.98 0.000 0.904076 1.303217 
CR -0.705439 0.5299879 -1.33 0.186 -1.75789 0.347012 
OM 0.0852409 0.0371446 2.29 0.024 0.0114791 0.1590027 
Constant 1.506641 1.822262 0.83 0.410 -2.11201 5.125291 
Q90 
PER -0.0071596 0.062574 -0.11 0.909 -0.1314192 0.1170999 
ROA 1.546076 0.3907848 3.96 0.000 0.7700553 2.322098 
CR -1.15182 0.8386874 -1.37 0.173 -2.817287 0.5136469 
OM 0.0079584 0.1101241 0.07 0.943 -0.2107263 0.226643 
Constant 5.166477 5.250608 0.98 0.328 -5.260191 15.59314 
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******************* 
*1994. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 98 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.2359 1.0000    
ROA 0.8787 -0.1988 1.0000   
CR 0.0894 -0.0379 0.0578 1.0000  
OM 0.1316 -0.1820 0.1438 0.0852 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 98 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4952 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4969 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.6317 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.011509 0.0096936 -1.19 0.238 -0.0307586 0.0077405 
ROA 0.8452996 0.1576815 5.36 0.000 0.5321754 1.158424 
CR -0.5178399 0.5196055 -1.00 0.322 -1.549673 0.5139936 
OM -0.0247079 0.084079 -0.29 0.770 -0.1916722 0.1422564 
Constant 1.684571 1.659911 1.01 0.313 -1.611684 4.980826 
q50 
PER -0.0144947 0.0103873 -1.40 0.166 -0.0351218 0.0061325 
ROA 1.053884 0.1268482 8.31 0.000 0.8019884 1.305779 
CR -0.7064899 0.7638534 -0.92 0.357 -2.223351 0.8103716 
OM -0.013572 0.0425365 -0.32 0.750 -0.0980411 0.0708971 
Constant 4.078982 1.7143 2.38 0.019 0.6747212 7.483242 
Q90 
PER -0.0130712 0.0262417 -0.50 0.620 -0.0651821 0.0390397 
ROA 1.73161 0.3662361 4.73 0.000 1.004337 2.458882 
CR 0.8082198 1.049815 0.77 0.443 -1.276505 2.892944 
OM 0.0040799 0.1009708 0.04 0.968 -0.196428 0.2045879 
Constant 1.666022 2.897186 0.58 0.567 -4.087215 7.419259 
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******************* 
*1995. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 99 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.0287 1.0000    
ROA 0.7245 -0.1345 1.0000   
CR 0.1284 -0.0793 0.2545 1.0000  
OM 0.1896 -0.1686 0.2281 0.0284 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 99 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.2755 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3746 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5447 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0063682 0.0732909 -0.09 0.931 -0.1518889 0.1391525 
ROA 1.141715 0.5563995 2.05 0.043 0.0369705 2.246459 
CR -2.47549 2.007307 -1.23 0.221 6.461044 1.510065 
OM 0.0308001 0.265551 0.12 0.908 -0.4964577 0.5580579 
Constant 1.75334 11.31535 0.15 0.877 -20.71356 24.22024 
q50 
PER -0.0109907 0.0186697 -0.59 0.557 -0.480598 0.260785 
ROA 1.219554 0.2572625 4.74 0.000 0.7087529 1.730354 
CR -1.531479 0.9598325 -1.60 0.114 -3.437249 0.3742905 
OM 0.0033087 0.0593572 0.06 0.956 -0.1145464 0.1211639 
Constant 4.152521 2.365499 1.76 0.082 -0.5442329 8.849275 
Q90 
PER -0.0191018 0.0234405 -0.81 0.417 -0.0656435 0.02744 
ROA 1.548177 0.3240089 4.78 0.000 0.9048499 2.191504 
CR -0.7314109 1.793308 -0.41 0.684 -4.292067 2.829245 
OM 0.0725137 0.1227187 0.59 0.556 -0.1711473 0.3161746 
Constant 6.42102 2.971643 2.16 0.033 0.5207521 12.32129 
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******************* 
*1996. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 95 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.1849 1.0000    
ROA 0.5338 -0.1705 1.0000   
CR 0.0874 -0.0328 0.1610 1.0000  
OM 0.1385 -0.1275 0.0649 0.0849 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 95 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.0943 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3226 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5398 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0130261 0.0447899 -0.29 0.772 -0.102009 0.0759568 
ROA 0.0766606 0.6522722 0.12 0.907 -1.219192 1.372513 
CR 0.4404104 2.006255 0.22 0.827 -3.545365 4.426186 
OM 0.0252134 0.2382545 0.11 0.916 -0.4481209 0.4985476 
Constant 1.175239 6.560711 0.18 0.858 -11.85876 14.20924 
q50 
PER -0.0264303 0.0203947 -1.30 0.198 -0.0669479 0.140872 
ROA 1.10315 0.2771368 3.98 0.000 0.5525696 1.653731 
CR -0.3898602 0.7705484 -0.51 0.614 -1.920689 1.140969 
OM 0.0042398 0.101516 0.04 0.967 -0.1974393 0.205919 
Constant 4.200651 2.379657 1.77 0.081 -0.5269536 8.928256 
Q90 
PER -0.0235073 0.0217859 -1.08 0.283 -0.0667888 0.0197742 
ROA 1.697861 0.3489703 4.87 0.000 1.004571 2.391152 
CR 0.5156717 1.452473 0.36 0.723 -2.369919 3.401262 
OM -0.0197103 0.093705 -0.21 0.834 -0.2058717 0.1664511 
Constant 5.455187 3.40044 1.60 0.112 -1.30038 12.21075 
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******************* 
*1997. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 91 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0903 1.0000    
ROA 0.4342 0.0789 1.0000   
CR 0.1274 -0.0452 0.3993 1.0000  
OM 0.0376 -0.0411 0.1180 -0.0389 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 91 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.1325 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.1808 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.2371 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.6410945 1.197047 0.54 0.594 -1.738557 3.020746 
ROA 5.788514 6.329198 0.91 0.363 -6.793515 18.37054 
CR -4.522945 10.42133 -0.43 0.665 -25.23987 16.19398 
OM 0.015829 2.063519 0.01 0.994 -4.086311 4.117969 
Constant -115.7812 193.1159 -0.60 0.550 -499.6829 268.1204 
q50 
PER 0.0556351 0.073619 0.76 0.452 -0.0907146 0.2019847 
ROA 2.833436 0.5122787 5.53 0.000 1.81506 3.851812 
CR -2.216624 2.359703 -0.94 0.350 -6.907558 2.474311 
OM -0.0076333 0.1401406 -0.05 0.957 -0.2862236 0.270957 
Constant -6.067991 4.149158 -1.46 0.147 -14.31624 2.180261 
Q90 
PER -0.0217031 0.1759827 -0.12 0.902 -0.3715451 0.3281388 
ROA 3.259906 2.257263 1.44 0.152 -1.227384 7.747196 
CR -0.3151284 5.09817 -0.06 0.951 -10.44996 9.819699 
OM -0.0139727 0.3956726 -0.04 0.972 -0.8005438 0.7725983 
Constant 2.725727 29.24386 0.09 0.926 -55.40915 60.8606 
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******************* 
*1998. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 83 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0424 1.0000    
ROA 0.1223 0.1223 1.0000   
CR 0.0334 0.0380 0.3153 1.0000  
OM -0.0285 -0.0246 -0.1126 -0.0076 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 83 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.0462 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.0602 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.0703 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 1.706846 2.320077 0.74 0.464 -2.912072 6.325764 
ROA 0.6818995 5.728897 0.12 0.906 -10.72346 12.08726 
CR 16.14812 38.35764 0.42 0.675 -60.21607 92.51232 
OM -0.4057572 4.498131 -0.09 0.928 -9.360849 8.549334 
Constant -141.4442 167.2526 -0.85 0.400 -474.4185 191.5301 
q50 
PER 0.0234033 0.3022027 0.08 0.938 -0.578236 0.6250427 
ROA 1.716099 0.8212571 2.09 0.040 0.081102 3.351096 
CR 1.424734 5.798686 0.25 0.807 -10.11956 12.96903 
OM -0.4502444 0.3684723 -1.22 0.225 -1.183816 0.2833276 
Constant -3.400001 13.47943 -0.25 0.802 -30.23548 23.43547 
Q90 
PER -0.4499254 0.3136929 -1.43 0.155 -1.07444 0.1745892 
ROA 0.7633555 0.8632879 0.88 0.379 -0.9553186 2.48203 
CR 4.986147 4.705119 1.06 0.293 -4.381027 14.35332 
OM -0.4832769 0.314352 -1.54 0.128 -1.109104 0.1425499 
Constant 27.12549 9.852604 2.75 0.007 7.510463 46.74052 
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******************* 
*1999. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 90 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0098 1.0000    
ROA 0.4048 -0.0254 1.0000   
CR 0.0555 -0.0324 0.2088 1.0000  
OM -0.0454 -0.0049 -0.0949 -0.0466 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 83 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.1063 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.1538 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.0997 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0310103 0.1197875 0.26 0.796 -0.2071594 0.2691801 
ROA 2.194591 1.578938 1.39 0.168 -0.9447609 5.333942 
CR 1.526799 8.868953 0.17 0.864 -16.10705 19.16065 
OM 0.0009822 1.131585 0.00 0.999 -2.248913 2.250877 
Constant -63.11658 66.06625 -0.96 0.342 -194.474 68.24081 
q50 
PER -0.0008149 0.006475 -0.13 0.900 -0.0136891 0.0120592 
ROA 1.326911 0.2982866 4.45 0.000 0.7338376 1.919985 
CR -0.6557544 0.6829697 -0.96 0.340 -2.013681 0.7021723 
OM -0.019812 0.0528138 -0.38 0.708 -0.12482 0.085196 
Constant 2.791569 2.718978 1.03 0.307 -2.614488 8.197627 
Q90 
PER -0.0076141 0.0238747 -0.32 0.751 -0.0550834 0.398552 
ROA 3.307377 1.686903 1.96 0.053 -0.0466389 6.661392 
CR -2.130684 2.972961 -0.72 0.476 -8.041727 3.780359 
OM -0.021824 0.4864542 -0.04 0.964 -0.9890252 0.9453772 
Constant 14.81231 19.65473 0.75 0.453 -24.26655 53.89118 
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******************* 
*2000. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 87 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0355 1.0000    
ROA 0.1624 0.0372 1.0000   
CR 0.1163 0.1045 0.3809 1.0000  
OM 0.1365 -0.1677 0.1900 0.1614 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 87 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.0439 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.0933 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.0820 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.104519 1.172834 0.09 0.929 -2.228622 2.43766 
ROA 2.549063 4.161391 0.61 0.542 -5.72927 10.8274 
CR 0.1745472 22.72077 0.01 0.994 -45.0243 45.3734 
OM 2.417407 11.60265 0.21 0.835 -20.66397 25.49878 
Constant -128.9673 434.1268 -0.30 0.767 -992.5839 734.6492 
q50 
PER 0.0003304 0.0310066 0.01 0.992 -0.0613516 0.0620125 
ROA 1.268453 0.3046129 4.16 0.000 0.6624806 1.874425 
CR -0.2269411 0.7220281 -0.31 0.754 -1.663285 1.209403 
OM 0.0290287 0.2322944 0.12 0.901 -0.4330789 0.4911363 
Constant -1.141959 3.745719 -0.30 0.761 -8.593388 6.30947 
Q90 
PER -0.0188752 0.695016 -0.27 0.787 -0.1571361 0.1193857 
ROA 0.9253148 0.37239 2.48 0.015 0.1845125 1.666117 
CR -0.2125821 1.187519 -0.18 0.858 -2.574936 2.149772 
OM -0.4898163 0.4556483 -1.07 0.286 -1.396246 0.4166133 
Constant 22.38047 18.18911 1.23 0.222 -13.80347 58.5644 
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******************* 
*2001. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 86 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0396 1.0000    
ROA -0.1393 0.0282 1.0000   
CR 0.1014 0.0556 0.2177 1.0000  
OM 0.1786 -0.2391 0.1556 0.2764 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 86 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.1045 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.1059 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.1386 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.1499211 0.4864029 0.31 0.759 -0.8178681 1.11771 
ROA 1.197857 0.6112193 1.96 0.053 -0.0182773 2.413992 
CR 0.5251431 2.758226 0.19 0.849 -4.962861 6.013147 
OM 0.5361923 2.036637 0.26 0.793 -3.516076 4.58846 
Constant -34.02404 57.03263 -0.60 0.552 -147.5011 79.45301 
q50 
PER -0.0034855 0.0525368 -0.07 0.947 -0.1080172 0.1010462 
ROA 0.9534188 0.5014369 1.90 0.061 -0.0442835 1.951121 
CR -0.2854371 0.8517844 -0.34 0.738 -1.980221 1.409347 
OM 0.1559167 0.3112522 0.50 0.618 -0.4633776 0.7752109 
Constant 1.975372 3.838541 0.51 0.608 -5.66212 9.612865 
Q90 
PER -0.1040955 0.1943044 -0.54 0.594 -0.4907003 0.282092 
ROA -1.167392 1.222326 -0.96 0.342 -3.599437 1.264652 
CR -1.792343 4.72816 -0.38 0.706 -11.1999 7.615212 
OM 2.194699 1.334544 1.64 0.104 -0.4606246 4.850023 
Constant 25.91519 10.03601 2.58 0.012 5.946676 45.8837 
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******************* 
*2002. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 80 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.0730 1.0000    
ROA 0.7744 -0.0167 1.0000   
CR -0.0177 0.1472 0.0987 1.0000  
OM -0.1965 -0.0033 0.0206 0.2451 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 80 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.0650 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.0331 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.3136 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.159534 0.2544203 0.63 0.533 -0.3472972 0.6663652 
ROA 1.255421 0.7635055 1.64 0.104 -0.2655604 2.776402 
CR -0.4527297 1.622271 -0.28 0.781 -3.684459 2.779 
OM -0.1491045 0.6281644 -0.24 0.813 -1.400472 1.102263 
Constant -6.191306 10.56268 -0.59 0.560 -27.23324 14.85062 
q50 
PER 0.0295392 1.384637 0.02 0.983 -2.7288 2.787878 
ROA 1.750311 11.54358 0.15 0.880 -21.24568 24.7463 
CR -0.0488126 23.85832 -0.00 0.998 -47.57702 47.47939 
OM -0.0516988 3.425236 -0.02 0.998 -6.875119 6.771722 
Constant -1.403504 47.82781 -0.03 0.977 -96.68138 93.87437 
Q90 
PER -2.412444 7.298949 -0.33 0.742 -16.9527 12.12781 
ROA 36.78298 16.88243 2.18 0.032 3.151459 70.41449 
CR -1.401207 57.03272 -0.02 0.980 -115.0162 112.2138 
OM -10.55123 14.86676 -0.71 0.480 -40.16733 19.06487 
Constant 235.6599 490.9287 0.48 0.633 -7423203 1213.64 
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******************* 
*2003. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 79 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.0262 1.0000    
ROA -0.0528 -0.0489 1.0000   
CR -0.0549 0.1287 0.0408 1.0000  
OM -0.0385 0.1665 0.2386 -0.0226 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 79 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.1288 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.0745 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.0190 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0266277 0.0738212 0.36 0.719 -0.1204642 0.1737195 
ROA 0.9476324 0.2357239 4.02 0.000 0.4779423 1.417323 
CR 0.0436958 0.4588753 0.10 0.924 -0.8706332 0.9580247 
OM -0.0098714 0.1919662 -0.05 0.959 -0.3923723 0.3726296 
Constant -2.526655 4.28895 -0.59 0.558 -11.07257 6.019265 
q50 
PER 0.0395715 0.0506622 0.78 0.437 -0.0613751 0.1405181 
ROA 1.008193 0.1561626 6.46 0.000 0.6970325 1.319354 
CR -0.2672848 0.4399104 -0.61 0.545 -1.143825 0.6092559 
OM 0.0276157 0.0492827 0.56 0.577 -0.0705823 0.1258136 
Constant 2.727271 1.802991 1.51 0.135 -0.8652661 6.319809 
Q90 
PER -0.1423776 0.6043554 -0.24 0.814 -1.346582 1.061827 
ROA 0.8109663 1.809378 0.45 0.655 -2.794298 4.41623 
CR -0.6507845 4.076692 -0.16 0.874 -8.773772 7.472203 
OM -0.3111948 1.960625 -0.16 0.874 -4.217826 3.595436 
Constant 29.72342 136.7959 0.22 0.829 -242.8483 302.2952 
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******************* 
*2004. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 79 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0458 1.0000    
ROA 0.2831 -0.0773 1.0000   
CR 0.0556 0.0965 0.0637 1.0000  
OM 0.0428 0.1349 -0.0680 -0.0520 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 79 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.0877 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.1905 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4206 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0819574 0.6733856 0.12 0.903 -1.259793 1.423707 
ROA 1.53559 1.640084 0.94 0.352 -1.732349 4.80353 
CR 1.271709 10.24566 0.12 0.902 -19.14322 21.68664 
OM 0.0860181 0.3761866 0.23 0.820 -0.6635501 0.8355863 
Constant -29.87522 82.11506 -0.36 0.717 -193.4931 133.7426 
q50 
PER 0.0261952 0.0593892 0.44 0.660 -0.0921403 0.1445306 
ROA 1.4372 0.3746962 3.84 0.000 0.6906019 2.183799 
CR -0.2345567 0.663202 -0.35 0.725 -1.556015 1.086902 
OM 0.0185046 0.038458 0.48 0.632 -0.0581247 0.0951339 
Constant -2.042442 3.038565 -0.67 0.504 -8.096916 4.012031 
Q90 
PER -0.0025199 0.940042 -0.03 0.979 -0.1898273 0.1847876 
ROA 2.445988 0.6610586 3.70 0.000 1.1288 3.763176 
CR -0.5376469 1.708469 -0.31 0.754 -3.941846 2.866553 
OM 0.1354293 0.4464136 0.30 0.762 -0.7540692 1.024928 
Constant 1.49505 7.386678 0.20 0.840 -13.22323 16.21333 
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TABLE A.7.6 – Malaysia: Quantile Regression (1991-2004) 
 
******************* 
*1991. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 44 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.1870 1.0000    
ROA 0.7833 -0.1769 1.0000   
CR -0.0871 0.0183 0.1614 1.0000  
OM 0.0702 0.0700 0.1997 0.4081 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 44 
bootstrap(500) SEs                                  
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5080 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.5008 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4775 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0467867 0.084401 0.55 0.583 -0.1239304 0.2175039 
ROA 0.9300748 0.1391556 6.68 0.000 0.6486061 1.211543 
CR -0.9837039 1.604938 -0.61 0.543 -4.229998 2.26259 
OM -0.0161434 0.0971388 -0.17 0.869 -0.2126252 0.1803384 
Constant -0.1868306 4.389884 -0.04 0.966 -9.066209 8.692548 
q50 
PER -0.1216821 0.1099091 -1.11 0.275 -0.3439943 0.1006301 
ROA 0.8049312 0.2127527 3.78 0.001 0.3745982 1.235264 
CR -1.337793 1.942335 -0.69 0.495 -5.266537 2.59095 
OM -0.0168416 0.1077657 -0.16 0.877 -0.2348182 0.201135 
Constant 9.498083 5.245261 1.81 0.078 -1.111459 20.10763 
Q90 
PER -0.4100838 0.1530806 -2.68 0.011 -0.7197184 -0.1004491 
ROA 0.5384368 0.255882 2.10 0.042 0.0207767 1.055917 
CR -2.232077 1.93284 -1.15 0.255 -6.141614 1.67746 
OM 0.0236955 0.1751869 0.14 0.893 -0.3306534 0.3780445 
Constant 25.71183 6.199697 4.15 0.000 13.17176 38.25191 
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******************* 
*1992. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 50 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3395 1.0000    
ROA 0.7658 -0.1954 1.0000   
CR 0.1226 -0.1579 0.3608 1.0000  
OM 0.2420 -0.0832 0.2424 0.3051 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 50 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4770 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4562 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4771 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0107802 0.0760051 0.14 0.888 -0.1423019 0.1638622 
ROA 0.9670596 0.1878053 5.15 0.000 0.5888002 1.345319 
CR -0.7944157 0.8657379 -0.92 0.364 -2.538101 0.9492699 
OM 0.0889914 0.0813755 1.09 0.280 -0.0749072 0.2528901 
Constant -2.483506 3.200833 -0.78 0.442 -8.930314 3.963302 
q50 
PER -0.0309879 0.1134713 -0.27 0.786 -0.2595307 0.197555 
ROA 1.003443 0.1612197 6.22 0.000 0.6787296 1.328156 
CR -0.5551085 1.391195 -0.40 0.692 -3.357119 2.246902 
OM -0.0289388 0.1012294 -0.29 0.776 -0.2328253 0.1749477 
Constant 2.829758 4.781049 0.59 0.557 -6.79977 12.45929 
Q90 
PER -0.1882163 0.1152667 -1.63 0.109 -0.4203754 0.0439427 
ROA 0.7123107 0.1957938 3.64 0.001 0.3179618 1.10666 
CR -3.785003 1.519546 -2.49 0.016 -6.845526 -
0.7244796 
OM 0.0625246 0.171732 0.36 0.718 -0.2833614 0.4084106 
Constant 20.85016 4.619267 4.51 0.000 11.54648 30.15384 
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******************* 
*1993. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 50 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3549 1.0000    
ROA 0.7027 -0.1656 1.0000   
CR 0.1136 0.0027 0.4353 1.0000  
OM 0.2613 -0.1831 0.1002 0.0320 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs =  50 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5206 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4181 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5741 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0333286 0.0253449 -1.31 0.195 -0.0843759 0.0177187 
ROA 0.9962839 0.1070549 9.31 0.000 0.7806642 1.211904 
CR -1.171611 0.8327885 -1.41 0.166 -2.848933 0.5057114 
OM -0.1220494 0.0513817 -2.38 0.022 -0.2255376 -0.0185613 
Constant 4.302243 2.000998 2.15 0.037 0.2720275 8.332459 
q50 
PER -0.0361852 0.0615295 -0.59 0.559 -0.1601119 0.0877416 
ROA 1.085847 0.1620247 6.70 0.000 0.7595128 1.412182 
CR -1.508232 1.443498 -1.04 0.302 -4.415587 1.399122 
OM -0.0251254 0.1061864 -0.24 0.814 -0.2389957 0.1887449 
Constant 4.71035 3.925751 1.20 0.236 -3.196518 12.61722 
Q90 
PER -0.0809412 0.0683072 -1.18 0.242 -2.185189 0.0566365 
ROA 0.7751584 0.1544932 5.02 0.000 0.4639932 1.086324 
CR -2.352968 1.52994 -1.54 0.131 -5.434425 0.7284892 
OM 0.8086373 0.3992666 2.03 0.049 0.004473 1.612802 
Constant 6.795087 7.085916 0.96 0.343 -7.47668 21.06685 
 
 386 
******************* 
*1994. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 51 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3347 1.0000    
ROA 0.7065 -0.2422 1.0000   
CR -0.1916 0.2109 -0.0847 1.0000  
OM 0.4682 -0.2448 0.2464 -0.0570 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 51 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.3474 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4172 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.5838 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0543589 0.0609711 -0.89 0.377 -0.1770874 0.0683696 
ROA 0.2802527 0.3190204 0.88 0.384 -0.361902 0.9224073 
CR 0.1612775 1.005893 0.16 0.873 -1.86348 2.186035 
OM 0.0361037 0.1060798 0.34 0.735 -0.1774238 0.2496312 
Constant 4.852725 3.46553 1.40 0.168 -2.123026 11.82847 
q50 
PER -0.0034039 0.0730637 -0.05 0.963 -0.1504734 0.1436656 
ROA 0.9002654 0.2270685 3.96 0.000 0.4432001 1.357331 
CR -0.1959691 0.9874111 -0.20 0.844 -2.183524 1.791586 
OM 0.1894365 0.1244991 1.52 0.135 -0.0611672 0.4400401 
Constant 1.875733 4.055699 0.46 0.646 -6.287965 10.03943 
Q90 
PER -0.0148587 0.1267952 -0.12 0.907 -0.2700842 0.2403667 
ROA 0.6968922 0.1837853 3.79 0.000 0.3269515 1.066833 
CR -0.5226151 1.201841 -0.43 0.666 -2.941796 1.896566 
OM 0.4243428 0.1655986 2.56 0.014 0.0910102 0.7576754 
Constant 7.670388 5.357627 1.43 0.159 -3.113956 18.45473 
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******************* 
*1995. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 50 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3366 1.0000    
ROA 0.6606 -0.2201 1.0000   
CR 0.0512 -0.0037 0.2658 1.0000  
OM 0.3025 -0.5919 0.0780 -0.3595 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 50 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.3523 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3332 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.3757 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0905211 0.0847586 -1.07 0.291 -0.2612337 0.0801916 
ROA 0.3011917 0.2744727 1.10 0.278 -0.2516247 0.8540081 
CR -0.075276 0.9747661 -0.08 0.939 -2.038556 1.888004 
OM -0.0228058 0.1056252 -0.22 0.830 -0.2355459 0.1899343 
Constant 7.446242 4.622537 1.61 0.114 -1.864026 16.75651 
q50 
PER 0.0217616 0.1035868 0.21 0.835 -0.186873 0.2303961 
ROA 0.7817402 0.2785704 2.81 0.007 0.2206707 1.34281 
CR -0.1416331 1.426136 -0.10 0.921 -3.014018 2.730751 
OM 0.1341325 0.11202 1.20 0.237 -0.0914875 0.3597524 
Constant 2.798125 4.428089 0.63 0.531 -6.120504 11.71675 
Q90 
PER 0.1152332 0.2114734 0.54 0.589 -0.3106961 0.5411625 
ROA 0.9255465 0.2544522 3.64 0.001 0.4130534 1.43804 
CR -0.2382566 1.495577 -0.16 0.874 -3.250504 2.773991 
OM 0.4763854 0.2916043 1.63 0.109 -0.1109357 1.063707 
Constant 1.370173 10.48682 0.13 0.897 -19.75136 22.49171 
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******************* 
*1996. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3275 1.0000    
ROA 0.7020 -0.1710 1.0000   
CR 0.1860 0.0619 0.3674 1.0000  
OM 0.1132 -0.1089 0.1170 0.0564 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 52 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4248 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3591 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.3620 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0535423 0.048125 -1.11 0.272 -0.1503572 0.0432726 
ROA 0.3981114 0.231338 1.72 0.092 -0.0672806 0.8635035 
CR 0.8868946 0.9933746 0.89 0.377 -1.111517 2.885306 
OM 0.0589584 0.0700233 0.84 0.404 -0.0819102 0.199827 
Constant 2.756899 2.922204 0.94 0.350 -3.121817 8.635615 
q50 
PER -0.0265488 0.988074 -0.27 0.789 -0.2253236 0.1722259 
ROA 0.7992038 0.2140607 3.73 0.001 0.3685693 1.229838 
CR -0.8210728 1.079166 -0.76 0.451 -2.992075 1.34993 
OM -0.0077946 0.054819 -0.14 0.887 -0.1175992 0.10201 
Constant 8.623063 3.537295 2.44 0.019 1.506944 15.73918 
Q90 
PER -0.1163082 0.1748637 -0.67 0.509 -0.4680886 0.2354721 
ROA 0.6524591 0.2029688 3.21 0.002 0.2441385 1.06078 
CR -1.154367 1.118159 -1.03 0.307 -3.403813 1.095079 
OM -0.0287693 0.1078917 -0.27 0.791 -0.2458195 0.1882808 
Constant 20.99922 5.455491 3.85 0.000 10.02418 31.97425 
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******************* 
*1997. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.1759 1.0000    
ROA 0.6580 -0.1118 1.0000   
CR 0.1173 0.0095 0.3939 1.0000  
OM 0.1741 -0.0098 0.1013 0.0287 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 52 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4390 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3913 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.2827 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0001544 0.0905836 -0.00 0.999 -0.1823851 0.1820763 
ROA 0.6648176 0.3080491 2.16 0.036 0.0451027 1.284533 
CR 1.205091 1.654187 0.73 0.470 -2.122704 4.532887 
OM 0.0606229 0.0882367 0.69 0.495 -0.1168864 0.2381323 
Constant -3.662638 2.32197 -1.58 0.121 -8.333839 1.008564 
q50 
PER -0.0007578 0.0458566 -0.02 0.987 -0.0930095 0.0914939 
ROA 1.025631 0.1990914 5.15 0.000 0.6251104 1.426151 
CR -1.726603 1.282664 -1.35 0.185 -4.306989 0.8537833 
OM -0.0046866 0.1165213 -0.04 0.968 -0.2390973 0.2297241 
Constant 6.118189 2.461015 2.49 0.017 1.167266 11.06911 
Q90 
PER -0.0021589 0.1726149 -0.01 0.990 -0.3494153 0.3450975 
ROA 1.878502 0.6540863 2.87 0.006 0.5626498 3.194353 
CR -4.50569 3.475711 -1.30 0.201 -11.49792 2.486539 
OM 0.573977 0.286621 2.00 0.051 -0.0026302 1.150584 
Constant 9.548947 8.381207 1.14 0.260 -7.311866 26.40976 
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******************* 
*1998. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 52 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0305 1.0000    
ROA 0.6276 0.1040 1.0000   
CR 0.2039 -0.0709 0.1738 1.0000  
OM 0.3959 0.1264 0.4825 0.0970 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs =        52 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 =    0.1669 
0.50 Pseudo R2 =    0.3041 
0.90 Pseudo R2 =    0.4829 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0454622 1.183095 -0.04 0.970 -2.425542 2.334618 
ROA 1.635452 3.097725 0.53 0.600 -4.596366 7.86727 
CR 1.298478 30.61507 0.04 0.966 -60.29111 62.88806 
OM 0.1869786 1.335542 0.14 0.889 -2.499785 2.873743 
Constant -19.50818 127.8388 -0.15 0.879 -276.6866 237.6703 
q50 
PER -0.0002485 0.0435735 -0.01 0.995 -0.087907 0.08741 
ROA 1.275848 0.3463486 3.68 0.001 0.5790847 1.972612 
CR -1.175978 1.349506 -0.87 0.388 -3.890835 1.538879 
OM 0.0111835 0.0907391 0.12 0.902 -0.1713601 0.1937271 
Constant 0.6899794 3.001833 0.23 0.819 -5.348929 6.728888 
Q90 
PER 0.0013744 0.0577524 0.02 0.981 -0.1148083 0.1175572 
ROA 1.646214 0.6143827 2.68 0.010 0.4102358 2.882193 
CR -1.443936 1.757382 -0.82 0.415 -4.979333 2.091462 
OM 0.0332407 0.1513632 0.22 0.827 -0.2712627 0.3377441 
Constant 5.314446 3.960029 1.34 0.186 -2.652105 13.281 
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******************* 
*1999. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 36 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3062 1.0000    
ROA 0.7447 -0.2988 1.0000   
CR -0.0165 -0.1813 0.0281 1.0000  
OM -0.0217 -0.0767 0.0180 0.1422 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 36 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5621 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4785 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4321 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0670371 0.0601742 -1.11 0.274 -0.1897633 0.055689 
ROA 0.8588792 0.1799057 4.77 0.000 0.491959 1.225799 
CR 0.2247465 0.8591785 0.26 0.795 -1.52756 1.977053 
OM 0.0198219 0.0527291 0.38 0.710 -0.0877197 0.1273636 
Constant 1.548543 3.137014 0.49 0.625 -4.84944 7.946525 
q50 
PER -0.0503356 0.0737996 -0.68 0.500 -0.2008508 0.1001796 
ROA 0.8997056 0.2734965 3.29 0.003 0.3419058 1.457505 
CR 0.1851345 1.064961 0.17 0.863 -1.986869 2.357138 
OM -0.0376217 0.0778025 -0.48 0.632 -0.193009 0.1210576 
Constant 6.556627 3.96213 1.65 0.108 -1.524191 14.63744 
Q90 
PER -0.1448759 0.3230653 -0.45 0.657 -0.8037718 0.5140201 
ROA 0.9277215 1.152233 0.81 0.427 -1.422273 3.277716 
CR -0.045789 3.012366 -0.02 0.988 -6.18955 6.097972 
OM -0.10462 0.2117539 -0.05 0.961 -0.4423369 0.421413 
Constant 16.42166 9.358414 1.75 0.089 -2.664951 35.50827 
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******************* 
*2000. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 44 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.2328 1.0000    
ROA 0.6924 -0.2318 1.0000   
CR -0.0638 -0.1296 0.1855 1.0000  
OM -0.0096 -0.0553 0.1242 0.2215 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 44 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.2762 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3550 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4721 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0078052 0.0588567 0.13 0.895 -0.1112438 0.1268541 
ROA 1.058766 0.2835004 3.73 0.001 0.4853328 1.6322 
CR -3.807953 2.024923 -1.88 0.068 -7.903746 0.2878399 
OM -0.2341061 0.134152 -1.75 0.089 -0.5054541 0.0372419 
Constant 9.146941 6.941506 1.32 0.195 -4.893581 23.18746 
q50 
PER -0.0026894 0.670298 -0.04 0.968 -0.1382699 0.1328911 
ROA 1.045255 0.2758682 3.79 0.001 0.4872585 1.603251 
CR -0.6877268 1.238658 -0.56 0.582 3.193149 1.817695 
OM 0.0166219 0.0675334 0.25 0.807 -0.1199773 0.1532211 
Constant 1.462311 6.001678 0.27 0.786 -10.49723 13.78185 
Q90 
PER -0.0446521 0.1221937 -0.37 0.717 -0.2918122 0.202508 
ROA 1.579292 0.3943668 4.00 0.000 0.7816103 2.376974 
CR -0.3063402 1.415579 -0.22 0.830 -3.169619 2.556939 
OM -0.1540183 0.1188745 -1.30 0.203 -0.3944645 0.086428 
Constant 13.36504 6.070756 2.20 0.034 1.085772 25.6443 
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******************* 
*2001. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 39 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3300 1.0000    
ROA 0.7881 -0.3374 1.0000   
CR -0.1219 -0.1521 0.1129 1.0000  
OM -0.1531 -0.0396 -0.0874 0.0273 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 39 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5600 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.5007 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.4670 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.0179914 0.0385287 0.47 0.644 -0.0603084 0.962911 
ROA 1.01073 0.1740966 5.81 0.000 0.6569232 1.364537 
CR -0.4180188 0.7054421 -0.59 0.557 -1.85165 1.105612 
OM -0.0032182 0.0616828 -0.05 0.959 -0.1285726 0.1221362 
Constant -0.8876494 3.193436 -0.28 0.783 -7.377492 5.602194 
q50 
PER -0.0206485 0.0628982 -0.33 0.745 -0.148473 0.107176 
ROA 1.158152 0.1981263 5.85 0.000 0.755108 1.560793 
CR -0.3885447 0.9298872 -0.42 0.679 -2.278303 1.501213 
OM -0.0235821 0.0643316 -0.37 0.716 -0.1543197 0.1071554 
Constant 2.33528 5.34854 0.44 0.665 -8.534261 13.20482 
Q90 
PER -0.1354292 0.1236981 -1.09 0.281 -0.386814 0.1159557 
ROA 1.651924 0.5411921 3.05 0.004 0.5520898 2.751759 
CR -3.243725 1.556175 -2.08 0.045 -6.406254 -
0.0811957 
OM -0.103176 0.1242322 -0.83 0.412 -0.3556463 0.1492943 
Constant 18.50657 9.599455 1.93 0.062 -1.001872 38.01501 
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******************* 
*2002. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 39 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.2644 1.0000    
ROA 0.6868 -0.3119 1.0000   
CR -0.0871 -0.1341 -0.1363 1.0000  
OM -0.1942 0.1530 -0.1104 0.0665 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 39 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.5197 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.3139 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.3462 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0232453 0.0337939 -0.69 0.496 -0.0919227 0.0454321 
ROA 0.84371 0.1725081 4.89 0.000 0.4931314 1.194289 
CR -0.2852261 0.6706119 -0.43 0.673 -1.648073 1.077621 
OM -0.000763 0.0543437 -0.01 0.989 -0.1112026 0.1096766 
Constant 1.061852 2.230858 0.48 0.637 -3.471797 5.5955 
q50 
PER -0.0068351 0.0517904 -0.13 0.896 -0.1120858 0.0984157 
ROA 1.036684 0.2987518 3.47 0.001 0.4295476 1.643821 
CR 0.2700574 0.9288492 0.29 0.773 -1.617591 2.157706 
OM 0.0050327 0.0809202 0.06 0.951 -0.159417 0.1694823 
Constant 0.1924754 4.409108 0.04 0.965 -8.767911 9.152861 
Q90 
PER 0.0324131 0.1812144 0.18 0.859 -0.3358589 0.4006852 
ROA 1.795414 0.7749286 2.32 0.027 0.2205693 3.370258 
CR 0.2397151 1.788319 0.13 0.894 -3.394586 3.874016 
OM -0.175952 0.1485666 -1.18 0.244 -0.4778755 0.1259716 
Constant 7.53369 10.0338 0.75 0.458 -12.85745 27.92483 
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******************* 
*2003. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 46 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER -0.3061 1.0000    
ROA 0.7623 -0.2794 1.0000   
CR -0.0431 0.0708 0.1021 1.0000  
OM 0.0430 -0.0779 0.1015 0.2148 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 46 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.6167 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4033 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.3142 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER -0.0021023 0.0312082 -0.07 0.947 -0.0651286 0.0609241 
ROA 0.9260369 0.1416967 6.54 0.000 0.6398746 1.212199 
CR -0.2722797 0.4947561 -0.55 0.585 -1.27146 0.7269005 
OM 0.0245094 0.0418304 0.59 0.561 -0.0599689 0.1089876 
Constant -1.150296 1.83937 -0.63 0.535 -4.864979 2.564386 
q50 
PER -0.0050991 0.0299043 -0.17 0.865 -0.0654921 0.0552938 
ROA 1.107933 0.2146968 5.16 0.000 0.6743439 1.541522 
CR -3.862191 0.712338 -0.54 0.591 -1.824815 1.052377 
OM 0.0090087 0.0579693 0.16 0.877 -0.1080627 0.1260801 
Constant 1.348404 2.593864 0.52 0.606 -3.89001 6.586818 
Q90 
PER -0.0226956 0.1504765 -0.15 0.881 -0.3265891 0.2811978 
ROA 0.8790437 0.5154235 1.71 0.096 -0.1618751 1.919962 
CR -0.5950326 1.693294 -0.35 0.727 -4.014709 2.824644 
OM -0.0175308 0.1524161 -0.12 0.909 -0.3253413 0.2902798 
Constant 10.544 6.19032 1.70 0.096 -1.957602 23.04561 
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******************* 
*2004. 
******************* 
 
CORRELATION 
Observations: 32 
 
 ROE PER ROA CR OM 
ROE 1.0000     
PER 0.0040 1.0000    
ROA 0.8186 -0.0299 1.0000   
CR -0.0996 -0.1216 0.1734 1.0000  
OM -0.1539 -0.2353 -0.0363 0.2651 1.0000 
 
SQREG 
Simultaneous quantile regression 
Number of obs = 32 
bootstrap(500) SEs 
0.10 Pseudo R2 = 0.4018 
0.50 Pseudo R2 = 0.4114 
0.90 Pseudo R2 = 0.6223 
ROE Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
q10 
PER 0.336687 0.2102517 1.60 0.121 -0.0947139 0.7680878 
ROA 1.221546 0.2734503 4.47 0.000 0.6604721 1.782619 
CR -1.198597 1.245764 -0.96 0.345 -3.754693 1.357499 
OM 0.0972455 0.0862984 1.13 0.270 -0.0798243 0.2743152 
Constant -7.550435 6.256172 -1.21 0.238 -20.38704 5.28617 
q50 
PER -0.056939 0.2804201 -0.20 0.841 -0.6323135 0.5184356 
ROA 1.135184 0.3273438 3.47 0.002 0.4635298 1.806838 
CR -2.251108 1.605158 -1.40 0.172 -5.544622 1.042405 
OM -0.0739856 0.1021257 -0.72 0.475 -0.2835301 0.135559 
Constant 11.61983 7.212324 1.61 0.119 -3.178633 26.4183 
Q90 
PER 0.1316961 0.5477262 0.24 0.812 -0.9921452 1.255537 
ROA 1.37739 0.3787355 3.64 0.001 0.6002893 2.154491 
CR -2.595066 2.044692 -1.27 0.215 -6.790428 1.600295 
OM 0.0311312 0.1471724 0.21 0.834 -0.2708416 0.3331041 
Constant 14.66006 11.76546 1.25 0.223 -9.480674 38.80079 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation analyses the policies adopted by Indonesia and Malaysia during and 
shortly after the East Asian Crisis in 1997/98. The authors give a short overview over the 
long period of growth in East Asia and the factors leading to the Crisis. Furthermore, the 
dissertation compares in detail the so-called ‚orthodox’ policies applied by Indonesia vs. 
the ‚unorthodox’ policies applied by Malaysia using qualtitative analyses e.g. corporate 
governance, and quantitative analyses e.g. indicator analysis, difference-in-difference 
analysis, ordered logistic regression and quantile regression of the macroeconomy and on 
a corporate level.  
The goal of this study is to show that countries have at disposal ‘orthodox’ as well as 
‘unorthodox’ policies in a crisis situation. Furthermore, this dissertation should show that 
the selection of economic policies should consider the circumstances leading to a crisis and 
the possible threats and benefits of the various policy choices. This is done by analyzing 
the policies used during a third-generation crisis on the succesful example of Malaysia and 
the less successful example of Indonesia. 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation analysiert die Wirtschaftspolitiken welche von Indonesien und Malaysia 
während und kurz nach der Ostasienkrise 1997/98 angewandt wurden. Die Autorin gibt 
einen kurzen Überblick über die lange Wirtschaftswachstumsphase in Ostasien und den 
Faktoren welche zur Krise geführt haben. Weiters vergleicht die Dissertation detailliert die 
sogenannten „orthodoxen“ Wirtschaftspolitiken welche von Indonesien angewandt wurden 
mit den „unorthodoxen“ Wirtschaftspolitiken welche von Malaysia angewandt wurden 
unter Anwendung von qualitativen Analysen (zB Corporate Governance) und quantitativen 
Analysen (zB Indikatoranalyse, difference-in-difference Analyse, Ordered logistische 
Regression und Quantile Regression) auf makroökonomischer Ebene und auf 
Unternehmensebene. 
Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es zu zeigen, dass Staaten sowohl „orthodoxe“ als auch 
„unorthodoxe“ Politiken in Krisensituationen zur Verfügung haben. Weiters soll die 
Dissertation zeigen, dass die Auswahl der Wirtschaftspolitiken die Umstände, welche zu 
einer Krise führen und die möglichen positiven und negativen Folgen der verschiedenen 
Wirtschaftspolitikmöglichkeiten, betrachtet werden sollten. Dies wird anhand einer Analyse 
der angewandten Politiken während einer sog. „thrid-generation“ Krise des erfolgreichen 
Beispiels Malaysias und des weniger erfolgreichen Beispiels Indonesiens aufgezeigt.  
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